

## DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

Theological and sociological aspects of the practice of zakāt  
**a case-study of Qatar 2017-2020**

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# **Theological and Sociological Aspects of the Practice of *Zakāt***

**A case-study of Qatar 2017-2020**



**By**

**Ola Alkahlout**

**Your Award (PhD)**

**August 2021**

# **Theological and Sociological Aspects of the Practice of *Zakāt***

**A case-study of Qatar 2017-2020**

**By**

**Ola Alkahlout**

***A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the University's  
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy***

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## **Certificate of Ethical Approval**

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Ola Alkahlout

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An Exploration of Zakat's Modern Philosophy and its Application in Peacebuilding.  
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## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this thesis to my late mother, Salma Al-Jedi, whose dearest wish was that I continue my studies and share my knowledge with others, as she did before me.

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## ABSTRACT

This thesis makes an original contribution to the literature on the sociology of Islām, and in particular, to the practice of *zakāt*. Its attention to the lived experience of Muslims in Qatar provides a window onto the motivations and actions of individual *zakāt*-givers and their relationship with religion and wider society.

Through a combination of surveys and interviews the research participants (both Qatari citizens and residents) reveal how the practice of *zakāt* is shaped by religious motivations, tribalism, different cultural backgrounds, Muslim scholars' interpretations, governmental and non-governmental charitable organisations' behaviour, and political intervention. The findings suggest that, Qatari *zakāt*-givers' decision-making is influenced by their relationship with *Allah*, their self-evaluation, and their consideration of society as a whole. Qatari *zakāt*-givers' lived religious experiences are reflected in their choices: practice, denial, avoidance, or ignorance (ignoring) *zakāt*. The important and distinctive contribution of this research is its attention to lived experiences. It demonstrates that both theological and sociological influences shape the motivations that inform individual decision-making regarding the practice of *zakāt*. This research develops a model that privileges everyday experiences of theologically-determined religious the practice of *zakāt*. This model can be used to study additional aspects of Islām in other geographical contexts. To complete the understanding of the lived experiences of *zakāt* in Qatar, and to strengthen the practice of *zakāt*, further complementary studies are required, which focus not only on the *zakāt*-givers but also on the lived experience of beneficiaries.



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## **LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS**

ARC	Qatar Foundation Annual Research Conference.
ATM	An Automated Teller Machine.
AWQAFM	Ministry of Awqaf and Islamic Affairs.
BOS	Bristol Online Survey.
CSO	Civil Society Organisation.
DIFI	Doha International Family Institute.
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council.
HBKU	Hamad Bin Khalifa University.
ICRS	International Centre for Research and Studies.
LNG	Liquefied Natural Gas.
MCS	Ministry of Culture and Sports.
MDPS	Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics.
NBK	Nasser Bin Khaled Al Thani Charitable Foundation.
NGO	A Non-governmental Organisation.
OPEC	The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries.
PPC	Permanent Population Committee.
QIA	Qatar Investment Authority.
QNL	Qatar National Library.
QNV	Qatar National Vision.
QRC	Qatar Red Crescent.
RAF	The Foundation Sheikh Thani Ibn Abdullah for Humanitarian Services.
RACA	Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities.
SMS	Short Message Service.
SPA	Saudi Press Agency.
SPSS	Statistical Package for the Social Sciences.
TPQ	Turkish Policy Quarterly.
UAE	United Arab Emirates.
WHO	World Health Organisation.

## Notes on translation and transliteration:

Translations of verses of the Qur'ān are from A.S Maududi (2007) *Towards Understanding the Quran*. trans. by I. Z. Ansari, U.K.: Islamic Foundation UK. [online] available from <http://www.Islamicstudies.info/tafheem.php> [accessed 26/12/2020]

The majority of translations of the *Ḥadīth* are from <https://sunnah.com/> [accessed 26/06/2020] (for other sources, please see the bibliography).

The transliteration of Arabic words is according to: <https://www.cambridge.org/core/services/aop-file-manager/file/57d83390f6ea5a022234b400/TransChart.pdf> [accessed 07/10/2020]

Quotations and excerpts from books and articles originally in Arabic have been translated by the researcher for the purposes of this study.

## GLOSSARY

<i>Allah</i>	Arabic word for God.
<i>Al-Tawaqquf wa al-Tabayyun</i>	One of the sects of Kharijites, <i>Sunnah</i> Muslims.
<i>Al-Qā'idah</i>	A transnational extremist Salafist militant organisation founded in 1988 by Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam, and several other Arab volunteers during the Soviet–Afghan War.
<i>ʿAqīqah</i>	Sacrificial animals for the new-born.
<i>ʿAsabiyyah</i>	Social solidarity (originally in context of tribalism).
<i>As-salāmu ʿalaykum</i>	Peace be upon you.
<i>Banū Hāshim</i>	Tribe in Saudi Arabia.
<i>Dār Al-ʿIfṭāʾ</i>	Egyptian Islāmic advisory, judicial, and governmental body.
<i>Dāʾish</i>	The Islāmic State of Iraq and Syria.
<i>Dhawi al-qurba</i>	Close relatives.
<i>Dhimmī</i>	A free, non-Muslim who is protected by a treaty of surrender under Islāmic law.
<i>Dirham</i>	A currency in several Arab states.
<i>Eīd al-Aḍḥā</i>	Last of two Islāmic holidays celebrated worldwide each year (considered the holier of the two).

<i>Eīd al-Fiṭr</i>	Festival after breaking the fast of <i>Ramaḍān</i> .
<i>Fī Al-Riqāb</i>	One of the categories of <i>zakāt</i> -beneficiaries.
<i>Fī Sabīlillāh</i>	Working purely for the sake of <i>Allah</i> .
<i>Fidyah</i>	Ransom.
<i>Fiqh</i>	Religious jurisprudence.
<i>Ḥadīth</i>	Narration or tradition according to the Prophet.
<i>Ḥajj</i>	Islāmic pilgrimage.
<i>Ḥalāl</i>	Lawful or permitted.
<i>Ḥanaḥī or Ḥanaḥīyyah</i>	One of the four traditional <i>Sunnah</i> Schools of Islāmic jurisprudence.
<i>Ḥanbalī or Ḥanbalīyyah</i>	One of the four traditional <i>Sunnah</i> schools of Islāmic jurisprudence.
<i>Hijrī</i>	Islāmic year.
<i>Ibn al-sabīl</i>	Traveller.
<i>‘Iftā’ or Fatwā (pl. Fatawā)</i>	Verdict; Islāmic religious ruling.
<i>Ijmā’</i>	Consensus between Muslim scholars.
<i>Imām or Sheikh</i>	One who leads Islāmic prayers.
<i>Islām</i>	Arabic meaning ‘surrender’ or ‘submission to the will of <i>Allah</i> ’.
<i>Ja‘farī</i>	School of jurisprudence in <i>Twelver Shī‘ah</i> Islām.
<i>Jannah</i>	Heaven or Paradise.
<i>Jihād</i>	Struggle; striving; or fighting for the cause of <i>Allah</i> .
<i>Jumu‘ah</i>	The congregational worship performed on Fridays in place of the midday worship.
<i>Kaffārah</i>	Expiatory; atonement.
<i>Khums doctrine.</i>	One-fifth obligatory tax-like charity in <i>Shī‘ah</i>
<i>Kuttāb</i>	Lineage groups.
<i>Madīnah</i>	Holy city in Saudi Arabia.
<i>Majlis</i>	Council.
<i>Makkah</i>	Holy city in Saudi Arabia.

<i>Mālikī</i> or <i>Mālikiyyah</i>	One of the four traditional <i>Sunnah</i> Schools of Islāmic jurisprudence.
<i>Muhammad</i>	The Prophet and righteous person believed by Muslims to be the final messenger of <i>Allah</i> .
<i>Maqāṣid Al-sharī‘ah</i>	Goals or objectives of <i>Sharī‘ah</i> ; Islāmic legal doctrine.
<i>Muftī</i>	Jurisprudence.
<i>Mujāhid</i>	A Muslim engaged in what he or she considers to be a personal <i>jihād</i> or personal struggle; struggle in the path of <i>Allah</i> .
<i>Mujāhidīn</i>	A Muslim engaged in what he or she considers to be a personal <i>jihād</i> or personal struggle; struggle in the path of <i>Allah</i> .
<i>Nadhr</i>	Vow.
<i>Niṣāb</i>	Wealth threshold; calculated at 2.5% of wealth subject to <i>zakāt</i> .
<i>Qarḍ Haṣan</i>	Interest-free loan.
<i>Qiyās Al- ‘Ulamā’</i>	Analogical deduction to find common cause of a problem which did not exist in the era of the Prophet and his Companions.
<i>Qur’ān</i>	Central religious text of Islām.
<i>Ramaḍān</i>	Ninth and holiest month of the Islāmic calendar; month of fasting.
<i>Ribā</i>	Usury, interest.
<i>Riddah</i>	Commonly defined as conscious abandonment of Islām by a Muslim in word or deed.
<i>Riyal</i>	Qatari currency.
<i>Ṣadaqah</i> or <i>Sadaqa</i>	Voluntary charity.
<i>Ṣadaqat al-Fiṭr</i>	Mandatory charity given during <i>Ramaḍān</i> and the <i>Ēid al-Fiṭr</i> celebration.
<i>Ṣadaqah Jāriyah</i>	Continuous charity.
<i>Ṣadaqah Lillah</i>	Charity for <i>Allah</i> .
<i>Ṣadaqah Nāfilah</i>	Voluntary charity (optional; philanthropic giving).
<i>Ṣadaqah Wajibah</i>	Obligatory charity.

<i>Ṣalāḥ</i>	Obligatory Muslim prayers (second pillar of Islām).
<i>Sha‘bān</i>	The eighth month of the Islāmic calendar.
<i>Shāfi‘iyyah</i> or <i>Shafi‘ī</i>	One of the four traditional <i>Sunnah</i> schools of Islāmic jurisprudence.
<i>Sharī‘ah</i>	Islāmic rules and regulations.
<i>Shī‘ah</i> or <i>Shia</i>	Follower; refers to the followers of Ali, Prophet Muhammad’s cousin and son-in-law. Also known as <i>shi‘i</i> .
<i>Sunnah</i> or <i>Sunni</i>	Largest branch of Islām.
<i>Tafsīr</i>	Term used for a commentary of a text, specifically a holy text.
<i>Taqwā</i>	Piety.
<i>Uḍḥiyyah</i>	Sacrifice.
<i>‘Ummah</i>	Collective term for all Muslim communities.
<i>‘Umrah</i>	Islāmic pilgrimage to <i>Makkah</i> , undertaken any time of year.
<i>Wahhābism</i> or <i>Wahhabi</i>	Religious movement of Islām developed in Saudi Arabia in 18th century.
<i>Waqf</i> (pl. <i>‘Awqāf</i> )	Endowment.
<i>Wizārat Al-Ma‘ārif</i>	Ministry of Education in Qatar.
<i>Zakāt</i>	Obligatory Muslim charity (third pillar of Islām.)
<i>Zaydī</i>	One of the <i>Shī‘ah</i> sects theologically closest to the <i>Ibadi</i> and <i>Mutazila</i> Schools.
<i>Zuhur</i>	The obligatory prayer for Muslims, performed in the afternoon, directly after the sun moves away from its zenith.

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# CHAPTER ONE

## Introduction

### 1.0. Setting the Scene

*Zakāt* is one of the most important forms of charity in Islām; in fact, *zakāt* is mentioned thirty times in the Qur’ān (Al-Qaradawi 1999). The Qur’ān states:

‘Establish Prayer and dispense *Zakah* (the Purifying Alms) and bow in worship with those who bow’ (*Al-Baqara*, 2: 43).<sup>1</sup>

Prophet Muhammad says it is a valued component of the Five Pillars of Islām. The *Ḥadīth* also cites *zakāt*. Ibn ‘Umar reported: The Prophet said, ‘(The structure of) Islam is built on five (pillars): [...], the establishment of *Salat* (prayer), and the payment of *Zakat* (obligatory charity) [...]

’ (*Al-Bukhari and Muslim Book 8: Hadith 216*). The Qur’ān and the *Ḥadīth* have continued to be influential since 1400 CE: the majority of practising Muslims believe in the obligation, and a number of Muslims are keen to practise *zakāt*. The practice of *zakāt* has functioned differently in the various sectors - personal, public, and voluntary - by directly or indirectly being under government administration, attracting attention from charitable organisations, and having individual applications as a religious duty. The researcher noticed this wide interest in *zakāt* during the course of her life in both majority and minority Muslim societies such as in Qatar and Britain.

*Zakāt* in *Sharī‘ah* (Islāmic law), according to the *Ḥanbalī* school, refers to a certain share of wealth to be given according to defined categories at specific times (Al-Hijjawi n.d: 242). Muslims pay their *zakāt* by following the eight categories of beneficiaries mentioned in the Qur’ān (*At-Tauba*, 9: 60): ‘the poor,’ ‘the needy,’ ‘the alms collectors and administrators,’ ‘for the reconciliation of hearts,’ ‘people in bondage or slavery,’ ‘people burdened with debt,’ ‘for the cause of *Allah*’, and ‘the wayfarer or stranded traveller’ (Al-Qaradawi 1999: 340). The practice of *zakāt* has been influenced by various interpretations of the Qur’ān and *Ḥadīth*. These interpretations have not only differed among schools of Islāmic thinking and religious practices in Muslim societies: many practices in the twenty-first century, such as Internet

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<sup>1</sup> Maududi, A. S. (2007) *Towards Understanding the Quran*. trans. by Ansari, I. Z. UK: Islamic Foundation UK. [online] available from <<http://www.islamicstudies.info/tafheem.php?>> [accessed 26 December 2020]

commerce, differed from practices implemented during the Prophet's time, 1,400 year ago. There are implications, therefore, for the practice of *zakāt* according to the traditional and modern (contemporary) applications.<sup>2</sup> The theological and sociological influences have roles in determining the motivations that inform individual decision-making for the practice of *zakāt*.

Economists and researchers such as Abdul-Rauf (1979), Asutay (2007), Atia (2011), Ammania, Abbab, and Dandagoc (2014), and Khaleel (2016) agree that *zakāt* is considered to be the backbone of the Islāmic economy due to the important role it plays in Muslim societies through the concepts of 'return gift' and 'redistribution of wealth' benefits.<sup>3</sup> Muizzuddin and Ridzuan (2015) and Stirk (2015) claim, furthermore, that the estimated amount of *zakāt* funds has the potential of being, at the very least, in the tens of billions of dollars each year. Muizzuddin and Ridzuan, Stirk, as well as many Muslim scholars, economists, and researchers such as Al-Qaradaghi, Kahf, Guermat, Al-Utaibi, and Tucker have stated that the announced figures of *zakāt* funds do not reflect the potential of *zakāt*. Al-Qaradawi (1999) explains the miserliness and the selfishness of the rich as individual behaviour, and not according to the tenets of Islām. Amuda and Che Embi (2013: 405) add that there are obstacles encountered by charity collection, particularly the lack of awareness or ignorance of its purposes. They posit that Muslim scholars have failed to educate Muslims about the concept of charity. Atia (2011) agrees, and states that *zakāt* receives less consideration than the other pillars of Islām. Amuda and Che Embi (2013: 405) suggest that the administration of charitable organisations also affects the application of *zakāt*. There has been an increase in the work of charitable organisations in the last twenty years, represented by the spread of offices, seminars, conferences, advertisements for projects, and humanitarian campaigns.

The practice of *zakāt* has also been manipulated by political intervention since the death of the Prophet.<sup>4</sup> *Zakāt* has played an important political role in history; for example, the '*Ridda*

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<sup>2</sup> Traditional and Modern does not relate to time periods, instead it relates to Islāmic methodologies for interpreting and applying theological ideas. Traditional or classical jurists who reject the rationalist or modern Islāmic theology in favour of strict textualism, which is written in the Qur'ān and mentioned in the *Hadīth* (Halverson 2010). The modern jurists who extend the meaning of the application of *zakāt* in contemporary times. The modern (contemporary) interpretation is not different from, or in competition with, the traditional interpretation – it is merely an extension. See Chapter Three: Table 3.1: *Zakāt* application according to traditional and modern Islāmic schools.

<sup>3</sup> 'Return gift' and 'redistribution of wealth' roles are switched between two individuals: the beneficiary becomes the donor through his or her work production, while the initial donor becomes a receiver, because the beneficiary spends his or her money in the community. The beneficiary consequently actively engages in the economic cycle, boosting the market that will, in turn, benefit the rich (Kochuyt: 2009). See Chapter Two: *Zakāt's* Methodology: Givers and Beneficiaries According to Sociology of Islām Approach.

<sup>4</sup> The general meaning of the word 'politics' has many definitions. This research is concerned with the meaning as 'The activities associated with the governance of a country or area, especially the debate between parties having power' (LEXICO 2021).

Wars'<sup>5</sup> between 632 and 633 CE emerged because of *zakāt*. Susetyo (2015: 519) presents *zakāt*'s management challenge in modern history from an Indonesian viewpoint, highlighting mismanagement of *zakāt*'s collection and disbursement strategies and policies.

The above-mentioned religious and social influences on the practice of *zakāt* in the twenty-first century have raised many questions during the course of this research (see section below 'Research Questions'). To answer these questions, this research is positioned within Sociology of Religion as its disciplinary framework, and is theoretically underpinned by lived religion as a framework for the research. This lived religion emphasis will allow the researcher to study everyday practices of *zakāt* in Qatar. By focusing on lived experiences of *zakāt* in Qatar in addition to theological understandings, this thesis aims to uncover the nuanced negotiations that ordinary people undertake around giving, taking, and administering *zakāt*. This research shows the enduring significance of theology in guiding everyday faith practices as well as the ways in which everyday practice departs from theology. This is discussed in detail in section 2.2 in the literature review chapter.

The sociology of religion, as one of the fields of social science, allows the study of the beliefs, practices, and organisational structures of religion by employing the tools and methods of the discipline of sociology (Johnstone 2016).<sup>6</sup> *Zakāt* is part of Islāmic religious law (*Sharī'ah*), and therefore, the research also focuses on both the sociology of Islām, a field within sociology of religion, and Islāmic society in relation to *zakāt*. The social phenomena of the practice of *zakāt* such as the lived experiences which are 'a representation and understanding of a researcher or research subject's human experience, choices and option and how those factors influence one's perception of knowledge' (Given 2008: 489). The representation of the lived experience of the 'subjects' interviewed in this research (Muslim citizens and residents in Qatar) regarding the practice of *zakāt* are viewed through the lens of this disciplinary framework.<sup>7</sup> The study of *zakāt* is dominated by theological or legalistic studies. The sociology of religion lens allows for the everyday lived experiences of *zakāt*, as practised by ordinary Muslims, to be included within the study of *zakāt*. The focus on sociology of religion, particularly sociology of Islām,

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<sup>5</sup> *Zakāt* was obligatory, and the ruler used to impose sanctions on those who refused to disburse their *zakāt* money. The first Caliph Abu Bakr declared a war on those Muslims who refused to pay *zakāt* called the 'Ridda Wars' (Hossain 2012: 3). See Chapter Three: The Reciprocal Effect of The Practice of *Zakāt* and Society.

<sup>6</sup> Social science deals with the relationship between society and human behaviour. Research into social science provides the means through which a process can be followed that would help to resolve the problems that exist in society (Ragin and Amoroso 2011; JHA 2014: 8).

<sup>7</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt*-Givers and Beneficiaries' Lived Experiences Between Belief and Practice.



and the lived religion of Islāmic society uses a combination of theories from the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth* in relation to *zakāt*.<sup>8</sup>

The Islāmic society 'consist[s] of a number of people in every place and at every time who are united by Islāmic belief and Divine Law, which regulate their relationships and their activities for the continuity and improvement of the society' (Saleh and Baqutayan 2012: 114). Religious Studies, on the other hand, help to understand why people believe what they do, and why they do what they do. The meaning of ethics, values, and morality are also important as they help to explain the relationships between believers and their communities, and how religion deals with politics, society, and culture (Dugbazah 2009; Phipps 2011; Haqqi 2015). This research investigates the attitudes and behaviour of *zakāt*-givers towards beneficiaries in the practice of *zakāt*, in an attempt to understand how they are integrated into religious beliefs. This investigation primarily focuses on the lived experiences of the givers; although an investigation into those of the beneficiaries would be useful, it is beyond the scope of this study. This investigation into the lived experiences of givers, will, furthermore, help to understand their practice of *zakāt*. The research also explores the lived experiences of human beings which often contradict the traditional approaches rooted in abstract generalisations and theories rather than education and instruction (Manen 1990).

To refine the approach, the study concentrates on the practice of *zakāt* in the context of the State of Qatar. This thesis explores the lived experiences of Qatari givers and beneficiaries, not solely as a religious commitment, but also to determine and understand the sociological meaning of their experiences (Anders and Astrid 2004; Waters 2016). The researcher aims to use the disciplinary approach of sociology of religion and the theoretical framework of lived experience, together with evidence from religious conduct and social behaviour, to analyse and discuss these phenomena regarding the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar.

Qatar is one of the Muslim-majority societies, and identifies itself as an Islāmic state; all the data collection was undertaken in Qatar. The Qatar context gives the researcher the opportunity to closely examine the practice of *zakāt* in that country between 2017 and 2020. Qatari society includes a considerable diversity of Muslims, both citizens and residents or non-citizens, cultures, tribal and urban societies; moreover, there is great wealth (ranked 41

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<sup>8</sup> Islām continually spreads in many countries. 20 per cent of the world's Muslims are in the Middle East-North Africa region, where the religion originated in the seventh century, and a majority of the Muslims globally (62 per cent) live in the Asia-Pacific region, including large populations in Indonesia, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Iran and Turkey (Lipka 2017).

according to *UNDP* 2019) and potential for *zakāt* in Qatar, making it a fertile source to investigate the factors affecting the practice of *zakāt*.

### 1.1. Qatar: Emerging Status

Qatar, the tiny Arab Gulf emirate with a population of 2,561,643 (*Qatari Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics* MDPS 2018) is considered a global ‘rising star’ due to its economic, social, educational, and environmental renaissance.<sup>9</sup> The Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) - the country’s sovereign wealth fund – for example, had over US\$355 billion in assets, making it one of the most active sovereign wealth funds in the world (Sergie 2017). Tok, Alkhater and Pal (2016: 1) highlight the country’s achievements in recent years: ‘Qatar has the world’s highest per capita GDP, the third largest reserve of natural gas, and is the largest exporter of liquefied natural gas (LNG)’. The GDP per capita in Qatar was last recorded at US\$63,222.10 in 2018 (*Trading Economics* 2019).

Qatar follows *Shari‘ah* and the principles of Islām according to the *Hanbali* school (*Hukoomi* 2018b), and the majority of the population is *Sunnah*. *Zakāt* receives considerable attention from the government, NGOs, and the Qatari people. *Zakat Fund* in 2014 stated that *zakāt*’s assets in Islāmic banks were approximately US\$42 billion (*Al-Jazeera* 2014). *Al-Raya* newspaper published an article in 2013, stating that, although it is difficult to accurately calculate *zakāt* funds, they were expected to be approximately four billion riyals (US\$1,098,901,098.90)<sup>10</sup>. What was collected through *Zakat Fund*, Qatari government, and charitable organisations was 170 million Qatari riyals (US\$46,703,296.70)<sup>11</sup> (*Dawam* 2013).<sup>12</sup>

During the course of this study (2017-2020), Qatar was under a blockade by neighbouring countries; despite the recent political instability in Qatar, mainly caused by the comprehensive embargo of neighbouring states, the revenue from the *zakāt* fund reached 164,215,305 million Qatari riyals (US\$45,064,720.70 million)<sup>13</sup> in just two months. The funds were gathered from citizens and residents placing donations in *zakāt* collection boxes and offices positioned throughout the country (Latibu 2016; *Hukoomi* 2018d; *Hukoomi* 2018e; *Qatar Charity* 2018). Al-Muftah (2016: 257) predicted: ‘[i]t is expected that the population of

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<sup>9</sup> See Chapter Four: Case Study: Qatar: Context Analysis.

<sup>10</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=4,000,000,000&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 12/01/2020]

<sup>11</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=170,000,000&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 12/01/2020]

<sup>12</sup> See Chapter Four: Qatar Charities: *Zakāt* Distributions Projects.

<sup>13</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=164%2C215%2C305&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 12/01/2020]

Qatar will continue to grow rapidly [up]to 2020, due to the enormous augmentation of the non-national labour force’. This suggests that the *zakāt* fund will also increase.

According to the disciplinary framework of the sociology of Islām, Qatar provides a significant case study for this research in which the lived experiences of individuals in Qatar can be examined in relation to the practice of *zakāt*. This examination will also be extended to other social interactions that affect the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar, such as charitable organisations, the influence of the Qatari government, and the impact of cultural diversity in Qatar on the practice of *zakāt*.

## **1.2. Rationale**

The researcher is originally from the Gaza Strip, part of Palestine, a Muslim-majority territory arguably similar to Qatar in that respect. Her upbringing in the impoverished Gaza Strip makes the researcher fully aware of the effects of poverty and the suffering it causes. A large number of the Gazan population is reliant on international aid (Elkahlout 2019). There are many charities in the Strip; some of them belong to individual donor foundations and others to faith-based, international, and national humanitarian organisations. Aid offered has remained insufficient for Gazans’ needs, particularly in areas of education, health, and livelihood, despite the extensive efforts of charities in Gaza. The researcher observed how *zakāt* was distributed among the members of society in the Gaza Strip. Through her lived experience there, religious and social motivations were one of the main reasons for Gazan *zakāt*-givers to donate, either from within or outside Palestine. The researcher monitored how *zakāt* beneficiaries were affected by conditional donations (individual preferences) or projects proposed by charitable organisations. Life in Gaza still faces the same problems which are represented in a continuous demand for aid. An increasing number of cases of *zakāt*-beneficiaries seek sustainable livelihoods rather than humanitarian aid during a crisis. The financial resources, and how they have been distributed, are in agreement with *Sharī‘ah* (Islāmic law).

The researcher was awarded her master’s degree in Islāmic banking, finance, and management. This covered the financial resources and their distribution according to *Sharī‘ah*, as well as Islāmic humanitarian donorship, its sources and destination, and the effective role of Islāmic humanitarianism in providing aid according to its modern and ancient history. She then worked with the ‘Islāmic Help’ charity organisation, whose strongest element was humanitarian aid, thus providing her a window into the charity’s Islāmic identity; she observed

that most of its wealth resulted from the religious motivation of donors. She also noted that significant amounts of money were being paid through obligations laid down by the Islāmic faith - *zakāt*, *ṣadaqah* (voluntary charity), and *waqf* (endowment). The donors were individuals, companies, and institutes. There were (and are) many humanitarian aid projects providing schools, health care, and the building of wells for poor families. She worked in the section concerning relations between donors and beneficiaries, and how they communicated with each other to ensure transparency and credibility for the organisation.

These three phases of the researcher's life - her upbringing, previous academic focus, and work in the charitable sector - motivated her to embark on this research. The researcher combined practical experience and theoretical study throughout these stages. The researcher co-existed with *zakāt* beneficiaries, and observed the influence of charitable organisations on one hand, and on the other, her studies informed her on the ways Islāmic legislation works regarding Islāmic donations. These three periods lay an active platform for enquiries and research into social practice in the field of sociology of religion. Enquiries included the religious or social reasons which affected the *zakāt*-giver to pay *zakāt*.

The researcher's academic journey through the religious field, both before and during this research, revealed that most of the books written on *zakāt* have been concerned with its religious and juristic aspects, and how it relates to Islāmic laws and legislative theories rather than debates on the sociology of its practice. The extent to which Muslims become aware of the meaning and practice of *zakāt* depends on whether it is for the sake of religion, the influence of society, or both. The practice of *zakāt* may be influenced by personal desires of givers and charitable organisations. The impact on the relationship between givers and religious scholars or charitable organisations is an issue that may affect the practice of *zakāt*; social influences may also have an effect on the behaviour of givers and their attitude towards beneficiaries. These influences are an important aspect of human conduct and help to define societies. The twenty-first century presents new challenges concerning the practice of *zakāt*. The facilitating behaviour of intermediaries between local and international charitable organisations concerning the collection and distribution of *zakāt*, for instance, is a balance between spiritual practice and big business. The protagonists of wars and conflicts, and promoters of religious obligations often have political motives regarding the practising of *zakāt*. Wars and conflicts require financial support as much as political parties. Where should they turn to gain this financial support? How do they convince *zakāt*-givers and distributors to finance their political agenda? These are some of the issues that will be addressed in this research in the field study of Qatar.

*Zakāt* has attracted much interest, both from givers and charitable organisations. *Zakāt* was chosen as the main focus for this study, with the exclusion of other forms of Islāmic donations, due to its religious importance in multiple areas: it is the only compulsory practice of giving in Islām. The researcher seeks to open wide horizons through this research by discovering the religious and social influences on the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. The thesis will consequently contribute to the understanding of both the theoretical and practical features in the practice of *zakāt*.

### 1.3. Research Aims and Objectives

This research aims to investigate the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar 2017-2020. A study of the lived experiences of *zakāt*-givers, and their understanding of the eight categories of *zakāt* beneficiaries takes into consideration both the theological motivations and sociological effects on decision-making in practising *zakāt*. The research further explores how *zakāt*-givers contribute to, and are affected by, the behaviour of charitable organisations, conflicting *zakāt* interpretations, and political intervention, through an analysis of the opportunities and challenges the practice of *zakāt* has on Qatari society. The study pursues the following research objectives to achieve the aim of the research.

The research objectives are twofold. Objective one is to identify and utilise concepts of *zakāt* through an extensive literature review which enables the development of a comprehensive understanding of the following:

- i. The philosophy and conceptual discipline of charity - focus on Islām.
- ii. The lived experience of *zakāt* between belief and practice, motivation and decision-making strategies.
- iii. *Zakāt* in Islām: different points of view of Islāmic denominations - focus on *Sunnah* thought.
- iv. *Zakāt*'s mechanism: collection and distribution strategies.
- v. *Zakāt*'s application or implementation in current times.
- vi. The reciprocal effect of the practice of *zakāt* and society through the political and economic impact on *zakāt* in society.

The second objective is to investigate the contemporary practices of *zakāt* through examining a primary case study (Qatar 2017-2020), and addressing the following issues:

- i. The degree of awareness of the concept of *zakāt* among Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents), and the rules and its application according to Islāmic Law (*Sharī'ah*) - *Sunnah* perspective.
- ii. Qatari motivation and decision-making strategies.
- iii. *Zakāt*'s mechanism: its collection and distribution in Qatar.
- iv. Lived Experiences of the Qatari givers in *zakāt*'s distribution through *zakāt*'s eight beneficiary categories.
- v. Qatari government's intervention in the practice of *zakāt*.
- vi. The impact of Qatari *zakāt* drivers: religious advisors and others on *zakāt*'s application.
- vii. The development of religious verdicts and education curricula concerning *zakāt* in Qatar and worldwide, and their impact on the behaviour of *zakāt*-givers.
- viii. Reciprocal effect of *zakāt* and sociology of religion such as social norms and culture.
- ix. The opportunities and challenges that face the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar in relation to politics and the economy.

#### 1.4. The Research Questions

This research is an exploration of the practice of *zakāt* through the disciplinary approach of sociology of religion and the theoretical framework of lived experience. The research question is:

How do the theological and sociological aspects of *zakāt* affect the everyday lived experience of Qatari Muslims citizens and residents in contemporary Qatar?

To support the answers to the research question, the researcher puts forward the following sub-questions:

- i. How do the theological and sociological motivations inform individual decision-making for practising *zakāt* in Qatar?
- ii. What are the main characteristics and patterns of the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar?
- iii. What are the opportunities and challenges facing the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar?

The research questions have been guided by theological, logistical, and ideological points of view such as the meaning of charity and *zakāt* in Islām, what logistic opportunities and challenges face the people who give, collect, distribute, and receive *zakāt*? What social and

cultural norms influence the decision-making of Muslims (citizens and residents) in Qatar in their practice of *zakāt*?

There are some questions which have arisen from a theological point of view.<sup>14</sup> The importance of charity in Islām, and the role of *zakāt* in terms of *Sharī‘ah* (Islāmic law). The responses may be due to the lack of awareness of the rules of *zakāt* concerning the categories of beneficiaries. The theological motivation of Muslims (citizens and residents) in Qatar may be influenced by their decision-making in practising *zakāt*. The rules of *zakāt* are varied and depend on traditional and modern interpretations by Islāmic scholars. *Zakāt* is paid globally by Muslims for the benefit of all Muslims, according to the concept of social solidarity – ‘*Ummah*. The impact this concept has on Muslims and non-Muslims living together, who are all experiencing the same crises and suffering, may affect Muslims’ decision-making when considering paying *zakāt* for the benefit of a diverse (religious) community.

The opportunities that facilitate the practice of *zakāt* from a logistical point of view may also face challenges which could hinder individual the practice of *zakāt*,<sup>15</sup> for example, external forces may use *zakāt* for personal interests such as political gain or family tradition. The collection and distribution of *zakāt* may raise doubts on transparency, impartiality, and even-handedness in Qatar; on the other hand, Qatari givers may exhibit ‘blind trust’ in who collects and distributes *zakāt* funds.

The cultural and social norms may influence Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) decision-making in their practice of *zakāt* from an ideological point view.<sup>16</sup> The behaviour of charitable organisations and government intervention may have an impact on Qatari decision-making. The importance of Islāmic scholars exerting an influence on raising awareness of *zakāt* may be an added element of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) decision-making strategies regarding the practice of *zakāt*. The investigation into these three points of view – theological, logistical, and ideological – regarding the practice of *zakāt* are relevant to this study, and will help to answer the research questions.

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<sup>14</sup>Theological: ‘relating to the study of religion and religious belief’ (*Cambridge Dictionary* 2020c)

<sup>15</sup>Logistical: ‘relating to the process of planning and organizing to make sure that resources are in places where they are needed, so that an activity or process happens effectively’ (*Cambridge Dictionary* 2020b).

<sup>16</sup> Ideological: ‘a set of beliefs or principles, especially one on which a political system, party, or organisation is based’ (*Cambridge Dictionary* 2020a).

### 1.5. The Significance of the Research

This research contributes to understanding the practice of *zakāt* by bridging two fields: religion and sociology. The current literature on *zakāt* mainly focuses on its theological and juristic aspects rather than the social contexts within which it is applied, and the consequences of human behaviour. This research is unique in that it is one of the first studies to examine *zakāt* - a religious practice - from the perspective of sociology. This research is an important study, which develops new knowledge by focusing on what ordinary people *do* every day. People think about *zakāt*, give *zakāt*, and accept *zakāt* in contexts that are shaped by theology and socio-political and cultural stimuli; they are influenced by their own personal beliefs emerging from the communities and societies they inhabit. This thesis is about how *zakāt* is practised in Qatar. Developing a model that privileges everyday experiences of a theologically-determined religious practice, also develops a model that can be used to study additional aspects of Islām in other geographical contexts. The contributions of this research are rich in information and discoveries which provide the foundations for future studies.

This research adds to Islāmic studies of *zakāt* from a religious standpoint. The results of this research will potentially help Muslim scholars learn about the challenges which face the practice of *zakāt* according to jurisprudence (the theory and practice of law). Muslim scholars who have authority to issue religious decisions (*fatawā*) such as *Dār Al-ʿIfṭāʾ*, Muftī, Sheikhs and Imāms of the mosque may have an impact on Muslim societies. Research findings as presented and discussed in this thesis have the potential to assist Muslim scholars in developing curricula and jurisprudence that shape the practice of *zakāt* in twenty-first century Qatar. This research contributes to academic knowledge on the practices of religion relevant to sociology through the lived experiences of Muslims. This research also assists in revealing the results of the lived experiences of Muslims in Qatar, and how the impact of religious and social factors affects their decision-making in the practice of *zakāt*.

This research, furthermore, could potentially contribute a policy and practice perspective including to the work of religious organisations that spread religious and social awareness of the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. This study will also assist Qatari charitable organisations to develop their management policies to serve the practice of *zakāt*. The behaviour of charitable organisations, for instance, will also benefit from this research. Their implementation of *zakāt*, which acknowledges the needs of the beneficiaries rather than their own aims or the desires of givers, is an important factor. This research also contributes to learning about the opportunities and challenges which *zakāt* faces in its practice, encouraging



the relevant authorities to recognise the opportunities and avoid the obstacles when dealing with *zakāt*.

## 1.6. Thesis Structure and Organisation

This research consists of nine chapters, divided into two parts. The first part is the Introduction, followed by Chapters Two and Three which present the literature review of the study. The literature review provides an insight into *zakāt* in order to identify new ways of interpreting prior studies of *zakāt* (mainly religious), and to identify the gaps in the literature. The most important part of the literature review is to locate this research within the context of existing literature. Chapter Four provides a context analysis of Qatar, as the case study. The case study research method can be defined as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context; when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’ (Yin 1984: 23). The second part of this research comprises Chapters Six, Seven, and Eight: The Analysis and Discussion). Bavdekar (2015: 40) says these chapters will ‘allow the authors to showcase the study’. He adds ‘It is used to interpret the results for readers, describe the virtues and limitations of the study, discuss the theoretical and practical implications of the research work done and provide an important “take home” message’. A presentation of the structure of each chapter in this research follows.

The second chapter provides an overview of the concept of charity from the polytheistic belief systems, before focusing on the philosophy of giving in monotheistic religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islām. It considers in particular *zakāt*’s methodology in dealing with givers and beneficiaries, according to the sociology of Islām and the Islāmic society. This chapter illustrates the effects on *zakāt*-givers when they make their decisions to practise *zakāt*.

The third chapter develops the literature review and focuses on *zakāt*’s mechanism: collection and distribution, and opportunities and challenges. The chapter provides comprehensive information on the *zakāt* form: definitions, interpretations, and conditions from *Sunnah* and *Shī’ah* perspectives.<sup>17</sup> The mechanism of *zakāt*’s collection and distribution, and

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<sup>17</sup> *Sunnah*: (80–90 per cent of Muslim population), the word *Sunnah* refers to those who follow and maintain the teachings and actions (*Sunnah*) of the Prophet Muhammad. *Sunnah* Muslims revere Abu Bakr as the closest companion of the Prophet and consider him the first caliph (successor) to the Prophet. Selected by a group of the Prophet’s companions, Abu Bakr was the father-in-law of the Prophet and one of his closest friends (Koenig and Al Shohaib 2014: 27–28). *Shī’ah*: (10–15 per cent of Muslim population) who believe that Ali, the Prophet’s son-in-law and cousin, was his rightful successor and first caliph. The *Shī’ah* believe that, only *Allah* has the right to choose a successor to the Prophet, since the successor is responsible for safeguarding Islam, the Qur’ān, and

its application, is through the eight categories of beneficiaries according to traditional or classical and modern Muslim scholastic interpretations. These data provide the researcher with the foundation on which to discuss the opportunities and challenges in the practice of *zakāt*, particularly in terms of its political and economic impact on society.

The Fourth chapter presents Qatari society through its demographic population: citizen and resident (non-citizen), tribal and other cultural backgrounds, and *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* denominations. The focus is on Islāmic education related to *zakāt* as an important part of *Sharī'ah* (Islāmic law), and proposes how the Qatari economy and standard of living make fertile grounds for the practice of *zakāt*.

Chapter Five presents the philosophical assumptions of ontology and epistemology of *zakāt*. The chapter also describes the methodology used such as a mixed method approach - quantitative and qualitative - through the distribution of a survey, and conducting semi-structured interviews with Qatari participants.

The analysis and discussion section is divided into three chapters – Six, Seven, and Eight. The first focuses on the analysis of the lived experiences of *zakāt*-givers according to their religious environment, and interrogates the impact the environment has on individual practice. The influence of religious motivations, societal aspects, and personal convictions inform the decision-making and practice of Muslims (citizens and residents) in Qatar regarding *zakāt*.

Chapter Seven juxtaposes *zakāt* as a spiritual practice and *zakāt* as big business. This chapter analyses the structures of charitable organisations in Qatar, both governmental and non-governmental, and how organisations persuade *zakāt*-givers to pay their *zakāt*. The chapter further analyses the reflection on the reciprocal effect of the behaviour of *zakāt*-givers and beneficiaries.

Finally, in chapter Eight, *zakāt* is discussed from the point of view of the impact givers and charitable organisations have on beneficiaries of *zakāt*. This chapter focuses on the 'preferred' and 'controversial' *zakāt* beneficiaries whom Muslims (citizens and residents) in Qatar choose to support or not. The chapter is an analysis of the hindrances to the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. This chapter opens up new possibilities for *zakāt* to be used in relation to contemporary societal issues by comparing givers perception of beneficiaries with what is possible within Islāmic foundational texts.

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*Sharī'ah* religious law. The majority of this population is in Iran (90 per cent), Iraq, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain (Koenig and Al Shohaib 2014: 27-28).

The conclusion and recommendations connect or pair up the key findings of the study, and examine them against the research aim and objectives. The chapter provides a summary of all the chapters of this research, followed by answers to the main research question regarding the influence the theological and sociological aspects have on the practice of *zakāt*. The chapter also presents the contributions of this research, and concludes with recommendations for future studies.

### **1.7. Summary**

The importance of this chapter lies in the path this study takes. The structure identifies this path in order to provide the methodology adopted. This chapter has presented the overall context of the study, the rationale, the purpose and objectives, research questions, methodology, and the significance of the study. The scene is set in Qatar, and focuses on the concept of charity, and the practice of *zakāt* from a theological and sociological point of view. The researcher's upbringing, studies, and work were the motivations behind commencing this research. The aim of this research is to study the lived experiences of *zakāt*-givers and their impact on the eight categories of beneficiaries, especially the beliefs, motivation, and decision-making strategies of Muslims (citizens and residents) in Qatar. The objectives are to investigate the impact religious advisors, scholars, and others have on the lived experiences and contemporary practices of Muslims in Qatar. The objectives are also an exploration of the strengths and weaknesses of jurisprudence (*Fiqh*), and the possibility of developing religious verdicts to conform to a modern age in Qatar. The chapter is a further exploration on how the theory of lived experience can influence the relationship between social norms and culture, and the practice of *zakāt*. An enquiry into how the sociology of religion, including the sociology of Islām, can help to understand the concept of lived religion, and the effect it may have on the everyday experiences of Qatari Muslims (citizens and residents) in their practice of *zakāt*.

This chapter presents the significance behind the research, and articulates its contribution in the fields of religion and sociology. The next chapter, Chapter Two, is the first part of the study of literature related to this research, and focuses on the philosophy of the practice of *zakāt*.

## CHAPTER TWO

### The Practice of *Zakāt*: Theologies of Structures and Lived Experience

#### 2.0. Introduction

The purpose of this research is to investigate the theological and sociological influences on the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar 2017-2020. To achieve this purpose, the two literature review chapters aim to identify and utilise concepts to enable a comprehensive understanding of religious and social influences on modern day the practice of *zakāt*, using Qatar as a contextual case study. These two chapters contribute to answering the following sub-research questions:

- (i) How do theological and sociological motivations inform individual decision-making and practice concerning *zakāt* in Qatar?
- (ii) What are the main characteristics and patterns of the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar?
- (iii) What are the opportunities and challenges in the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar?

This chapter provides a review of the literature on lived experience, and particularly lived religion, as a theoretical framework to study everyday practices of *zakāt*. The chapter addresses charity in general, and focuses on the concept of charity within the Abrahamic faiths (Judaism, Christianity, and Islām). The methodology of charity, and dealing with givers and beneficiaries is also investigated. This chapter, furthermore, examines a sociology of Islām perspective on *zakāt*, including the motivation and decision-making strategies adopted by givers and beneficiaries within Islāmic society in Qatar (the case study for this thesis). Religious motivations, social and cultural norms, and personal convictions are some of the key themes in this research.

The next chapter (Chapter Three) as the second part of the literature review will examine *zakāt* from a religious perspective regarding definitions, conditions, the mutual relationships regarding *zakāt*, and its political and economic implications.

#### 2.1. Charity as an Act of Faith

It is important to discuss charity from an individual's perspective before talking about charity from a religious angle. An individual or human being is born as a 'clean slate' devoid of any religious or societal influences (Locke 1836). Children grow up and acquire experiences

and influences from their parents, families, and their environment. They are raised as Jews, Christians, and Muslims in the monotheistic religions (or even with no religion in some cases) according to their parents' beliefs and principles. According to the *Ḥadīth*, Abu Huraira reported *Allah's* Messenger as saying: 'No babe is born but upon *Fitra* [state of purity and innocence]. It is his parents who make him a Jew or a Christian or a Polytheist [...]' (*Sahih Muslim* Book 33: *Hadith* 6426). The behaviour of individuals is affected by these principles as they begin to grow, develop, and communicate within their communities. The concepts of 'sympathy' and 'compassion' by one individual towards another resonate throughout the notion of charity. The giver responds to suffering with empathy and concern, while the beneficiary is grateful for the sympathy and compassion shown by another (Reddy and Ajmera 2015: 146). This caring relationship is based on personal motivation without the involvement of factors such as religion which pass laws to practise giving, whether by compulsion or inducement. Individual motivation seems to provide freedom of choice for giving, and reflects personal behavioural interaction within a community: an individual's sense of others, including animals and the environment, for instance, and the co-existence between them. Humanity is all about feeling love and compassion for other people - be they relatives or strangers. The first philanthropic law recorded on earth was in Babylon in the Code of Hammurabi (1792 BC-1750 BC), one of the earliest legal codes written (Al-Qaradawi 1999: 4; Retsikas 2014: 19). Pharaonic and Greek civilisations subsequently observed philanthropic acts, which appeared in the form of helping the economically-deprived sections of society such as the poor and needy. The Pharaohs and Greeks used this terminology to explain the notion of 'charity' as a gift from one person to another (Bird 1982). This shows that charity and philanthropy, in some form or another, have been practised since ancient times.

The Abrahamic or monotheistic faiths<sup>18</sup> such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islām, believe in one God, while the polytheistic beliefs such as Hinduism and Shintoism believe in several; despite the differences in these models of faith, the main religious doctrines *all* promote charity. The *Bhagavad Gītā* (Hindu scripture *As it is*, 17:20 n.d.) says:

That gift which is given out of duty, at the proper time and place, to a worthy person, and without expectation of return, is considered to be charity in the mode of goodness.

The Fifth Book of the Torah says:

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<sup>18</sup> All Abrahamic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islām) worship a single *Allah*. The Prophet Abraham is claimed by Jews as the ancestor of the Israelites, while his son Ishmael (Isma'il) is seen in Muslim tradition as the ancestor of the Arabs. Abraham is described as a 'father in faith' in Christian tradition - (see *Romans* 4) - which may suggest that, all three religions come from one source (Goldburg (2020).

Whenever you reap your harvest in your field and leave some unraked grain there, you must not return to get it; it should go to the resident foreigner, orphan, and widow so that the Lord your God may bless all the work you do (Deuteronomy 24:19).<sup>19</sup>

The apostle Luke says in the New Testament:

Sell what you possess and give alms (*Luke* 12:33).<sup>20</sup>

The Qur'ān says:

‘Those who spend their wealth by night and by day, secretly and publicly, will find that their reward is secure with their Lord and that there is no reason for them to entertain any fear or grief’ (*Al-Baqra*, 2:274).

The meaning of charity within Judaism according to Bird (1982: 148-149) is, ‘God required *zedakkah* of his people, namely rightly-ordered human relations that did not neglect those who were disadvantaged. God also commanded *hesed* (graciousness and loving-kindness) of his people as they extended hospitality and assistance to their needy neighbours’. Islām has the same concept of charity as Judaism. Awang et al. (2017) explain the meaning of charity in Islām according to Muslim scholars such as Ibn Kathīr, Al-Qurṭubī, Al-Shāfi‘ī, Al-Ḥanafī, Al-Ḥanbalī. The Qur'ān ‘refer[s] to the act of spending out of the wealth for the sake of *Allah*’. The authors add, Prophet Mohammed completes the meaning of charity as it ‘can be done in any means not only restricted to material giving but also covers the nonmaterial aspects such as doing good towards others’ (Awang et al. 2017: 152). The concept of charity in early Christianity, by contrast, ‘is the highest form of love, signifying the reciprocal love between God and man that is made manifest in unselfish love of one’s fellow men’ (St. Paul in Corinthians 1:13). Charity in Greek and Roman times had a political flavour: it practised donating food and organising festivals as a means of gaining the loyal allegiance of the lower classes. This form of ‘charity’ was refused by the (Christian) Church as ‘they felt philanthropic altruism was largely motivated by the desire for prestige and involved no genuine concern for others nor any real sacrifices on the part of the donors’ (*The Widow’s Offering*, Luke 21: 1- 4, cited in Bird 1982: 158). The Church consequently imposed a ‘tithe’ - one tenth of annual produce or earnings - formally taken as a tax for the support of the Church and clergy to avoid this issue (*LEXICO* 2019).

The charitable concept within the three Abrahamic religions had been keen to order their followers to practise charity - or the giving between people - whether morally or

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<sup>19</sup> Rosen mentions the ‘Talmud ordered that Jews were to give at least 10 per cent of their annual net earnings to ‘*tzedakah*’. ‘The word *tzedakah* derives from the Hebrew word *tzedek*, justice (Rosen 2014: 1).

<sup>20</sup> Burg continues along the same lines, and states that, tithes appeared in Christianity: ‘A tithe is a one-tenth part of something, paid as a contribution to a religious organization or compulsory tax to government’ (Burg 2004: viii).

materially. Followers of Abrahamic religions occupy more than half of Earth's population (Hackett and McClendon 2017); it would be incorrect to say, however, all followers practice some form of charity. Religious doctrines encourage giving, charity, and sympathy among people; however, this does not mean that people, even if they adhere to a particular religion, want to follow the religious laws. There are instincts, feelings, desires, and other human qualities, which control the behaviour of people. Babbie (2015) states humans differ in feelings and emotions, and therefore it is difficult to forecast and generalise human behaviour. The competitive factor people display, for example, has a role in determining and directing the charity. The reluctance of a rich father, whose son is not successful in education for instance, to support the son of a poor father whose son is successful, may often seem like meanness (or even jealousy), but is more likely lack of awareness of the intention of *zakāt*. The giver may resent having to contribute to *zakāt*, on the grounds of having worked hard to gain his or her wealth, and does not feel there is any justification in sharing it. Questions arise such as why do the poor or needy people not make any effort to support themselves? Why should the rich be responsible for the poor or needy? The main factor here is that the rich are in control of the flow of money, and the poor are those who are at the mercy of the desires of the rich. The rich are the owners of their wealth, and may be the ones who even created it (rather than inheriting it); this may cause the poor or needy to also feel resentment or jealousy. A poor or needy person may question why this rich person has more wealth than he or she does. They may even consider the rich are thieves or exploitative, and so on. The feelings the givers' or beneficiaries have, however, do not diminish the importance of the role of religion as part of charitable actions. To understand the true humanistic nature of charitable giving, it is of great importance to inspect the interaction between the donor and recipient. Donations based on a feeling of superiority, for instance, may occur, yet as per most religious texts, such donations are ethically immoral. The fundamental nature of the donation in this case, is founded upon class and prestige, inevitably leading to inequality. These interactions should rather be based on dignity, humility, and genuine good will, regardless of race, creed, religious or national affiliations, and so on.

The following section focuses on understanding the attitude and behaviour of *zakāt*-givers and beneficiaries towards the practice of *zakāt* in Muslim-majority societies (including contemporary Qatar) is through the lens of the sociology of Islām.

## **2.2. *Zakāt*'s Methodology: Givers and Beneficiaries According to Sociology of Islām Approach**

This research provides an understanding of the attitude and behaviour of *zakāt*-givers and beneficiaries towards the practice of *zakāt* in a Muslim-majority society such as Qatar. According to Cherry (2020: n.p.), 'attitude refers to a set of emotions, beliefs, and behaviour towards a particular object, person, thing, or event'. People develop attitudes throughout their lives, often from the results of experience or upbringing; these can have a powerful influence on their behaviour. People behave according to their personal principles and reactions towards a certain phenomenon at a certain time; however, although attitudes are often long-lasting, they can also change, which will affect their behaviour at any given time. Questions arise such as what motivates Muslims to give *zakāt*, and whether this is reflected in their preferences. What influences *zakāt*-givers' decision-making regarding the collection of *zakāt* and its distribution mechanism? Providing answers to such questions help to understand how Muslims approach the conceptualisation of their roles as *zakāt*-givers and beneficiaries, as well as *zakāt*'s collection and distribution mechanism.

The interests of this research lie in the investigation of the practice of *zakāt* from an Islāmīc social perspective in Qatar; for example, how Muslims in Qatar practice *zakāt* in their community, the customs and traditions they follow - including religion - in practising *zakāt*, and what social influences have changed in practising *zakāt* according to religious guidance such as charitable organisations. El-Khereiji (1990: 166) defines sociology of religion as 'The study of social phenomena in the field of religion and the social relations of religion at home and abroad'. Sociology of religion - a field of social science - will help to understand the beliefs, practices, and organisational forms of religion, and employs the tools and methods of the discipline of sociology (Johnstone 2016). Social science, in turn, helps to understand the relationship between society and human behaviour, and provides the means that would help to resolve the problems that exist in society (Ragin and Amoroso 2011; JHA 2014: 8). The interests of this research also lie in the sociology of Islām within Islāmīc society in relation to *zakāt*. Saleh and Baqutayan define 'Islāmīc society' as 'consisting of a number of people in every place and at every time who are united by Islāmīc belief and Divine Law, which regulate their relationships and their activities for the continuity and improvement of the society' (2012: 114). The sociology of Islām, examined through religious studies, also helps to understand the Muslims in Qatar awareness of the practice of *zakāt*. Islāmīc studies, in addition, serve as references to educate Muslims on modern *zakāt* applications. A Qatari can be knowledgeable about the distribution of *zakāt*, according to the options available in his or her community



which apply to *zakāt*-beneficiaries. The rules and their application according to the Islāmic normative or ethical ideal of a way of life (*Sharī'ah*) are drawn from the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth* (sayings) of the Prophet Mohammed, and viewed from a *Sunnah* perspective.

The Sociology of Islām, as a disciplinary approach for this research, helps to discover and understand the behaviour of those who believe in giving *zakāt*, its beneficiaries, and the practices and application within Islāmic society. The meaning of ethics, values, and morality are, furthermore, also important, as they explain the relationships between believers and their communities, and how religion - Islām - deals with state governments, society, and culture (Dugbazah 2009; Phipps 2011; Haqqi 2015). The negotiations that individuals undertake with society and religious doctrine is also an important element in how they live their lives. This shows it could be a potential challenge to practise *zakāt* as an individual, as the individual citizen has no freedom of choice in making his or her decision when practising *zakāt*. It makes little difference, in this case, whether Muslims in Qatar believe in *zakāt* or not: they often practice it by obeying their family leaders, especially as the *majlis* are the ruling power, after the government, in Qatari society (Zahlan 2016) (See subsection below 'Tribal Culture and its Impact on the Practice of *Zakāt*').

The relationship between believers in *zakāt* - givers or beneficiaries - and their society is an essential component of civility. Koenig and Al-Shohaib (2014: 38) in their chapter '*Muslim Beliefs, Practices, and Values*' explain this equality in Muslim society as 'Islam encourages "downward" comparisons with regard to possessions, but "upward" comparisons with regard to values'.<sup>21</sup> The authors add that 'This [concept of equality] minimizes a sense of inferiority that Muslims might [...] feel towards] those who are rich or better off [...]. Equality [...] and fairness [...] help to combat feelings of low self-esteem'. The relationship between the givers and beneficiaries encourages humility and modesty in giving, and saves beneficiaries from embarrassment caused by, for example, poverty. Arrogance and boasting are specifically forbidden in Islāmic teachings, as stated in two passages in the Qur'ān: 'Go now, and enter the gate of Hell, and abide in it for ever. Evil indeed is the abode of the arrogant' (*An-Nahl*, 16: 29), and in (*Lugman*, 31: 18) 'Do not (contemptuously) turn your face away from people, nor tread haughtily upon earth. *Allah* does not love the arrogant and the vainglorious'. Here, faithful Qatari Muslims who adhere to the commands and teachings of Islām, suppose their attitude

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<sup>21</sup> Wills and Collins (Cited in Suls, Martin, and Wheeler 2002: 161) explain Social comparison as 'influential downward-comparison theory proposed that (a) threatened people are more likely to compare with others who are worse off than themselves than with others who are better off and (b) exposure to a less fortunate other'. While the upward-comparison shows 'that people intentionally compare themselves with superior other (i.e., upward targets) and that such comparisons can make self-views more positive'.

and behaviour will be influenced by the orders of the two verses while practising *zakāt*. The preservation of dignity and non-embarrassment of the beneficiaries is thus respected. Givers who boast about their donations, on the other hand, destroy any dignity a beneficiary may have, and will doubtlessly cause him or her unnecessary embarrassment by the revelation. A Qatari, as a human being, has feelings that may go beyond the path of following Islāmic teachings (explained in the previous section). Perfection, effectiveness, and completeness are characteristics which are hard to attain for all human beings, including Qataris. Feelings such as happiness and sadness, generosity and miserliness, vanity and humility, for instance, are some of the emotions which influence the behaviour of people; it is therefore difficult to predict what feelings a Qatari will have when paying or receiving *zakāt*.

Rights govern *zakāt*'s reciprocity philosophy. The givers have the right to decide to whom their money is given when they pay their *zakāt*, and the beneficiaries have the right to the *zakāt* of the giver. This reciprocal relationship in rights was evident in both verses of Makkah (*Az-Zariyat*, 51: 19) and Madīnah (*Al-Ma'arij*, 70: 24-25). According to Al-Qaradawi (1999: 11), the two Qur'ānic verses on *zakāt* in Makkah and Madīnah are considered a clear emphasis on permitting *zakāt*-beneficiaries to ask for their rights from *zakāt*-payers. These two verses also show that the philosophical alms-giving principle is based on the 'right' approach: the less fortunate (poor, needy, and vulnerable) have a 'right' to the wealth of the rich. This saves the beneficiaries from feeling embarrassed or less valued. This also seems to show a reciprocal relationship based on equal rights between givers and beneficiaries. The reciprocal relationship will also be positively enhanced by the ethics of a Muslim when distributing *zakāt*. The relationship must be based on mutual respect for each other, with no judgement or causing harm to one another (verbal, moral, or physical), and without projecting any sense of superiority or inferiority. Al-Ghazali (n.d) mentions the Muslims' manners regarding *zakāt* when giving to beneficiaries. These manners include secrecy, open-giving (generosity), avoidance of taunting and hurting, humility, giving the best, and seeking the worthy and deserving. Islāmic ethics are, therefore, keen for the relationship between the giver and the beneficiary being based on mutual respect and dignity, and preserved for both parties. Al-Ghazali's interpretations of these concepts - drawn from the teachings of Islam - are transmitted into the social benefits between the giver and the beneficiary.

Kochuyt (2009), furthermore, explains from the social level that the wealth redistribution process is part of the philosophy of the 'return gift' concept. The author explains the reciprocal relationship concerning equal rights as 'return gift' in three steps: givers are obliged to give, and others expect them to do so; once the gift has been given, the subsequent

obligation requires the beneficiary to accept what has been offered; and once the gift is received, the invitation to form a relationship is accepted. This means, both actors become connected through a relationship in which the donor can expect the beneficiary to ‘return his or her gift’. The beneficiary’s return comes through the wealth redistribution process (Kochuyt 2009). The philosophy of ‘return gift’ reinforces Durkheim's argument that religion strengthens social cohesion and solidarity (McGivern 2014). This social cohesion works strongly between a Muslim and another Muslim; however, the same circle of return in the twenty-first century has become more exposed, as the mixing of Muslims and non-Muslims has become greater. This means that *zakāt* contributes to social cohesion on one group of society (say Muslims) at the expense of the other (non-Muslims), or inequality may exist between citizens and non-citizens (residents). This becomes a challenge in the application of *zakāt* in the twenty-first century regarding mixed societies. ‘Lived religion’ as a concept insists that people read and negotiate their way around religious texts, and then implement religious doctrine in ways that do not always fully conform to the text. This may be because of practical and social limitations; however, they often may still conform to the ethos of the text.

### **2.3. *Zakāt*-Givers and Beneficiaries’ Lived Experiences Between Belief and Practice**

It is not possible for a researcher to observe the personal motivations of individuals or groups, but it is possible to observe their behaviour. Their lived experiences of the practice of *zakāt* may bring the researcher close to the signs of personal motivation or the rationale for their actions. The lived experiences approach is the conceptual framework of this research, supported by the disciplinary approach of sociology of religion. Lived experience is ‘a category of qualitative research which focuses on society, culture, language and communication’ (Marshall and Rossman (2011: 92). Given (2008: 489) explains lived experience ‘is explored and understood in qualitative research, is a representation and understanding of a researcher or research subject’s human experience, choices, and option and how those factors influence one’s perception of knowledge’. According to Manen (1990: 10) ‘lived experience is not about reflecting on an experience while living through it, but is recollective, in which experience is a reflection on it after it has passed, or someone has lived through it’. Lindseth and Norberg (2004) add: ‘the goal of such research is not to understand individuals' lived experiences as facts, but to determine the understandable meaning of such experiences’. Boylorn adds ‘lived experience responds not only to people's experiences, but also to how people live through and respond to those experiences. [...] Lived experience seeks to understand the distinctions

between lives and experiences [...] why some experiences are privileged over others' (cited in McIntosh and Wright 2018: 5). Muslims in Qatar may think about *zakāt*, give *zakāt*, and accept *zakāt* in contexts which could be shaped by religion. The practice of *zakāt*, however, is still reflected in the behaviour of human beings which could also shape personal convictions and social influences formed by the behaviour of the government, NGOs, and political intervention.

Manen (1990) states in his book *Researching Lived Experiences: Human Science for an Action Sensitive Pedagogy* that, lived experience 'is distinct from traditional approaches derived from the behavioural or natural sciences - an approach rooted in the "everyday lived experience" of human beings in educational situations [...] rather than relying on abstract generalizations and theories'. McGuire (2008: 4) argues that religion as 'practised by individuals is often vastly different from religion as prescribed by institutions'. She adds 'The value of the term "lived religion" thus lies in "distinguishing the actual experience of religious persons from the prescribed religion of institutionally defined beliefs and practices"' (McGuire 2008: 12). Social privilege, for instance, involves 'special advantage or entitlement for one's own benefit to the detriment of others' according to class, age, gender, and religion (among others) (Black and Stone 2005). This suggests that, *zakāt*-givers have the social and cultural power to decide whether their *zakāt* should support a certain project or whether it should support beneficiaries according to the eight categories.<sup>22</sup> How they should practice *zakāt* is another choice they have in their decision-making strategy. This strategic choice is according to their personal knowledge regarding the world around them, and is from direct involvement in daily occurrences rather than opinions and approaches by other people. Adopting the approach of lived experience in this research helps the researcher to study the daily life of a Qatari (citizen and resident) in the practice of *zakāt*. The practice of *zakāt* is therefore from the perspective of human behaviour rather than religious influences as a theoretical perspective. Lived religion, in turn, is also a factor to consider in human behaviour.

Knibbe and Kupari (2020) discuss lived religion through McGuire, Orsi, and Ammerman's train of thought. Firstly, Knibbe and Kupari (2020: 158) say 'The lived religion approach has pioneered a strand of ethnographically rounded scholarship that navigates between several imposing bulwarks of research which make up the landscape of religious studies and sociology of religion'. Orsi (2003: 172) says, 'The interpretive challenge of the study of lived religion is to develop the practice of disciplined attention to people's signs and practices as they describe, understand, and use them, in the circumstances of their experiences,

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<sup>22</sup> See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* Mechanism: Distribution According to Eight Categories of *Zakāt*-beneficiaries.

and to the structures and conditions within which these signs and practices emerge'. Ammerman (cited in Knibbe and Kupari 2020: 163) says that, 'the study of everyday religion against the longstanding tradition, within sociology of religion, of presupposing that religion takes place primarily in certain hermetic social arenas, namely within the sphere of either religious institutions or the home'. *Zakāt*-givers are, therefore, influenced by their perception of the principles of *zakāt* according to their religious beliefs, personal experience, options, and decision-making strategies. The lived religion approach to *zakāt* is between religious practice, according to the application of religious and legislative texts on *zakāt*, and sociological practice according to non-religious influences such as culture. There are consequently several questions which may reveal their rationale such as: how *zakāt*-givers wish to pay their *zakāt*, and to whom and why; the effect daily life in Qatari society has on the practice of *zakāt*; the routine and ways Qatari *zakāt*-givers follow in practising *zakāt*; and the effect various Qatari cultures have on the daily lives of *zakāt*-givers in their practice of *zakāt*. Seeking answers to these questions may reveal the reality of *zakāt*-givers' motivations and decision-making strategies towards the concept of *zakāt*.

The authors of the book *Everyday Lived Islam in Europe* (2013; eds Nathal M. Dessing, Nadia Jeldtoft, and Linda Woodhead) propose a new way of studying contemporary Islām is to focus on what being a Muslim means in their everyday lives. According to Jeldtoft and Woodhead (2013), everyday lived religion is tactical and strategic, and emotions shape and alter social structures and can be tactically used. Woodhead (2013) explains that the strategy is a plan of action designed to achieve a long-term or overall aim, while tactics are the specific actions or steps one undertakes to accomplish one's strategy. A nation's strategy in a war, for example, might be to win the hearts and minds of the opponent's civilian population. To achieve this, governments could use schemes or techniques such as radio broadcasts or building hospitals. The stakeholders or authorities such as Muslim scholars, charitable organisations, or governments in the case of *zakāt*, are interested in the practice of *zakāt*. Their strategy is for Muslims (Qataris) to practice *zakāt* in both the short term and long term. To achieve this aim, they will use various techniques such as spreading awareness programmes on the religious commitment of practicing *zakāt* through television, radio, and advertisements. *Zakāt* will be affected by the behaviour of the authorities, however; the diversity of interpretations of the Qur'an differ between the branches of scholars, for example, and directing *zakāt* according to the desire of charitable organisations or of the government which serves their own interests (see Chapters Four and Seven). It may depart from the religious goal of helping the

beneficiaries, for instance in this case, despite the encouragement of the continuity of the practice of *zakāt* in the short and long term.

Jeldtoft (2013), in turn, adds the spirituality and emotional approach. Spirituality is the quality of being concerned with the human spirit or soul as opposed to material or physical things. Religion here means the motivation which encourages the Qatari *zakāt*-givers to practice their *zakāt*. Religious motivations comprise self-purifying, the love of *Allah*, and obedience to religious teachings *taqwā* (piety), preparing for the Afterlife, and trade and reward with *Allah* (see section below ‘Interrogating Religious Motivations’). According to emotions, Jeldtoft (2013) says they can be reactions to internal stimuli (such as thoughts or memories) or events which occur in one’s environment. She adds, ‘Emotions shape and alter social structures. Emotions can be tactically used’. Society here plays an important role in forming memories; for instance, the effect a father’s behaviour in practicing *zakāt* has on the memories of children. Another example is having confidence in a specific charitable organisation whose conduct with givers has remained the same throughout its history, and still exists. The lived religious experience in Qatar will therefore be valuable for this research in clarifying these concepts in the practice of *zakāt*. The daily life of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) is affected by the surrounding environment in which they live regarding the practice of *zakāt* and the religious texts of *zakāt*.

Religion plays a major part in the behaviour and attitudes held by *zakāt*-givers towards *zakāt*, but outside influences such as cultural norms, social elements such as sense of belonging and familial control, and political considerations also have a role in *zakāt*-givers’ decision-making methods. The lived experience and lived religion of *zakāt*-givers and beneficiaries may disclose these different factors. The motivations of *zakāt*-givers’ could be influenced by both the theological and sociological aspects. These motivations have an impact on the belief in *zakāt* and its practice within Islāmic society. The investigation into how and why *zakāt*-givers view their religious obligations and lived experiences will possibly be revealed through the interviews conducted with various respondents to this study.

#### **2.4. *Zakāt*’s Philosophy: Motivation and Decision-making Strategies**

Authors such as Lillis et al. (cited in Kumar and Sharma 2000: 480) define motivation as ‘the stimulation of any emotion or desire operating upon one’s will and promoting or driving it to action’. This stimulation of their emotions or desires has an impact on Muslims’ decision-making on whether to pay or not to pay their *zakāt*. These motivations are influenced by belief

in, and practice of, *zakāt*, whether it is a religious, social, or personal conviction, or all of them. The *zakāt*-givers' lived experiences are consequently diverse in belief, practice, thought, and application. The researcher's own lived experience in Muslim majority or minority societies shows this can be understood, based on the relationship between the Muslim - Qatari and *Allah*; the Muslim - Qatari and themselves; and the Muslim - Qatari and society. Figure (2.1) below displays these *zakāt* relationships and its results between belief and practice.




Figure 2.1: Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) relationships with *Zakāt*

Figure 2.1 shows three different aspects that shape Qatari Muslims' lived experiences, motivations, and decision-making around *zakāt*:

**Aspect One:** the relationship between the Qatari Muslim and *Allah*. Here the Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) belief in *Allah* will be a strong motivation in accordance with Islāmic teachings to practice *zakāt*; however, their behaviour or decision-making will have two actions regarding *zakāt*. First, if the Qatari believes in *zakāt*, and is influenced by religious motivations such as obedience and preparing for the Afterlife, he or she will practice *zakāt* (see section below). If, on the other hand, the Qatari does not believe in *zakāt*, he or she is unlikely to practice *zakāt*.

**Aspect Two:** the relationship between the Qatari Muslim and Self. Here, the Qatari attitude and behaviour will be based on his or her personal convictions without the influence of religion or society. People have feelings and desires which influence their decision-making, as previously explained. These feelings do not have to be governed by a particular system such as religion. This relationship, therefore, also has two parts: attitude and conviction. If the Qatari's attitude is influenced by the concept of *zakāt*, he or she will practice *zakāt*. Here, the impact of these motivations affect the decision-making of Qatari Muslims, such as compromise, co-operation, empathy, solidarity, and compassion, for example, towards the poor and the needy. If, on the other hand, there is no religious and social conviction for any reason, or it is influenced by attitude such as miserliness or apathy, it is unlikely that a Qatari will practice *zakāt*.

**Aspect Three:** the relationship between Muslims and society. The cultural, social, political, and religious norms, for instance, will have an impact on a Muslim's attitude on his or her decision-making. If Muslims are influenced by these factors, their attitude will also influence their decision to practise; otherwise, it is unlikely they will pay *zakāt*.

The results of these relationships are divided into four groups: Muslims in Qatar who believe in *zakāt* and practice; those who believe but do not practice; those who do not believe and do not practice; or those who do not believe but practice *zakāt* due to cultural and societal influences. The religious and social motivations, in addition to personal convictions, have an impact on the attitude and behaviour of the Muslims in Qatar when practising *zakāt*.

#### **2.4.1. Interrogating Religious Motivations**

There are many sociologists such as Ibn Khaldun (1338-1406 CE), Marx (1818-1883 CE), Durkheim (1858-1919 CE), and Weber (1864-1920 CE) who have recognised that religion is the main engine of religious-majority societies (Hussein 1925; Al-Wardi 1994; McGivern 2014).<sup>23</sup> It is the nerve on which the behaviour of religious societies is centred. The religious incentive is, therefore, one of the strongest inducements which may affect decision-making. The philosophy of Islām encourages its followers to be engaged with their societies; for example, lending a helping hand and visiting the sick (*Al-Bukhari* Book 6: *Hadith* 4). Parboteeah, Hoegl and Cullen (2008: 389) highlight religion as part of a Muslim's culture and a personal choice; this cultural factor can influence one's decision-making - religious values

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<sup>23</sup> The scholars in this research are briefly mentioned in order to illustrate the importance of the role of religion in society.



often provide guidance for what is considered to be acceptable behaviour. Phipps finds that there is also a strong link between religiosity and higher ethical decision-making. This means those who have the highest volume of giving are those who are known to be religiously committed (2011: 181).<sup>24</sup> Emphasising the role of religious motivation in practising giving among Muslims, Mittermaier (2019) argues in an interview about her book *Giving to God: Islāmic Charity in Revolutionary Times* that ‘Many pious givers in Egypt do not prioritize compassion. They rather foreground God [...]. Their giving [helps to get [...]] around some of the crueler [*sic*] and more wounding aspects of charity, as well as “compassion fatigue”’. This means that, although human reaction may be unconscious behaviour (Mazen and Ibrahim n.d.), religion was the primary motivation in giving. A conflict between religious and humanitarian incentives may arise, or religion may be in opposition to humanity. The practice of *zakāt* may only be for the sake of religion or it may be based on a humanitarian incentive such as for mixed societies of Muslims and non-Muslims. Bacon (cited in Haqqi 2015: 104) also mentions that, ‘Religion is the most substantial bond of humanity’. Religious motivation is, nevertheless, a strong incentive affecting decision-making, regardless of the humanitarian aspect.

Based on the main sources of Islām - the Qur’ān and *Ḥadīth* - and the interpretations of some Muslim scholars and authors’ opinions of these, a review will be conducted on the religious motivations that affect the practice of *zakāt*. Religious motivations are self-purifying, the love of *Allah*, and obedience to religious teachings (*taqwā* - piety), preparing for the Afterlife, trade and reward with *Allah*, and *’Ummah* (social solidarity).

The first one is self-purification. There are several Muslim scholars and authors such as al-Mawardi (1994); al-Qaradawi (1999); Retsikas (2014); and Kahf (2017) who have written about the benefits of *zakāt* in self-discipline or ‘the essence of refinement’ for *zakāt*-givers. According to these scholars, the practice of *zakāt* is observed for cleansing and purifying Muslims from unwanted desires such as greed, intolerance, vanity, and self-love. The Qur’ān says:

(O Prophet)! Take alms out of their riches and thereby cleanse them and bring about their growth (in righteousness) (*At-Tauba*, 9: 103).

Al-Ghazali (n.d.) states: ‘The habit of miserliness is only eliminated by making oneself accustomed to spending money, for to break an attachment one must force oneself away till a new habit is found’. He adds, ‘The purity he acquires is in proportion to his expenditure, to his

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<sup>24</sup> Those who are non-religious, also have moral principles. Stealing for instance, is unethical, as it causes distress by unlawfully depriving someone of his or her property. The thought of being robbed oneself, usually prevents someone from doing the same to another, and is based on personal feelings, not necessarily on religious teachings.

delight in giving away and to his joy in spending for the sake of *Allah*'. This self-purifying pays attention to the fact that *zakāt* is not only concerned with the financial aspect, but it also has a moral interest. Muslims who care about morality are also interested in this incentive. The love of *Allah* and *taqwā* (piety) are also motivated by religion. Regarding the love of *Allah*, al-Ghazali (n.d.) declares, 'the truth of our claim to love God is therefore put to the test, and we are asked to give up the wealth which is the apple of our eye'. The Qur'ān states:

Surely *Allah* has purchased of the believers their lives and their belongings and in return has promised that they shall have Paradise (*At-Tauba*, 9: 111).

Qatari Muslims, in this case, would be in conflict with their opposing feelings. Here, a Qatari will fight miserliness by giving in order to win or 'purchase' heaven, as the verse explains. This religious motivation encourages the spirituality and emotional approach, as Jeldtoft (2013) discusses above. This incentive will consequently be a religious driver in the practice of *zakāt* in society. This ultimately depends, however, on the extent of the Qatari relationship with *Allah* compared to personal convictions in the practice of *zakāt*.

Obedience, on the other hand, is based on the love of *Allah*. Muslims who love *Allah*, and are committed to Islāmic teachings, obey the orders of *Allah* and the Prophet. The Qur'ān says:

Believers! Obey *Allah* and obey the Messenger, and those from among you who are invested with authority (*An-Nisaa*, 4:59).

The Qur'ān also warns those who do not pay their *zakāt*:

And there are those who amass gold and silver and do not spend it in the Way of *Allah*. Announce to them the tidings of a painful chastisement (*At-Tauba*, 9:34).

Obedience is underpinned here by practising *zakāt*. It is one of the influences in decision-making for giving - obedience and the fear of punishment. This does not mean, however, that all Qatari Muslims follow the orders of *Allah* and the Prophet - people's feelings and attitudes are not alike; for example, an individual may not believe in *zakāt*, but he or she may still practice it as a societal custom or tradition.

Preparing for the Afterlife is another religious motivation. The Qur'ān encourages Muslims to prepare for an eternal Afterlife; life on earth is only a transitory passage towards eternity. The Qur'ān says:

No; but you prefer the present life, whereas the Hereafter is better and more enduring (*Al-A'la*, 87: 16-17).

Regarding inducement to avoid punishment on Judgment Day, the Qur'ān says:

Those who are niggardly about what *Allah* has granted them out of His bounty think that niggardliness is good for them; it is bad for them. What they were niggardly about will turn into a halter round their necks on the Day of Resurrection (*Al-i'Imran*, 3: 180).

Imām Ali, the fourth Islāmic Caliph, is also quoted as encouraging Muslims to prepare for the Afterlife: ‘Get ready for the journey, for you are being driven, and prepare yourselves for death, since it is hovering over you. Be a people who wake up when called, and who know that this world is not their abode, and so have it changed (with the next)’ (*Nahjul-Balagah* n.d.: 449). *Zakāt*, as a form of being a good deed such as helping the poor and needy, is seen as a path to *Allah*, and will be favourably considered on the Day of Resurrection; thus, practising Muslims follow the path to Paradise through *zakāt*.<sup>25</sup> Muadh bin Jabal cites the Prophet: ‘O Messenger of *Allah*, tell me of a deed which will take me into Paradise and will keep me away from the Hell-fire.’ The Prophet replied: ‘that you pay *zakāt*’ (*An-Nawawi’s Forty Hadith* No. 29). This motivation is entirely based on religious teachings; thus, *zakāt*-givers are obligated to follow these instructions in order to win access to eternal life in Paradise rather than be damned to suffer eternal punishment in Hell. Muslims are therefore keen to follow the teachings of Islām for fear of punishment on the Day of Resurrection, and Hell being their fate; one of these teachings is the payment of *zakāt*.

It is commonly accepted that most Muslims believe *Allah* is wise and most merciful; on the other hand, He is also the judge, and His punishment can be severe. All Muslims’ visible and hidden works are monitored by Him; however, people have a free choice to do things, either according to *Allah*’s will or against it, and are responsible for those choices (Koenig and Al-Shohaib 2014). The attitude and behaviour of *zakāt*-givers and beneficiaries are fearful of *Allah*’s judgement if they do not obey His teachings. Muslims are inspired to practise *zakāt*, and therefore, *zakāt*-givers have the freedom to choose the beneficiaries of their charitable acts. *Zakāt*, under invitation and intimidation is, therefore, a way to prepare for the Afterlife, and is another religious motivation. The choice between heaven and hell is a tone often used to motivate Muslims to practise *zakāt*. This motivation, inspired by invitation and intimidation, seems to be the tool to pressurise the givers to pay their *zakāt*. Those responsible and interested in *zakāt* such as Muslim scholars and charitable organisations usually use these religious incentives (see Chapters Four and Seven).

Trade and Reward with *Allah* is another religious motivation for profitable trade and risk-free business, resulting in rewards throughout the lives of Muslims. *Allah* encourages

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<sup>25</sup> The Day of Judgement or Resurrection is part of the eschatology of the Abrahamic religions. Muslims and Jews are buried, and remain in their places of burial until the day they are resurrected according to the will of God or *Allah*; Christians, on the other hand, are either buried or cremated: the Bible neither approves of nor forbids cremation; it is the soul that matters, not the body: ‘To be absent from the body is to be present with the Lord’ (2. Corinthians 5: 6-8; Philistines 1:23).

Muslims to give or donate through any charity they choose, and the rewards will surely come their way. The Qur'ān states:

Those who spend their wealth by night and by day, secretly and publicly, will find that their reward is secure with their Lord and that there is no reason for them to entertain any fear or grief (*Al-Baqara*, 2: 274).

Abu Huraira also cites the Prophet in the *Ḥadīth*: 'Charity does not decrease wealth' (*Sahih Muslim* Book 32: *Hadith* 6264). The Muslims who believe in this concept will feel their wealth is safe when they spend with expectations of a return. Trade is normally based on success or failure. Muslims' behaviour is thus associated with their belief that *zakāt* is a gain rather than a loss. *Zakāt*-givers distribute their *zakāt* to *zakāt*-beneficiaries on the one hand, in the expectation of a reward such as additional wealth, good health, and a good family reputation, and on the other, the trade with *Allah* will be a reward to the givers for the investment made during their lives on Earth. *Allah*'s encouragement and a certainty of 'return gift' have an impact on Muslims' decision-making regarding *zakāt* (see section above '*Zakāt*'s Methodology: Givers and Beneficiaries According to Sociology of Islām').

Social solidarity ('*Ummah*') has a socio-religious motivation as a result of the dual benefit between the giver and the beneficiary. It means Muslims' social solidarity with other Muslims worldwide; consequently, every Muslim is obligated to take care of his Muslim brother (and sister) wherever he or she lives. The impact of the practice of *zakāt* on society can be understood from Durkheim's point of view: Muslims' performance can be the key function of providing social solidarity of a society (McGivern 2014). The author also explains Durkheim's point as: 'he believed that religion is about community: it binds people together (social cohesion), promotes behaviour consistency (social control), and offers strength for people during life's transitions and tragedies (meaning and purpose)' (McGivern 2014: 473). The 'equality' relationship between *zakāt*-givers and beneficiaries achieves the concept of solidarity in Muslim society. Islām, on the same lines, also encourages social solidarity under the notion of '*Ummah*'. *Zakāt*-givers in Qatar, for example, will therefore take care of *zakāt*-beneficiaries in Palestine. It is possible to take a different approach in this case, such as *zakāt*'s political involvement in which intervention will be through *zakāt* according to Qatari policy in the Palestinian issue. Alkahlout (2020) explains that the Qatari charitable assistance to the Palestinians - especially in the Gaza Strip – has had both a positive and negative impact: Qatari aid may include *zakāt* funds which implies the politicisation of *zakāt*.<sup>26</sup> There are many

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<sup>26</sup> See Chapter Four: Politicisation of *Zakāt* in Qatar.

passages in the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth* which mention the meaning of Islāmic solidarity such as *Al-i'Imran*, 3: 103, *At-Tauba*, 9: 71, and *Jami` at-Tirmidhi* Vol. 4, Book 7: *Hadith* 2166. The *Qur'ān* says in other passages:

‘Surely the believers are none but brothers unto one another, so set things right between your brothers’  
(*Al-Hujurat*, 49: 10).

The interpretation of the meaning of believers by Muslim scholars such as Ibn Kathir (2001: 360) and Sabuni (2001: 217) are those who are followers of Islām or are Muslims; consequently, Islāmic solidarity is one of the motivations to practise *zakāt*.

The problem lies in the fact that Muslims and non-Muslims are living together under the same crises and suffering; for example, Christians and Muslims in Palestine. The issue arises on how the practice of *zakāt* can be discriminatory when it is dealing with universal human suffering. Petersen (2015: 83) discusses the neutrality of Western humanitarian organisations, which is the distribution of humanitarian aid to all the victims of disaster-stricken areas. Islāmic charitable aid is different: the aid is part of the concept of solidarity, which is in order to protect fellow Muslims from external threats (Petersen 2015: 83). Drawing upon literature from the socio-scientific study of religion, it is possible to use notions on religious in-group bias to better understand Islāmic concepts, and Muslim practice of giving priority to other Muslims when paying charity. Tongeren et al. (2015) discuss the religious in-group bias according to previous studies (Brewer 1979; Efferson, Lalive, and Fehr 2008). They explain human behaviour as how humans naturally form more favourable impressions of members of their own groups rather than those from others. Humans have the propensity to share a common cultural or group identity which reflects their own attitudes, and allocate more resources to in-group members relative to out-group members. Tongeren et al. (2015: 213) say, according to Hall, Matz, and Wood (2009): ‘Because religion is often a fundamental aspect of identity, individuals prefer to affiliate with those who share their religious beliefs’. Muslims will therefore prefer to associate with other Muslims rather than non-Muslims. Religious intolerance should be the main reason for most responses from individuals regarding the identity factor. The religious affiliation to a certain group (the in-group) is stronger than a non-shared identity (out-group). It thus appears that religious intolerance may be a default response for most people - individuals who differ on this key aspect of identity will likely be viewed more negatively than those who share a religious affiliation (Tongeren et al. 2015). The religious in-group bias is taken seriously in the studies by various researchers (Rowatt, Franklin and Cotton 2005; Batson and Stocks 2008), who investigate and improve on the concept of religious bias and its intolerance rather than

tolerance. This dimension will be further examined in the fieldwork sections of the thesis, especially the lived experience approach used in this research - the daily lives of givers and beneficiaries in Qatar. Social influences such as tribalism also affect religious incentives which influence decision-making when practising *zakāt*. This theme is investigated in the following section.

#### **2.4.2. Influence of Social and Cultural Norms**

Moving away from the theological to the sociological motivations of *zakāt*, social aspects have an effect on the biological, psychological, socio-cultural, and environmental behaviour of human beings (Kangai 2012). The various sociological factors that might have an effect on the practice of *zakāt* are belief and disbelief, origins, ethnicity, sect, geography, schools of Islāmic thought such as *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah*; the level of, for example, education and poverty; the structure of a society, including tribal community and civil society. Strombach et al. (2014) note that individual decisions almost always have some kind of connection to a social environment. It is reasonable to expect that they are also guided by others regarding preferences; for example, in fund-raising campaigns, people encourage each other to donate, and also build a certain trust between themselves. It is not merely trust that drives people to help each other, but also has the element of imitation. Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) pay *zakāt* to a specific entity, such as directly to the beneficiary or a specific organisation, and their children or friends are consequently affected by their behaviour. This effect is a result of the co-existence between givers and their society, as they talk about the collection and distribution of *zakāt*; in this case, both tradition and trust are encouraged in the practice of *zakāt*. The practice of *zakāt* becomes subject to the influence of the behaviour of society. The behaviour of society is considered an opportunity to practice *zakāt*, but relying on *zakāt* information handed down by others may create a lack of awareness of *zakāt*'s mechanism. Dependence on what people circulate becomes the norm, not on what the mechanism of *zakāt* means, such as following the path of *zakāt* until it reaches the beneficiary. Tradition and trust may consequently create a change in the way *zakāt* is practised.

Grimmer (2015) states that people tend to give if they have had experience of suffering; if they have personally known the sufferer(s); and when they are influenced by a donor who gives publicly to a certain cause. The Qatari (citizen and resident) will respond to the payment of *zakāt* in this case, based on a prior experience in suffering and need. This is what was verified in the interviews for this research (see Chapter Eight). Giving publicly, on the other hand, may be considered to be a form of self-glorification; however, psychotherapist Richard Joelson

(2018) says ‘pride in itself is not the problem: appropriate pride is a feeling of self-respect and personal worth’; pride in oneself may also inspire others to donate through a sense of ‘*Ummah* or social solidarity. Boasting, on the other hand, is considered excessive pride, and may affect donors’ decision-making.

Another aspect of cultural and social norms is that the presence of males is greater than that of females in making daily-life decisions, prevalent in tribal societies such as Qatari citizens (Fromherz 2012; Blanchard 2014; Zahlan 2016). This phenomenon was observed by the lived experiences of the researcher in societies such as Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, and currently in Qatar. A woman cannot travel without the permission of her father, brother, or husband, for example, and is often obliged to obey the wishes of her father or husband; consequently, this may affect a woman’s awareness and her dependence on men in the practice of *zakāt* (see Chapter Four). The tribal influence on the behaviour of Qatari society is not only on the decisions affecting Qatari females – it extends to the identity of the Qatari society.

#### **2.4.2.1. Tribal Culture and its Impact on the Practice of *Zakāt***

The current research has focused on a tribal society as an example of the social influence on Muslims’ attitude and behaviour. Tribalism is the well-known identity of Qatari society which is also the case study for this research.<sup>27</sup> Al-Wardi (1994) and Ghadban (2018) explain tribal society as the prevailing order in the society of the Arabian Peninsula (including Qatar), and that a tribal society is governed by customs and traditions. Each tribe has its own social system, and the head of the tribe is called the ‘master of the tribe’ assisted by an advisory council called the *majlis* or ‘tribal or clan council’. This council consists of leaders and policy-makers: it is they who take decisions about war, peace, reconciliation, transmission, and travelling to look for food, water, and pasture. Almari (2018) states the exploration of tribal society is divided into two parts in terms of impact: the nuclear family - parents, brothers, and sisters, and the extended family - grandparents, uncles, aunts, and cousins. The extended families gather together in *majlis* - meeting places which are divided into separate spaces for men and women. One of the characteristics of tribal society is the control of family members. There is a leader in each family, starting with the father and extending through the masculine line of the larger family - the sons - followed by ‘subordinate’ males, and, finally, female

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<sup>27</sup> (Al-Rishidi 2011; BouTaleb 2012: 23) define the tribe as a group of people that mostly belongs to a single lineage that goes back to a supreme grandfather or a tribal alliance that is considered an ancestor, and it consists of several sub-units and clans. Tribe members often inhabit a common territory that they consider their home, speak a distinct dialect, and have a homogenous culture or common solidarity against outside elements at least. See Chapter Four: Tribal and Other Cultures - Demographic Diversity.

members. Ibn Khaldun first explained *‘Asabiyyah* as social solidarity with emphasis on unity, group consciousness, and a sense of shared purpose and social cohesion, originally in a context of ‘tribalism’ (Al-Daraji 2003). Ibn Khaldun continues by saying, a tribal system involves a simple way of life, free from the complexities found in urban areas, and in which it tends to apply the literal teachings of Islām.<sup>28</sup> The desires of the individual may be ignored when the distribution of *zakāt* is made in front of other members of the tribe. Research into the lived experiences of Muslims in Qatar reveals that tribalism affects the practice of *zakāt* (see Chapter Four: Qatar Context Analysis).

McGivern (2014: 472) says ‘while some people think of religion as something individual because religious beliefs can be highly personal, religion is also a social institution’. He adds ‘social scientists recognize that religion exists as an organised and integrated set of beliefs, behaviours, and norms centred on basic social needs and values’. The researcher has grown up experiencing group participation in religious rituals such as exchanging food during the fasting month of *Ramaḍān*. The situation in the practice of *zakāt*, may, however, be different as a result of the religious reasons for secrecy in its practice such as no third-party involvement, or the morals that Islām encourages such as humility and modesty.<sup>29</sup> The practice of *zakāt* still has characteristics and patterns through societal behaviour. Muslims, for example, frequently visit the charitable organisations in the community as givers or beneficiaries. Charitable organisations are the specialised places for collecting and distributing donations, including *zakāt*. The presence of charitable organisations, in this case, means they are partners in the social influence on the practice of *zakāt* in a reciprocal relationship between these organisations and the *zakāt*-givers and beneficiaries.

### **2.4.3. Personal Convictions**

People do not behave in the same way as each other, nor do they have the same personal convictions as others. This means that not all Qatari Muslims practice *zakāt* according to the ethical teachings of the Islāmic religion or social influences. Robbins (2001: 91) explains that ‘it’s true that people all have values, attitudes, likes and dislike, feelings, goals, and similar general attributes yet individual differences are far more illuminating. People differ in intelligence, personality, abilities, ambition, motivations, emotional display, values, priorities, expectations, and the like’. The results of the formation of their feelings and emotions may consequently be due to factors such as personal convictions between the Qatari and Self, or

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<sup>28</sup> See Chapter Four: Tribal and Other Cultures - Demographic Diversity.

<sup>29</sup> See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* Mechanism: Collection and Obstacles Facing Collection.



other factors such as religion and society. There are also factors which are part of that society such as charitable organisations and their behaviour within that society. These personal feelings and emotions may have an impact on Qatari Muslims' beliefs. The Muslims in Qatar personal convictions regarding practising *zakāt* will be the result of a decision-making process based on convictions, unaffected by religion and society.

*Zakāt* payments - material or in kind - for example, have a monetary value. Money is important for people's livelihoods and well-being, and may be perceived as a symbol of validity, power, and value (Yamauchi and Templer 1982; Muzikante and Škuškovnika 2018). The claim that money is important is only true to a certain degree: it is one of the media which humans strive to obtain in order to achieve comfort in their lives. It is also the universal language used by most people to fund their daily needs. It may, however, also encourage some people to be self-centred and conceited by openly expressing pride in their riches. the Qur'ān says:

Wealth and children are an adornment of the life of the world. But the deeds of lasting righteousness are the best in the sight of your Lord in reward, and far better a source of hope (*Al-Kahf*, 18: 46).

One person is motivated by greed for wealth accumulation; another is motivated by philanthropy and distribution of his or her wealth. What motivates Muslims in Qatar to pay *zakāt*? The motivation should be strong enough to convince the Qatari *zakāt*-givers to pay their *zakāt*. This allows a part of *zakāt*-givers' wealth to be shared with others. If, on the other hand, the inner convictions of *zakāt*-givers are not in agreement within themselves, religious motivations and other factors will not be enough to gain their acceptance and convictions regarding *zakāt*. *Zakāt*'s motivations, in turn, will have an impact on *zakāt*-givers' decision-making to practise *zakāt*.

Based on all the above, the findings of this research will clarify what was concluded in this chapter through the three relationships: the Qatari and *Allah*; the Qatari and Self; and the Qatari and society's influences on Qatari *zakāt*-givers' decision-making. Qatari *zakāt*-givers' lived religious experiences are reflected in their choices: practice, denial, avoidance, or ignoring *zakāt*. Practice: presumes *zakāt* will be practised, especially in a society that is characterised by a majority of Muslims and has an Islāmic identity such as Qatar. Avoidance: despite believing in it, *zakāt* will not be practised, for reasons such as personal convictions, individual interpretations, religious influences or those of others. Ignorance: here, despite Muslims in Qatar believing in *zakāt*, they are not aware of how or why *zakāt* is practised, thus they ignore it. Denial: here, *zakāt* will not be practised due to non-belief in *zakāt*. The religious,

social, and personal factors may have an impact on *zakāt* in terms of belief and practice. This effect will be discovered through the lived experiences of Qatari givers and beneficiaries of *zakāt*. The ways in which these simple cases of the practice of *zakāt* are blurred and made complex in the individual lives of research participants is discussed in Chapter Six.

## 2.5. Summary

This chapter has presented a review of the literature on the importance of charity in religions, especially the Abrahamic, monotheistic ones - Judaism, Christianity, and Islām. The relationship between the givers and the beneficiaries has been explained from a theological point of view. This concept is based on the Islāmic encouragement of a ‘downward’ comparison regarding possessions, but an ‘upward’ comparison with regard to values, and how this concept could be applied to the relationship between Qatari givers and beneficiaries. The attention that Islām has given to protect the dignity of the beneficiaries is reflected in various verses from the Qur’ān, *Ḥadīth*, and the opinions of scholars. The research findings will demonstrate whether or not this is always respected by *zakāt*-givers whose behaviour is often influenced by pride, for example, or ignorance. The majority of previous research studies on *zakāt* emphasise the theological and legal aspects. The researcher begins to set out the unique approach which this project takes in situating *zakāt* at the cusp of religious practice and socio-cultural contexts. The researcher shows how religious motivations are as important as social ones by drawing on the relevant literature. The customs and traditions Muslims follow regarding *zakāt* in the case of Islām, are influenced by the social elements which motivate their decision-making. Families, *majlis* (councils), charitable organisations, and religion play a significant part in how the Muslims in Qatar (case study) consider their engagement in the practice of *zakāt*. People give because they believe; they also give because people around them give. People also give because they want to give according to the principle of personal conviction aside from religion and social influences. This research project will complete the understanding of the lived experience of *zakāt* through fieldwork in Qatar.

The second part of this literature review will focus on *zakāt* as a term in Islām, such as its definition and the roles it plays from different points of view of Islāmic denominations - with the main focus on *Sunnah* thinking - and *zakāt*’s mechanism: its collection and distribution, and the challenges and opportunities concerning the practice of *zakāt*.

## CHAPTER THREE

### ***Zakāt's Mechanism: Opportunities and Challenges through the Practice of Zakāt***

#### **3.0. Introduction**

The purpose of this research is to investigate the theological and sociological influences on the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar 2017-2020. To achieve this purpose, the two literature review chapters (Two and Three) aim to identify and utilise concepts to enable a comprehensive understanding of religious and social influences on modern day the practice of *zakāt*, using Qatar as a contextual case study.

Chapter Two has provided an overview of the concept of charity from the polytheistic belief systems. The focus of that chapter is on the philosophy of giving in monotheistic religions such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islām. It considers in particular *zakāt's* methodology in dealing with givers and beneficiaries according to the sociology of Islām and the Islāmic society. The chapter illustrates the effects this has on *zakāt*-givers when they make their decisions to practise *zakāt*.

Chapter Three develops the literature review and focuses on *zakāt's* mechanism - its collection and distribution, and the opportunities it offers and challenges it faces. This chapter provides comprehensive information on the *zakāt* form: definitions, interpretations, and *zakāt's* conditions according to *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* perspectives. This chapter also displays the mechanism of *zakāt's* collection and distribution, and its application through the eight categories of beneficiaries according to traditional or classical and modern (contemporary) Muslim scholastic interpretations. These data provide the researcher with the foundation on which to discuss the opportunities and challenges on *zakāt's* practice in terms of the political and economic influences.

#### **3.1. Charity Types in Islām**

Charity in Islām has been allocated several classifications. Based on the Qur'ān and the *Sunnah* or examples of Prophet Muhammad (*Ḥadīth*), Anwar (2015: 46) simplifies this classification:

- i. *Zakāt* (compulsory alms-giving).

ii. *Ṣadaqah* (charity - voluntary)

- a) *Ṣadaqah Wajibah* - obligatory charity: *Ṣadaqah al-Fitr* – fast-breaking, *Nadhr* - vow, *Fidyah* - ransom, *Kaffārah* - expiatory, *Udhiyyah* – sacrifice;
- b) *Ṣadaqah Nāfilah* - voluntary charity (optional; philanthropic giving, out of mercy for the less fortunate);
- c) *Ṣadaqah Lillah* - for Allah: *Waqf* - endowment; *ʿAqīqah* -sacrificial animals for the new-born; *Ṣadaqah* for relief from (financial) difficulties: *Ṣadaqah* for the expiation of sins; charity over and above *Zakāt* and *Ṣadaqah Wajibah*.

iii. Other types: *Ṣadaqah Jāriyah*–continuous; *Qarḍ Ḥaṣan*–interest-free loan.

The diversity of charitable giving is a confirmation that Islām also considers charity as one of the most important acts for Muslims. It gives freedom to the Muslims to choose how they would like to practise, and how they wish to distribute their donations. *Zakāt*, *ṣadaqah* and *waqf* (endowment) are the most commonly observed types of charity in Muslim societies. A brief explanation of *ṣadaqah* and *waqf* is necessary to illustrate some other types of giving in Islām other than *zakāt*.

*Ṣadaqah* (voluntary charity) is derived from the word *sidq* ‘truth’. It is an optional charitable donation, and can be offered to both Muslims and non-Muslims. *Ṣadaqah* is ‘often performed through voluntary work, in-kind contributions, and free services. It can be given to anyone, with no specific groups designated as recipients’ (Ibrahim and Sherif 2008: 5). This source of charity gives flexibility to donors when deciding on the sector, country, and project it is intended to fund (Atia 2011: 7). *Ṣadaqah* could be monetary assistance; lending a helping hand in sickness (moral support); forgiveness such as a pardon for debtors or mistakes or misunderstandings; social communication such as visiting or being visited by relatives, friends, and neighbours; spreading knowledge, such as giving free tutorials or training, and so on (Naveed 2017: n.p.). Abu Dharr reports the Prophet saying, ‘Your putting some of the water from your bucket in your brother's bucket is *sadaqa*. Your removing stones, thorns and bones from people's path is *sadaqa*. Your guiding a man in a place where there are no guides is *sadaqa*’ (Al-Adab Al-Mufrad Book 38: *Hadith* 891). Muslims who practice *ṣadaqah* in all or any of its forms also receive rewards from Allah, as it has a similar religious motivation as *zakāt*. These options are strong motivations to practise *ṣadaqah* in all or any of its forms, for the benefit of a mixed society of Muslims and non-Muslims. This ‘fair’ concept of charity will help to support a cohesive society in which all its members can co-exist, despite the solidarity of *ʿUmmah* and people's feelings and attitudes towards charity not being the same.

*Waqf* (endowment) is another option of the Islāmic donations concept. *ʿAwqaf* or *waqf* mainly refers to a religious endowment such as cash or buildings, plots of land or other assets to a religious, educational, or charitable cause (Kaleem and Ahmed 2010). The money is disbursed for projects compliant with *Shariʿah* (in accordance with Islāmic principles), such as schools and hospitals (Elasrag 2017: 6). The University of Al-Azhar in Egypt is one example of *ʿAwqaf* –it provides free education to graduate and post-graduate students (Kaleem and Ahmed 2010: 418). The endowment works to bring together members of society in one place, with different classes, rich or poor, and their affiliations, and so on.

The diverse categories of charitable giving provide the freedom and options to practise giving, and shows a choice in a donation system which should facilitate and encourage the act of giving. Compulsory giving ensures continuity in the practice of giving such as *zakāt*.

### 3.2. *Zakāt* in its Religious Form: Definition and Various Interpretations

*Zakāt*, in linguistic terms, and according to the classical Arabic dictionary *Al-Qamus Al-Muhit*, means ‘to grow and to increase’ and also ‘cleanliness, growth, blessing and praise’ (Fairuzabadi 2008: 713). *Zakāt* in *Sharīʿah* (Islāmic religious law) refers to a certain share of wealth, prescribed by *Allah*, to be given to specific categories of beneficiaries (al-Mawardi 1994: 71; Al-Qaradawi 1999; and Al-Sistani 2009). The Qurʾān uses all the above-mentioned categories (*Al-Baqara*, 2: 43), (*At-Tauba*, 9: 5), (*Al-Hajj*, 22: 78), and (*Al-Maʿarij*, 70: 24-25). One of the passages says:

Those who truly believe and establish the Prayer and pay *Zakah*, those who firmly believe in *Allah* and in the Last Day, to them, We shall indeed pay a great reward (*An-Nisaa*, 4: 162).

Prophet Muhammad emphasises what the Qurʾān states about *zakāt* in the *Ḥadīth*, such as *Sunan Ibn Majah* (Vol. 3, Book 8: *Hadith* 1788), and *Jamiʿ at-Tirmidhi* (Vol. 2, Book 2: *Hadith* 617). Abu Ayyub Khalid bin Zaid Al-Ansari reported: ‘A man came to the Messenger of *Allah* and said, “Direct me to a deed which will admit me to *Jannah* [heaven or paradise] and take me away from the Fire [Hell]”. The Messenger of *Allah* said, “Worship *Allah* and associate no partner with Him, perform *As-Salat* [prayer], pay *Zakat*, and maintain the ties of kinship [ʿUmmah]” (*Al-Bukhari and Muslim* Book 1: *Hadith* 331). The significance of this message is exemplified in the religious motivation of Muslims to practise *zakāt*. It had the effect of making the majority of Muslims willing to pay *zakāt* every year, whether or not they had a religious awareness concerning *zakāt*’s concept and mechanism. The responsibility for practising *zakāt* by Muslims here is for both males and females. The majority of *zakāt* verses in the Qurʾān particularly address the Muslim individual:

Establish Prayer and dispense *Zakah* (the Purifying Alms) and bow in worship with those who bow (*Al-Baqara*, 2: 43).

It was also narrated in the *Hadīth*, Abu Hurairah said: ‘I was sitting with the Prophet [SAW] when a woman came to him and said: “O Messenger of Allah, two bracelets of gold”. He said: “Two bracelets of fire” (*Sunan an-Nasa’i* Vol. 6, Book 48: *Hadith* 5145). The Messenger here gave the responsibility for paying *zakāt* to the woman - not to her husband, father, brother, and so on, otherwise she will be punished in the Hereafter. The practice of *zakāt* may therefore be performed by the female herself, or she can delegate someone to act on her behalf with her full consent (Mardawe 1955: 197). A woman in Qatar, however, may be overwhelmed by male domination which includes the interaction of females in the practice of *zakāt* (see Chapter Four; ‘Tribal and Other Cultures Demographic Diversity’). The permission a woman gives to a man to act on her behalf, may give him the power to make his own decisions without her knowing. Tribal customs and traditions will push her to agree to appoint a man to ‘distribute’ her *zakāt*. The man may find a religious excuse to make his own decisions on her behalf. It would be religiously permissible and also preserve the customs and traditions. This phenomenon has been investigated in the fieldwork concerning Qatari society, and the tribal characteristics that strengthen the presumed authority of the male over the female (see Chapter Six).

It is not necessarily the obligation of *zakāt* for Muslims means all Muslims are believers in the practice of *zakāt*. There are some groups of Muslims who believe in *zakāt* but do not practice it such as *Al-Tawaqquf wa al-Tabayyun* sect.<sup>30</sup> Their conditions are classified under the relationship between the Muslim and *Allah* in terms of belief in *zakāt*, but they do not practice *zakāt*, as indicated in the previous literature review chapter. Al-Aql says in his book ‘*Kharijites*’, *Al-Tawaqquf wa al-Tabayyun* have ceased to pay *zakāt* because they believe Muslims are currently in a vulnerable situation similar to that in early Islām in *Makkah* (1998: 114-8). Al-Aql further mentions that the group (*Tawaqquf wa al-Tabayyun*) believes a reason for the supposed weakness of Islām is the detachment of Muslims from the traditional teachings and laws of *Sharī‘ah*. Mamouri (2015) adds, their belief in establishing an ‘Islāmic State’ or caliphate with an Islāmic government to implement the collection and distribution of *zakāt*, led to attacks and hostility towards Islām. They believed that, as there was no so-called ‘Islāmic State’ implementing Islāmic laws, it was their religious duty to establish one. This sect’s reason

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<sup>30</sup> *Al-Tawaqquf wa al-Tabayyun* is one of the sects of Kharijites, *Sunnah* Muslims, who are more fanatical in religion and who consider that people can be Muslims if they follow their sect’s beliefs. The majority of them live in Egypt, Pakistan, and Afghanistan (Al-Aql 1998; Sonn and Farrar 2009).

for refusing to pay *zakāt* is one example of the various interpretations of *zakāt* which have influenced its practice.

Muslim jurists believe the Qur'ān is the word of *Allah*, and His word should therefore be literally observed. They also believe that the Qur'ān is valid at all times and in all places (Al-Qaradawi 1993; Al-Bouti 2002); however, it is not always clear how to practise some of the religious obligations demanded by the Qur'ān such as *zakāt* and prayers. The Prophet Muhammad clarified these practices in the *Ḥadīth* (Saeed 2006). There have, nevertheless, been many transitions since the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth* were written. Changes have occurred in the economy, development of methods and apparatus for living, the recent technological revolution, and so on. Rosdi (2015: 73) mentions that, 'The epistemology of common development theory originates from western ideology, while the epistemology of Islāmic information stems from the four main sources called *Maqāṣid Al-sharī'ah*, which are *al-Qur'ān*, *al-Ḥadīth*, *Ijmā'* (Consensus) and *Qiyās Al-'Ulamā'* (Analogical Deduction) (2015: 73). Consensus means agreement within a group – usually by Muslim scholars whose judgements are trusted in connection with special rulings in matters of jurisprudence. Analogy, on the other hand, is to find a common cause of a problem that did not exist in the era of the Prophet and his Companions (Al-Amidi 1981).

Who is qualified to be a Muslim scholar in order to be able to discuss issues relating to *zakāt*? Al-Qaradaghi said in an interview with *Al-Raya* (2012) that there are certain qualifications and conditions which a person must fulfil before being allowed to issue a *fatwā*. They need to master knowledge in general, and in the following detailed knowledge:

- i. The Qur'ān and its sciences.
- ii. The science of *Ḥadīth*.
- iii. Awareness of the reasons for the revelation of the verse, and the arrival of the *Ḥadīth*.
- iv. The Consensus and Analogical Deduction of the objectives of Islām, especially the consensus of the Companions.
- v. Knowing Arabic: science is a general knowledge of linguistics and auxiliary sciences in every subject.
- vi. *Fiqh* (the theory or philosophy of Islāmic law) on Necessity and Need.

*Zakāt* issues, however, cannot be unified and resolved in a cohesive pattern or framework of interpretations. The interpretation of *zakāt*, for instance, is based on several factors: (i) interpretations by Islāmic scholars; (ii) existing differences in traditional and modern opinions of juristic perspectives concerning *zakāt*'s mechanism; and (iii) diversity of Islāmic societies.

Interpretations of the Qur'ān differ between the *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* scholars according to the changing times. The various scholars' interpretations of the Qur'ān also differ between the branches of Islām and various schools of religious thought such as *Ḥanafī*, *Mālikī*, *Shafī'ī*, *Ḥanbalī* (*Sunnah*), *Ja'farī*. and *Zaidī* (*Shī'ah*).

Differences also exist in traditional and modern (contemporary) opinions of juristic perspectives concerning *zakāt*'s mechanism; for example, the contrasting views of *zakāt* concerning rented land (Rosele, Abdullah and Ramli 2003: 8). Abu Hanifah<sup>31</sup>, for instance, declared: 'The levy is on the land of the land-owner and not on the produce of the one who rents the land from the owner'. Al-Qaradawi (2016), however, disagrees. Rosele, Abdullah, and Ramil (2003) claim that Al-Qaradawi follows the opinion of Ibn Rushd<sup>32</sup>: 'When a landowner rents his (or her) land to another, both parties are liable to pay *zakāt*'.

The diversity of Islāmic societies is another factor. The cultural and social norms have an impact on *zakāt* from one society to another.<sup>33</sup> This is despite the Muslims' belief in the Qur'ān as being valid for all times and in all places. Members of these Muslim societies are distinguished by their origins, ethnicity, sect, geography, schools of Islāmic thought such as *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah*, the level of education, degree of poverty, and the structure of a society such as a tribal or civic community. There is considerable ethnic and cultural diversity within the Muslim 'Ummah. Esposito states that 'there is not one but many Islāms' (1998: 223). A Muslim in South Asia such as in Pakistan, for instance, would be culturally different from a Muslim in the Middle East such as Lebanon, despite their reference to one religion and one Messenger; likewise, a Muslim who lives in Europe will be culturally different from a Muslim who lives in Africa. The religious practices of these Muslims, and therefore their type of 'Islām', will be shaped by their culture (Manen 1990).<sup>34</sup> People negotiate their unique cultural and ethnic identities as they find ways to practise *zakāt* in their lives. This research will explore the impact of their diverse lived experiences on the practice of *zakāt* of individuals in Qatar. The validity of diverse interpretations a Muslim follows will contribute to the confusion caused by these conflicting factors mentioned above regarding the practice of *zakāt*. A Muslim will ask questions such as whether *zakāt* should be spent inside or outside of the country, or whether

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<sup>31</sup> Imam Abū Ḥanīfa (699 – 767 CE) by *Sunnah* Muslims, was an 8th century *Sunnah* Muslim theologian and jurist of Persian origin, who became the eponymous founder of the *Ḥanafī* school of *Sunnah* jurisprudence, which has remained the most widely practised law school in the *Sunnah* tradition (al-Thahabi: 1996).

<sup>32</sup> Abū l-Walīd Muḥammad Ibn 'Aḥmad Ibn Rušd; (1126-1198 CE), often Latinised as Averroes, studied jurisprudence on the *Mālikī* school. He was a Muslim Andalusian polymath and jurist who wrote about many subjects, including philosophy, theology [...] Islamic jurisprudence and law, and linguistics (Al-Maliki: n.d.).

<sup>33</sup> See Chapter Two: Influence of Social and Cultural Norms.

<sup>34</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt*-Givers and Beneficiaries' Lived Experience Between Belief and Practice.



wealth falls under the payment of *zakāt* or not, and so on. These kinds of questions can create confusion in a Muslim's awareness of *zakāt*, and a challenge to the practice of *zakāt*; on the other hand, these different understandings of *zakāt* could also help Muslims to feel free to choose how to practise. This notion is reinforced by many authors such as Al-Shaibani (1996) and Al-Baghdadi (2012: 47) who explain that the diversity of interpretations is a mercy for 'Ummah. Here a Muslim is not restricted to a specific clarification of *zakāt*, as some interpretations may not be appropriate for the time, place, or a Muslim's living conditions. The various versions, it could be argued, provide greater opportunities for the Muslim to practise *zakāt*.

### 3.2.1 *Zakāt's Conditions from Sunnah and Shī'ah Perspectives*

The *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* sects consist of more than 95 per cent of Muslims (Koenig and Al-Shohaib 2014). This research explores both denominations, with a specific focus on the *Sunnah* community in Qatar. Probing into Qatari *Sunnah* practices of *zakāt* will improve understanding the religious and social influences, and, subsequently, the generalisability of this research.<sup>35</sup> This is one of the reasons why the researcher chose Qatar as the focus of this research: it has a *Sunnah* majority population (Ismael 2014).<sup>36</sup>

Traditional *Sunnah* Muslim scholars, and those who extend the meaning of *zakāt*, (such as Ibn Kathīr, Al-Qurṭubī, Al-Shāfi'ī, Ibn Ḥanbal, Ibn Qudamah, Al-Qaradawi, Al-Zuhayli, and Al-Qaradaghi) attempt to meet modern or contemporary explanations of the behaviour of *zakāt*-givers, according to the conditions of wealth as follows:

- i. *Zakāt* is obligatory for all Muslims: men and women, adults, and children, the sane and those who have a limited mental capacity;<sup>37</sup>
- ii. The status of their wealth: full ownership, debt-free, and growth over and above personal needs; and

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<sup>35</sup> Al-Thani and Jaber (2019) explain the different *Sunnah* schools which exist in Qatar are *Ḥanafī*, *Mālikī*, *Shāfi'ī*, and *Ḥanbalī*. *Ḥanbalī* is the largest among Qatari citizens, while the others are followed by Qatari residents. See (Chapter Four: *Zakāt* Education and Awareness in Qatar Society), and (Chapter Five: Case Study: Qatar).

<sup>36</sup> See Chapter Four: *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* Demographic Diversity.

<sup>37</sup> The *Ḥanafī* school differs from the rest of the *Sunnah* schools in the matter of *zakāt* for children, the sane, and those with limited mental capacity. *Ḥanafī* believe that there should be no *zakāt* due from children or the ones with limited mental capacity. Al-Qaradawi (1999: 53) explains that this was confirmed in the interpretation by *At-Tauba*, 9: 101: 'stance purification is needed from sins and evil. Children and the insane have none of these and need no purification or cleansing, so they should not be among those from whom *zakāt* must be taken'.

- iii. The types of wealth include gold and silver; honey and animal products; minerals and sea products; shares and bonds; earnings; buildings; livestock; agricultural and business goods. A person's wealth is calculated according to when *niṣāb* is reached.

*Niṣāb* is defined as 'the minimum level to determine whether there is *zakāt* to be paid on the assets' (Ubaidillah and Sallehuddin 2013: 196). To determine the minimum of *zakāt* (*niṣāb*), each type of wealth is different: approximately eighty-five grams of gold; five hundred and ninety-five grams of silver; five camels; forty sheep; 652.8kg of grain, fruit or agricultural crops, and so on. A similar rate applies to trade goods, currency, and savings. *Zakāt* therefore amounts to 2.5 per cent of one's wealth. *Sunnah* Muslim scholars have determined that, according to the *Hadīth*, Ali ibn Abu Talib quotes The Prophet as saying:

When you possess two hundred dirhams and one year passes on them, five dirhams are payable. Nothing is incumbent on you, that is, on gold, till it reaches twenty dinars. When you possess twenty dinars and one year passes on them, half a dinar is payable. Whatever exceeds that will be reckoned properly (*Sunan Abi Dawud* Book 9: *Hadith* 1568).

*Zakāt* therefore amounts to 2.5 per cent of one's wealth, and when *niṣāb* is reached at the end of one *Hijrī* (Islāmic year), *Sunnah* Muslims should pay their *zakāt*. Ibn Umar narrated, 'Whoever earns any money, he is not liable to pay *Zakah*, until the period of a year has passed (while still possessing the same amount of money)' (*At-Tirmidhi* Book 4: *Hadith* 630). It could be that, some *Sunnah* fail to have sufficient awareness of the rules and conditions of the practice of *zakāt*, and the same scenario may prevail among *Shī'ah*. Defects in religious comprehension or awareness of *zakāt* lead to an obstacle in the mechanism of *zakāt*, such as its collection and distribution. If so, this situation also implies that the lack of awareness will challenge *zakāt* in its practice.

*Shī'ah* scholars such as Rizvi (1999), and official *Shī'ah* websites such as *Al-Najafi* which portray *Shī'ah* jurisprudence, the interpretations show areas of similarities and differences between *Shī'ah* and *Sunnah* points of view. Interpretations including the amount of *niṣāb* to be paid, and the notion of paying *zakāt* every Islāmic year, are examples of similarities. Al-Najafi (n.d.) and Rizvi (1999: 1) on the other hand, also mention different interpretations from those of the *Sunnah*:

- i. There is no *zakāt* due from children and those whose mental capacity is limited, because there are no prayer obligations on these individuals;<sup>38</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> The *Hanafi* school from *Sunnah* agreed with *Shī'ah* about the matter of *zakāt* for children and the sane and those who have a limited mental capacity.

- ii. Only nine items are considered obligatory for *zakāt* (2.5 per cent):
  - a) Coins: silver and gold;
  - b) Livestock: cows, sheep, goats, and camels; and
  - c) Crops: 847kg of wheat, barley, dates, and (or) raisins.

There is a clear disparity of *zakāt* interpretations between *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah*, which could contribute to the present challenge for Muslims in their religious awareness of *zakāt* (see section above 'Zakāt in its Religious Form: Definition and Various Interpretations'). According to the Qur'ān (*Al-Anfal*, 8: 41), it is significant that another type of religious alms obligation in *Shī'ism* is classified as *Khums*. This form of wealth entails one fifth or twenty per cent tax that must be paid on all items such as:

- i. Booty (seized through war);
- ii. Objects obtained from the sea;
- iii. Treasure;
- iv. Mineral resources;
- v. Gainful earnings (business profits);
- vi. Lawful acquisitions which have become 'mixed up' with unlawful ones; and
- vii. Land which has been sold by a Muslim to a *dhimmī* (a free, non-Muslim who is protected by a treaty of surrender according to Islāmic law).

*Khums* has six categories of expenditure (Sachedina 1980). According to Mughniyyah, the difference between *zakāt* and *khums* is that *khums* is distributed according to 'the shares of God, the Prophet (S) and the *dhawī al-qurba* will be paid to the Imam (A) or his representative, to be spent for the benefit of the Muslim community'. The other three parts are to be given to the orphans, destitute people, and travellers belonging exclusively to *Banū Hāshim* (Mughniyyah 2017: 135).<sup>39</sup> The Qur'ān focuses on *zakāt* more than on the *khums*, while *Shī'ah* are more concerned with the practice of *khums* rather than *zakāt* (Al-Haidari 2014).

Al-Haidari explains that this preference was due to the participation of *Sunnah* groups in paying *zakāt* under many types of wealth, weakening interpretations of *zakāt* among the *Shī'ah*, and thus bringing the *khums* alternative into practice. It can also be attributed to the *Shī'ah* concentration on *Banū Hāshim*, including the Imām and *Shī'ah* leadership, where there is no *zakāt* for *Banū Hāshim*. An Imām does not receive *zakāt*, yet does receive *khums*. This is confirmed by Al-Haidari who states that an Imām must possess an abundance of wealth in case

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<sup>39</sup> *Banū Hāshim* is a clan in the Quraysh tribe in Saudi Arabia, which consists of the Prophet Muhammad's ancestors and descendants. The *Banii Hashem* clan is present and known to this day (Firestone 1990).

a poor or needy person requests monetary assistance, and should therefore take *khums*. *Zakāt* is challenged by this *Shī'ah* practice and *khums* is given preference. The reduction of the practice of *zakāt* may result in its weakening or avoidance, or even disappearance in societies such as Iran.

The two sections above expose the probability of Muslims' lack of awareness in the various attitudes towards *zakāt*, and a challenge to the practice of *zakāt*. Islāmic scholars in this case, have an important role in the education of Muslims regarding *zakāt* and its application.

### 3.2.2. Muslims' Education and Awareness of *Zakāt*

Methods and practices have been developed to enhance the spread of understandings of *zakāt* by Islāmic scholars in the twenty-first century. Academic departments have been established for the purpose of 'Islāmic Studies' (which falls under the discipline of *zakāt* jurisprudence). Mosques have also played a pivotal role in raising *zakāt* awareness, particularly during the Friday prayers - '*jumu'ah zuhr* time' - where a large number of Muslims gather together.<sup>40</sup> Television productions such as *Shari'a and Life* on *Al-Jazeera* have also greatly contributed to promoting the awareness of *zakāt*. Al-Qaradawi and Al-Qaradaghi, both well-known Islāmic scholars, have spoken about jurisprudence and *zakāt* on the programme mentioned (aired on 28 September 2008 and on 19 April 2019; *Al Jazeera Arabic* 2008; *Al-Jazeera Mubasher* 2019). This method is an example of utilising the power of modern technology and wide-spread broadcasting to extend a message on the important significance of *zakāt* in society. There are websites which discuss *zakāt* jurisprudence whilst providing resources and information on matters concerning *zakāt* and how to calculate it. Marketing campaigns, led by large Islāmic charities such as *Islāmic Relief Worldwide* and *Muslim Hands*, for instance, have also raised awareness of *zakāt*.<sup>41</sup>

This considerable spread of information about *zakāt* aims to raise Muslims' awareness of *zakāt*, especially since there are Muslims who practice *zakāt* without being able to explain why (Haqqi 2015). The concept of *zakāt* and its practice may be influenced by common opinions and behavioural customs which are shared by families, for instance, rather than according to the guidelines or rules provided by *Shari'ah*. Muslim scholars also have a role in raising overall

<sup>40</sup> The majority of Muslims gather together every Friday - *jumu'ah* for the afternoon prayer '*zuhr*' according to the *Hadīth*. It was narrated by Jabir bin 'Abdullah that: The Messenger of *Allah* said: 'Whoever misses *jumu'ah* three times with no cogent excuse, *Allah* (SWT) will place a seal on his heart' (*Sunan an-Nasa'i* Vol. 2, Book 14: *Hadīth* 1370).

<sup>41</sup> [https://muslimhands.org.uk/zakat/calculator?gclid=CjwKCAiA8qLvBRABEiwAE\\_ZzPZaCH-JOy5SGrq\\_RHd5FRfYPfjYXX3di09kly18p2l85uICQ-m7r7hoCyVgQAvD\\_BwE](https://muslimhands.org.uk/zakat/calculator?gclid=CjwKCAiA8qLvBRABEiwAE_ZzPZaCH-JOy5SGrq_RHd5FRfYPfjYXX3di09kly18p2l85uICQ-m7r7hoCyVgQAvD_BwE) [accessed 13/12/2019]  
<https://www.qcharity.org/en/qa/zakat> [accessed 13/12/2019]

community awareness. The task that scholars undertake in raising awareness is considered one of *zakāt*'s opportunities which encourages the continuity of the practice of *zakāt*. Their intended and unintended biases have, on the other hand, also become a challenge in practising *zakāt*. Amuda and Che Embi (2013: 405), furthermore, highlight the obstacles in charity collection, particularly the lack of awareness or ignorance of it. They posit those Muslim scholars have failed to educate Muslims about the concept of charity, and the role of charitable institutions. It is noteworthy how all of these different sources of education do not adequately cover Muslim awareness about *zakāt*. The extent to which Muslims are made aware of the concept of *zakāt* is as important as the rules and its application in line with *Sharī'ah*. Advancements in religious verdicts and education curricula concerning *zakāt*, not only in Qatar, but worldwide, have become crucial in discovering their impact on *zakāt*-givers' behaviour. *Zakāt*'s collection methods in the twenty-first century have become part of an attempt to discover this impact.

### 3.3. *Zakāt* Mechanism: Collection and Obstacles Facing Collection

According to a Qur'ānic verse quoted by *At-Tauba*, 9: 103, and *Ḥadīth Sahih al-Bukhari* Vol. 2, Book 24: *Hadith* 573, the Prophet Muhammad and the first two Caliphs, Abu Bakr and 'Umar, *zakāt* was controlled by the state and not by individuals; the *zakāt* mechanism was therefore not an optional choice connected to religious worship: it presumed Muslims were aware of the financial accounting of *zakāt*, and its extraction was the responsibility of the state.<sup>42</sup> The importance of paying *zakāt*, according to the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, declared war on those Muslims who refused to pay, known as the '*Ridda Wars*' (Hossain 2012: 3). During the time of Uthman bin Affan, the third Caliph, *zakāt* management was opened up to non-state actors as intermediary agents for collecting the funds. The state collection of *zakāt* from the givers was popular in the first centuries of Islām and during the time of the Ottoman Empire (*Ottoman Souvenir* 2018). Responsibility for practising *zakāt* has consequently become the duty of the individual to pay *zakāt*.

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<sup>42</sup> According to a Qur'ānic verse quoted by *At-Tauba*. The Qur'an says: '(O Prophet)! Take alms out of their riches [the people] and thereby cleanse them and bring about their growth (in righteousness), and pray for them. Indeed, your prayer is a source of tranquillity for them. *Allah* is All-Hearing, All-Knowing' (*At-Tauba* 9: 103). The Prophet's instructions to his delegates narrated [by] Abu Ma'bad: '...tell them that *Allah* has made it obligatory on them to pay *Zakat* which will be taken from the rich among them and given to the poor among them...' (*Sahih al-Bukhari* Vol. 2, Book 24: *Hadith* 573).

*Zakāt* collection is currently divided into four management models according to Stirk (2015: 7): government collection, independent collection and delivery agencies, collection by mosques and charitable organisations, and individual collection.

*Zakāt* is collected and distributed by the government in countries such as Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Pakistan, and Malaysia; other countries collect *zakāt* as a part of tax such as Qatar and Kuwait (Kroessin 2008: 36; Susetyo 2015: 527). Ubaidillah and Sallehuddin (2013: 1) praise the Malaysian role on *zakāt* collection, where *zakāt* centres have been established in every state to manage its collection and distribution. Khan (2007), on the other hand, says the government of Pakistan distinguishes the collection of *zakāt* between the *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah*. This implies that governments may contribute to fuelling sectarian conflict; since *zakāt* is under government control, it is therefore formulated to serve the government's desire(s) through its collection and distribution. This fact suggests that *zakāt* has become politicised; on the other hand, there may be sufficient administrative control to protect *zakāt* collection and distribution from being influenced by governmental interference, thus over-ruling the religious goals of practising *zakāt*. The extent to which this influence may have on religious spokespersons concerning the interpretation of *zakāt* may also be another factor influencing the collection and distribution of *zakāt*.

There are some countries with majority-Muslim populations such as Indonesia, which allow independent agencies to operate in this field. The official permission offers *zakāt*-givers the option to decide on where their contribution should go. This system has certain flaws according to Susetyo (2015: 519). He presents *zakāt*'s collection and distribution in Indonesia as open to mismanagement of the disbursement of funds and contravenes *zakāt* policies. The responsibility of these agencies seems to be the collection and administration of *zakāt*. They receive *zakāt* and distribute it according to their personal judgements. This does not necessarily mean they mismanage *zakāt* funds, but that it is merely a subjective decision which may appear to be mismanagement to some people.

Mosques and charitable organisations are important in countries such as India, the United States, and various European nations, where no centralised government-managed *zakāt* collection agencies exist. These institutions of worship are central to religious practices. The mosques or non-government organisations (NGOs) collect large sums of *zakāt* (Stirk 2015). *The Guardian* (2015), on the other hand, declares that there are many charities which spend a great deal of money on fundraising campaigns - the United Nations, for example, have spent most of their budget activities on administration. It appears to have an effect, in one way or another, on a Muslim's decision to pay *zakāt*. The foundations of these organisations are

evidently governed by a commercial system rather than religious conviction, as their existence and capital are based on these donations: they would not be able to operate without these funds. The assumption here is of bias in *zakāt*'s administration when applying *zakāt* according to an organisation's desires, as in the case of Muslim scholars discussed above. This can, moreover, be present in administrative work in terms of transparency and neutrality. This is especially prominent in rich countries with a Muslim majority which define themselves as following Islāmic law such as in Qatar. Here the state provides fertile ground for the work of these institutions.

Individual *zakāt* payments are made directly by the giver to the beneficiary. This is a custom that has existed since the time of Prophet Muhammad to the modern day. *Zakāt* has passed through multiple stages of religious commitment regarding the act of giving by Muslims. *Zakāt*'s process has included specific phases: to whom it is due, types of wealth and conditions, the amount of *niṣāb*, and its distribution, according to the eight categories of beneficiaries. The individual *zakāt* mechanism will be fully responsible for the individual Muslim's awareness of the religious aspect of *zakāt*. That is, through understanding of the religious concept of *zakāt* in its distribution, the individual Muslim will distribute his or her *zakāt*. *Zakāt* will also be exposed to individual interpretations as a result of personal convictions.<sup>43</sup> A lack of conviction in the practice of *zakāt*, in this case, may result in a form of ignoring it.

One of the strengths of the four management models of *zakāt* collection is to provide the opportunities to continue practising *zakāt*, in spite of their failings or limitations in some areas. According to the government-collection principle, it would be an advantage for *zakāt* to be collected from a responsible state representative in order to ensure its payment. The state also has the responsibility to follow the path of *zakāt* from the giver to the beneficiary. The role of the state here is also important to ensure that *zakāt* does not go to undesirable destinations. This does not mean, however, that *zakāt* should be driven by political motives according to the desires of the state itself. The fact that *zakāt* is under the administration of the state, means there is a chance that *zakāt* may be distributed according to the state's political aspirations. This could also have an adverse effect on the religious goal of *zakāt* (further investigation into this phenomenon concerning Qatari society has been developed in Chapter Eight).

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<sup>43</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt*-Givers and Beneficiaries Lived Experience Between Belief and Practice.

Mosques and charitable organisations could also be a useful channel for decision-making; for example, the difficulty some Muslims have in deciding who the beneficiary should be, or the difficulty in reaching a certain beneficiary. Projects that take place in Pakistan or Chad, for instance, are funded by *zakāt*-givers in Germany. The process of delivering *zakāt* to the beneficiaries becomes a problem, however, as it would involve administrative fees which do not occur in individual payments. It could also become a dependency issue which relieves the giver of deciding, arguably leading to the absence of social solidarity, especially when the giver and the beneficiary live in the same community. The reliance will be on mosques or charitable organisations to deliver *zakāt*. There will be an absence of privileges and direct communication between the giver and the beneficiary, as in the ‘return gift’ concept.<sup>44</sup>

There are others who believe that it is their religious duty to give their contribution directly to beneficiaries, thus ensuring they receive *zakāt*. It would be difficult for the giver to communicate directly with the beneficiary outside the country, on the other hand, to verify whether the beneficiary is entitled to *zakāt*, under the terms of the eight categories of beneficiaries. There are many authors such as Amuda and Che Embi (2013) and Khan (2007), however, who stress that the processes of *zakāt* collection and distribution are not that simple. Guermat, Al-Utaibi and Tucker (2003: 2) explain that collecting information about *zakāt* is difficult for three reasons: (i) there are few rules on how much is given, to whom it is given, and how it has been transferred. This is the responsibility of jurists and economists to clarify; (ii) *zakāt* is a religious duty, therefore, direct enquiries about it should not be made. This concept, in principle, is correct; however, how can Muslims be made aware of the mechanisms of *zakāt*, if they are denied answers to their questions, explanations, exchanges of experiences and opinions about *zakāt*’s *fiqh*? and (iii) Where no third party is involved - *zakāt* is given directly to the beneficiary by the donor; this process remains secret and undisclosed; consequently, *zakāt* cannot be counted. The authors are, arguably, correct regarding the involvement of a third party, in terms of Islām’s support for giving in secret; however, it presents one of the difficulties in assessing how much *zakāt* is collected and distributed.

There are some Muslims who believe *zakāt* should be a direct transaction between a donor and a beneficiary, which means no third-party actor or intermediary between the individual and *Allah*. They are bound by their basic and traditional understanding of the principles of *zakāt* according to the Qur’ān and *Hadīth* of the Prophet. The Qur’ān says:

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<sup>44</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt’s Methodology: Givers and Beneficiaries According to Sociology of Islām Approach*.



If you dispense your charity publicly, it is well; but if you conceal it and pay it to the needy in secret, it will be even better for you (*Al-Baqara*, 2: 271).

Abu Hurayra cites the Prophet: ‘Seven types of people will be shaded by *Allah* under His shade on the day when there will be no shade except His’. Those include ‘a person who practices charity so secretly that his left hand does not know what his right hand has given (i.e., nobody knows how much he has given to charity)’ (*Maliks Muwatta* Book 051: *Hadith* 014). The philosophy of discreet giving is meant not only to avoid causing the beneficiary any embarrassment, but also to avoid negative publicity and boasting by the giver; on the other hand, public-giving may encourage others to pay *zakāt* in fulfilment of their Islāmic duties (Al-Munajjid 2002).

There is another obstacle. People (Muslims) may wish to keep the actual amount of *zakāt* paid confidential. *Niṣāb* is a fixed percentage of a Muslim’s wealth. This means it would not be difficult to calculate the value of a person’s assets from the amount of *zakāt* paid (if he or she abides by the rules laid down in the Qur’ān and *Hadīth*). The secrecy of the amount still exists, nonetheless, especially between two individual parties, if not the collection agencies. *Zakāt* collected by various entities and individuals should be distributed to Muslim beneficiaries in line with the conditions laid down in the Qur’ān.

### **3.4. *Zakāt* Mechanism: Distribution According to Eight Categories of *Zakāt*-beneficiaries**

It is worth mentioning the manners and values Muslims uphold in the interactions between givers and beneficiaries, before reviewing the distribution of *zakāt*. These values aim to preserve the dignity and mutual respect between the two parties, and to prevent embarrassment and the removal of class differences. They also aim to strengthen consolidation and social solidarity, which many Islāmic scholars, including Ul-Haq 1995, have explained that practising *zakāt* as a benefit.<sup>45</sup> Depending on whatever management system is used, *zakāt* is collected by governments, agencies, mosques, NGOs, and individuals, to be distributed to Muslim beneficiaries, according to Islāmic doctrine. There are eight categories of beneficiaries mentioned in the Qur’ān:

The alms are meant only for the poor and the needy and those who are in charge thereof, those whose hearts are to be reconciled, and to free those in bondage, and to help those burdened with debt, and for expenditure in the Way of *Allah* and for the wayfarer. This is an obligation from *Allah*. *Allah* is All-Knowing, All-Wise (*At-Tauba* 9:60).

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<sup>45</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt’s* Methodology: Givers and Beneficiaries According to Sociology of Islām Approach.

Al-Qaradawi (1999: 340) explains the categories of beneficiaries as: the poor, the needy, workers in *zakāt* administration, those whose hearts are being reconciled (to Islām), the emancipation of slaves, people in debt, for the cause of *Allah*, and for travellers. Both *Sunnah* and *Shī‘ah* agree on these categories of *zakāt*-beneficiaries (Maghniyyah 2014: 177). Table 3.1 below shows the definitions of beneficiaries of *zakāt*, the distribution according to tradition, and those who extend the meaning of *zakāt* applications in contemporary times. The modern (contemporary) interpretation is not different from, or in competition with, the traditional interpretation – it is merely an extension. This Table 3.1 is the result of a literary study of Islāmic scholars, jurists, economists, and a group of researchers specialising in *zakāt* such as Ibn Qudamah (1968); Al-Zuhayli (1989: 956-7); Mashhur (1993); Al-Qaradawi (1999); Benthall (1999: 31); Ibn Kathir (2001); Al-Qaradawi (2006); Al-Ghufaili (2008: 405-84); Kochuyt (2009: 103-4); Rehman and Ahmedov (2011); Koenig and Al Shohaib (2014: 36); Allami (2015: 154-8); and Stirk (2015: 10).

Categories of <i>Zakāt</i> -beneficiaries <sup>46</sup>	Traditional or classical understandings <sup>46</sup>	Modern (contemporary) understandings
<b>The Poor</b> who do not have sufficient funds for food, clothing, and housing.	<i>Zakāt</i> given directly to the beneficiary by the <i>zakāt</i> -giver, or sent to Muslim societies which cater for poor Muslims.	To include orphans and foundlings, widows and divorcees, prisoners and their families, unemployed and homeless people, students who cannot afford to marry, disaster victims, and those in need of free medicines, or dignified funerals. Establish factories, real-estate, commercial enterprises for the poor, in whole or in part, to provide enough income.
<b>The Needy</b> who are able to earn some of what meets their essential needs, but is not sufficient for food, clothing, and housing. The needy are in a better situation than the poor.	<i>Zakāt</i> given directly to the beneficiary by the <i>zakāt</i> -giver, or sent to Muslim societies which cater for needy Muslims.	Extends to include anyone in need of assistance in the aftermath of a crisis or disaster, in addition to modern applications of the poor category.
<b>Alms Collectors and Administrators of <i>Zakāt</i></b> for workers in the <i>zakāt</i> institution. Includes collection, preservation, and transfer. Separation of the <i>zakāt</i> funds from the rest of the Islāmic donations; separating	All issues concerning the workers of <i>zakāt</i> collection and distribution.	All issues concerning <i>zakāt</i> collection and distribution, including expansion of <i>zakāt</i> institutions and job titles in modern (contemporary) times.

<sup>46</sup> Traditional or classical jurists who reject the rationalist or modern Islāmic theology in favour of strict textualism, which is written in the Qur’ān and mentioned in the *Ḥadīth* (Halverson 2010).

conditional <i>zakāt</i> from unconditional. Distribute <i>zakāt</i> to beneficiaries, regardless of where the beneficiaries are situated.		
<b>The Reconciliation of Hearts</b> to encourage non-Muslims to convert to Islām. Confirmation and support of new converts to Islām.	Used in Prophet Muhammad's time to encourage non-Muslims to convert to Islām.	Includes giving to non-believers from this category to deflect any dangers threatening Muslims; funding institutions to care for newly-converted Muslims; funding peacebuilding activities <sup>47</sup> ; raising Islāmic awareness to address the compassion felt by Muslims for Muslims, or Muslims for non-Muslims by creating a coherent, fraternal society that cares for its people, regardless of their religious beliefs.
<b>People in Bondage or Slavery</b> for manumitting Muslim slaves (an agreement between the servant and master to be freed from slavery in exchange for money paid to the master).	Freeing of slaves in exchange for money.	Extends to include enslaved, oppressed, or wrongly imprisoned people; victims of trafficking or modern slavery; indebted Muslims who cannot afford to repay their debts; 'blood money' – compensation for wrongful killing.
<b>People Burdened with Debt</b> whose debts make it impossible for them to meet their basic needs, provided these debts have not been incurred through sin such as drinking wine or gambling (unless they have repented).	<i>Zakāt</i> given directly by <i>zakāt</i> -giver to beneficiary in debt, according to certain conditions.	Extends to reconciliation between Muslims, and to people who are affected by natural disasters or have had their assets destroyed. Could be used to support people living in countries disrupted by high levels of national debt.
<b>For the Cause of Allah</b> those working for an Islāmic cause, that is, 'purely for the sake of <i>Allah</i> ' ( <i>Fī Sabīlillā</i> ).	Defending Muslims and Islāmic conquests through <i>Jihād</i> <sup>48</sup> such as invasion; providing weapons of war; <i>ḥajj</i> pilgrimage and the 'Umrah; all in close proximity and obedience to <i>Allah</i> ; public interests; and <i>Jihād</i> (striving in the way of <i>Allah</i> ) in its general sense (self-improvement) and fighting for the sake of <i>Allah</i> .	Extends to include building mosques, religious foundations, schools, charitable trusts, hospitals, and social projects; emergency relief programmes worldwide; workshops; establishing and financing Islāmic websites; establishing Islāmic satellite channels; creating and supporting Islāmic radio stations; establishing meaningful Islāmic newspapers and magazines; raise awareness about Islām.
<b>The Wayfarer or Stranded Traveller</b> who do not have the means to enable them to return to	<i>Zakāt</i> given directly to the stranded wayfarer or traveller by the <i>zakāt</i> -giver.	Extends to include children living on the streets; provide support for travellers or people far from home, including

<sup>47</sup> Peacebuilding activities: Socio-economic development and culture of justice, truth, and reconciliation; Equitable and balanced poverty reduction, sound and equitable economic management, repatriation and reintegration of the displaced, dialogue among conflicting groups, capacity building and training in conflict resolution, peace education (*The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development* (OECD) 2007: 8).

<sup>48</sup> *Jihād* defined on the same lines and not only meaning use in war. There are many *Ḥadīth* to show other meanings of *jihād*, such as accepted *ḥajj* (*Sahih al-Bukhari* Vol. 4, Book 52: *Hadith* 43). Another *Ḥadīth* shows the best type of *jihād* is speaking a true word in the presence of a tyrannical ruler (*Abu Dawud and At-Tirmidhi* Book 1: *Hadith* 194).

their country. <i>Zakāt</i> paid to them to cover their needs as long as the travel is not for sin.		refugees and internally displaced persons.
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Table 3.1: *Zakāt* application according to traditional and modern Islāmic schools

Table 3.1 shows the diversity in the applications of *zakāt* between traditional and modern (contemporary) schools. This variety increases the range of *zakāt* applications in that it covers different situations that affect people in society. It also gives more scope to the giver in distributing *zakāt*. This mixture of interpretations in the application of *zakāt* between the two schools - modern or traditional - could raise the assumption of more confusion in the consciousness of the Muslim. Questions will arise in the Muslim's mind such as who is more entitled to *zakāt*, and whether it is permissible or not. Which school of thought should be followed - modern or traditional? The state of confusion between the ancient and recent practice of *zakāt* may encourage a tendency to ignore its practice. The Qatar field work shows that this assumption is the reality. *Zakāt* offers opportunities to encourage the continuity of the practice of *zakāt*, and the benefits it provides for the individual and society; however, there are also challenges facing *zakāt* such as the reasons impeding its practice.

### 3.5. The Reciprocal Effect of the Practice of *Zakāt* and Society

The reciprocal effect between *zakāt* and society started in Makkah (Mecca), the birthplace of Islām.<sup>49</sup> This was to prevent unjust financial practices such as *ribā* (usury) which occurred during the pre-Islāmic era. Islām prohibits usury – unethical or immoral financial loans which unfairly enrich the lender ('loan shark') - 'surplus value without counterpart' (interest on a loan rather than payment for goods or services), or 'to ensure equivalency in real value', and that 'numerical value was immaterial' (Kumar and Shehryar 2017: 259). Retsikas (2014: 10) says, usury not only promotes unfair growth, the direct result of human-to-human interaction, but may also increase debt and poverty. Ammania et al. (2014: 306) say that, '*zakāt* could serve as debt relief where[by] *zakāt* has the ability to increase the money supply in the demand for goods and services and hence their corresponding supply'. Atia (2011: 2) also mentions that, '*zakāt* plays a fundamental role in the economic system'. This shows that the practice of *zakāt* benefits the economy, and also provides a return for an individual in reducing the accumulated and recurring debts as a result of interest (usury). Poverty also lies in the same circle of debt as a result of financial shortfall in the effort to pay off debts. Poverty is a heavy

<sup>49</sup> The verses revealed in *Makkah*, (Az-Zariyat, 51: 19), were without complexity in order to allow the followers of Islām to easily deal with the new religion. *Zakāt* was thus revealed in Makkah, without clear conditions on who should give *zakāt*, its percentage or the categories of beneficiaries.

burden on the economy, and *zakāt*'s support for the less prosperous beneficiaries is one of the tools for alleviating poverty. The correlation between givers and beneficiaries starts under the concept of *niṣāb*, which was formalised in Madīnah (*Al-Ma'arij* 70: 24-25), where wealth, percentages, ratio of alms, and the areas of distribution were determined (Al-Alusi n.d: 99-98). Khaleel (2016) explains that *niṣāb* is the standard line between *zakāt* givers and beneficiaries; thus, *zakāt* is given to beneficiaries until they are lifted up to, or above, the *niṣāb* level; this allows the beneficiaries to acquire improved purchasing power, thanks to the donors.

Debt relief and poverty reduction through *zakāt* is thus improved as a result of the relationship between Muslims. It not only includes social benefits, but *zakāt* is also intended to protect one's wealth from being stolen, going astray, or being misappropriated. The living conditions of a Muslim would improve to a level that could not be the same as the poor beneficiary of *zakāt* - one who does not have enough money for food, clothing, and housing to last a year (see Table 3.1).

The redistribution of wealth is another aspect of the social and economic effects of *zakāt*. There are several Islāmic economists, scholars, and researchers such as Inaya (1989), Hossain (2012), Minor (2014), Ibrahim (2015), and Kahf (2017) who have commented on the role of *zakāt* for redistributing wealth within a society. Kochuyt (2009) explains the wealth redistribution process as the roles are switched between two players: the beneficiary becomes the donor through his or her work or agricultural products, for example, while the initial donor turns into a receiver, because the beneficiary spends his or her money in the community, and thus refreshes the economic aspect that benefits societies. The beneficiary consequently actively engages in the economic cycle, thus boosting the market that will, in return, benefit the wealthy. This operation of wealth redistribution, with a high potential for *zakāt* finance, apparently contributes to the advancement of the economy. Akan says a benefit of *zakāt* income for businesses is 'the reinvestment of retained incomes and dividend allocation among the shareholders'. He adds that this reinvestment is a budget for a source of wealth redistribution (2015: 19).<sup>50</sup> Guermat, Al-Utaibi and Tucker (2003: 3) also state that redistribution supports a positive economic cycle of growth, and helps to improve the well-being of others.

The downside of this system, however, is it may encourage beneficiaries to be dependent on *zakāt*, and this may lead to treating 'people in need' as passive objects rather than active subjects. Asutay (2007: 13) argues: 'Instead of simply giving funds to those

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<sup>50</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt's Methodology: Givers and Beneficiaries According to Sociology of Islām Approach*.

economically less fortunate for their immediate consumption, developing projects for the sustainability, survival, and continuity of the economically less fortunate is the new strategy with *zakāt* funds'. These projects, such as creating jobs, aim to empower the less affluent to help themselves, and encourages them to become responsible and self-sufficient (Atia 2011). The benefits of *zakāt* are therefore twofold: it 'purifies' the payers, by reminding them of their greed and selfishness; and it creates an opportunity for its beneficiaries to enhance and improve their own lives. According to Abdul-Rauf (1979: 4) and Bangura (2011: 14), *Allah* could have made all of the needs of humans to be easily met. Bangura expands on this point: without economic challenges, humans would find it difficult to be motivated - they would remain idle, and would neither be of benefit to themselves nor others.

*Zakāt* may provide an empowering individual process for its practice, although it also leaves the individual with the responsibility of gaining religious awareness of *zakāt* application and distribution in the twenty-first century. This proves to be a weakness in its practice, but it is probable that not all Muslims are able to educate themselves on the religious aspects of *zakāt*. Religious awareness studies have their own specialists, as indicated by Al-Qaradaghi (see section above: *Zakāt* in its Religious Form: Definition and Various Interpretations). It is difficult, therefore, for an individual to maintain his or her religious awareness of *zakāt*, and guidance by religious scholars is required here, thus posing as a *zakāt* challenge.

According to *zakāt* opportunities, *zakāt* has a great religious strength in that it possesses an important role in fulfilling the principles of the Qur'ān and the *Ḥadīth*. It is one of the five pillars of Islām, which makes it obligatory, in contrast to other concepts and categories in Islām. A strong, religious motivation encourages Muslims to practise *zakāt*, evident by the long time - over 1,400 years - Muslims have been practising *zakāt*. The religious motivation, in addition, is facilitated by social solidarity (*'Ummah*), despite controversy in mixed Muslim and non-Muslim societies. *'Ummah* inspires the practice of *zakāt* through the sympathy and solidarity between one Muslim and another. *Zakāt* institutions, moreover, benefit from *zakāt* in the sense that they do not need any capital. The wages of 'fund workers' are provided for in one of the *zakāt* categories, meaning the institution does not need to invest additional funds in administration. The result of establishing a *zakāt* institution is made easier and more supportive: many charitable organisations (government and NGOs) have accordingly paid attention to the practice of *zakāt*. This suggests that *zakāt* can continue to be active, effective, and practised. The religious responsibility of Islāmic scholars to educate and continue their advocacy for the practice of *zakāt* has, furthermore, proven to be a *zakāt* opportunity. These

opportunities have allowed *zakāt* to be widely, effectively, and continuously practised. The other opportunities for *zakāt* are examined through the case study of Qatar.<sup>51</sup>

The challenges facing *zakāt* institutions or charitable organisations may relate to *zakāt*'s administrative work. Muslims may not be happy with the fees of *zakāt* project management, or the administrative management in terms of transparency, neutrality, and fairness. The bias of religious leaders, and the application of *zakāt* in mixed societies (Muslims and non-Muslims) have both posed considerable challenges to *zakāt*.

### 3.5.1. *Zakāt* and National Politics

The reciprocal effect between *zakāt* and society also appeared in *zakāt*'s involvement in politics. The meaning of 'political' here is 'the activities associated with the governance of a country or area, especially the debate between parties having power' (*LEXICO* 2021). *Zakāt* has attracted political interest since its inception; political intervention has been imposed on the *zakāt* mechanism since Islām came into effect. The political aspect calculates the value of *zakāt* and its collection and distribution mechanism. *Zakāt* was paid by Muslims to other Muslims who needed help. This cycle later became administered under an Islāmic government, and extended to cover the support of neighbouring poor communities (Al-Ghufaili 2008: 534). This practice, since the early days, had been a common feature of Muslim Caliphates, starting with the first Caliph, Abu Bakr (573-634 A.D.). Abu Bakr declared war on those Muslims who refused to pay through the '*Ridda* Wars'. Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1922 (*Ottoman Souvenir* 2018), *zakāt* became an individual decision in some Muslim societies; in others, *zakāt* was (and is) governed by the state. There are six states which currently apply this method, namely, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Pakistan, Malaysia and Libya, which obtain *zakāt* payments directly from individuals' bank accounts; on the other hand, *zakāt* is calculated as part of the tax system in Kuwait and Qatar (Stirk 2015). Inaya (1989) and Minor (2014: 109) approve of Abu Zahra's claim: scholars unanimously agreed that *zakāt* was (is) the responsibility of the state to collect and distribute, as it is an aspect of a state's sovereignty (cited in Inaya 1989). The authors agree that, due to the Islāmic financial policy, a state can utilise *zakāt* resources to fund the protection of the state and its citizens from the danger of external enemies; this does not cover extending it to aggression and enslaving other people beyond its borders. This does not prevent *zakāt* bias in favour of the state. The interest of the state is not necessarily focused on religious goals. The Islāmic religion is spread across

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<sup>51</sup> See Chapter Four: Qatar: Context Analysis.

countries, and every country has its own interests. This suggests that the states guide the religion according to their own interests, even over the main objectives of *zakāt*. The history of *zakāt* indicates that politics has given wide attention to *zakāt* which has made its practice becoming politicised (see below).

The difference between *zakāt* and government tax in this research must be briefly considered. The word ‘tax’ has become common in the twenty-first century, and its discussion is part of modern societies. *Zakāt* is also called the Islāmic tax (Al-Zuhayli 1989). According to Islāmic economists, scholars, and researchers such as Al-Qaradaghi (n.d); Shbair (1996); Al-Ghufaili (2008); Alemour (2015), Table 3.2 outlines the differences between *zakāt* and tax.

Comparison	<i>Zakāt</i>	Tax
<b>Compulsion and obligation</b>	A permanent and mandatory religious obligation for Muslims only and the Muslim will not be penalised legally for it, Exception: Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Yemen, Pakistan, Libya, and Malaysia.	A compulsory deduction for Muslims and non-Muslims. Penalty laws for those who decline, refuse, or attempt to avoid paying. It has no stable amount, as it varies according to changing circumstances and conditions subject to authorities’ discretion.
<b>Benefit</b>	Religious reward.	A taxpayer pays according to ability regardless of the extent to which he benefits from public activities as a member of society.
<b>Collection Authority</b>	State and individual responsibility.	State collection only.
<b>Punishment</b>	The penalty for <i>zakāt</i> evaders extends to the afterlife.	The penalty for tax evasion and failure to pay depends on universal punishment such as imprisonment.
<b>Beneficiaries</b>	The eight <i>zakāt</i> -beneficiaries mentioned in the Quran.	Tax revenue is part of the state budget, to be spent as the state deems appropriate.
<b><i>Zakāt</i> Base and Tax Base</b>	Obligatory for growing wealth or having the potential for growth.	Obligatory for either growing wealth or with no potential for growth.
<b>Methods</b>	Cash and in-kind payments.	Cash payments only.
<b>Time to deliver/ Time for performance</b>	Every <i>Hijrī</i> year (Islāmic year).	Annually (Gregorian Calendar).
<b>Ratio</b>	Fixed payment calculation - <i>niṣāb</i> of 2.5%.	Not fixed: escalates with increasing income or wealth and government demands.



<b>Exemptions</b>	No exemption for every Muslim who reaches <i>niṣāb</i> .	Tax exemptions may include some owners, such as presidents, rulers, and some close associates.
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Table 3.2: Comparison between *zakāt* and government tax

According to the interpretation of *Al-Baqara*, 2: 43 regarding individual responsibility, Al-Qaradawi (1999) explains that, if the state does not collect *zakāt*, this does not mean that individual Muslims have no obligation to pay it - the individual Muslim is still responsible for himself or herself to pay *zakāt*. Islāmic jurisdiction, moreover, does not exempt the taxpayer from paying *zakāt* (Al-Qaradaghi n.d.). This may not satisfy some Muslims in terms of paying twice. Muslim scholars have made it clear that religious motivations such as trade and reward with *Allah*, and preparing for the Afterlife compensate the Muslim for paying *zakāt*.<sup>52</sup> *Zakāt* may create a conflict, in this case, between the religious and legal obligations to the state. *Zakāt* may even become an extra burden after taxes for the Muslim to carry. These tensions naturally create new challenges for the practice of *zakāt*. The Muslim will find it easier to avoid the practice of *zakāt* because of the absence of legal accountability rather than evade the political power of the state's tax-collection process.

According to the authoritarian concept, another aspect of the relationship between politics and *zakāt* is illustrated by Minor (2014: 11): 'The political climate between *zakāt* institutions and the United States and its allies are highly charged'.<sup>53</sup> Petersen (2015: 20) states that, 'Since the 1980s, a number of transnational Muslim NGOs have (rightly or wrongly) been accused of financing or otherwise supporting so-called "terrorist" networks'.<sup>54</sup> Saudi Arabia banned all national NGOs from sending funds abroad in 2003, on the grounds of preventing the support of terrorism (Billat 2015: 30). Non-governmental organisations are permitted to operate, for example, but are kept under close observation, and forced to compete with state-sponsored groups. The extent to which *zakāt* has been used under state sovereignty in domestic politics and foreign policy is an interesting issue; whether *zakāt*-givers have the authority to decline or accept the use of *zakāt* funds for political financing is another. The practice of *zakāt*

<sup>52</sup> See Chapter Two: Interrogating Religious Motivations.

<sup>53</sup> Authoritarian denotes a state in which the single power holder – an individual 'dictator', a committee or junta, or an otherwise small group of political stakeholders – monopolises political power; as long as it is not contested, society is allowed some freedom (Cinpoes 2012). Sekiguchi (2010) also says Authoritarianism is a form of government characterised by strong central power and limited political freedom. Individual freedom is subordinate to the state, and there is no constitutional accountability under an authoritarian regime...informally defined as 'executive power' with often vague and shifting powers.

<sup>54</sup> *Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights* (2008: 5) defines the word 'Terrorism' as 'commonly understood to refer to acts of violence that target civilians in the pursuit of political or ideological aims'.

may either encourage religious intolerance or it may exercise tolerance. *Zakāt* has also been blamed for supporting *Jihād* (a holy war waged on behalf of Islām as a religious obligation). The *Sunnah* jurists - *Ḥanafī*, *Mālikī*, *Shafīʿī*, and *Ḥanbalī*, have interpreted *Jihād* as included under ‘for the cause of *Allah*’ *zakāt* category (Al-Qaradawi 1999: 406). *Jihād* can be involved in militant activity if there are (perceived) attacks on Islām, on the condition that it is not used to harm other Muslim countries. The category of ‘for the cause of *Allah*’ generally applies as a good deed in terms of *zakāt*; however, it lies between *Jihād* being a religious duty, and defence of an Islāmic state from outside aggression, financed by *zakāt* funds.

There is currently political tension between Qatar on one side, and Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Bahrain, on the other. These sides have both Muslim societies, and are members of the Arab Gulf States. The second edition of ‘Trade in Islām’ forum (2015) reports that, the value of *zakāt* is \$100 billion, only as part of the assets of the Gulf banks, let alone other countries. Billat (2015:12) says: ‘The Arab Gulf States have historically used foreign aid and humanitarian aid as a quiet tool of their respective foreign policies, and they still have high political interests in funding humanitarian action’. When *zakāt* is collected by the state, this implies the state has the authority to manage vast sums of money. This is meant to be used solely for charitable intentions; however, during the process of collecting and giving, issues of nationalist interest and sovereignty become mixed with the intention of giving. This raises the question of whether the role of *zakāt* is to use it to ‘exterminate’ or ‘subjugate’ other countries, under the pretext of Muslim defence in each country; on the other hand, it may contradict the role of religion through the door of *zakāt*. Spreading hatred and incitement to violence appears here as more important than the values of peace.<sup>55</sup>

Peace is a significant characteristic of the Abrahamic faiths. It appears in the greetings of Judaism - *Shalom* (Numbers 6: 24-26), ‘go in peace’ in Christianity (John 14:27), and *As-salāmu ‘alaykum* in Islām (peace be upon you) (*Al-Adab Al-Mufrad* Book 42: *Hadith* 891). The Islāmic philosophy of peace is summarised in *Ḥadīth* ‘Ubadah bin Samit’ that the Messenger of *Allah* ruled: ‘There should be neither harming nor reciprocating harm’ (*Sunan Ibn Majah* Vol. 3, Book 13: *Hadith* 2340). The use of weapons in the name of ‘defence’ is not one of the elements for spreading mercy, love, and peace, called for by most, if not all, religions. Islām demands strict obedience and conformity to the teachings of the Qur’ān and *Ḥadīth*, but specifically incorporates a benevolent element in its doctrine. Muslims associate

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<sup>55</sup> The concept of peace is: ‘freedom from war and violence, especially when people live and work together happily without disagreements’ (*Cambridge Dictionary* 2018c)

their behaviour with Islāmic teachings, and feel much closer to *Allah* by obeying this connection. Islāmic instruction for *zakāt* mechanisms exists since *zakāt* is an obligatory religious commitment. This is especially useful since the intricate process of *zakāt*, from donor to beneficiary, requires guidance of an established and knowledgeable source, mainly to avoid exploitation. The field work was a great opportunity for this research for the investigation of questions in this section regarding the impact of Qatari policy on the practice of *zakāt*. Questions arise such as whether Qatari *zakāt* money goes towards supporting conflicts and wars; what effect the recent intervention of the Qatari government in the *zakāt* mechanism has had; and whether Qatari policy affects the Muslims in Qatar decision-making in the distribution of *zakāt*.

### 3.6. Summary

This chapter has provided a window onto the various types of charity in Islām, such as *ṣadaqah* (voluntary charity) and *waqf* (endowment), which give Muslims a choice on how or where to give their donations. The main focus of this chapter, however, has been on *zakāt* which is a compulsory religious form of charity according to *Sharī'ah* (Islāmic religious law). *Zakāt* refers to a certain share of wealth prescribed by *Allah* to be given to specific categories of beneficiaries such as the poor, the needy, workers in *zakāt* administration, those whose hearts are being reconciled (to Islām), the emancipation of slaves, people in debt, for the cause of *Allah*, and for travellers (Al-Qaradawi 1999; and Al-Sistani 2009). The practice of *zakāt* is affected by many factors such as the different interpretations of the Qur'ān between the *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* branches of Islām; the diversities which exist between traditional and modern (contemporary) opinions of juristic perspectives concerning *zakāt*'s mechanism; and the diversity of Islāmic societies. These factors are all part of understanding the practice of *zakāt*, and its contrasting conditions. This contrast seems to cause confusion for *zakāt*-givers. The four responsible bodies for the collection and distribution of *zakāt* are the government, independent collection and delivery agencies, mosques, and charitable organisations. These bodies are not all open and impartial - some may be affiliated to political groups or prefer to donate to certain sections of the society. The awareness of *zakāt* is primarily an individual responsibility, although courses in Islāmic Studies in schools, universities, Islāmic institutions, and mosques, and television and the Internet have gone a certain way towards providing *zakāt* awareness programmes; these may help to eliminate some confusion concerning the practice of *zakāt*. The reciprocal effect of the practice of *zakāt* and society was evident through the

economic benefits *zakāt* provides, and the activity of *zakāt* institutions. *Zakāt* has not been able to avoid attracting political intervention. This has had an impact on society such as government control of the collection and distribution of *zakāt* in Qatar (the case study of this research).

The literature review chapters will be the basis for analysing the case study of this research. Qatar is presented in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER FOUR

### Case Study: Qatar: Context Analysis

#### 4.0 Introduction

The previous two chapters of the literature review explored the practice of *zakāt* through lived experiences as the theoretical framework of this research, supported by the discipline of sociology of religion. This chapter will provide contextual information about Qatar and Qatari society, in order to situate the findings.

This research was conducted in Qatar during the period 2017-2020. Qatar is a peninsula in the Middle East, sharing a land border with Saudi Arabia, and maritime borders with Bahrain and United Arab Emirates (Crystal and Anthony 2017). It is the smallest country in the region after Bahrain, and gained independence from the British Mandate in 1971. The country has been governed by HH Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani or the Amir of Qatar since 2013. Qatar is known as an Arab country with an Islāmic identity which follows *Sharī'ah* (Islāmic law). The objectives of focusing on Qatar in this context analysis chapter are to investigate the current practices of *zakāt* through an empirical exploration of the lived experiences of *zakāt*-givers and *zakāt*-beneficiaries. Taking into consideration both theological motivations and sociological effects on decision-making in the practice of *zakāt*, an analysis of the opportunities offered, and challenges faced by *zakāt* in Qatar will be made.

To achieve these objectives, the following issues are addressed through the sociology of Islām's conceptual framework: understanding the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar's society; examining Qatar's demography such as its citizens and residents, tribal and cultural backgrounds, and *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* denominations. This chapter also throws light on the methods through which *zakāt* is taught and emphasised in Qatar society, to improve its awareness. The methods are raising awareness of *zakāt* through educational curricula, and awareness-raising campaigns for *zakāt* by Qatar charities. *Zakāt*'s mechanism in terms of its collection and distribution in Qatar is explored, and whether the Muslims in Qatar pay their *zakāt* individually or through Qatar's charities, government, or NGOs; and finally, it raises the question of the politicisation of *zakāt* from internal and external Qatari perspectives.

#### **4.1. Qatar's Demographic Diversity: Impact on the Practice of *Zakāt***

This section is an analysis of the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar through several lenses. This includes the diversity of the population, cultures, and religious sects. The range of angles helps the researcher understand the lived experience of the practice of *zakāt* through theological motivations and sociological influences, and its role in individual decision-making in relation to the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar 2017-2020.

##### **4.1.1. Citizen and Resident Demographic Diversity**

Qatar society is comprised of a mixed population (citizens and residents), and reached 2,561,643 at the time of this research; most of whom live in and around the capital, Doha (MDPS 2018). Qatari citizens constitute approximately only ten per cent of the total population (*Human Rights Watch* HRW 2016; Snoj 2017). This small percentage of Qatari citizens represents a challenge for them in maintaining their identity, their Arab and Islāmic values, and their culture (MDPS 2015: 27).

Ninety per cent of the population of Qatar originates from different backgrounds (De Bel-Air 2014). De Bel-Air adds, ‘Non-nationals [residents], in effect, dominate numerically in every occupation level. The majority remain in the artisan or unskilled worker sections compared to the “white collar” workers’ (2014: 7). The residents (non-citizens) have had an impact on the diversity of the population. Their input is attributed to the economic rise, particularly as Qatar’s national development strategies are to extend through ‘Qatar National Vision (QNV) 2030’ (MDPS 2008). Qatar is likely to play an increasingly prominent role in international development co-operation in areas of ‘Poverty reduction, including through employment creation in rebuilding and infrastructure projects, improved health and education as well as better management of the environment [...]. [These will be] the main areas of focus of Qatar’s international cooperation’ (MDPS 2015: 9). The World Cup preparations such as construction, factories, paving roads, and excavations in the desert have attracted many residents who are able workers (*Qatar Foundation Annual Research Conference* ARC 2018). Residents with varied backgrounds naturally have their own identities, customs, and traditions, which are reflected in their practice of *zakāt*. Citizens, the minority, also possess their own ways of practising *zakāt*.

The residents (majority) come to Qatar in search of stable and paying jobs. It is probable that some of their income does not reach *niṣāb*.<sup>56</sup> Qatar is considered a wealthy country assume *zakāt*-beneficiaries do exist in Qatar. It is consequently important to study the practice of *zakāt*-givers and *zakāt*-beneficiaries - in this case, according to the sociology of Islām. How the differences between the country's majority resident and minority citizen population affect the practice of *zakāt* will help to answer the research questions. An issue that arises is whether there is a specific pattern adopted by citizens for practising *zakāt* which differs from that of residents. Cultures demographic diversity, and its impact on *zakāt*, are at the centre of this study.

#### 4.1.2. Tribal and Other Cultures - Demographic Diversity

Culture in Qatari society is built on tribalism for Qatari citizens, and various other cultures for Qatari residents. According to Fromherz (2012), Blanchard (2014), and Zahlan (2016), Qatar's society is known for its tribal families such as the ruling al-Thani family, which has gained strength from this tribal affiliation. Family councils or *majlis*, one of the tribal customs, is a place where family members or tribes gather to make decisions about both personal and community matters. One of the characteristics of tribal society is the family's control over family members.<sup>57</sup> This means the discussions of *zakāt* issues such as collection and distribution also take place in *majlis*. The decisions made through the *majlis* will consequently have an impact on a Qatari individual's motivations and decision-making. This sequence of events potentially shows it could challenge the practice of individual giving or receiving *zakāt*. An individual citizen, in this case, lacks the freedom of choice in determining his or her decisions and attitudes towards practising *zakāt*. This means that, whether Muslims in Qatar believe in *zakāt* or not, they often practice it by obeying their family leaders, especially when the government is the ruling power in Qatari society through the *majlis* (Zahlan 2016). Tribal dominance over individual decision-making may also contribute to the opportunities for *zakāt* to continue. The failure of individual practice of *zakāt* such as in the case of denial is assumed to be excluded from tribal behaviour as it would be considered a form of apostasy or

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<sup>56</sup> *Niṣāb*: 'the minimum level to determine whether there is *zakāt* to be paid on the assets', which amounts to 2.5 per cent of one's wealth (Ubaidillah and Sallehuddin 2013: 196).

<sup>57</sup> See Chapter Two: Influence of Social and Cultural Norms.

*ridda*.<sup>58</sup> Tribal domination seems to govern an individual's decision-making, regardless of whether a citizen *zakāt*-giver's motivation is based on tribal commitment or on religious duty.

Another dimension of tribal influence in the practice of *zakāt* is male dominance over Qatari females. Authors such as Fromherz (2012), Blanchard (2014), and Zahlan (2016) explain that one of the characteristics of tribalism is the male domination of females. The presence of males is greater than that of females in making decisions concerning daily life in a tribal society such as Qatar. A female Qatari citizen does not have the right to choose a husband, for example, outside the social Qatari framework of citizenship (Al-Qadi 2014; MDPS 2016b; Hukoomi 2018c). This means that it may be difficult for a Qatari citizen females to make their own decisions regarding practising *zakāt*, without male approval. This means that male domination in Qatar may have an effect on the awareness of *zakāt* among females. This will also explain another aspect of male dependency on paying *zakāt*. A female will depend on a male to take over this religious obligation, although this does not prevent her from her religious commitment to pay *zakāt*.<sup>59</sup> The responsibility for practicing *zakāt* is as an individual in the absence of state responsibility (Al-Qaradawi 1999), whether the Muslim is male or female. The practice of *zakāt*, in this case, suggests it may be subject to gendered discrimination in Qatari society (see Chapter Six).

There are more than two million residents with different nationalities in Qatar De Bel-Air (2014). The largest migrations come from India, the Philippines, and Egypt. These three countries are situated in different locations, for example, and migrants from these countries comprise a large range of cultures and Muslim groups. It is consequently assumed that multiculturalism and mixed customs and traditions have an impact on the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. The question here is whether citizens donate locally, and whether expatriates (residents), in contrast, remit their donations to their own countries. Their religious guidance on *zakāt* issues may come from Qatar or from their corresponding countries of origin. The issue is whether the residents interact with *zakāt* affairs as part of Qatari society, and answer the calls of Qatari Muslim scholars for donations to certain disaster-stricken areas. This also leads to the enquiry of whether a dialogue exists in Qatari society on the issue of *zakāt* among residents and citizens.

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<sup>58</sup> *Zakāt* was obligatory, and the ruler used to impose sanctions on those who refused to disburse their *zakāt* money. The first Caliph Abu Bakr declared a war on those Muslims who refused to pay *zakāt* called the 'Ridda Wars' (Hossain 2012: 3). See Chapter Three: The Reciprocal Effect of The Practice of *Zakāt* and Society.

<sup>59</sup> See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* in its Religious Form: Definition and Various Interpretations.



#### 4.1.3. *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* Demographic Diversity

This research is only concerned with the Qatari givers and beneficiaries from the viewpoint of sociology of Islām, as *zakāt* is only an obligation for Muslims in the country. *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* are the most widespread doctrines in Qatari society, and the *Sunnah* school of Islām is in the majority. The *Shī'ah* population ranges between 10 to 15 per cent, and their families originate in neighbouring countries such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran (Ismael 2014; Saber 2015; Al-Dragee 2017). They were already part of Qatari society even before the country's independence. Qatari *Shī'ah* have their own neighbourhoods, including living areas and mosques, and are separate from the *Sunnah* (Al-Dragee 2017). Understanding Qatari society requires understanding the relationship amongst the Qatari people themselves, both *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah*. Dussari (2011) and Ismael (2014) explain the co-existence between the two Muslim groups is based on common understanding and respect. The religious guidance for each denomination may have an impact on their motivation and decision-making. The affiliation to each denomination is another consideration; perhaps the *Shī'ah* send *zakāt* or *khums* abroad, especially as they are the minority in *Sunnah*-led Qatar. It could be that, both groups give their *zakāt* to the same organisation such as *Zakat* Fund, the official government authority. They may prefer to support Muslim charities such as Qatar Charity, on the other hand, or their religious communities. This raises the point of whether there is an interaction and discussion on *zakāt* issues between Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents), or whether the difference in the Islāmic denominations and schools prevents dialogue. Diversity in Islāmic thought may affect the Qatari awareness of *zakāt*.<sup>60</sup>

Qatar's demographic diversity between citizens and residents, tribal and other cultural backgrounds, and *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* denominations, suggests that there is a challenge for the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. It is, nevertheless, also an opportunity for the practice of *zakāt* in some respects such as the impact of tribalism. *Zakāt's* lived experience in the relationship between Qataris as Muslims, and the nation's demographic differences, may affect the decision-making of individuals, and result in either the practice or non-practice of *zakāt*. The call for education and awareness of the (religious) role *zakāt* plays in everyday experience therefore becomes evident.

Religious education regarding *zakāt* adopts many methods such as through universities, schools, and religious speeches. The possible effect each of these processes have on the practice

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<sup>60</sup> See Chapter Eight: The Interpretations of *Zakāt*-Beneficiaries: Opportunities and Challenges.

of *zakāt* become important in discovering the reasons why Muslims in Qatar practice their decision-making in the way they do.

#### **4.2. *Zakāt* Education and Awareness in Qatar Society**

The two main methods for the delivery of *zakāt* awareness are the educational system represented in schools and universities, social media such as television programmes, religious sermons, and so on. Islāmic studies were the first courses and subjects prioritised in Qatari society. *Permanent Population Committee* (2011: 10), Zahlan (2016), and Formezon (2017) mention that, during the late nineteenth century, the education system in Qatar was run and controlled by the *Kuttāb* ‘lineage groups’, the travelling educators who taught religion, science, and culture. This influence was followed by the opening of the first religious school in Qatar in 1913. The education system was based, however, on the curriculum for a conservative Muslim society. The first school was built for boys in 1948, followed by a girls’ school in 1956, both under the Ministry of Education - *Wizārat Al-Ma ‘ārif* (Al-Misnad cited in Nasser 2017). Nasser adds that Qataris became interested in education after being encouraged by the government to build more schools and universities, and to provide scholarships within and outside the country (2017). The number of public and private universities in the State of Qatar reached 16 universities and colleges in 2014/2015 - a rise of 12 per cent compared to 1989/1990. The rapid development in education has also had an impact on Islāmic studies in Qatari schools and universities, where most of the Qatari universities have a branch of Islāmic studies; for example, Qatar University and Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU). It is worth mentioning here, one of the educational goals of College of *Sharia* in Qatar University is section (7): ‘to acquaint the student with the history of Islāmic jurisprudence, its doctrines, terminology and exponents, especially the *Ḥanbalī* school of thought’ (*College of Sharia and Islamic Studies* 2020).

The attention that Qatari society has paid to Islāmic studies shows that religion is a powerful motivating factor in the behaviour of a Qatari individual: religion influences his or her decision-making in the practice of *zakāt*. The religious motivation, through the sociology of religion lens, also has an impact on the behaviour of Qatari society. Islāmic religious practice is a characteristic of Qatari society which includes prayer, *zakāt*, fasting, and pilgrimage to Mecca. The lived experience of the Qatari and religion has an influential effect on his or her decision-making to practise *zakāt*. This lived experience, furthermore, has an effect on the relationship

between the Qatari and a society with an Islāmic character which has a strong religious influence on the practice of *zakāt*. Promoting awareness of the meaning and goal of *zakāt* is one of the tasks for those who are responsible for its clarification (scholars, educators) in Qatar.

The *Sunnah* are the majority in Qatari society, as previously mentioned. *Sunnah* schools of thought include the *Mālikī*, *Shafī'ī* and *Ḥanbalī*. The latter school (*Ḥanbalī*) was the one that settled in the country (Al-Thani and Jaber 2019). According to these authors, the reason for this is due to the tribal and clan inter-connection between Saudi Arabia and Qatar - Saudi Arabia follows the *Ḥanbalī* school. Part of this research relates to the study of *zakāt* from an Islāmic legal point of view (as mentioned in Chapter Three). It is important to be aware of Islāmic studies in Qatar, and to know how *fiqh* (jurisprudence) is conducted regarding *zakāt*. Qatar identifies itself as an Islāmic state and follows *Sharī'ah* and the principles of Islām according to the *Ḥanbalī* school (Hukoomi 2018b), in spite of residents following different schools of thought. The *Ḥanbalī fiqh* - jurisprudence (the theory or philosophy of Islāmic law) has consensus on *zakāt* with three other major *Sunnah* schools, *Ḥanafī*, *Shafī'ī*, and *Mālikī*; however, there is a distinction between *Ḥanbalī* and the rest.<sup>61</sup> The *Ḥanbalī* school is the strictest and most traditional, holding that, 'the Qur'an in its wording, without any exegetic infringements and correcting interpretations was the absolute, irrefutable basis of the law' according to Zacharias (2006: 504). Zacharias adds, 'The secondary source of law was the sum of Islāmic traditions that could be handed down to Muhammad' (2006: 504). Regarding the Islāmic applications in Qatari society, Zahlan (2016: 112) says, 'there is no question about its applicability, particularly in view of the strong *Wahhabi* [a branch of *Ḥanbalī*] feelings in Qatar', Fromherz (2017) agrees with Zahlan. This poses the question, of to what extent *Ḥanbalī fiqh* is exercised today in Qatar regarding *zakāt*; equally, is it flexible enough to develop and update the rules and applications concerning *zakāt*, which would reflect modern challenges.

The characteristics of tribal society with the methodology and followings of the *Ḥanbalī* doctrine may make the religious jurists have a notable influence on Qatari society. This is confirmed by Formezon (2017: 155). He says, 'Qatari tribes still follow and enforce Islāmic rules, even without the guidance of official religious representatives of the state'. The question therefore remains regarding how Muslims in Qatar raise awareness about *zakāt*.

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<sup>61</sup> The *Ḥanbalī* school is known as 'the school of the strict traditionalists. It goes back to Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Hanbal of Arabian origin (died 241 H. or 855 C.E.) who was a collector of traditions, a theologian, and a legal scholar' (Zacharias 2006: 504).

The rapid development in instruction indicates that Qatar could practically become an education hub in the region. The advancement in teaching may also have helped create tensions between a conservative society and its liberals. These rapid changes will, most likely, greatly affect the young generation of Qataris. The young will probably argue for a general reform, including *zakāt*. Acquiring a higher and liberal education may also have an impact on the views of graduates linked to their *zakāt* behaviour. Education will influence their awareness of *zakāt*, and their motivation and decision-making. Charitable organisations also have a role in ‘educating’ Muslims in Qatar through awareness-raising campaigns of *zakāt*, and its collection and distribution strategies.

#### **4.2.1. Qatar Charities and Awareness-raising Campaigns for *Zakāt***

Qatari society is becoming more knowledgeable regarding *zakāt* through the spread of *zakāt* jurisprudence on media platforms, and through seminars and conferences (*Al-Arab* 2013; *Al-Sharq* 2015; *Al-Watan* 2017b; and *Al-Watan* 2018). *Zakat* Fund and Qatar Charity for example, state on their websites that they are conducting awareness campaigns about *zakāt*. The *Zakat* Fund states: ‘Based on *Zakat* Fund administration’s responsibility, they’re spreading the jurisprudence of *zakāt* by setting up media campaigns, [...] organising specialised scientific and jurisprudence courses, [...] courses for the calculation of *zakāt* for companies, [and] participating in [*zakāt*] seminars and conferences’ (*Zakat Fund* 2019). There are ‘live’ questions on the *Zakat* Fund website through filling in questionnaires to determine the eligibility of people, and submission of requests for *zakāt* from *Zakat* Fund (*Zakat Fund* 2020); for instance, ‘I am a sick man. I am a resident of Qatar and I live in Hamad Compound. I have a disability’. The Local Guide replied in answer to his eligibility: ‘Yes my brother provided that the papers are completed’. Another question from a resident: ‘If I asked for financial aid [...] which papers are required?’ the Local Guide answered: ‘Book from the company or sponsor + Salary certificate + House rent contract + nine months’ bank statement + Certificate from the Qatar Exchange + Certificate from Qatar Credit Information Centre + Pictures of family and passport residence’ (*Zakat Fund* 2020). Qatar Charity also explains on its website: ‘Qatar Charity is concerned with helping to calculate *zakāt*, whether for individuals or companies, responding to legitimate financial questions related to it, and facilitating the process of paying it in through all regular and electronic ways’ (*Qatar Charity* 2019). The same process is pursued by *Zakat* Fund regarding the eligibility to receive payment from its *zakāt* funds.

These methods may find approval and be desirable by Muslims in Qatar who are unaware of dealing with accounts, or who do not wish to deal directly with financial jurists. This is because they do not want to make known to the public the total amount of *zakāt* they are paying, or the details about their wealth, for example. This reluctance to provide private details may contribute to the lack of awareness of *zakāt*-givers on the subject of the financial aspects of *zakāt*. *Zakāt* participants may also become too dependent on the machine calculations of *zakāt*, and neglect their religious responsibility to be aware of the role and meaning of *zakāt*. There is, furthermore, an assumption that Muslim scholars, in one way or another, are biased towards the organisation for which they work. There is also a likelihood of partiality towards the organisations which promote projects serving their personal interests. Bias and partiality are merely subjective opinions, and do not help to promote the actual awareness of *zakāt* – supporting the poor and needy, for instance, rather than supporting the desires and wishes of individual leaders.

#### **4.3. *Zakāt* Mechanism: Collections and Distributions in the Wealthy Country of Qatar**

Woertz (2012), *Oxford Business Group* (2014: 31) and Bantam (cited in Kayaoglu 2015: 94) say, Qatar has been described as the ‘Pygmy with the punch of a giant’ and a global ‘rising star’. Qatar is considered to have one of the world’s highest per capita GDP - US\$63,222.10 per capita in 2018 - and the third largest reserves of natural gas in the world, after Russia and Iran. It is also considered to be one of the world's most important producers of oil, despite its small geographical size and population in the region (Tok, Alkhater, and Pal 2016: 1; *Trading Economics* 2019). This wealth has enabled the state to lay foundations for present and future prosperity (Dargin 2007, *Hukoomi* 2018a). International recognition such as Qatar winning the hosting of the FIFA World Cup in 2022 has helped. An estimated injection of US\$220 billion infrastructure investment programme into the country is envisaged for this event, and, arguably, the first step towards ‘QNV 2030’ (*MDPS* 2008; Tok, Alkhater and Pal 2016). The Amir launched ‘Qatar National Vision (QNV) 2030’ in 2008, with the intention of ‘building a bridge between the present and the future’. The Amir states: ‘The National Vision aims at transforming Qatar into an advanced country by 2030, capable of sustaining its own development and providing for a high standard of living for all of its people for generations to come’ (*MDPS* 2008). These economic activities have provided Qatar Investment Authority (QIA) with over US\$355 billion in assets, thus becoming one of the most active, sovereign wealth funds in the world (Sergie 2017).

This fertile environment provides a high standard of living which has made the Qatari citizen enjoy protection and security such as free health care, housing grants, subsidised utilities, and university-level education (De Bel-Air 2014). The features of these high living standards began to emerge on the Qatari landscape through buildings such as malls, hospitals, schools, universities, administrative government buildings, residential units including luxury villas, infrastructure, corniches along the coastline, public facilities and parks, and financial wealth to purchase luxury cars. Tok, Alkhater and Pal (2016: 16) say, ‘resource wealth has made them, virtually overnight, the richest people on the planet. Small states do not usually get that rich, that quickly’.

These excellent living standards suggest that *zakāt*-givers would play a strong and active part in the social status of Qatar society, since the conservative (tribal) and heavily religious society in particular (*Sunnah’s Hanbalī* and Islāmic state identity) create an atmosphere of vital activity by *zakāt*-givers. This may explain the numerical spread of Islāmic charitable organisations across the capital, Doha. Ferjabi (2017) and Dawam (2013) explain that there are three ways in which *zakāt* is given in Qatar.

- i. Paying *zakāt* independently to whomever he or she wants (individually).
- ii. Paying *zakāt* to the Zakat Fund (Qatari government organisation).
- iii. Paying *zakāt* to non-governmental charity organisations (NGOs).

The method for paying *zakāt* is either through individual cash payments, direct bank transactions to *zakāt*-beneficiaries, or through Qatari charitable organisations.

It is worth noting that, in most of the literature review, the follow-up and updating of *zakāt* in Qatar came about very largely through Qatari newspapers such as *Al-Sharq*, *Al-Watan*, and *Al-Raya*. The interest of Qataris in reading daily newspapers is high, and therefore, newspapers will be one of the fastest communication media in Qatar (*Oxford Business Group* 2020). These newspapers are also interested in publishing articles on social issues concerning Qatari society (*Al-Raya* 2019; *Al-Watan* 2019). This may explain the importance of *zakāt* in Qatari society, and one of the main conversations in which the public is interested.

During the fieldwork, the researcher published ten-weekly columns (in Arabic) in a Qatari newspaper - *Al-Watan* - between May and July 2019. The researcher presented *zakāt* issues, such as the dependency on receiving *zakāt*, the cost of projects provided by *zakāt*, *zakāt* employees’ salaries, and so on. These queries were derived from the literature review and fieldwork in Qatar. The publications also described how *zakāt* could provide some projects for

resolving conflicts, encouraging political dialogue, creating job opportunities, and spreading awareness about the Islāmic religion. The eight-column publications presented the eight categories of *zakāt*-beneficiaries. ‘For the cause of *Allah*’ category according to interpretations of strict jurisprudence and interpretations of renewed jurisprudence’ was declined by the newspaper without giving any reasons. The rejection of this particular category may have been because the article touched on politically-sensitive issues such as the claim of providing finance to the military during the Arab Uprisings.<sup>62</sup>

#### 4.3.1. An Individual Qatari Practice of *Zakāt*

Individual *zakāt* practice is one behavioural aspect of Muslims in Qatar (Dawam 2013; Ferjabi 2017): it is not mandatory as it is in Saudi Arabia and Yemen (Kroessin 2008; Susetyo 2015). Qatari individuals prefer to pay their *zakāt* directly to beneficiaries. The ‘no third-party actor or role between the individual and beneficiaries’ concept is one of the main motivations which encourage individuals to make their own decisions. The Qatari (citizens and residents) take responsibility for the distribution of *zakāt*, therefore, choosing *zakāt*-beneficiaries is based on a personal decision. *Zakāt*, in the case of individual practice, is subject to the extent of Qatari individuals’ awareness of the concept. *Zakāt*-givers will not say how much *zakāt* they have paid, nor will the *zakāt*-beneficiaries disclose how much *zakāt* they have received. The *zakāt* process will, therefore, be limited to being between the *zakāt*-giver and the *zakāt*-beneficiary. A reflection of this relationship appeared in a report by Stirk (2015) ‘*AN ACT OF FAITH, Humanitarian financing and Zakat*’. Stirk says, the estimate of the total amount of *zakāt* funds collected globally every year through official mechanisms amounts to tens of billions at the least, but the amount could be increased to hundreds of billions of dollars if *zakāt* is calculated through informal practices. Qatar has demonstrated similar statistics. *Al-Raya* newspaper published an article in 2013, stating that, although it is difficult to calculate *zakāt* funds accurately, the expectation is that *zakāt* will be approximately four billion riyals, (US\$1,098,901,098.90)<sup>63</sup>; however, what has been collected by *Zakat* Fund is 170 million Qatari riyals (US\$46,703,296.70)<sup>64</sup> (Dawam 2013). Dawam adds, the businessmen and trade

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<sup>62</sup> Arab Uprisings: Several uprisings started in December 2010, the first one in Tunisia. Mass demonstrations, protests, riots, military coups and military foreign interventions and acute civil wars have occupied the Middle East and North Africa’s scene in the last seven years (Abdelsalam 2015).

<sup>63</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=4,000,000,000&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 12/01/2020]

<sup>64</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=170,000,000&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 12/01/2020]

professionals, Darwish, Elsiefy, and Al-Hajiri stressed the importance of the existence of laws regulating the methods of collection, distribution, and spreading societal awareness about the value of *zakāt*. They point out, in a similar way, the need to determine the authorities which are responsible for collecting *zakāt*, and the provision of multiple methods for *zakāt*-givers to feel comfortable with paying *zakāt* from their money (Dawam 2013). Knowledge of *zakāt* financial statistics is significant for several reasons. Banks (2018) explains:

- i. To ensure that the business (*zakāt*) can fund its current commitments;
- ii. To enable the business (*zakāt*) to meet its objectives and make confident financial decisions;
- iii. To budget (*zakāt* funds) and provide estimates of revenue, plans for expenditure, and restriction of any spending that is not part of the plan;
- iv. To budget (*zakāt* funds) ensuring that money is allocated to those things that support the strategic objectives of the business (*zakāt*); and
- v. To provide a well-communicated budget will help everyone understand the priorities of the business (*zakāt*).

An additional reason is that Islāmic economists and jurists will have the capacity to determine whether the practice of *zakāt* in a location corresponds with the economic estimates for that country. If the amount of *zakāt* paid in a country is provided, the countries in need will be identified, and thus focus can be targeted on distributing *zakāt* and financial projects in such regions. The lack of knowledge of the total of *zakāt* statistics - of formal and informal processes - is a challenge to practising *zakāt*. It is more difficult to effectively distribute *zakāt* to beneficiaries, on one hand, and on the other, it affects *zakāt* institutions' establishment and work structure. There are a number of Qatari who prefer to practise *zakāt* individually, while others prefer to pay their *zakāt* to charities.

#### **4.3.2. Qatar Charities: *Zakāt* Collection Methods and Qatari Response**

Charitable work has developed in Qatar with projects that focus on financial relief, building mosques, and digging wells for water, to becoming sustainable developments by establishing the Qatari charities - Qatar Red Crescent (1978) and Qatar Charity (1980) for this purpose. These were followed in the 1990s by other Qatari charities (*Al-Raya* 2007; *Al-Jazeera* 2017c; *Shaheen* 2018). According to the statistics in 2016, the number of Qatari charities had reached 20, each dealing with diverse projects such as advocacy, preaching and counselling, health, social services, education and research, and disabilities, to name a few (*International*



Centre for Research and Studies 2016). The Qatar charities are divided between a government organisation (*Zakat Fund*) and NGO charities.

*Zakat Fund* is regulated by the Qatari government, and started work in 1995 under a department affiliated to the Minister of *Awqaf* and Islāmic Affairs in the State of Qatar (*Hukoomi* 2019; *Zakat Fund* 2019). This organisation clearly states that it is responsible for the work of *zakāt*. According to the website of *Zakat Fund* (2019b), ‘*Zakat Fund* collects *zakāt* payments from the rich, and spends the wealth on the poor and other *zakāt*-beneficiaries’ categories. It performs a role in calling on society to pay *zakāt*. Al-Sawy (2012) explains that, *Zakat Fund* does not collect the *zakāt* payments as a compulsory method from those who have to pay *zakāt*. This official attention paid to *zakāt* from an organisation operating under the Qatari government, however, indicates that *zakāt* in Qatar is gaining importance in Qatari society. The behaviour of Qatari *zakāt*-givers regarding the practice of *zakāt* is a clear and noticeable activity in Qatari society. This may be because the Qatari government is concerned about the path these financial payments may take.

NGO charities such as Red Crescent, Qatar Charity, *Eid Charity*, Reach Out to Asia, and so on, also play a part in collection and distribution of *zakāt* (*International Centre for Research and Studies* 2016; *The Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities RACA* 2020a). The NGOs compete with *Zakat Fund* in collecting *zakāt*. Government and NGO charities accept credit card payments by telephone, mobile (SMS), ATM, and online. The donations are also collected through headquarters, sub-offices, and collection points or ‘pin boxes’ located in malls and public places in the country (Latibu 2016; *Hukoomi* 2018d; *Hukoomi* 2018e; *Qatar Charity* 2018). Advertisements for projects in the affected areas and humanitarian campaigns are additionally launched by charitable organisations. This situation indicates that the *zakāt* payment mechanism serves the present position (2017-2019) in Qatari society. These multiple methods are also considered part of a good system for urging *zakāt*-givers to pay their *zakāt* in any way they choose. Encouraging the payment of *zakāt* does not depend on providing many ways to help payment, but there are also awareness programmes and grass-root training to encourage Muslims in Qatar to pay *zakāt*. This approach may put pressure on *zakāt*-givers, as the many organisations and their marketing campaigns create an undesirable competitive atmosphere for those who pay *zakāt*.

Qatari’s response to these methods is assumed to be effective. Al-Sawy (2012) mentions that, between 2006 and 2007, *zakāt* funds had reached approximately 11 million

Qatari riyals (US\$ 3,021,978.02)<sup>65</sup>. Al-Hindawi, a *Shari'ah* supervisor of the *Zakat* Fund in Qatar, said in a television interview (2014) that *zakāt*'s assets in Islāmic banks were approximately US\$42 billion (*Al-Jazeera* 2014). According to a report by *Al-Raya* (2017) in September 2014, the total number of projects supported by Qatari philanthropists in Bangladesh reached 7,709; in a similar vein, the newspaper also added: Qatar sent its aid to earthquake victims in China in 2008; Haiti and Chile in 2010; and to the Haiti tornado disaster in 2016. Qatar Red Crescent sent US\$400,000 to aid Ukrainian displaced persons in 2015. The Qatari government also became involved with the Qatari charity projects in the 'Relieve Aleppo' in Syria campaign in 2016 (Mohamed 2016, *GULF TIMES* 2016). The Aleppo campaign's slogan encouraged *zakāt* donations which reached US\$67 million (*Al-Araby* 2016). The 'Campaign for the Human' in 2019 earned 24,750 million riyals (US\$6,799,450)<sup>66</sup> within two hours', for the relief of refugees in six countries: Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, and Bangladesh, in addition to *Rohingya* Muslims in Myanmar (*Al-Sharq* 2019).

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Figure 4.1: Campaign images. Source: *Al-Sharq* 2019

Figure 4.4 shows how much the campaign used images to attract the sympathy of *zakāt*-givers. These images present themes of victimisation and dependency, and thus attract compassion from the viewer, further encouraging donations, or, in this case, *zakāt*. According to Erlandsson, Nilsson, and Västfjäll (2018) and Willis (n.d.), the charities promote the commodity by finding effective ways in which to attract the donor; for example: photographs of orphans, poor children, or the needy, in wretched conditions. The picture painted here is that

<sup>65</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=11,000,000&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 12/01/2020]

<sup>66</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=24,750,000&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 24/01/2020]

the charities are traders and the beneficiaries have become a commodity to purchase by *zakāt*-givers: the giver thus becomes targeted from all directions, and organisations need to attract individual donor's empathy to the marketed cause. If the cause can evoke emotion, it could help to increase the funds raised (Burnett 2002: 113). Emphasis is put on the hardship and adversity of the less fortunate which could be particularly effective in a wealthy country such as Qatar (2017-2020) where many may have not seen such images prior to the advertisements. This shows a contrast with charitable guidelines which advise images should emphasise survival and agency, rather than hardship and misery. These suggestions concern the relationship between the *zakāt*-giver and the *zakāt*-beneficiary of charity. The action taken by Qatari charities may affect the motivations and decision-making of Muslims in Qatar, which may also explain one of the reasons why Qatari society generously responded to these appeals.

#### 4.3.2.1. Qatar Charities: *Zakāt* Distribution Projects

The latest statistics in 2019 showed that more than 250 million riyals (US\$68.68 million)<sup>67</sup> was the volume of Qatari *Zakat* Fund aid during 2019 (BAWABAA 2020). *Zakat* Fund says that most of these donations go to *zakāt*-beneficiaries within Qatar (2019b). According to *Hukoomi* (2018d), 'The majority of the beneficiaries of the fund are of limited income, but the *Zakat* Fund also provides aid, training and support to middle-income and needy people, who face financial difficulties in covering the costs of daily life'. This means that if a country is characterised as 'rich' among the countries of the world, and Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) are considered to be recipients of the world's highest incomes, to whom does the *Zakat* Fund give *zakāt* in Qatar?

NGO charities claim that the majority of these charities such as *Afif* Charity, *Nasser Bin Khaled Al Thani* (NBK) Charity, Qatar Charity, and *Eid* Charity (RACA 2020a) explain their goals, and the work they do to support *zakāt*-beneficiaries. *Eid* Charity's goals, for example, are caring for widows and orphans, building schools, hospitals, mosques, and centres for memorising the Qur'ān, which contribute to alleviating the suffering of some poor Qatari families (*Eid Charity* 2020). According to Qatar Charity's website, it provides sponsorship to donors or *zakāt*-givers for orphans, students, and families, as well as projects contributing to building mosques and housing for the poor, water provision, health care, and education (*Qatar Charity* 2020). Gharaibeh (2013) observes that, the tiny Gulf state has become known all over

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<sup>67</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=250&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 14/08/2020]

the world for relief programmes and helping the needy, ‘healing wounds’, spreading education, developing resources, building mosques, digging water wells, and building health centres. He adds: the donations come from *ṣadaqah* (voluntary charity), *zakāt*, and personal sacrifice.

*Hukoomi* (2018d) mentions, ‘Government entities are in place to oversee the *Zakat* Fund and ensure all donations go to the right places’. *Zakat* Fund continues in the same vein: ‘Fund holders keep in mind that some community members may be reluctant to seek help arbitrarily, so they [*Zakat* Fund] come to help them while preserving their feelings and dignity’. The *Zakat* Fund and NGOs are considered to be intermediaries between *zakāt*-givers and *zakāt*-beneficiaries, and practice professional ethics such as accountability and transparency in processing *zakāt*. This suggests a full interest exists in observing the practice of *zakāt* from both donors and beneficiaries alike. This, however, does not mean that the process of practising *zakāt* is complete. This ‘unbiased’ concept must be proven to *zakāt*-givers, which begs the question: what criteria and standards are followed in the process of *zakāt*, and what level of scrutiny does the government exercise regarding these charities.

#### **4.4. Politicisation of *Zakāt* in Qatar**

*Zakāt* has attracted the attention of the Qatari government, considering the rapid economic growth, and the increasing number of wealthy Qatari citizens and residents. The Qatari government sees the payment of *zakāt* as a form of taxation; it therefore requires control, or at least close observation. Stirk (2015: 3) says *zakāt* collection is part of the public taxation system, noting that, ‘*Zakat* resembles a form of tax, as it is collected and managed by the state in relation to a person’s earnings and used to provide social welfare services or a public safety net for people in need’. If *zakāt* is considered a part of state tax, it does not relieve the Muslims in Qatar from the double payment of state tax and the religious obligation of *zakāt*. This duplication highlights the intervention of the Qatari government in *zakāt*. Once the Qatari government has become aware of the amount of *zakāt* being collected, it is natural to assume that accountability and investigation will also take place regarding its distribution.

Another issue of government intervention in *zakāt* is the monitoring and accountability of charitable organisations in Qatar. The Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities (RACA) is an independent governmental organisation, established by the State of Qatar in 2014. The role of this enterprise is to portray a collective responsibility ‘through local non-governmental organizations, the Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities cooperate with leading international humanitarian aid organizations to ensure that active external assistance

contributes to achieving the goals of sustainable global development' (RACA 2020b). Based on this initiative, the Qatari charities work to channel donations, including *zakāt*, under government control. *Zakāt* here means collection, distribution, account monitoring, and managing projects supported by *zakāt* payments. *Zakāt* awareness-raising programmes are also part of the charity's goals - whether it is at a general level for Qatari people or private training for *zakāt* scholars, for instance. This has been confirmed and praised by Yousf (2017). He explains the good relationship that RACA has with charitable organisations in Qatar, especially after the declaration of the global war on 'terrorism'. Yousf adds (2017): 'The RACA commission undertook the process of overseeing the accurate collection, coordination, and control of donations, and obligating all associations to submit to the supervision of the commission'. Yousef continues by stating the charity should be 'providing them with the necessary information and documents required to carry out their work and performing their supervisory duty according to the protocol upon which the body was established'. Matleq (2016) agrees with RACA's commitment to the charities, but disagrees with the random collection of donations. *Zakāt*'s collection, distribution, and management have been subject to government monitoring. The question is whether all Qatari charities are equally monitored by the government. Lestra (2017: 71) says, 'Others, like the Qatar Foundation and its aid affiliates (Reach Out to Asia, Silatech and Education Above All) enjoy a special legal status'. The author continues: 'Being set up by a royal family member, they "resort to special Emiri decrees to ensure [their] independence" as well as "the international nature of [their] operations". They can act without oversight beyond that of their alma mater' (Lestra 2017: 71). This may also expose the principle of preserving the sovereignty of the Al-Thani tribe - one of the competing tribes in Qatar - and, on the other hand, preserving the sovereignty of the Qatari citizens above that of the residents, especially since the Qatari citizen is in the minority in Qatar. RACA has stated that it is content with observation despite the above (Lestra 2017). RACA's intervention did not stop there. Formezon (2017: 154) says, 'the power of Islām as a religio-political ideology could challenge the state. It has become the accepted wisdom of political scientists that religion and religious institutions have been effectively marginalised by Emiri power in Qatar'. It is clear that the clergy has an influence on Qatari society, especially since it can be called a tribal society. This may throw light on one of the reasons for imposing the embargo on Qatar in 2017. Qatar has been accused of sponsoring organisations under the name of 'charity', and donating funds for undesirable purposes such as purchasing weapons for groups engaged in wars or conflicts.

The period in which the fieldwork was conducted for this research coincided with the blockade of Qatar. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, imposed a siege on the country in June 2017; Egypt followed suit, and Jordan reduced its diplomatic ties with Qatar - it shut down *Al-Jazeera* bureaux in Amman. Yemen, Mauritania, Maldives, and Comoros, cut off diplomatic relations with the State of Qatar. Djibouti also announced a reduction in its diplomatic representation in Qatar (*AL-Watan* 2017a; BBC 2017a); *Saudi Press Agency* 2017 a, b, c, d; Chughtai 2018). These countries claimed Qatar supported ‘terrorism’ and several extremist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood - considered to be a terrorist organisation by these countries - as well as the Houthi of Yemen, through *Al-Qā'idah* and the Organisation of the Islāmic State (*Dā'ish*). Qatar's support for Iran, according to these Gulf states, is believed to be destabilising their security. They also claimed that Qatar encouraged some citizens to rebel against their governments, as in Bahrain and Egypt, and hosted opposition activists (*Al-Arabiya* 2017; *Al-Jazeera* 2017b; Chughtai 2018). The blockade came with a ten-day ultimatum consisting of thirteen demands, when Saudi Arabia closed its border with Qatar, the only land access to the country. The blockade also severed all air and sea links with the country, and cut off diplomatic ties with the State of Qatar. It is worth mentioning that, the blockade caused ‘thousands of families and individuals across the region who make up a tight-knit social fabric cutting across national borders: splitting up families, interrupting students’ education, threatening jobs, raising prices of staple foods in Qatar, and leaving residents of the region facing an uncertain future’ (*Amnesty* 2017: n.p.). Amnesty's findings correlate with Abdulmeneim and her research team of 2018 (*DIFI* 2018). According to the behaviour of Muslim society, the Qatari tribal society, especially the roots of these families, extend to neighbouring countries, and equally, their connection to each other is supported through the united concept of '*Ummah*.

Qatar and the neighbouring countries are not only related through language, religion, and culture, but they also have mutual interests such as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), founded by Qatar and Saudi Arabia in 1981. The Charter of *GCC* (2018) states:

Being fully aware of the ties of special relations, common characteristics and similar systems founded on the creed of Islām which bind them; and desiring to effect coordination, cooperation and integration between them in all fields.

The Charter continues with these mutual interests in the service of Arab and Islāmic causes:

[...] in conformity with the Charter of the League of Arab States which calls for the realization of closer relations and stronger bonds; and in order to channel their efforts to reinforce and serve Arab and Islamic causes (*GCC* 2018).

This petition now seems to be irrelevant in the face of the slogan of Arab nationalism or Islāmic 'Ummah, following the imposition of the blockade on Qatar. This current state of affairs may present a problem regarding these governments' use of *zakāt* finances for war funding. Qataris' reactions on the domestic level have supported their prince and his government (Fromherz 2017). These are based on many factors such as the state has been strengthened in the hearts of its citizens' pride in their country (Shushan 2011); there is no room for the culture and religion to play any role in Qatar's foreign policy (Kayaoglu 2015); and the high standard of Qatari life provided by the government. Qatar recently increased its *zakāt* fund in the *Sha'bān* and *Ramaḍān* months of 2017; in a mere two months, it reached around 164 million Qatari riyals (US\$45 million)<sup>68</sup>, despite the country's political instability and the comprehensive economic embargo from neighbouring countries (Zakat Fund 2017).<sup>69</sup> Zakat Fund says, this increased revenue has been collected from the donations to *zakāt* made by citizens and residents in collection boxes and offices positioned throughout the country. Ferjabi (2018) confirms that, despite the siege, Zakat Fund had received a 25 per cent increase in *zakāt* donations in 2017 compared to 2016. Ferjabi does not explain, however, why *zakāt* donations increased after the siege. Seeing it in this way, it is presumed that Muslims in Qatar do not mind providing their government with funds from their *zakāt*, under 'for the cause of Allah' category, and according to the *Ḥanbalī* school (Al-Ghufaili 2008). The concept of *zakāt* in this regard concerns some interpretations that agree *zakāt* could support the provision of weapons. *Zakāt* thus becomes either a tool of vengeance and rebellion or a blessing for some people. The question is whether the motivation to pay *zakāt*, and the aid provided from it, is based on charitable work ethics or on political intervention. The Muslims' decision-making and loyalty regarding *zakāt* also swings between citizens and residents: whether nationals should support their government, or whether the loyalty of residents lies in sending their *zakāt* to their countries of origin.

Kuwait attempted reconciliation under the GCC framework, but it failed (Mounier-Kuhn 2018) as did the international efforts to address the Gulf crisis (Mahmoud 2018). Qatar replied by stating that Gulf reconciliation is subject to an apology and the lifting of the blockade (Albawaba 2018). Qatar has, in the meantime, retained air transportation with Turkey and Iran, particularly after the closure of the only land port, thus maintaining its self-sufficiency to a

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<sup>68</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=164&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 16/08/2020]

<sup>69</sup> *Sha'bān* and *Ramaḍān* are months in the Islamic year. Muslim scholars such as ibn Al Uthaymeen and ibn Baz clarify that, during *Sha'bān* and *Ramaḍān* the reward will be doubled and more (Alahmed 2012: 141, 153). Muslims therefore increase their charitable work and religious obligations, such as paying *zakāt* during these months.

certain extent (*Turkish Policy Quarterly* 2017). Qatar has recently withdrawn from The Organisation of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which includes members from Algeria, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (*CBC* 2018). This raises the question of whether Qatar intends to withdraw from the GCC in the near future. Qatar has vehemently denied allegations such as supporting terrorism; moreover, it also states that the conditions required to break the blockade are unrealistic, and are aimed at curbing Qatar's sovereignty such as closing the *Al-Jazeera* channel which is supported by the Qatari government (*Al-Jazeera* 2017a; *BBC* 2017b; *Al-Jazeera* 2018b).

The government intervention by monitoring the Qatari charities through RACA has revealed differing opinions regarding its aims, which is one of the probabilities of politicisation of *zakāt* from an internal perspective. The other view is the effect of the siege on Qatar by neighbouring countries does not seem to have affected Qatari contributions to *zakāt*, but it has been affected by restrictions on *zakāt* distribution abroad. A possibility exists in the light of this crisis that *zakāt* funds are used to financially assist conflicts in the region, following the principle of 'for the cause of *Allah*' category valued by the *Ḥanbalī* school. The Muslims in Qatar reactions on a domestic level suggest they supported their prince and his government in the official approach; it can therefore be assumed that *zakāt* supports conflict and wars in the region.

#### 4.5. Summary

This chapter has presented a background to Qatar as the case study of this research (2017-2020). Qatari society has a diverse demography: (i) population: citizen minority compared to resident majority; (ii) the powerful tribal society in Qatar has made it dominant over the cultural differences of non-Qataris as residents, who have brought their own cultural backgrounds from their countries of origin; and (iii) the characteristics of Qatari society have been reviewed as they reflect its religious identity. Qatari society generally adopts the *Sunnah*'s *Ḥanbalī* identity. The relevance of the *Shī'ah*, a minority migrant community, with its origins in neighbouring countries such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Iran (Ismael 2014; Saber 2015; Al-Dragee 2017) has also been debated. Qatar's economy, and the impact it has had on the standard of living in Qatar has been presented as an important feature of the country's approach to charity and *zakāt*. Its high living standards suggest that *zakāt*-givers would play a strong and active part in the social status of Qatar society, particularly because of a conservative



(tribal), heavily religious society (*Sunnah's Ḥanbalī*, and the Islāmic State's identity) creates an atmosphere of dynamic activity by *zakāt*-givers.

The three methods which the Qatari chooses to pay his or her *zakāt* has also been outlined: individually, to the *Zakat* Fund (Qatari government organisation), and to non-governmental charity organisations (NGOs). The history of Qatar charities has been presented, with some of their principles and methods of collecting *zakāt* such as credit card payments by telephone, mobile (SMS) ATM, online, and so on. Donations are also collected through headquarters and sub-office organisations, collection points or 'pin boxes' located in malls and public places in various areas in the country. The role of Qatari charities in awareness-raising of *zakāt* has also been addressed such as setting up media campaigns, organising specialised scientific and jurisprudence courses, organising regular courses to help calculate *zakāt* for companies, as well as participating in seminars and conferences. The distribution of *zakāt* by Qatar charities has been shown to support such projects as caring for widows and orphans, and building enterprises, wells, health, and education schemes.

There is no doubt that there is significant evidence of Qatari governmental political intervention in *zakāt*. This intervention, whether internal or external, restricts and monitors individual practice of *zakāt*, the work of charitable organisations, and the collection and distribution inside and outside Qatar. The reasons for the government's restrictions on the practice of *zakāt* is due to fear of being accused of financing 'terrorism'; a desire to pursue its interests in directing *zakāt* funds; controlling internal affairs of the state; dictating the path of religious *zakāt*, and taking into consideration *zakāt*-givers and *zakāt*-beneficiaries. The protection from external interference, promoted by Qatari citizens through their support for the government using *zakāt* funds under 'for the cause of *Allah*' category for wars and foreign conflicts with Qatar, is another reason.

The information that has been collected and analysed about Qatar in this chapter is the foundation for the analysis of the fieldwork in Qatar, and the methodology adopted in designing an appropriate plan for conducting this research.

## CHAPTER FIVE

### Research Methodology

#### 5.0. Introduction

Diverse lived experiences of *zakāt* in Qatar are informed by both theological underpinnings shared by Muslims all over the world, as well as by the specific contextual considerations that arise from the geographical and political location of Qatar. The complexities and nuances that inform how *zakāt* is ‘lived’ have been discussed in the preceding chapters. This chapter will establish and outline a methodological foundation to empirically explore this lived experience. The purpose of this chapter is to set out the methods through which the following three research questions will be answered:

- i. How do theological and sociological motivations inform individual decision-making and practice regarding *zakāt* in Qatar?
- ii. What are the main characteristics and patterns of the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar?
- iii. What are the opportunities and challenges in the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar?

#### 5.1. Philosophical Assumptions

*Zakāt* philosophy arises mainly from the interpretations of the *Qur’ān* and *Ḥadīth* (Asutay 2007). The methodology and legislation of *zakāt* philosophy are built on *Sharī‘ah* (Islāmic law) and the path of Prophet Muhammad. The attitude and behaviour of *zakāt*-givers and beneficiaries are therefore based on religious sources which inform their beliefs and practices.<sup>70</sup> This research is also concerned with the social impact on the practice of *zakāt*. Knowing the social and religious origins which givers and beneficiaries use as a point of reference for their conduct will be through the sociology of Islām, as the disciplinary approach for this research. The ontology and epistemology of *zakāt*, and the paradigm chosen for this study, will help to answer the research aim.

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<sup>70</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt*-Givers and Beneficiaries’ Lived Experience Between Belief and Practice.

### 5.1.1. Ontology of *Zakāt*

Ontology generally focuses on the philosophy of the nature of being, real and related to how researchers view reality; it is also concerned with whether reality exists by itself, or if it is produced by the individual (Blaikie 2007); ontology of *zakāt*, however, is different. The practice of *zakāt* stems from Islāmic beliefs that are prevalent across the ‘Muslim world’ and in Qatar. People give or accept *zakāt* because they believe it is mandated by *Allah* in the Qur’ān, and by Prophet Muhammad in the *Ḥadīth*. Presenting a single reality of *zakāt* is almost an impossible task, however, even though ontology of *zakāt* mainly lies in these two sources. This is due to three things: (i) the various interpretations of the Qur’ān according to different schools of thought such as *Sunnah* and *Shī‘ah*, and *Shafī‘ī* and *Ḥanbalī*; (ii) diversities that exist between the traditional and modern opinions of juristic perspectives concerning *zakāt*’s mechanism; and (iii) the diversity of Islāmic societies.<sup>71</sup> It is not possible, in this case, to adopt a specific Qurānic text or a specific *Ḥadīth* relating to an issue concerning *zakāt* without jumping from one interpretation to another. There are different interpretations of *zakāt* concerning land, for instance; some Muslim scholars agree that it should be classed under *zakāt*, and others do not. The State of Qatar claims to follow *Sharī‘ah* according to the *Ḥanbalī* school of thought (Hukoomi 2018b); however, the practice of *zakāt* is an individual choice. Qatari society’s impact on the behaviour of Qatari citizens is influenced by the *Ḥanbalī* traditional school of jurisprudence (*fiqh*) in *Sunnah* Islām regarding *zakāt*. The reality of practising *zakāt* is not easy to understand due to the different interpretations within the *Ḥanbalī* school. This complex reality also applies to Qatari residents who follow diverse denominations and teachings (Al-Dragee 2017).

Al-Saadi (2014: 1) points out from a social perspective, ‘Ontological issues are concerned with questions pertaining to the kinds of things that exist within society’. Patterson and Williams (1998) add that ontology explains human behaviour, and how it relates to the nature and experience of human beings. The researcher’s ontological view, for example, is that *zakāt* exists as a feature of Islām; as a *Sunnah* Muslim herself, she has had first-hand experience, and witnessed how *zakāt* is practised in accordance with Islāmic teachings in her own community. Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) lived experience between beliefs and practice of *zakāt* is based on the three stages of relationships: (i) Qatari and *Allah*; (ii) Qatari and Self; and (iii) Qatari and society.<sup>72</sup> It is difficult to investigate ontology of *zakāt*

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<sup>71</sup> See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* in its Religious Form: Definition and Various Interpretations.

<sup>72</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt*-Givers and Beneficiaries Lived Experience Between Belief and Practice.

through the individual behaviour of Muslims in Qatar regarding the practice of *zakāt*. Individual behaviour is not in the public sphere such as the act of prayer, for instance; due to religious factors, some give *zakāt* in secret.<sup>73</sup> Qatari society's conduct represented in the charitable organisations, especially *zakāt* institutions, assists in investigating the ontology of *zakāt* in Qatar. The questions presented in the survey and the interviews also helped to discover whether *zakāt* exists in Qatar, and, if so, in what form. Do they all pay *zakāt* or do only some pay? Who legislates on *zakāt*? Are *zakāt*'s authorities (scholars such as the Muftī, Sheikhs and Imāms of the mosque) or leading institutes such as *Dār Al- 'Iftā'* authorised to issue religious opinions (*fatāwā*)? What impact do these have on Qatar society? The difficulties that resulted from various interpretations of *zakāt* have had an impact on the epistemology of *zakāt*.

### **5.1.2. Epistemology of the Research: Learning About the Practice of *Zakāt* in Qatari Society**

According to Burrell and Morgan (1979) and Bryman (2008), epistemology addresses the study, theory, and justification of knowledge. Al-Saadi (2014: 2) mentions 'how the kind of epistemological assumptions which we make or hold about knowledge profoundly affect how we go about uncovering knowledge of social behaviour' (cited in Cohen, Manion and Morrison 2011). To gain knowledge about *zakāt* and its existence in Qatari society is not a straightforward matter. The interpretations of *zakāt*, as one of the Qur'ān's rules or guidelines of Islāmic observances held by Muslims (as explained above), differ between adherents and non-adherents to *zakāt*'s mechanism. These contrasting interpretations challenge attempts at gaining knowledge from a theological viewpoint regarding *zakāt*. The researcher, nevertheless, followed both the theoretical and practical approaches to gain knowledge of *zakāt*'s mechanism, the challenges it presents, and the opportunities it offers in Qatar. *Zakāt*'s mechanism, and the system in place for collecting and distributing it (by whom, and how) in Qatar have been examined. New knowledge has been obtained through data collection according to the mixed methods approach. This approach includes an interpretative epistemological technique<sup>74</sup>, as a way of obtaining relevant information. The researcher selected an interpretative approach because the method involves focusing on the dialogue between Qatari participants and the researcher in order to increase understanding about Qatari

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<sup>73</sup> See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* Mechanism: Collection and Obstacles Facing Collection.

<sup>74</sup> The epistemological method consists of interpretative, positivist, post-positivist and pragmatic epistemology (Ryan et al. 2002; Creswell 2014).

social behaviour. This method creates a foundation for knowledge gained through analysis by the researcher whose reflections and deliberations focused on the research problem (Dessler 1999; Agger 2007).

The researcher has chosen the interpretative-constructivist paradigm because it helps the researcher to gain further knowledge about *zakāt* from existing *zakāt* knowledge in Qatari society (Dessler 1999). Bevir (2002: 2) explains that the interpretative approach studies beliefs, ideas or discourses as they apply to all political studies; consequently, the interpretative approach is also appropriate for this purpose. Additional knowledge was gained from in-depth interviews with the stakeholders in Qatar; moreover, interviews with the participants in the survey were used to interpret and understand the dialogue between the participants and the researcher. The results of these interviews helped to build further knowledge regarding religious views, social interaction, and individual opinions concerning the application of *zakāt*.

## **5.2. Methodology**

This research relied on a mixed methods approach to study the lived experience of Qatari givers and beneficiaries, the role of charitable organisations and the government, and in particular, the collection and distribution mechanism of *zakāt* in Qatar. This research has followed a mixed methods approach in which quantitative and qualitative research integrates purposes and procedures which are deductive and inductive, subjective and general, and contextual (Punch 2013; Ansari, Panhwar and Mahesar 2016). The ‘research onion’ (Figure 5.1 below) illustrates the research methods process. The research onion is derived from the one developed by Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2009). The onion locates data collection and analysis techniques in the centre. A number of layers have to be ‘peeled away’ before reaching the research centre, thus ensuring that a complete process is adopted. These layers are aspects to take into consideration when choosing the research methodology for this study.




Figure 5.1: Research Onion (adapted from Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill 2009)

Layer One. The research philosophy model is interpretivism.

Layer Two: The research philosophy should also take into consideration induction, deduction, subjectivity, and objectivity.

Layer Three: Mixed Methods: Qualitative and Quantitative Choices.

Layer Four: Qatar: survey and in-depth-interview strategies.

Layer Five: Data Collection and Data Analysis Techniques and Procedures.

The deductive approach ('top-down') involves developing an existing concept, and then subjecting it to an empirical study (Ali and Birley 1999). The purpose of this method is to allow the researcher to begin with general ideas and assumptions on the selected topic, in order to develop particular research questions. The deductive approach involves developing a hypothesis based on an existing theory, and then subjecting it to an empirical study (Ali and Birley 1999). The approach is related to research goals such as linking causes to effects. This process moves from theory to observations in order to emphasise the quantitative results through theory testing according to explicit, predetermined research

designs (Morgan 2013). Morgan adds, ‘The procedures associated with deduction are, necessarily, quite different, in particular, theory testing requires you to rely on predetermined designs that first collect and then analyse data’ (Morgan 2013: 49). The researcher employed quantitative methods with a deductive approach in producing a survey which relied on a predetermined design. One of the results of the deductive approach appears in the diverse interpretations of the application of *zakāt* which could intensify confusion in the consciousness of the Muslim.<sup>75</sup> The concept was investigated in section one of the survey question: ‘I am aware of the eight categories of *Zakāt*-beneficiaries’ (see appendix A). The results were developed to shed light on such themes as the development of interpretations of Islāmic studies in the practice of *zakāt*, as well as religious comprehension based on increasing awareness of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) regarding *zakāt* applications (see ‘Survey’ section below for source of questions and themes).

The inductive (‘bottom-up’) approach uses a specific question to extrapolate general questions on the topic. The inductive process starts with open-ended questions, followed by analytical strategies which lead to the discovery and the exploration of the research goal (Morgan 2014). A qualitative method was employed in this research according to the inductive approach - semi-structured interviews with both the elites or stakeholders such as Dr. Kahf, and other participants such as citizens and residents. The interviews began by asking a specific question, followed by asking further questions according to the interviewees’ initial answers. The interview with Dr. Kahf, for example, commenced with questions about the mechanism of *zakāt*, then led on to raising more questions about the philosophy of *zakāt*, and religious legislation concerning Islām and Muslims in general.

Morgan (2014: 49) mentions that, ‘[i]n Qualitative Research, the subjective purposes aimed at meaning and interpretation also involves close, personal contacts that use the researcher as the “instrument” for recording observations.’ The researcher preferred a mixed methods approach when asking questions; for example, the questions focused on obtaining general information regarding awareness of *zakāt*. The answers were discussed from a more subjective focus, as the researcher is a *Sunnah* Muslim who believes that a subjective approach helped to establish a rapport with the participants, and made her more acceptable to them during

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<sup>75</sup> See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* Mechanism: Distribution According to Eight Categories of *Zakāt* beneficiaries.

the in-depth interviews. Questions and methods were chosen from a subjective position by the researcher in an attempt to answer the research questions; for example, the choice of Qatar as the case study and selection of participants, both stakeholders and general, through a mixed methods approach. A subjective approach may be useful in various instances; for example, the researcher is a Muslim, and her mother tongue is Arabic - the same as the majority of the interviewees. Her positionality (as a Muslim), therefore, helped her to develop a relationship with participants on the one hand, whilst being constantly aware of possible biases that may have arisen through familiarity, on the other.

Morgan notes that the purpose of generality regarding quantitative research is to emphasise the control of external factors: the research can apply to a wide range of issues in a case study such as a survey (2014: 50). ‘Quantitative research produces universally applicable information through well-controlled procedures with larger numbers of cases’ (Morgan 2013: 50). The researcher believes a degree of generality was achieved in this research through:

- i. The religious perspective: questions were designed to be compatible with all Islāmic schools.
- ii. The questions were designed to be answered by any participant, irrespective of his or her education, class, social status, or location. Islām, and therefore *zakāt*, is practised all over the world; consequently, these enquiries could apply to any Muslim, anywhere.
- iii. Participants were given the choice of whether to accept or decline answering a question, without giving a reason.

The application of these three points to the research, emphasised the control of external factors such as *fiqh* (Islāmic law), and differences between *Sunnah* and *Shī‘ah* schools of thought.

The theoretical context of this research is the lived experiences of both the givers and the beneficiaries in the practice of *zakāt* in Qatari society. It also includes *zakāt*’s mechanism - collection and distribution - through Qatari charitable organisations and the Qatari government. The selection of the research context provided a suitable opportunity for studying behaviour in a specific situation or locale (Morgan 2014). Behaviour happens naturally, which decreases the impact a researcher may have on the research. A mixed method or ‘triangulated’ approach helps towards gain more data for this research.



### 5.3. Mixed Methods Approach: Quantitative and Qualitative Techniques

The mixed methods approach combines qualitative and quantitative techniques. The researcher has applied the quantitative research method through a survey in Qatar from which data can be generalised to include some larger populations (Jick 1979; Teddlie and Tashakkori 2009). The quantitative strategy adopts a deductive approach in which emphasis is placed on testing a theory according to the empiricist and positivist philosophies (Bryman 2012). Empiricism relies on a sensory perception of the world, while positivism relies on the belief that all knowledge is *a posteriori* - gained from ('lived' or past) experience (Moser 2018). This research is positioned within Sociology of Religion as its disciplinary framework, and is theoretically underpinned by lived religion as the framework. The emphasis on lived religion will allow the researcher to study everyday practices of *zakāt* in Qatar. The focus on sociology of religion, particularly on the sociology of Islām and the Islāmic society, uses a combination of the theoretical framework of lived experience, the disciplinary approach of sociology of religion, and evidence from religious conduct and social behaviour, to analyse and discuss these phenomena regarding the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar.

Qualitative methods have been employed including semi-structured and in-depth interviews with nineteen stakeholder (elite) participants and twenty 'general' participants. The qualitative method is used to understand and explore a social phenomenon generating theories in which human beings are one of the foci (Bergman 2008; Creswell 2012; Ansari, Panhwar and Mahesar 2016). The interviews addressed questions that relate to the lived experience of *zakāt*, its application in modern life, religion, Islām, society, culture, and humanity. Triangulation or combination of a mixed methods approach offers better understanding of research problems.<sup>76</sup> Many authors such as Rossman and Wilson (1985), Fearon and Laitin (2008), and Silverman (2016) discuss the value of the triangulated technique. Qualitative and quantitative methods overlap: they can be both complementary and contradictory. This approach provides consistency and validity in producing a richer and hopefully truer account (Jick 1979).

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<sup>76</sup> Triangulation: the concept of 'triangulation', also known as 'mixed methods' research, is the act of combining several research methods to study one thing (Kennedy 2009).

## 5.4. Research Strategy

Research strategy is defined by Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill (2007, 2009) and Collis and Hussey (2009) as the development of a plan on how the researcher can achieve the research aim. The research strategy for this thesis is based on the mixed methods approach in an attempt to answer the research questions. The case study for this research is Qatar between the years 2017-2020. A survey was distributed to Qatari citizens and residents (see section below ‘Survey’). The survey was followed by in-depth interviews with the influential stakeholders, who were able to refer the researcher to other relevant parties in Qatar, and a selection of participants from the survey (see section below ‘In-depth Interviews’). The data collected were measured and analysed according to the mixed methods approach. The results were used to compare them to the theories in the literature review chapters, and to answer the research questions.

The section outlines the trustworthiness of the qualitative findings, the researcher’s reflexivity and position regarding how the researcher avoided imposing her personal opinions on this research, and the limitations the researcher faced in Qatar. Ethical considerations were also drafted through the participants’ information sheet and informed consent form, and the potential risks for the researcher and respondents.

### 5.4.1. Case Study: Qatar

There are many authors such as Flyvbjerg (2006); Driscoll et al. (2007); and Thomas and Myers (2015), who cite the benefits of adopting a case study in research. Yin (1984: 23) for example, expounds the case study research method as ‘an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context [...] when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used’. The researcher’s choice of Qatar as a case study was due to several reasons.<sup>77</sup> One of the main reasons is that this research particularly focuses on Islām, and the population of Qatar has a majority of Muslims. Islām is a religion whose canon or rules are based on *Maqāṣid Al-sharī‘ah: al-Qur‘an, al-Ḥadīth, Ijmā‘* (Consensus) and *Qiyās Al-‘Ulamā’* (Analogical Deduction); furthermore, the various interpretations of Muslim scholars and individual interpretations may have an influence on the decision-making of Muslims. The research predicted that a Qatari respondent may answer a question according to his or her understanding

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<sup>77</sup> See Chapter Four: Qatar: Context Analysis.

of Islāmic teachings, rather than giving a truthful representation of his or her thoughts and behaviour. The researcher now lives in Qatar and has a strong social community, including family and relatives. Living in Qatar made it easier for the researcher to seek permission to conduct interviews. Residing in the country further facilitated transportation and communication with respondents, as well as being able to observe people either objectively or as a participant-observer.

The validity and reliability of this research cannot be measured in the context of generalisability, as the number of survey forms distributed in Qatar is considered small in comparison to the total population.<sup>78</sup> The validity and reliability of this research are, however, considered appropriate for Qatar at the time of the research (2017-2020). The results of the survey helped to build a foundation for the analysis and discussion of the interview results in terms of a qualitative approach. Miles and Huberman (1994) assert that the quality of the meanings emerging from the qualitative data should be tested. Lincoln and Guba (1985) propose trustworthiness as an alternative term for reliability and validity, and a way of assessing good qualitative research. They identified four criteria - credibility, dependability, confirmability, and transferability - on which the significance of qualitative research can be evaluated.

### **The Trustworthiness of the Qualitative Findings: Ethical Underpinnings of the Research**

According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), credibility negotiates whether the results of qualitative research are credible or believable, based on the participants' perspectives. Transferability or generalisability concerns the degree to which the qualitative research results can be generalised in other contexts. Dependability relies on obtaining the same findings if the same phenomenon is observed twice (or more); and confirmability is the degree to which the results could be confirmed by others.

The researcher was concerned about taking into account the importance of trustworthiness. The interviews were only conducted with people above eighteen years of age who were able to express their thoughts, as required by the prevailing laws. This is in order to

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<sup>78</sup> Validity in sociology research is the 'correctness of measure' (Yaremko et al. 1982: 245). To determine validity, an explanation of the relationship between the test and attitude or behaviour it is intended to measure, is required (Knortz 2009). Reliability refers to 'the repeatability or dependability of measurement' of an instrument such as a survey or an interview (Goodstein 1982: 140). Reliability is more the consistency of a measurement of an instrument, while validity focuses more on how strong the outcome of the programme is likely to be. They are both essential, as one without the other makes the research unbalanced and weak (Galvan 2006).

ensure the authenticity and ethical considerations of the research participants. A careful approach was taken during the interviews, in recognition of the fact that this study is closely related to religious practices - of which *zakāt* is one - in order not to influence or contradict the participants' sentiments regarding their religious beliefs.

Premised on this understanding, the study carefully considered all ethical issues, followed established guidelines by Coventry University, and also acquired the university's approval before embarking on the field research; in addition, the researcher considered the needs, dynamics, and practices of participants and their social contexts. This section thus outlined the ethical considerations which guided the research. It underscored the following ethical issues: informed consent, anonymity and confidentiality, minimising harm to participants, possible risk to researcher, and data protection and accessibility.

Data protection and accessibility is crucial in qualitative and quantitative research, as it could have serious implications on issues of participants' confidentiality. During the fieldwork, hard copies and digital data were stored in a secure location, and on a password-encoded laptop, to prevent access by unauthorised persons. Data were securely kept on Coventry University's hard drive, and are password-protected until the completion of these studies. Data were only accessed by the researcher or her supervisors whenever necessary. Seven years after this study (2026 – as stated in the ethics application) soft data on the university's hard drive, as well as on the researcher's computer or external drive, will be erased, and the hard data will be shredded.

The researcher was keen to ensure that 'sufficient' and 'accessible' information was made available regarding the study, based on which, potential participants could make an informed decision whether to participate or withdraw (Gray 2014: 75). The information provided in the consent form or contract reflected the vulnerabilities that may occur during the research (Sudman 1998). The *Research Ethics Committee* (2019) explains the purpose of the participant information sheet and consent form as providing the participants with the information needed regarding the research topic to help them decide whether to participate or not. It provides a level of transparency as to what participation in the research requires from the participants. The objectives of the research, and the rights of the participants, were therefore clearly explained, before interviews began. Following the selection of participants and their consent to participate in the research (see Appendix K), they were provided with information sheets, which highlighted the purpose of the study, its relevance and methodological

approaches, data access, as well as dissemination procedures (see Appendix L). An introductory letter (from the Director of Studies in the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry University) was given to the participants to further prove the researcher's authenticity and credibility; all sheets provided to the participants were translated into Arabic. This was done not only to ensure credibility and to build trust, but also to protect the participants from any exploitation or harm, especially in precarious contexts such as participants' opinions relating to the political affairs of the State of Qatar - particularly at the time of the fieldwork for this research. Qatar was facing political disturbance due to the blockade. Guenther (2009: 413) explains 'Confidentiality may give some researchers the feeling of complete protection when, in fact, it often still leaves respondents vulnerable to identification and possibly to harm'. Guenther (2009: 420) also highlights the factors that should be of concern when mentioning the name of people:

- i. the wishes of respondents and the logic behind these wishes;
- ii. the researcher's degree of commitment to collaborative endeavours with respondents;
- iii. the level and type of risk to respondents if real names (of people, organisations, places, or other entities) are used;
- iv. the significance of the decision for the accuracy of reporting research findings; and
- v. the possible effects of the decisions for the researcher's and/or respondents' commitments to social change

This is one of the reasons the researcher decided to use symbols for the majority of respondents, to protect them from any future threats or harm if their true identities were disclosed.

The researcher hid most of the names in order to preserve their anonymity. This is due to the sensitivity of some of the information provided by the participants, particularly regarding political and government issues. Written, informed consent was obtained from the stakeholder participants to use their real names such as Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi, Professor Monzer Kahf, and Dr. Majed Al-Ansari. Ali Al-Qaradaghi.

A digital recorder (or notes taken for those who objected to being recorded) was used in the study for recording the interviews, in order to prevent any loss of information, or any changes to the actual interviews (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill: 2007). The interviews were digitally recorded for those who agreed, while for those who objected, their responses were written down in note form, and transcribed at a later date. The interviews were transcribed verbatim by playing the recorded interview (or transcribing the notes to the best of the

researcher's ability) and writing them up, word-for-word. The interviews and questionnaires were presented in Arabic, and then translated into English. The researcher's mother tongue is Arabic, but an officially-approved translation company - *Diwan Business Solution* - was used for these interview recordings. The translations were reviewed by the researcher to ensure accuracy, as answers needed to be translated without losing the original meaning. The transcripts were further revised upon completion to eliminate any typographical errors, and verified by comparing them to the original Arabic text. The researcher also took into consideration the following:

- i. To make every effort not to influence the study by continually regarding her positionality and reflecting on it.
- ii. To adopt a rational and logical analysis of the survey and questionnaires, and to have no pre-defined judgment of their results.
- iii. To adopt an interpretative approach to analyse the interviews.
- iv. To take notes on daily occurrences and incidents, and record her observations regarding both research approaches as well as the participants' behaviour.
- v. To note the context of the dynamics in order to conduct comprehensive reflexivity and post-interview evaluation. This would consequently contribute to improving and enriching the research methodology, and the interpretation of the findings.
- vi. To observe and respect the laws and culture of Qatar such as the dress code of females, in an attempt to build a rapport with the research participants.
- vii. To maintain constant contact and communication with her supervisors and family and friends throughout the field study.

According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), generalisability can be applied to other contexts or communities; however, it is difficult to compare Qatari society with other societies because of the difference in feelings and attitudes between one person or community and another. The various interpretations of *zakāt*, for instance, by *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah*, and between the *Sunnah* or *Shī'ah* themselves cannot be easily generalised. The diversity interpretations of traditional and modern *zakāt* application, the different characteristics of societies, and the small sampling of participants does not offer much of a 'generalisable' opportunity for this research. The information from the findings in both the survey and interviews may present some similarities with other Muslim societies in the Middle East such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey (*Pew Research Center* 2009). Qatari society is known for being Islāmic with a *Sunnah* majority, and

also its citizens and residents who belong to different cultures.<sup>79</sup> Qatar also has a large number of *zakāt*-givers, as is common in most Islāmīc societies. The *Sunnah* branch of Islām is the largest in the world (Koenig and Al Shohaib 2014). The influence of different cultures on the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar could help to include any societies which share at least one of these cultures. It is also important to note that socio-cultural factors as well as theological factors (for example different schools of thought) mean that *Sunnah* Islām is practised differently in various parts of the world.

The results of this research may, nevertheless, contribute to the understanding and study of societies possessing similar demographics and characteristics as Qatari society such as Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, and Saudi Arabia. The teachings of Islām are universal. This may indicate that some of the findings would be applicable to other countries which have majority or minority Muslim populations.

### **Reflections on Positionality**

Shacklock and Smyth (1998: 6) posit that, ‘researchers operating out of a critical perspective are not immune to the effects of technical cognitive interests, which structure knowledge and understandings about ethics, power, politics, reliability, and validity in research’. Factors such as gender, education, culture, political affiliations, and religion, can distort a researcher’s ontological, epistemological, and methodological standpoints and approaches (Sikes 2004). Better awareness of reflexivity and a researcher’s position can be achieved through three processes as Savin-Baden and Major (2013: 71-73) state: (i) Researcher recognising her stance which may influence the research; (ii) Researcher locates herself in relation to the participants. This requires constant reflection by researchers, not only on how they view themselves, but also how their studied populations could perceive them; and (iii) Researcher locates herself in relation to the research context and process. This means recognising how researchers affect the study and the likelihood of being influenced by the research context.

The researcher is a Muslim female, and originates from an Arab country and culture; however, she can describe herself as both an ‘insider’ according to her Muslim heritage, and an ‘outsider’ whose views, opinions, and understanding of the Qatari context have largely been informed by

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<sup>79</sup> See Chapter Four: *Sunnah* and *Shī‘ah* Demographic Diversity.

scholarly literature, a field visit, and media narratives. The researcher made every effort not to influence the study by continually regarding her positionality and reflecting on it. The researcher attempted to adopt rational and logical analyses of the survey and questionnaires, and to have no pre-defined judgment of their results according to the quantitative method. She adopted an interpretative approach to analyse interviews in line with the qualitative method. Notes were taken on daily occurrences and incidents, and observations were recorded, both regarding research approaches as well as the participants' behaviour. The context of the dynamics was also noted in order to conduct comprehensive reflexivity and post-interview evaluation, which would consequently contribute to improving and enriching the research methodology and interpretation of the findings.

## Limitations

The limitations of the research include inequality in the ratio between: (i) citizens and residents; (ii) males and females; (iii) the diversity of the Qatari population according to age groups; and (iv) percentage of *Shī'ah* compared to *Sunnah*. To overcome these challenges, the researcher capitalised on her 'insider' background as a female Muslim in order to gain access to the Qatari female community. She made every effort to balance opinions of citizens and residents, and those of different age groups (in the sampling) in her survey and interviews, except for the age group under 18 years.<sup>80</sup> To achieve this balance, a snowball technique was employed to access the *Shī'ah* participants in Qatar (see section below 'In-depth Interviews').

One of the challenges that faced the researcher was the gender issue. The researcher, who identify herself as a female, faced difficulty in accessing male-run departments, according to Qatar's tribal society; on the other hand, being a female researcher made it easier to access female-run departments.<sup>81</sup> The findings posed another challenge. The researcher had no previous experience with the SPSS and NVivo programmes; however, this problem was overcome by courses provided by Coventry University and private tuition. The results of the data collection, survey, and interviews, together with the literature reviews, helped the researcher to analyse and discuss the research questions.

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<sup>80</sup> There is no responsibility for the age group under the age of 18 in the practice of *zakāt* on the *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* schools (Al-Qaradawi 1999; Rizvi (1999). See Chapter Three: *Zakāt's* Conditions from *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* Perspectives.

<sup>81</sup> See Chapter Four: Tribal and Other Cultures - Demographic Diversity.



The other research limitations will be mentioned and discussed in each section, such as the ‘Survey’. A pilot test was conducted before starting the fieldwork in Qatar.

#### 5.4.2. Pilot Study

De Vaus (1993: 54) posits ‘Do not take the risk. Pilot test first’. The term ‘pilot studies’ refers to mini-versions of a full-scale study (also called ‘feasibility’ studies), as well as the specific pre-testing of a particular research instrument such as a survey or interview schedule. The pilot study aims to ensure clarity and comfort with the questions, and the necessity of visual aids and proper recording of the data (Bryman 2008; Saunders, et al. 2009). Van Teijlingen and Hundley (2002) further emphasise piloting an interview with an expert gives the researcher the advantage of having information that could result in better outcomes later. Five participants were chosen from Doha Institute - the area where the researcher lives - and one from the business sector, for this purpose. The five participants were carefully selected, based on their long experience in Qatari society. They were four females and one male; three citizens and two residents; four between 26-35 years; and one from the 36-45 age group. Three of them agreed to participate in an interview after the pilot survey. This gave the researcher a chance to expand the questions, based on the participants’ comments about their lived experience of practising *zakāt* in Qatar. The interaction of participants with the survey and interviews were good, as they showed their enthusiasm for the research topic, and responded to every question in the survey and the interviews. The participants in the pilot study also expressed their concerns about the length of the survey questions. They argued that maybe not all Qataris would have enough patience to complete the survey, and suggested merging some of the survey questions. Based on their advice, the researcher modified the survey questions without deleting any questions (see section ‘Modified Survey Questions and BOS Design’). They also suggested distributing the survey through *WhatsApp* – a social media platform - as most participants would be familiar with it, and it is widely used in Qatar society. The researcher consequently designed a link to *WhatsApp*. Participants also expressed concerns about the *zakāt* questions which related to the administration of charitable organisations and the Qatari government.<sup>82</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> See Chapter Four: Politicisation of *Zakāt* in Qatar.

### **5.5. Data Collection, Tools, Procedure, and Analysis**

The researcher followed a concurrent and sequential design for the data collection and analysis. This section displays the results of the survey, and explains the modified survey questions and BOS design, the SPSS program, and the results of the data analysis. This section also displays the results of the contribution by the stakeholders (scholars and experts) and survey participants' interviews, followed by interview analysis from the imported NVivo program.

Based on Baran and Jones's (2016: 12) models of mixed methods research and data analysis, the focus was on integrating results according to the following forms: 'merging or converging the two datasets (Concurrent and Sequential Design) by actually bringing them together and embedding one dataset within the other so one type of data supports the other dataset'.<sup>83</sup> Figure 5.2 (below) was used as a guide for the data collection and analysis methods:

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<sup>83</sup> Concurrent Design: Concurrent mixed method data collection strategies are employed to validate one form of data with the other form, to transform the data for comparison, or to address different types of questions (Creswell and Clark 2007: 118). Sequential Design: Data collected in these designs will provide more data about results from the earlier phase of data collection and analysis, to select participants who can best provide that data, or to generalise findings by verifying and augmenting study results from members of a defined population (Creswell and Plano Clark 2007: 121).




Figure 5.2: Guidance for the data collection and analysis methods

The researcher first followed a concurrent approach to in-depth interviews which took place with the stakeholders alongside those conducted from the survey. Secondly, the researcher followed a sequential approach by processing the survey, followed by interviewing the consenting participants. The BOS, SPSS, and NVivo programs used for data analysis are explained below.

The researcher employed the following data collection tools: surveys, interviews, field notes and an activity log. The tools address the researcher's positionality and risks, data collection process, participant recruitment, data analysis, considerations, protection, and

accessibility. Figure 5.3 below shows the results of data collection from the survey and interviews.




Figure 5.3: Data collection results from the survey and interviews in Qatar 2018

The next sub-section elucidates in detail the data collection from the survey and interviews used in this research.

### 5.5.1. Survey

Crowther and Lauesen describe the survey as ‘defining the objectives, selecting a survey frame, determining the sample design, designing the questionnaire, collecting and processing the data, analysing and disseminating the data and documenting the survey’ (2017: 328). A survey in this research was used: (i) to gather (detailed) data on attitudes, impressions, and opinions from a specific part of a population; (ii) to collate the data into emerging themes; and (iii) tease out findings to present generalisations about the whole population (Pinsonneault and Kraemer 1993). The strengths of surveys are twofold: they can be applied to both small and large samples of the population; and they can provide information about attitudes and

opinions, where observational techniques have failed (Glasow 2005). The limitations of surveys can include their unsuitability as a process for gathering information, as the researcher needs to understand the context of the phenomena (Pinsonneault and Kraemer 1993); and biases may occur in the responses, because respondents may choose to report what they believe they should say for various reasons (religion, family, community), rather than the truth or reality (Bell 1996). The researcher used *zakāt's* obligatory concept (*zakāt* as a religious practice) as an acceptable theory in the survey, to discover how participants interpreted and described their own practices. The researcher also explored their practices and behaviour towards this religious commitment, and their attitude towards, and acceptance of, *zakāt's* application. The researcher also discovered mechanisms of *zakāt's* application in modern times.

A survey was used as the first step in this research as a major method for collecting data (Mathers, Fox and Hunn 2009). Lincoln and Guba (1985) state that a survey is necessary to collect headline data which can be tested and explored in depth in the qualitative data collection process. This 'mixed method' approach allowed triangulation of different kinds of data to build a coherent and incisive narrative about the lived experience of *zakāt* in Qatar. The survey questions were based on the literature review of this study that was underpinned by lived experiences as a theoretical framework. Based on themes that emerged from the literature review, the research questions, in consultation with this researcher's supervisors and following a pilot study it was decided that the research questions should focus on three themes: motivations and decision-making, characteristics and patterns of behaviour, and the opportunities and challenges facing the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. Detailed questions addressing each of these themes were presented in each section (see Table 5.1 below).

	<b>Section 3: Decision-making When I make my <i>Zakāt</i> decision, I trust and act according ...</b>	<b>I trust</b>	<b>I do not trust</b>	<b>I do not know</b>
3.1	My family; I pay my <i>Zakāt</i> with them			
3.2	My own judgment			
3.3	Media Reports (TV, radio, newspapers)			
3.4	Social Media Reports (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram ...)			
3.5	Advertisements (billboard, TV commercials ...)			
3.6	Calls from Muslim Scholars			
3.7	Humanitarian Appeals (government, United Nation, NGOs)			

Table 5.1: Sample of survey questionnaire (Section 3: Decision-making)

Appendix (A) presents the survey questionnaire; the analysis of the answers involved both BOS and SPSS.

#### 5.5.1.1. Modified Survey Questions and BOS Design

The researcher employed quantitative methods with a deductive approach in which the questionnaire relies on a predetermined design through the BOS programme.<sup>84</sup> The questionnaires were designed through the BOS programme in Arabic, as it is the official and spoken language in Qatar. The questions were meant to be clear, direct, and easy to understand. It was initially planned to distribute 100 survey questionnaires by email to the clients of Qatar Charity. The purpose of the survey was to elicit information regarding who were *zakāt*-givers. Qatar Charity declined to co-operate in the distribution of the survey and gave no reason. Based on advice received from the pilot study of this research, it became apparent that communication with people in Qatar was faster through social networking platforms. The link to BOS's questionnaire was distributed via direct emailing and social media platforms such as *WhatsApp*. The estimated time it would take to complete each survey questionnaire would be less than twenty minutes.

The survey questionnaire was accompanied by a participants' information sheet (see Appendix L) and acknowledgement of having read it. The following pages required answers to several closed mandatory questions including: (i) 'I agree that I have read the participants' information sheet', and the answer should be 'yes' in order to move on to the next page; (ii) 'Are you a *zakāt*-giver?' - the answer is optional - 'Yes' or 'No'; and (iii) the demographic section which covers gender, nationality, and age groups. The rest of the design has optional questions - the participants do not have to answer them - including: (i) five sections, each one with different questions, depending on the participant and the topic, and (ii) participant's contact details.

The survey questionnaire was modified three times. The first time a question on whether a participant was a *zakāt*-giver or beneficiary was added. Observation of *zakāt* activity in Qatari society, which covers the social strata regarding *zakāt*, helped in addressing the research questions. The second time, the three questions in section four were merged into one

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<sup>84</sup> BOS: Bristol Online Survey, easy to use tool for creating online surveys 'BOS allows you to develop, deploy and analyse surveys via the web. A variety of question types are available, complex data flows can be built up 'by the use of filter questions, and there are some very easy-to-use data analysis tools. No complicated setup or technical knowledge is needed' (*Online surveys* 2017).

question, to encourage participants to complete the survey. The three questions asked about the motives for giving *zakāt* - as a religious obligation, on humanitarian grounds, or both. The answers to the original questions were optional: 'Agree', 'Disagree', or 'I do not know'. The questions were simplified to multiple choice: 'I give my *zakāt* as a religious obligation, on humanitarian grounds, or both' (see Appendix A). The third time, a third question was added regarding the participants' willingness to leave their contact details for an interview.

The survey was launched through the online BOS program (supported by Coventry University's online system) from 6th of April 2018 to 1st of August 2018, targeting up to 500 prospective respondents, with the intention of attracting at least 100 participants, as the planned method for this research. Hard copies were also distributed to staff and visitors in the Qatar National Library (QNL), and the staff of three ministries: Ministry of *Awqaf* and Islāmic Affairs (AWQAFM), Ministry of Culture and Sports (MCS), and Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (MDPS), as recommended by a ministry staff member. Hard copies were also distributed to the *Ehsan* Organisation for participants over the age of 66 years. Table 5.2 below shows the number of participants who answered and returned the questionnaire, either through BOS or through hard copies.

<b>Via</b>	<b>Place</b>	<b>Participants</b>
<b>BOS Online</b>		<b>67</b>
<b>Hard Copy</b>	QNL	12
	AWQAFM	15
	MCS	19
	MCS Family	10
	MDPS	17
	<i>Ehsan Organisation</i>	5
	Individual Participants	8
	Total Hard Copies	<b>86</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>153</b>

Table 5.2: The names of the entities and the number of participants who responded to the questionnaire

Responses were slow when the survey was distributed initially via *WhatsApp* and email during the first three months. The researcher decided to also distribute hard copies of the survey in Qatar. This move proved successful: 86 completed hard copies were returned, compared to 67 electronic copies.

It is interesting to note that 61 responses to the survey came from government centres in Qatar - more than a third of the total number of replies. The results from government responses, however, were considered as one of the survey's limitations of this research. This result could have an effect on the findings, especially those concerning the political aspect. The researcher observed that, during her visits to the ministries, most of the employees were Qatari citizens. This observation could also have an effect on the findings regarding government influence on the mechanism – collection and distribution - of *zakāt* in Qatar. The researcher benefited from these results, however, particularly in the political analysis, and the effect political intervention could have on *zakāt* (see Chapter 8: Analysis and Discussion).

Another survey limitation was in the results of the 67 electronic copies: no question was asked to determine whether this survey was completed in Qatar or abroad. It is possible that, in this case, any person who was not a Qatari (citizen or resident) could have participated in the survey, which means this omission may have an effect on the results. The researcher is bound by the results she received, however, especially the compulsory answer to the question determining whether the participants considered themselves Qatari citizens or residents, did help to identify the participants.

A further survey limitation was the omission of a section on education level, income level, and so on. This was intentional, after careful consideration and advice from the pilot study participants. Qatari society as a tribal society, is subject to tribal domination of both the citizens and the residents, depending on the competitiveness between the tribes. The researcher decided to leave these questions out of the survey for two reasons: (i) questions concerning level of education might prevent respondents from participating in, or completing, the survey. This may have caused them embarrassment (even though they were assured of confidentiality); and (ii) questions concerning income are sensitive issues, and may also affect prospective participants' decisions to fully participate in the survey (for the same reasons as above). The answer to the question of whether a survey respondent was a *zakāt*-payer or not (also a sensitive issue), on the other hand, helped the researcher to discover who (and why) respondents practised *zakāt*. The survey results, in spite of these limitations and omissions, helped to provide a sound basis for the selection of participants for the interviews (see the three analysis and discussion chapters).



### 5.5.1.2. Data Recording with SPSS

The BOS program was used for the initial analysis. Gathered information was further analysed through the SPSS program since it offers enhanced accuracy with multiple options (*IBM SPSS Statistics* 2013) and is approved by Coventry University. Data were collected by using an instrument designed especially for this specific study: every question, topic, and category in the questionnaire was given a cypher prior to data entry in SPSS, and variables were coded and labelled. The entry of data used is the SPSS procedure for analysis. The data have been reviewed several times to ensure their accuracy; furthermore, every survey was reviewed and entered item-by-item, and description analysis was utilised to process them. The data were ‘cleaned up’ before processing, reviewed for missing data, and tables created in order to achieve the purposes of the study, thus ensuring no mistakes had been made (Pallant 2013: 44). The data were ready to process, and outcomes were presented for further analysis and discussion after they had been collected, coded, entered, and reviewed. Variables in this research have been defined in value categories.<sup>85</sup>

- i. Agreement by participants to read and accept terms and conditions of information sheets;
- ii. *Zakāt*-givers (or not).
- iii. Demographic variables: nationality, gender, and age groups.
- iv. Five sections:
  - a. Section one: awareness of *Zakāt*.
  - b. Section two: to whom *Zakāt* is given.
  - c. Section three: Decision-making.
  - d. Section four: Motivation.
  - e. Section five: *Zakāt* and Peacebuilding. (Subsequently converted to suggested projects under the opportunities for the practice of *zakāt*).
- v. Contact details of participants.
- vi. Appendices table.

The results of the BOS, SPSS, and NVivo programs indicated three fields were present: religion and society, Islāmic political economy, and peacebuilding. The researcher decided to focus on the sociology of religion to investigate the practice of *zakāt* from the social and religious aspects. The data collected for the other two fields: Islāmic political economy and peacebuilding was beneficial, however, in enriching the analysis under the category of the

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<sup>85</sup> See Appendix I: Survey.

challenges and opportunities in the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. These two strands of the data will be further explored in future publications.

### 5.5.1.3. The Demographic SPSS Result

Table 5.3 shows that 153 participants contributed to the survey.

<b>I confirm that I have read and understand the Participant Information Sheet for the above-mentioned project and have had the opportunity to ask questions</b>					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Agree	153	100.0	100.0	100.0

Table 5.3: Participant information sheet

Table 5.3: *zakāt* - contributors and non-contributors - shows that 133 participants positively responded which represents 86.9 per cent of *zakāt*-givers, and 20 participants gave negative answers, which represents 13.1 per cent of the total participants. Twenty participants did not clarify whether they were givers, beneficiaries, or neither. They are those who neither reach the minimum level for paying *zakāt* (*niṣāb*), nor fall under one of the eight categories of *zakāt*.

<b>Are you Zakat Givers?</b>					
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Yes	133	86.9	86.9	86.9
	No	20	13.1	13.1	100.0
	Total	153	100.0	100.0	

Table 5.4: *Zakāt* contributors and non-contributors

The participants were questioned about their personal information such as Gender, Nationality, and Age group. These details were further broken down to reflect Male or Female, Citizens and Residents, and various age groups: 18-25 years; 26-35 years; 36-45 years; 46-65 years; and above 66 years old.

Gender: The total of citizens and residents (male and female) who contributed to *zakāt* stands at 86.9 per cent: 60 male respondents, and 93 female respondents (Table 5.5). There are more men than women in Qatar; despite the dominant population density in Qatar being male, especially in Doha (*MDPS* 2018), the character of Qatari culture provides a female researcher with an advantage in contacting influential female respondents when distributing the hard copy

survey questionnaires to Qatari institutions.<sup>86</sup> This will be further explained in the analysis and discussion chapters.

		Gender			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Male	60	39.2	39.2	39.2
	Female	93	60.8	60.8	100.0
	Total	153	100.0	100.0	

Table 5.5: Gender

Nationality: Citizens are in the minority: 90 per cent of the population is residents.<sup>87</sup> The researcher observed, however, the three Ministry staff were mainly citizens, which may explain close percentages between citizens and residents. Table 5.6 shows the number of citizen and resident participants: 85 citizens - 55.6 per cent, and 68 residents - 44.4 per cent.

		Nationality			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	Qatari	85	55.6	55.6	55.6
	Foreign Resident	68	44.4	44.4	100.0
	Total	153	100.0	100.0	

Table 5.6: Nationality

Age Group: Table 5.7 below shows that the majority of respondents were from the age groups (26–35) and (36–45) years - 58 respondents in the total age count representing 37.9 per cent, and 46 respondents representing 30.1 per cent, respectively. The age groups (46–65) years reflected 17 respondents – 11.1 per cent, and (Above 66) years eight respondents – 5.2 per cent which represents the lowest number of participants. This may be due to the survey being distributed during working hours. The age group (18–25) years had 24 respondents, representing 15.7 per cent; students are expected to attend university in the morning.

		Age			
		Frequency	Percent	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
Valid	18-25 Years	24	15.7	15.7	15.7
	26-35 Years	58	37.9	37.9	53.6
	36-45 Years	46	30.1	30.1	83.7
	46-65 Years	17	11.1	11.1	94.8
	Above 66 Years	8	5.2	5.2	100.0
	Total	153	100.0	100.0	

Table 5.7: Age groups of respondents

<sup>86</sup> See Chapter Four: Tribal and Other Cultures - Demographic Diversity.

<sup>87</sup> See Chapter Four: Citizen and Resident Demographic Diversity.

The results of the survey are presented in detail in Appendix (I). The qualitative fieldwork was complemented by the survey findings as outlined in the sections below.

### 5.5.2. In-depth Interviews

The constructivist-interpretative model was used to analyse the information gained from in-depth interviews about religious, political, charitable, and academic opinions concerning *zakāt*, and an attempt made to link the findings to social behaviour. The researcher chose semi-structured interviews because they would help to make the questions open-ended (Sekaran and Bougie 2010). This strategy would allow the researcher to ask new questions according to the answers of the interviewees. The new questions focused on the research aim and objectives.<sup>88</sup> The researcher chose an in-depth interview strategy as a ‘conversation with a purpose’ through which interviewers can solicit targeted information, opinions, and perspectives from interviewees (Legard, Keegan, and Ward 2003: 138). An additional in-depth interview was conducted with a selection of survey participants, as a way of gaining further knowledge about Muslims’ awareness and behaviour regarding *zakāt*.

The researcher was keen to cover as much as possible with the sample population selected for this research. To achieve this goal, the researcher followed a snowball technique to gain further participant recruits.<sup>89</sup> The study mainly employs a purposive sampling approach, complemented by a snowball technique, to ensure that participants are selected across a broader population (except under 18 years old - see ‘Limitations’ above), and included Qatari Muslim citizens and residents, males, females, young adults, and members of the older generation, in an effort to provide a balanced result for this research. Purposive sampling (or judgement sampling) is one of the fundamental approaches in qualitative research, and is a non-random selection technique. It encompasses the ‘identification and selection of individuals or groups of individuals that are proficient and well-informed with a phenomenon of interest’ (Etikan, Musa and Alkassim 2016: 2). The researcher selected each ‘sample’ based on an individual’s experience and knowledge relating to the research.

The questions were prepared in advance by having a preliminary appointment with the interviewee through email, mobile, or telephone. Once the interview was scheduled, the

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<sup>88</sup> See Chapter One: Research Aims and Objectives.

<sup>89</sup> Snowballing is a referral mechanism or approach that allows participants to link the researcher to other potential respondents in the study. This technique was used to identify participants, particularly at the community level, who were not easily identified or accessed but have useful information that will enrich the findings of the research (Oppong 2013).

researcher complied with Coventry University's ethical structure in dealing with interviewees. The interviewees' response language was optional - Arabic or English; all the interviewees preferred Arabic. The duration for each interview was planned to be no more than twenty minutes to half an hour, except for the scholars Kahf and Al- Qaradaghi: their interviews lasted approximately 90 minutes due to the importance of their role in the research, and the many topics to discuss at those meetings for this research. There were also some interviewees who were particularly interested in the research; they wanted the discussions to last longer, and to be able to give their opinions. This added interest provided the researcher with a good opportunity to collect valuable data; consequently, the time limit for each interview depended entirely upon the interviewees.

#### **5.5.2.1 The Result of Stakeholder and Survey Respondent Interviews**

The interview methodology was planned to incorporate: (i) Islāmic jurisprudence; (ii) academic fields and Islāmic Studies; (iii) Qatar charities; (iv) *Zakat* Fund (government institution); and (v) twenty participants from the survey. The plans had to be changed. Qatar Charity declined to participate in the research, and Professor Al-Qaradawi's poor health prevented him from participating. The researcher decided to use the snowball technique to cover the new plan. The research interviews were also expanded to include other sectors such as political economy, sociology, and conflict resolution and peacebuilding. The Qatar charities' section involved interviews with *Jassim & Hamed Bin Jassim* Charitable Foundation, Qatar Red Crescent, and Organisation of Islāmic Cooperation. The staff members of two different organisations were interviewed, as well as Qatari activists who dealt with charitable donations in Qatar society.

Table 5.8 shows 39 interviews were conducted with Qatar charities, scholars and experts in various academic fields, Qatari activists, and twenty participants from the survey. Table 5.8 identifies the participants interviewed under the title of each section, and the appendix reference for each section. The table also shows the names of stakeholder participants interviewed, and the codes that were used to encrypt the names of other participants to preserve their anonymity. The table also shows whether the interview was digitally recorded, or written notes were taken. A display of the different requests and modifications has been made; for example, whether an interviewee requested a copy of his or her interview or not; whether it

was modified or not; and whether a response was received or not within the time limit of one week.

	Sections and Appendix	Participants <sup>90</sup>	Details	Digitally Recorded (DR) or Notes Taken (NT)	Modified (M) Not Modified (NM) No Response (NR) No Request (NRQ)
Stake-holders	Islāmic Jurisprudence (Appendix B)	Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi	Male: Secretary-General of the International Union of Muslim Scholars. A well-known <i>Sharī'ah</i> and <i>Fiqh</i> scholar as well as Islāmic economics. Professor of Jurisprudence and a faculty of <i>Sharī'ah</i> and Islāmic Studies at Qatar University in Doha.	DR	M
		Sheikh Yusuf Al-Qaradawi	Male: chairman of the International Union of Muslim Scholars. Brief discussion due poor health.	NT	NRQ
	Islāmic Studies (Appendix C)	Professor Monzer Kahf	Male: Professor of Islāmic Finance, College of Islāmic Studies, Hamad Bin Khalifa University, Doha, Qatar.	DR	NRQ
	Political Economy (Appendix F)	Dr. Majed Al-Ansari	Male: political sociologist and researcher at Qatar University, and Manager of Policy Department of the Social and Economic Survey Research Institute (SESRI).	DR	NR
	Sociology (Appendix G)	Mohammed Al-Rwaili	Male: Head of Coordination Programme at Hamad Bin Khalifa University College of Islāmic Studies, Doha, Qatar.	DR	NM
	Zakat Fund (Appendix D)	E-mail Responses (Appendix M)	'Anonymous' to protect identity.	No Interview	(NRQ)
	Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Studies (Appendix H)	Professor Sultan Barakat	Male: Founding Director of the Centre for Conflict and Humanitarian Studies at Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Qatar.	NT	NRQ
		Dr. Ibrahim Fraihat	Male: Associate Professor and Programme Chair, M.Sc. Conflict Management and Humanitarian Action at Doha Institute for Graduate Studies, Qatar.	DR	NRQ
	NGO Staff Members -	C1	Identities hidden to respect confidentiality.	DR	M
		C2		NT	NRQ

<sup>90</sup> The researcher has written ethical consent and obtained permission from the participants to use their names.

	Qatari Charities:  (Appendix E)	C3		NT	NRQ
		C4		NT	NRQ
		C5		NT	NM
		C6		DR	NR
		C7		NT	NRQ
		C8		NT	NR
	Activists - Qatar Charitable Donations  (Appendix E + D)	QA1	Identities hidden to respect confidentiality.	NT	NRQ
		QA2		NT	NRQ
		QA3		DR	NR
		QA4		DR	NRQ

Twenty Participants from Survey	S1	Female citizen, age group (26-35) years.	NT	NR
	S2	Female resident, age group (26-35) years.	DR	M
	S3	Male citizen, age group (above 66 years).	NT	NRQ
	S4	Female resident, age group (26-35) years.	DR	NM
	S5	Female resident, age group (26-35) years.	DR	NM
	S6	Female resident, age group (26-35) years.	NT	NRQ
	S7	Female resident, age group (26-35) years.	DR	NM
	S8 (Withdrew participation)		NT	-
	S9	Female resident, age group (26-35) years.	NT	NM
	S10	Female citizen, age group (36-45) years.	DR	NRQ
	S11	Female citizen, age group (18-25) years.	NT	NR
	S12	Female citizen, age group (46-65) years.	DR	NRQ
	S13	Female resident, age group (36-45) years.	DR	M
	S14	Female resident, age group (26-35) years.	DR	M
	S15	Male citizen, age group (26-35) years.	DR	NRQ
	S16	Male resident, age group (18-25) years.	DR	NRQ
	S17	Male resident, age group (26-35) years.	DR	NRQ
	S18	Male citizen, age group (26-35) years.	DR	NRQ
	S19	Male citizen, age group (above 66 years).	NT	NR
	S20	Male resident, age group (above 66 years).	DR	NR

Table 5.8: Participants interviewed for this study

A copy of individual interviews was sent to the interviewees who requested them. To respect the confidentiality of participants, their names were coded and replaced with capital letters and

serial numbers relating to each section; for example, Qatar charities' staff members appear as C1 ... C8; Activists – Qatar Charitable Donations as QA1 ..., QA2; and Survey: S1 ... S20 for each survey respondent. The key to the coded names is kept in a separate, password-protected file. The names of the interviewees are listed, and the options available to them, such as appearing anonymously (coded references), digital recordings, or note-taking of the interviews. The table reflects 23 digitally-recorded interviews, and notes taken for 16 interviews. Seventeen interviewees requested a copy of their interviews; seven copies were modified by the interviewees, two were not, and eight interviewees did not respond. Twenty-two interviewees did not request a copy of their interviews.

#### **5.5.2.2. Interview Analysis and Imported Data using NVivo Program**

Coventry University's NVivo software was employed to generate codes and themes for analysing field data. The researcher used the NVivo12 program, supported by Coventry University, as it helps to codify large amounts of data. 'The package can enable a researcher to rapidly and accurately analyse research items such as questionnaires, transcripts of interviews and focus groups and other literature' (*Durham University* 2012: 1). The researcher also used the NVivo program to codify interview data to be used later as a guide with SPSS analysis results in the analysis and discussion chapters. The research is a combination of all the interview data into one NVivo project. The researcher was thus able to conduct an advanced find and filter process through the NVivo program: the exploration (through models, coding, queries and memos) provides ways in which these themes have an impact on other factors found in the interviews with NVivo key terms and the sources for coding cases nodes (or units of observation) (*QSR* 2008; *QSR* 2016) (see Appendix J for the results of the NVivo nodes).

The results obtained from NVivo nodes contributed effectively to export the key themes of this research. Strauss (1987) and Joffe and Yardley (2004) mention that the process of NVivo software helps the researcher to construct codes, themes, and categories.

### **5.6 Key Themes**

The key themes mainly emerged from the findings of both the survey and interview questionnaires. The researcher's observations, and the analysis of the opinions of academics, Islāmic jurisprudence experts, and other stakeholders were also part of the key themes. Those who dealt directly with *zakāt* such as government and non-governmental charitable



organisations also contributed to some of the key themes and sub-themes. The lived experiences of *zakāt*-givers, for instance, exist in the behaviour of Muslims through their practice of *zakāt*. The pilot case study, literature review, and consultation and discussion with the supervisors of this research, helped to extract the key themes. The NVivo nodes and codes also helped the researcher to extract the themes or threads which run throughout the data. The themes are also the basic topics of the narrative being examined as Vaismoradi et al. (2016) argue. They also add that themes are used in the later phase of grounded theory to tie it all together. The researcher followed three stages to extract the key themes of this research.

The first stage of the process was to read and review the interviews, then create files or cases which bore the same section name; some sections were merged into one file because they contained similar types of questions such as those on *fiqh* and Islāmic studies. The ‘tree’ and ‘free’ nodes were based on research questions and sub-questions, research objectives, the literature review, and interview questions. The free nodes have been created from the participants’ responses to the interviews. The function of nodes is to store references in NVivo in order to code the text. The coding process involved importing the transcription of each interview, and critically evaluating it to help understand its context.

The second stage developed sub-themes from the number of references or codes, which consisted of two or more codes and associated supporting texts. There were 81 codes for ‘*Zakāt* and Political Elements’, for example, repeated in several files.

The third stage placed these codes with similar references under one key theme, and its name was based on the common material which emerged for the analysis.

Three core themes and ten sub-themes were identified through the process of coding and ‘thematising’. The researcher has extracted the following key themes:

Key theme one was the Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) lived experience according to the theological influences in practising *zakāt* in Qatar. The sub-themes which emerged under this key theme were:

- i. Qatari’s lack of awareness of the concept of the beneficiaries of *zakāt*.
- ii. The confusion that exists between the traditional and modern interpretations of *zakāt*.
- iii. The different interpretations and mistranslations of the beneficiaries’ category of *zakāt*.
- iv. An individual reaction to *zakāt* is its practice, denial, avoidance, or ignorance (ignoring).

- v. Restriction of projects (*zakāt*-givers' conditional projects) and *zakāt*'s distribution between desire and needs.

Key Theme two was Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) lived experience from the sociological influences on practising *zakāt* in Qatar. The sub-themes which emerged were:

- i. The impact tribalism and different cultural backgrounds had on the attitude and behaviour of Muslims in Qatar towards practising *zakāt*.
- ii. Qatari society's wealth, generosity, and religious commitment.
- iii. The attention paid by charitable organisations (government and NGOs) to *zakāt*, and their methods for persuading *zakāt*-givers to pay their *zakāt*.

Key Theme three was politicisation of the practice of *zakāt* in contemporary Qatar.

The sub-themes which emerged were:

- i. Politicisation of *zakāt* for military use, according to various interpretations of 'for the cause of *Allah*' category.
- ii. Qatar government's restrictions regarding the behaviour of *zakāt* institutions, and the *zakāt* collection and distribution mechanism regarding financing certain projects.

The key themes and sub-themes were used together to help answer the research question and three sub-questions in the discussion and analysis chapters.

## 5.7. Summary

This chapter has explained that the source of the ontology of *zakāt* is the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*. The religious representation of the reality of *zakāt* is difficult due to various factors: interpretations of the Qur'ān according to the different branches of Islām such as *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah*, and different schools of thought between *Shafī'ī* and *Hanbalī*; the differences which exist between the classical and modern (contemporary) opinions of juristic perspectives concerning *zakāt*'s mechanism; and the diversity within Islāmic societies. *Zakāt* epistemology in Qatar, on the same lines, is not straightforward; the impact of gaining knowledge about *zakāt* has the same factors mentioned above; for example, Qatar society's diverse demography. An interpretative-constructivist paradigm is necessary to discover new knowledge about *zakāt*

from existing knowledge regarding Qatari society. The ‘research onion’ has illustrated the research methods process. The methodology chosen was a mixed-methods approach: qualitative research because it consists of purposes and procedures that integrate inductive, subjective, and contextual approaches, and is appropriate for in-depth interviews with stakeholder members of the Qatari Muslim society. The adoption of a quantitative research method has been explained because it integrates purposes and procedures that are deductive and objective, and can be generalised; for example, to portray an overall concept of Islām, particularly the branch of *Sunnah* as the largest group (compared to *Shī‘ah*, the second largest) as the main focus of this research.

The data collection, tools, procedure, and analysis processes have been explained through a survey, the modified questionnaires, and access to data according to the BOS and SPSS programs. Survey interviews with the stakeholders and general members of Qatari society followed the same process: both before and after interviews were conducted according to an ethical process, and organised through the NVivo program.

The results of the data collection for this research completed the survey process with 153 respondents, and 39 interview participants. The researcher isolated the three key themes: Muslims in Qatar lived experience according to the theological influences in practising *zakāt* in Qatar; Muslims in Qatar lived experience from the sociological influences in practising *zakāt* in Qatar; and politicisation of the practice of *zakāt* in contemporary Qatar. The researcher’s aim was to use a disciplinary approach of sociology of religion together with a theoretical framework of lived experience to analyse religious conduct and social behaviour in Qatar. This approach and theoretical framework will help to evaluate and discuss these phenomena in relation to the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. The analysis and discussion of these themes will be the focus of chapters Six, Seven, and Eight.

## CHAPTER SIX

### *Zakāt-Givers' Lived Experiences with the Practice of Zakāt*

#### 6.0. Introduction

The primary aim of this research is to investigate the influences of theological and sociological aspects on the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar 2017-2020. This chapter is the first of three analysis and discussion chapters. This chapter is an examination of the lived experience of Qatari *zakāt*-givers – citizens and residents – in the practice of *zakāt*. The focus is on attempting to answer the research questions: (i) how the theological and sociological motivations inform individual decision-making for practising *zakāt* in Qatar; (ii) what the main characteristics and patterns of the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar are; and (iii) what opportunities and challenges face the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar.

Qatar is a wealthy Islāmic state with a *Sunnah* Muslim majority. The country's demographics include citizens and residents, tribal and other cultural backgrounds, and *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* denominational influence. There are more residents than citizens who are distinguished by their origins and ethnicity; different religious groups, and schools of Islāmic thought (*Sunnah* and *Shī'ah*); different levels of education; and poverty. Citizens live according to a tribal culture, which dominates other cultures in Qatar.<sup>91</sup>

This chapter addresses the lived experiences of Qatari *zakāt*-givers, and presents a discussion on how it affects their practice of *zakāt*. The chapter is also an exploration of the Qatari *zakāt*-givers' motivations that form their decision to practise *zakāt*. The discussion originates in their theological and societal motivations, and their personal convictions which affect Qatari lived experiences, using the sociology of Islām as the disciplinary framework. The chapter covers the religious obligation to give *zakāt*, as well as the methods of its practice, and the ways in which it is denied, avoided, or ignored. Attention is paid to all the key themes which emerged from the analysis; however, further attention is paid to: the theological influences in practising *zakāt* in Qatar, including the Islāmic environment which surrounds the *zakāt*-givers; the sociological influences on practising *zakāt* in Qatar, including tribalism and the different cultural backgrounds: the impact of attitude and behaviour of Muslims in Qatar on practising

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<sup>91</sup> See Chapter Four: Qatar's Demographic Diversity: Impact on the Practice of *Zakāt*.

*zakāt*; and the individual action regarding *zakāt*: practice, denial, avoidance, and ignorance (ignoring), as a result of the religious and social influences.

The next chapter (Chapter Seven) is the second of three analysis and discussion chapters. Chapter Seven addresses the daily practices of Qatari charitable organisations and *zakāt*. Chapter Eight will focus on how *zakāt*-givers and charitable organisations' lived experiences influence *zakāt*-beneficiaries. The researcher will construct a rational and convincing narrative through these chapters regarding the key themes which have emerged from the findings, and which characterise the everyday practice of *zakāt* in Qatar.

### **6.1. Qatari Lived Experience: A Religious Environment Impact on the Practice of *Zakāt***

A large majority of Qatari citizens and residents are enthusiastic about practising *zakāt*. The findings from the survey disclosed 133 out of a total of 153 respondents practice *zakāt*-giving.<sup>92</sup> The 20 respondents in the survey who claimed they did not practice *zakāt*, either failed to meet the *niṣāb*<sup>93</sup> threshold, or adopted one of the three behavioural conditions of denial, avoidance, or ignorance.<sup>94</sup> They did not clarify whether they were among *zakāt*'s eight beneficiary categories such as the poor and needy. It is assumed they were reluctant to disclose this information through fear of losing their dignity or shaming their families - especially as one of the characteristics of Qatari society is competition between families.<sup>95</sup>

The factors that motivated the increase in the practice of *zakāt* could be religious influences, social or personal convictions, or all of these. Addressing and discussing the religious factors in this section will contribute to what motivates Muslims in Qatar to practise *zakāt*. The researcher also aims to develop an understanding of what the impact of an Islāmic Qatar has on its society, and how this environment has affected the motivation and decision-making of Muslims in Qatar in the practice of *zakāt*.

Religious motivations are built on one's relationship with *Allah*.<sup>96</sup> These motivations have proved to be the strongest factor in urging Muslims in Qatar to practise *zakāt*. Evidence from the interviews shows that most respondents believe that, as *zakāt* is one of the five pillars

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<sup>92</sup> See Chapter Five: The Demographic SPSS Result.

<sup>93</sup> *Niṣāb*: 'the minimum level to determine whether there is *zakāt* to be paid on the assets', which amounts to 2.5 per cent of one's wealth (Ubaidillah and Sallehuddin 2013: 196).

<sup>94</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt*-Givers and Beneficiaries' Lived Experience Between Belief and Practice

<sup>95</sup> This behaviour will be presented in Chapter Seven, 'Qatari Charitable Organisations and Lived Experiences of *Zakāt*: Between Spiritual Practice and Big Business'.

<sup>96</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt*'s Philosophy: Motivation and Decision-making Strategies.

of Islām, it should therefore be practised as a religious obligation. S4<sup>97</sup> and S16<sup>98</sup> agreed. S16 added ‘It is an obligation on who can pay it, and fulfil its conditions to help poor people live’. What guides the Qatari majority’s religious motivations to practise *zakāt* stems from the Qur’ān, *Hadīth*, the interpretations and opinions of some Muslim scholars and their own interpretations according to their personal convictions. These findings correspond with the current literature which includes the motivations for self-purification, *taqwā* (piety), preparing for the Afterlife, social solidarity - ‘*Ummah*’ - and trade and reward with *Allah*.<sup>99</sup> The Muslims in Qatar response to religious motivations in practising *zakāt* means that Muslims in Qatar are interested in the teachings of Islām, and observance of those teachings.

Sheikh Al-Qaradaghi<sup>100</sup>, the Secretary-General of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), suggested another religious motivation which also benefits society. *Zakāt* is given, he says, so the giver maintains a good reputation amongst the people. Al-Qaradaghi explained that desiring a good reputation can motivate a good deed:

It is a reason to be delighted; therefore, when the rich [man] gives to the poor, people remember him with good deeds and pray for him.

The Sheikh continued:

A good reputation has two benefits: one - the man is relieved and happy about the people’s love for him; and two - *Allah* the Almighty will accept their testimony on Judgment Day.

This quotation suggests that the socio-religious motivation to urge the practice of *zakāt* is beneficial to the Muslim society, as it builds a relationship between *zakāt*-givers and *zakāt*-beneficiaries, based on mutual love and care. According to the social aspect, the *zakāt*-giver is pleased with the people’s love for him. According to the religious aspect, the act of giving makes people remember him (or her) for his good deeds, and offer prayers for him, and *Allah* the Almighty will accept their testimony (on the good deeds he has performed during his life on earth) on Judgment Day. ‘A good reputation among people’ is close to the idea and goal of ‘return gift’ that Kochuyt proposed (2009) in the literature review of this thesis. The roles are switched between two players: the *zakāt* beneficiary becomes the *zakāt*-donor through his or her production of work, while the initial *zakāt*-donor becomes a receiver, because the *zakāt*-beneficiary spends his or her money in the community. The *zakāt*-beneficiary actively engages in the economic cycle, boosting the market that will, in return, benefit the wealthy. This means

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<sup>97</sup> Interview with S4, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 20/06/2018.

<sup>98</sup> Interview with S16, a male resident and (18-25) years, on 15/05/2018.

<sup>99</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt’s* Philosophy: Motivation and Decision-making Strategies.

<sup>100</sup> Two interviews with Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi on 14/04/2018 and 12/05/2018.

maintaining ‘a good reputation among people’ as a socio-religious motivation, and the idea of ‘return gift’ are parallel notions which will strengthen the relationship within society, thus helping to create a cohesive society in which each member cares for the other. Qatari society is not devoid of potential *zakāt*-beneficiaries. There is a class of unskilled workers in Qatar (HRW 2016). It is assumed that they may be beneficiaries of some *zakāt* payment (see Chapter Eight). The concept of lived experience regarding beneficiaries of *zakāt* in terms of ‘a good reputation among people’ and ‘return gift’ in Qatari society has not been studied, as it is beyond the scope of this research.<sup>101</sup>

Religious motivations resulting from the Qatari relationship with *Allah* are not the only ones that influence Qatari decision-making to pay *zakāt*; yet, the Islāmic environment in Qatar provides the population with the attention and incentives to respect *zakāt*. Qatar identifies itself as an Islāmic State, and follows *Sharī‘ah* (Hukoomi 2018b). The Qatari government has paid considerable attention to the distribution of Islāmic studies and education in schools, universities, houses of worship, and so on, as a result (Zahlan 2016; Formezon 2017). The Muslims in Qatar response to religious motivations supports Salvatore’s (2016) explanation that religion is the fundamental element and centre of Muslim behaviour, since an Islāmic character is prominent throughout Qatari society. This statement is apparent from the practice of Muslims in Qatar to pray and fasting. The researcher’s observations while in Qatar revealed that worshippers frequently attended available prayer spaces (in mosques, shopping centres, and so on) for collective prayer, five times a day, reinforcing the fact that Islām is the focal point of a Qatari’s life. During the month of *Ramaḍān*, similar to other Islāmic societies in the Middle East, many shops close at the time of fast-breaking. These signs indicate that the Qatar society not only has an Islāmic identity, but also encourages its application. The religious motivation of Muslims in Qatar in the practice of *zakāt* is paired with the surrounding Islāmic environment. Qatar society has inherited a religious legacy by following the teachings of Islām which has been shared by generations of citizens. The residents also respect the Islāmic environment, whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims. Men are not allowed to enter government buildings in shorts, for example; in addition, men and women play in separate sports halls. The Islāmic social context has an influence on Muslims in Qatar: the importance of *zakāt* is discussed and promoted on television channels, radio stations, and in mosques. The methods these information channels use, however, are both positive and negative. They aim to attract contributions to charity such as *zakāt* (and certain ‘preferred’ or ‘desired’ projects)

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<sup>101</sup> See Chapter Nine: Thesis limitations and Recommendations for Further Research.

through persuasive methods: receiving approval from both *Allah* and the community (Dessing, Jeldtoft, and Woodhead 2013).<sup>102</sup>

The volume and style of advertisements and appeals often create ‘donor fatigue’. The constant display of the poor and needy, or appeals for projects which do not resonate with *zakāt*-givers’ desired projects become blurred, and are eventually ignored (see Chapter Seven). The fear of being negatively judged by *Allah*, on the other hand, may compel *zakāt*-givers to donate.

The religious influences are evident in Qatari society; cautions, warnings, and reminders in a country that presents itself as observing the tenets of Islām may explain the high number of *zakāt* practitioners reflected in the survey - 133 of the respondents practised *zakāt*-giving. The Qatari citizens and residents are surrounded by Islāmic information which urges them to practise *zakāt* which thus becomes a religious norm. The high level of Islāmic information available to Qatari citizens and residents normalises the practice of *zakāt* which consequently becomes a part of everyday life. The Islāmic environment also has an impact on Qatari behaviour. Here, the Qatari becomes driven, and not free to choose, because of the direct or indirect influence of the Islāmic environment. Children are born ‘pure and innocent’. The adults, and the environment in which children are raised, determine what they become. The Islāmic culture and identity in Qatar, for example, means that children born into Muslim families in Qatar, will more than likely be raised as Muslims (*Sahih Muslim* Book 33: *Hadith* 6426; Locke 1836).<sup>103</sup> The Islāmic environment inspires the next generation to instinctively practise *zakāt* as a religious duty; thus, the behaviour of giving *zakāt* is religiously inherited, and shows how *zakāt* finally becomes a religious norm.

Mittermaier (2019) explains that the practice of giving in Egypt is reflected in a different way from the religiously sublime goal of giving which is to prioritise compassion for the poor people. There are some Egyptians who practice giving only because of *Allah*. This means that, if there is no religious bond with *Allah*, the practice of giving will not be for the poor.<sup>104</sup> The driving force of Qatar society (similar to Egyptian society in terms of having a majority of Muslims) is religion, and is focused on the theological rather than the humanitarian side. This was evident from the survey results of this research. The statistics regarding the motivations illustrated in the replies from the survey respondents were both religious and

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<sup>102</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt*-Givers and Beneficiaries’ Lived Experiences Between Belief and Practice.

<sup>103</sup> See Chapter Two: Charity as an Act of Faith.

<sup>104</sup> See Chapter Two: Interrogating Religious Motivations.



humanitarian: 88 out of a total of 150 respondents; 61 respondents religious only; and one respondent was only motivated by humanitarian aid<sup>105</sup> (see figure 6.1 below).




Figure 6.1: Religious and humanitarian motivations: Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents)

The fact that the question of what motivation best describes why donors give their *zakāt* was not specifically asked in the survey, figure 6.1 shows that Muslims in Qatar are more motivated by religious influences than by humanitarian needs.<sup>106</sup> This is contrary to the behaviour of the Egyptian society, for instance; the Muslims in Qatar prefer to pay their *zakāt* for religious reasons such as social solidarity - '*Ummah*' - rather than for human need in conflict or disaster areas where Muslims and non-Muslims live or suffer together.<sup>107</sup> Muslims in Qatar seem to show their sympathy and quick response to the humanitarian aid requests abroad, however, even though they do not seem to recognise the hardship and suffering of unskilled workers within Qatar.<sup>108</sup> This means that the behaviour of Qatari society is not linked to a specific pattern, confirmed in the responses in the survey results. The choices may have been religious or humanitarian, but this does not mean that the practical application of *zakāt* reflects these choices. This explains either the Muslims in Qatar lack of awareness of the concept of the beneficiary categories of *zakāt*, or their personal convictions are the main reasons for their behaviour concerning the practice of *zakāt*, or perhaps even both.

<sup>105</sup> See Appendix I: I.4.1. The *Zakāt* Given As ...'.

<sup>106</sup> For statistics of other motivations such as family, media reports, advertisements, or own judgment, see Appendix I: Survey section I.3. Section three: Decision-making.

<sup>107</sup> See Chapter Eight: The Needy' and 'The Wayfarer or Stranded Traveller' Categories Application between Social Solidarity ('*Ummah*') and Humanitarian Aid.

<sup>108</sup> See Chapter Eight: 'The Poor' Category: Muslims in Qatar Awareness of its Application.

The Islāmic environment encourages the opportunities for practising *zakāt* on one hand, but, on the other, the ‘inherited religion’ concept may be practised without awareness of the conditions concerning *zakāt*-beneficiaries. One’s blind payment of *zakāt* as a way of merely following family customs, without the appropriate conviction in the Islāmic concept, can be regarded as a challenge to the practice of *zakāt*. The lived experience of Muslims in Qatar becomes an important feature in their motivational behaviour. The influence of the tribal nature of the society, and the impact it has on different cultural backgrounds on the practice of *zakāt*, create a formal institution.

## 6.2. The Impact of the Qatari Society’s Tribal Nature and the Cultural Background on the Lived Experience of Muslims in Qatar in Practice of *Zakāt*

The findings from the survey show that 133 out of a total of 149 respondents - citizens and residents - placed their trust in their families when making their decisions to pay *zakāt*. This high number of trust in the family was synonymous in the responses of both citizens and residents. Figure 6.2 below shows the statistics for citizens as 71 respondents, and residents as 62 respondents out of a total of 149 respondents who placed their trust in their families to decide on how or to whom their *zakāt* contributions should be made.<sup>109</sup>




Figure 6.2: Trust in families: Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents)

<sup>109</sup> See Appendix I: I.3.1. Family.

This high level of trust enables families to act as a formal institution, responsible for encouraging the payment of *zakāt*. This characteristic of Qatari society makes the practice of *zakāt* a consistent routine or pattern in relation to families. Children are inclined to follow their fathers' patterns of behaviour in paying *zakāt* to a specific party or family member, for instance, regardless of whether the recipient falls under one of the eight categories of *zakāt*. This patriarchal pattern may be caused by fear, ignorance, or even laziness. The children of Qatari citizens have been brought up to respect their parents, especially their fathers, and may fear their fathers' anger or punishment. Their knowledge of the full meaning of *zakāt* may not be comprehensive. They may not bother to inform themselves because they know their fathers will dictate who the beneficiaries should be. This is where the education institutes and scholars could help to inform young people or the so-called 'ignorant' about the purpose of *zakāt*.

The motives of Qatari citizens and residents regarding the family connection when practising *zakāt* can be explained in several ways. The family bond is the result of the reflection of the social solidarity of 'Ummah, and a commitment to religious teachings. The Qur'ān says:

['...], Whatever wealth you spend let it be for your parents and kinsmen [...]' (*Al-Baqara*, 2:215).

The customs and traditions according to the patriarchal system is another motive for Qataris preferring family connections (see below). Qatari citizens' fear of contradicting family values or traditions is the motive driving obedience of the family wishes. The other motive is dependence of sons or daughters on the head of the family to distribute their *zakāt*, and therefore relieving them of their responsibility. Fear, obedience, or laziness all lead to ignorance of the meaning of *zakāt* - showing empathy for others; however, decision-making is an individual religious responsibility according to *Al-Baqara* (2: 43).<sup>110</sup> This dependency pattern encourages the continuous practice of *zakāt*; however, individuals also have the responsibility to learn the meaning of *zakāt* and its purpose, and to ensure that *zakāt* is delivered to the beneficiaries.

The Qatari families' tribal nature and the cultural background has an impact on the lived experience of Muslims in Qatar in practice of *zakāt*, and on the decision-making of citizens. Family roles and major decisions concerning both nuclear and extended families within the tribe are usually made at the *majlis* (council or community meeting place) in tribal societies

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<sup>110</sup> See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* in its Religious Form: Definition and Various Interpretations.

such as Qatar.<sup>111</sup> Issues concerning *zakāt* are thoroughly discussed through the meetings of the extended family (which represents the whole family or tribe), and decisions implemented by tribal members, including matters such as distribution of *zakāt* collected from the family members. These decisions are usually made by the head or leader of the tribe. This finding supports Zahlan's (2016) views that the *majlis* are the ruling power in Qatari society. C6<sup>112</sup> agreed, stating that:

One of the customs in Gulf countries [...] has significantly influenced charitable work, especially by the important figures in the country [...]. They encourage each other to donate; in these *majalis* [pl. of *majlis*], all issues are discussed.

Acts of religious duty have become a societal pattern of behaviour embedded into society over many years, regardless of whether it is formal (codified) or informal (habit) (Aldasheva and Platteau 2014). A Qatari man, for instance, was keen to pay his *zakāt* every year, and his children followed his behaviour by also giving their *zakāt* to him. The same Qatari man gave his *zakāt* to one of his relatives, under the Islāmic religious principle of 'charity begins at home'. His sons adopted this 'inherited' behaviour, although they were not aware of the underlying reason. The Islāmic tradition was to continue paying *zakāt* on behalf of a deceased family member who initiated this custom.

The habit of giving *zakāt* to relatives was confirmed by a number of the participants such as S14<sup>113</sup>, S18<sup>114</sup>, and S19<sup>115</sup>. S18 said 'If the parent or the one who is responsible for a family, knows of an entity in need, or a certain, trustworthy entity to whom he will pay *zakāt* funds, we will do the same'. S19 who is a Qatari citizen and head of his family said: 'Every year I ask my children about their *zakāt*'. His questioning further reinforces the effect of family tribal culture on Qatari motivations to pay *zakāt*. C8<sup>116</sup> agreed with the other participants, and mentioned that '*Zakāt* payments to charities in the Arab Gulf States have become a routine matter'. This means that the practice of *zakāt* becomes an inherited habit: taken from A and given to B, for instance, without being particularly aware of the spiritual principles of *zakāt* such as compassion for the poor and needy. This shows that *zakāt* will be merely according to family values and customs rather than execution of *Allah's* will. This raises the highly

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<sup>111</sup> Almari (2018) explains the *majlis* as a meeting place which is divided into separate spaces for men and women. One of the characteristics of tribal society is the family's control over its members. There is a leader in each family, starting with the father, and sons extending family members down the masculine line of the larger family, followed by 'subordinate' males, and, finally, female members.

<sup>112</sup> Interview with C6, a charity staff member, on 27/03/2018.

<sup>113</sup> Interview with S14, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 17/07/2018.

<sup>114</sup> Interview with S18, a male citizen and (26-35) years, on 12/06/2018.

<sup>115</sup> Interview with S19, a male citizen and (above 66 years), on 29/06/2018.

<sup>116</sup> Interview with C8, a charity staff member, on 18/07/2018.

significant question of whether people practice Islām without thinking about it. This practice arguably becomes a habit which subsequently suggests there may be a lack of conviction or even awareness of the purpose or meaning of *zakāt*. ‘Blind obedience’ by citizens within the tribal community makes *zakāt* active, regardless of the reasons. This means that the inherited family practice of *zakāt* provides an opportunity to continue practising *zakāt*.

Tribalism in Qatari society may also continue to be a challenge to *zakāt*-giving, on the other hand, due to the lack of awareness of the giver concerning the entitlement of the beneficiary. The results of the survey and the qualitative interviews showed the high trust that the Qataris place in their families also explains this as one of the motives that encourages Muslims in Qatar to practice *zakāt*. The family motivation or tribalism is a form of influence and power, as it provides social status, respect, and authority for the tribe: tribes compete for titles, fame, prestige, and popularity. Qatari families, especially the well-known ones, donate to projects named after them.<sup>117</sup> This means that the tribal influence on the practice of *zakāt* has arguably set aside its religious path. The practice of *zakāt* has become a tribal pattern for promoting power and prestige in Qatari tribal society, rather than upholding modesty and humility, for instance, according to Islāmic principles. The family which pays more *zakāt*, and has projects named after it, indicates that it is probably wealthier than the other tribes, and has a greater presence and definition of itself in society. It would therefore have more influence and authority among the tribes, as rivalry between the tribes takes place in the name of *zakāt*. *Zakāt* has, in fact, become a ladder for tribal families to climb in their attempts to gain power and influence: *zakāt* has therefore become a way of displaying social class. This behaviour has the possibility of making *zakāt* a source of distrust, and thus encouraging *zakāt*-givers to avoid practising *zakāt*. This cultural behaviour regarding practising *zakāt* can also be understood as a religious competition on how it shows obedience to *Allah*. This means that the behaviour of families bears several motivational possibilities such as social motivation based on competition between families, and theological incentives based on competition for the sake of religion. Adopting the pattern of periodically offering or receiving *zakāt*, on the other hand, encourages Muslims in Qatar to continue practising *zakāt* as a regular routine in their lives.

Family bonding among Qatari citizens or family motivation was not approved by all interviewees. The results of the survey also reflected the desire of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) to practise *zakāt* individually. There are contradictions in the implementation of

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<sup>117</sup> See Chapter Seven: Charitable Organisations in Qatar and Lived Experiences of *Zakāt*.

individual religious practice between family practice and individual practice regarding *zakāt*. Muslims in Qatar, as families, wish to practise *zakāt* in the name of the family (as previously mentioned), meaning that it is preferable that the head of the family collects *zakāt* from all family members and to distribute it according to his decision (as a family tradition), which therefore makes individual distribution undesirable. This tribal clash in individual practice by both males and females was reflected in the survey and interviews; despite 71 citizen respondents practising *zakāt* - mainly through their families (see Figure 6.2 above), the survey showed 61 out of a total of 145 respondents - both male and female - preferred to practise *zakāt* individually (see figure 6.3 below).




Figure 6.3: Individual *Zakāt* practice in Qatar

An instance of this is evident when S15<sup>118</sup> said: ‘I do not follow my family’s decision - I have my own independent opinion and judgment’. Another interviewee, Al-Rwaili<sup>119</sup>, a sociologist and a Qatari citizen, partly agreed with S15. He pays *zakāt* with his family because he does not want to abandon tribal customs, but also pays another personal *zakāt* to satisfy his own decision-making. This means, in addition to the religious and social results as a source of incentives for the Qatari to pay *zakāt*, there exists another source which is personal convictions: both percentages of practising *zakāt* through the family or individually are high. This means

<sup>118</sup> Interview with S15, a male citizen and (26-35) years, on 09/05/2018.

<sup>119</sup> Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al-Rwaili on 16/10/2018.

that the citizens' desire to practise *zakāt* has three dimensions: family, individually, and both. The tribal influences do not absolutely control citizens' decision-making: there is some freedom for citizen *zakāt*-payers to make their own decisions.

The second tribal clash is male dominance. The findings contradict the literature in the matter of the conservative nature of tribal society which anticipates males will dominate Qatari women in such phenomena as marriage and salaries (Fromherz 2012; Al-Qadi 2014; *MDPS* 2016b; *Hukoomi* 2018c). Women prefer to practise *zakāt* individually in spite of characteristic male dominance of Qatari society. The survey showed 71 females (citizens and residents) out of a total of 145 respondents practised individual decision-making, compared to 48 respondents of the males (citizens and residents)<sup>120</sup> (see figure 6.3 above). The survey did not compare the percentage of female Qatari citizens with the female Qatari residents; however, the results from the survey were also supported by those from the interviews. C4<sup>121</sup> commented that, 'Qatari women [citizens] came in person to pay their *zakāt*, despite the patriarchal society's traditions and customs'. This was also confirmed by the interview with the QA3 and QA4 couple, Qatari citizens and activists in Islāmic donations. QA3<sup>122</sup> indicated that his wife QA4<sup>123</sup> practised *zakāt* as an individual, without interference from anyone; QA4, in turn, reinforced what her husband had said, noting that the matter of paying her *zakāt* was her decision alone. This evidence suggests some Qatari women are able to decide and pay their *zakāt* without the need to consult their male family members. Based on the survey results (Table 6.3), C4, and the couple's response, Qatari society accepts the religious behaviour of women at the expense of its own identity. The practice of *zakāt* in Qatar for both genders is therefore seen as an act of individual religious responsibility. This shows that, in matters of religious practices such as *zakāt*, religious duties take precedence over cultural and patriarchal norms in Qatar. The majority of *zakāt* verses in the Qur'ān, in fact, particularly address the Muslims' individuality:

'Establish Prayer and dispense *Zakah* (the Purifying Alms) and bow in worship with those who bow' (*Al-Baqara*, 2: 43).

According to the results of the survey, supported by the interviews, the individual practice of *zakāt* by women is incompatible with the dominant culture in Qatari society, characterised as patriarchal - a product of a tribal culture. The research therefore shows that the importance of

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<sup>120</sup> See Chapter Five: Table 5.5 Gender.

<sup>121</sup> Interview with C4, a charity staff member, on 18/09/2018.

<sup>122</sup> Interview with QA3, an activist in Islamic donations, on 27/06/2018.

<sup>123</sup> Interview with QA4, an activist in Islamic donations, on 27/06/2018.

religious practice for Qatari female citizens was more important than the influence of the patriarchal Qatari society.

This proof from ‘lived experiences’ provides an important insight into how social hierarchies and norms are negotiated in Islāmic societies such as Qatar. A number of individual decisions regarding paying *zakāt* take precedence over payment to intermediaries (such as family leaders or *zakāt* collection and distribution centres) in Qatar. The consistency of this behaviour gives rise to the notion that *zakāt* payments will continue to be made in the immediate future. The reference to religion over social influence for some Muslims in Qatar is another indicator of the religious aspect of *zakāt*, and the desire to implement Islām. This provides opportunities to practise *zakāt* in Qatari society, as it places great significance on the compulsory nature of one of the pillars of Islām, prompting many to donate.

The effect of tribal families on Qatari citizens is similar to the effect of families on Qatari residents. The cultural background of Qatari residents means their families have an impact on the decision-making of residents. Their family ties are maintained through connections with family members in their countries of origin, where religious duties are reciprocally and continuously encouraged. The maintenance of the strong connection between the Qatari residents and their families in their countries of origin (De Bel-Air 2014) appears to be influential when the residents send *zakāt* back to their families. The survey showed 62 Qatari resident respondents (male and female) also preferred to practise *zakāt* with their families (see Figure 6.2 above). The resident interviewees did not clarify whether they would have chosen to practise *zakāt* in a different way. Interviews with S5<sup>124</sup>, S6<sup>125</sup>, and S7<sup>126</sup> indicated the relevance of sending their *zakāt* to their countries of origin. S5 said: ‘I send it to Somalia for my family to distribute my *zakāt*’. S13<sup>127</sup> added: ‘My family contacts me to tell me the names of the beneficiaries of *zakāt*. Accordingly, I send *zakāt* to my country’. The family and the *zakāt*-givers in these societies are particularly important, especially for individuals earning small wages; the income for someone from Somalia working in Qatar, for instance, is much higher than that in Somalia. This puts them in a privileged position to send *zakāt* to family members.

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<sup>124</sup> Interview with S5, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 01/06/2018.

<sup>125</sup> Interview with S6, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 26/09/2018.

<sup>126</sup> Interview with S7, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 01/06/2018.

<sup>127</sup> Interview with S13, a female resident and (36-45) years, on 15/05/2018.



The commitment of Qatari residents to their families, similar to Qatari citizens, is demonstrated in their *zakāt* practice. This means that residents are affected by their communities in the practice of *zakāt*. A Qatari resident's decision to pay *zakāt* is driven by social influences rather than their own religious awareness. The practice of *zakāt* through social influences has two aspects: the practice of *zakāt* is routine with a single pattern which may follow unconscious behaviour or awareness of *zakāt*, including *niṣāb*, conditions, applications, and distribution. The restriction on the *zakāt*-giver guarantees the continuation of *zakāt* and individual behaviour to fulfil religious obligations. The practice of *zakāt* was made by social impact which provided both an opportunity and challenge for *zakāt*. *Zakāt* opportunities arose through family bonds and *zakāt*-givers. A citizen or resident pays *zakāt* influenced by either a sense of (religious) commitment or encouragement from his or her family. The challenges of *zakāt*, in contrast, are apparent through the *zakāt*-giver's dependence on the family regarding the calculation, collection, and distribution of *zakāt*. This situation suggests that a lack of awareness of the principles of *zakāt* and its beneficiaries exists.

It is noteworthy that, despite the difficulty of comparing Qatari society with other societies because of the difference in personal feelings and attitudes,<sup>128</sup> the results of this research may, nevertheless, significantly contribute to the understanding and study of societies possessing similar demographics and characteristics as Qatari society. Societies such as those in Kuwait, United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia have comparable social structures as Qatar (GCC 2018); on the other hand, *Sunnah* societies which have different demographics and social contexts such as in Europe (where Muslims are in the minority) would require further investigation. The outcome of the findings have also revealed that the personal convictions of the Qatari in the practice of *zakāt*, are beyond the religious or social influences that were discussed in the two previous sections.

### 6.3. Qatari Lived Experience: Impact of Personal Convictions on the Practice of *Zakāt*

Personal convictions are the relationship between the Qatari and Self. The personal convictions which appear in the interviews with Al-Rwaili<sup>129</sup> and Al-Ansari<sup>130</sup>, political sociologists, had a different view regarding *zakāt* and tax.<sup>131</sup> Al-Rwaili stated that there is no

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<sup>128</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt's* Methodology: Givers and Beneficiaries According to Sociology of Islām Approach.

<sup>129</sup> Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al-Rwaili on 16/10/2018.

<sup>130</sup> Interview with Dr. Majed Al-Ansari on 16/10/2018.

<sup>131</sup> See Chapter Three: Table 3.2: Comparison between *zakāt* and government's tax.

difference between *zakāt* and tax. He said: ‘The world regime today doesn't accept the word *zakāt* [...]. I consider tax as *zakāt*’. Al-Rwaili’s point of view contradicts Muslim scholars’ perceptions according to Shbair (1996) and Alemour (2015). Tax beneficiaries do not necessarily have the qualifications that allow them to be *zakāt*-beneficiaries. Al-Rwaili’s point of view thus explains the attitude of those who see themselves having to pay taxes twice: once in the form of a religious obligation, and the other in the form of a state requirement. Al-Ansari, on the other hand, explained *zakāt* is a more inclusive system than taxation. He said:

*Zakāt* focuses on all the funds taken from the rich and the identification of how it goes to the poor, as well as the strategic projects of the state.

Al-Ansari continued:

The Qur’ānic text adds the expression ‘in the way of *Allah*’. [This expression] was used by military institutions to finance ports, where a substantial part goes to social care [in] its various forms.

Contrasting with Al-Rwaili, yet agreeing with the majority of interviewees, Al-Ansari preferred *zakāt* to taxation, thus indicating that not all Muslims in Qatar are fully convinced to practise *zakāt* in the same manner. One’s behaviour is unpredictable, undisciplined, and cannot be ‘sown’ with others according to a specific methodology. An Islāmic society contains strict people, who persist in applying the laws of Islām as preached by traditional scholars of Islām, without considering adaptations required for modern life. Another type of society consists of less-strict Muslims who combine the application of *zakāt* with the changes in life, similar to the way of modernist scholars; both sets of individuals practice *zakāt*, yet in their own particular ways. Belief fails to unite the attitudes of Muslims - practice and behaviour of Muslims is not uniform. It is therefore difficult to generalise about all members of Islāmic society according to belief and practice. This condition is reinforced by Bowen (cited in Contractor 2012: 5) who points out the differences between belief and practice; for example, a Muslim may fast and eat only *halāl* meat, but may not regularly pray. Contractor (2012: 5) adds: ‘The difference between ‘believing’ and ‘practising’ is simultaneously more nuanced, complex, and subtle. Culture and social contexts of believers add to this complexity’. Jeldtoft and Woodhead (2013), on the same lines with Contractor (2012), also explain everyday lived religion is tactical and strategic, and emotions shape and alter social structures and can be tactically used. This means that personal convictions in the practice of *zakāt* do not always influence personal decision-making without having an impact on religion and society. The religion and cultural influences, customs, and traditions also have a role in decision-making and personal convictions. This explains, for example, the behaviour of Qatari society towards the mechanism of collecting and distributing *zakāt*; some of the participants expressed their discomfort with the procedures used

to collect and distribute *zakāt*, while others were in agreement. The approval of the latter may be influenced by the tribal customs and traditions in the practice of *zakāt*; on the other hand, it may be due to lack of awareness of the purpose of *zakāt*; nevertheless, personal convictions regarding practising *zakāt* remain outside the framework of either religion or society. Diversity in belief, and exercising the practice of *zakāt*, create cases of practice, denial, avoidance, and ignorance (ignoring) over time.

#### **6.4. The Results of the Effect of Theological, Sociological, and Personal Conviction Factors on Practising *Zakāt***

The previous sections revealed how three factors: theological, sociological, and personal convictions contributed to creating motivations to pay *zakāt* for Muslims in Qatar. These factors may provide opportunities, but also challenges to the practice of *zakāt*. The following section is a discussion on such challenges, and how these dynamics create an environment that contributes to cases of denial, avoidance, and ignorance (ignoring) in the practice of *zakāt*.

There was no evidence of denial or refusal to practise *zakāt* in the survey or the interviews of this research, such as the *Al-Tawaqquf wa al-Tabayyun* sect.<sup>132</sup> Denial cannot be dismissed as an existing reason in Qatar for the failure to practise *zakāt*.<sup>133</sup> The diverse behaviour of people is probably and simply due to persons in a community who do not share the same beliefs or thought processes (Babbie 2015). The varied interpretations of Islām by *Sunnah* and *Shī‘ah*, for example, as well as the different explanations by different schools of thought in the same sect. It is also reasonable to consider that one can deny *zakāt* according to one’s own personal interpretations.

Avoidance is when one believes in *zakāt*, yet creates reasons relating to one’s own wealth why one should not practice it. Spending money is not desirable for everyone, even if it has theological or philanthropic purposes. Yamauchi and Templer (1982) and Muzikante and Škuškovnika (2018) explain that money is important for one’s livelihood and well-being, and may be perceived as a symbol of validity, power, and value. There were some interviewees who expressed their annoyance at other Muslims in Qatar who resorted to various methods to

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<sup>132</sup> *Al-Tawaqquf wa al-Tabayyun*, is one of the sects of *Kharijites*, *Sunnah* Muslims. They ceased to pay *zakāt*, because they believed Muslims are currently in a vulnerable situation similar to that in early Islām in *Makkah* (Al-Aql 1998: 114-18).

<sup>133</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt*-Givers and Beneficiaries’ Lived Experiences Between Belief and Practice.

avoid paying *zakāt*. S19<sup>134</sup>, for example, stated that: ‘Some Muslims in Qatar use their money to buy buildings in order not to pay *zakāt*’. According to the *Ḥanbalī* school, buildings are not included under the *niṣāb* payment rules (Al-Qaradawi 1999). This suggests that by avoiding the necessity of having to declare their denial of *zakāt* has helped them resort to avoiding the practice. It is also possible that they believe in *zakāt*, but the act of paying it seems a heavy burden.

According to the Islāmic economist Kahf regarding *niṣāb*, the percentage may have been appropriate for the economic conditions in the time of the Prophet, but it is difficult to believe that it can remain suitable 1,400 years later, considering all the economic changes since then.<sup>135</sup> In his interview for this research, Kahf said that *zakāt* has a low percentage of *niṣāb* for the twenty-first century.

*Zakāt* comes through two stages: (i) it was the time of the Prophet, and the time shortly after him [through] the first 40 years after the Caliphs; [and] (ii) it was the time of the Great Jurists continuing till today. *Zakāt* needs to be re-examined in studies, to be updated, and needs improvement to its values.

There are some Muslims in Qatar who avoid paying *zakāt*, however, despite the percentage being small from Kahf’s point view. This means that Muslims in Qatar still feel it is a financial burden for them, as is the current government tax imposed on them. This tax is mandatory and payable to the state, whereas *zakāt* is considered to be a form of Islāmic ‘tax’, and is also obligatory. This means that a Muslim will be obliged to pay taxes twice: one for the state and one as a religious commitment. If the level of *niṣāb* is raised to say 10 per cent, and the state tax is 20 per cent, this means a Qatari will have to pay 30 per cent of his or her income and wealth (if it reaches *niṣāb*). This may be another reason why practising *zakāt* may be rejected, ignored or avoided. This attitude could present a new challenge to the practice of *zakāt*, and a new way of dealing with it is required, as Kahf says.

Using traditional interpretations to avoid practising *zakāt* is not only a way of escaping religious responsibility, but also a way of avoiding shame or embarrassment in a society characterised by an Islāmic tribal identity. Apparent wealth, the perceived symbol of validity, power, and value, may be diminished through paying *niṣāb*; on the other hand, purchasing a building may also deplete an individual’s wealth, even though it may continue the perception of wealth in the eyes of society. These interpretations may satisfy an individual’s personal

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<sup>134</sup> Interview with S19, a male citizen and (above 66 years), on 29/05/2018.

<sup>135</sup> ‘An economic system is a means by which societies or governments organize and distribute available resources, services, and goods across a geographic region or country. Economic systems regulate the factors of production, including land, capital, labor, and physical resources’ (CFI 2021: n.p.).

religious accountability, especially within himself or herself, but it may not satisfy other aspects. Practising *zakāt* is not merely about the financial (giving) aspect; *zakāt* also contributes to the social aspect such as co-existence, and feelings of belonging to a society through giving and receiving. *Zakāt* also has an important religious motivation - preparing for the Afterlife.<sup>136</sup> The giver's aim is to win entrance into Heaven through good behaviour rather than being condemned to Hellfire by less favourable behaviour. Practising *zakāt* is basically a religious duty which not only benefits society, but also helps to develop a relationship between a Muslim individual and *Allah*. This means that a Muslim draws closer to *Allah* through observing His commands according to the Qurān, and the Prophet's guidance through the *Ḥaḍīth*. The Qatari is not only a follower of Islām, but also a human being, and behaves like one in his or her attitude and desires. According to 'lived experience' as the theoretical framework of this study, this appears to be true, and applies to the majority of Muslims in Qatar. It is not necessarily the case that religious texts are followed by all members of societies with an Islāmic identity; however, the perception that some members of these societies can avoid practising *zakāt* (according to the eight categories) do not receive approval from many of the survey and interview respondents. The opinions of the majority of respondents in this research show that religious teachings should take priority over the behaviour, attitude, and desires of Qatari society and individuals.

The researcher did not interview a Qatari Muslim who declared his or her avoidance or denial of *zakāt*. It is not acceptable for Muslims in Qatar to speak openly about their disbelief in the practice of *zakāt*: admitting avoidance, for instance, would result in being stigmatised. The characteristics of tribal society in Qatar also contribute to 'blocking' someone who does not believe in *zakāt* from declaring his or her position, as it would be considered a form of apostasy or *ridḍa*.<sup>137</sup> Qatar is a difficult setting in which to depart from the customs and traditions of the tribe (Fromherz 2017). A son or daughter, for instance, may not be allowed to adopt a different approach from his or her nuclear or extended family.<sup>138</sup> The tribal dominance in Qatari society over other aspects of cultures in the society limits the residents' freedom of expression, and arguably, also helps to prevent the denial or avoidance of *zakāt*. This means the freedom to express a Qatari's conviction in practising *zakāt* is not permitted if it is inconsistent with customs and traditions, or with the interpretations of Qatar's recognised

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<sup>136</sup> See Chapter Two: Interrogating Religious Motivations.

<sup>137</sup> The first Caliph Abu Bakr declared a war on those Muslims who refused to pay *zakāt* called the 'Ridda Wars' (Hossain 2012: 3).

<sup>138</sup> See Chapter Four: Tribal and Other Cultures - Demographic Diversity.

religious scholars. This was apparent in the reactions by S14, S18, and S19 who believed in following the methodology of the family and community, rather than individual interpretation of *zakāt*. C6 and C8 also agreed (see section above on ‘The Impact of the Qatari Society’s Tribal Nature and the Cultural Background on the Lived Experience of Muslims in Qatar in Practice of *Zakāt*). If the Qatari *zakāt*-givers, on the other hand, can avoid it by means that do not conflict with society, they will not hesitate to do so. This means that the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar is far from its supreme, spiritual goal such as purification of the individual from selfishness, vanity, and greed, as well as endorsing social solidarity by exchanging the feeling of suffering with the recipients of *zakāt*.<sup>139</sup>

Ignorance is the act of believing in *zakāt*, but not practising it because of the lack of awareness of the theological basis of *zakāt*, highlighted by Amuda and Che Embi (2013: 405).<sup>140</sup> The survey recorded 147 out of a total of 153 respondents claimed to be aware of the concept of *zakāt*;<sup>141</sup> however, C4<sup>142</sup> confirmed that some *zakāt*-givers approached the charity with incorrect estimates of the details of their *zakāt* requirements. C4 explained: ‘Most scholars in the *zakāt* field do not have complete awareness of the financial aspect regarding *zakāt*; when it comes to calculating the money due for *zakāt* it is usually wrong’. QA2<sup>143</sup> confirmed C4’s point of view, and said: ‘Most of *zakāt* questions come about *niṣāb*’. *Niṣāb* is closely related to calculating *zakāt* dues’. These statements echo the interview participants’ complaints, and suggest that Islāmic scholars are not fulfilling their responsibility to educate Qatari Muslims. If a confused Muslim is unable to approach a religious figure with a question regarding *zakāt*, it will only lead to further uncertainty, thus increasing the challenge to *zakāt*. The diversity of Islāmic schools among Muslims in Qatar - citizens and residents - gives rise to different interpretations of *zakāt*, thus creating confusion which can lead to deciding to ignore *zakāt*. These different *zakāt* interpretations, however, could help the Qatari feel comfortable and free on how to practise. This notion is reinforced by authors such Al-Shaibani (1996) and Al-Baghdadi (2012: 47) who explain that the diversity of interpretations is a mercy for ‘*Ummah*. The commitment according to a certain method of interpretation of *zakāt* may be appropriate for some Muslims in Qatar, yet impractical and difficult for others, a point especially significant in the demographic differences between citizens and residents.’<sup>144</sup> Qatari Muslim

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<sup>139</sup> See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* in its Religious Form: Definition and Various Interpretations.

<sup>140</sup> See Chapter Eight: The Interpretations of *Zakāt*-Beneficiaries: Opportunities and Challenges.

<sup>141</sup> See Appendix I: I.1.1. Awareness of the Conceptual Meaning of *Zakāt*.

<sup>142</sup> Interview with C4, a charity staff member, on 18/09/2018.

<sup>143</sup> Interview with QA2, an activist in Islamic donations, on 20/07/2018.

<sup>144</sup> See Chapter Four: Qatar's Demographic Diversity: Impact on the Practice of *Zakāt*.

society is made up of demographic diversity in terms of culture and religious affiliations. There are the *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* and their different schools of thought; in addition, each Qatari Muslim has his or her own interpretations of *zakāt*, and, because *zakāt* is an individual practice in Qatar, it is optional. This means that the applications of *zakāt* will be dependent on the religious background of each Qatari citizen or resident, and his or her decision-making in observing or avoiding *zakāt*. This diversity in the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar may provide some relief for both citizens and residents. The options presented in the practice of *zakāt* give them more freedom. The diversity of interpretations leads to the possibility of avoidance as a continuous cycle; on the other hand, they also act as an opportunity for the practice of *zakāt*, since it gives the Qatari a greater freedom of choice on how he or she considers *zakāt*.

The practice of *zakāt* in Qatari society is between the giver and the beneficiary. This relationship may be affected by religion, society, or personal convictions through the lived experiences of either party.

#### **6.5. Lived Experiences of *Zakāt*: Relationship between *Zakāt*-givers and Beneficiaries**

There is an established hierarchy in Qatar between Qatari citizens and residents, and between citizens themselves in terms of the position and wealth of their tribes (explained in Chapter Four on the context analysis of Qatar). The humiliation in exposing one's financial status amongst an arguably extravagant society with high living standards, and the stress on prestige and reputation could be a primary cause for Muslims in Qatar to hesitate before declaring themselves in need of *zakāt*. The beneficiaries may feel that they are of less value because of their need for charity. It also reflects on the competitive nature of families in a tribal society such as Qatar, in which it becomes a sensitive matter between the giver and the beneficiary compared to between their families. This concept of feeling less valued has some contradictions with the commandments of the Prophet in his last sermon. Abu Nadrah also cites the Prophet in the *Ḥadīth*: 'There is no favour of an Arab over a foreigner, nor a foreigner over an Arab, and neither white skin over black skin, nor black skin over white skin, except by righteousness (*Musnad Ahmad* 22978, Grade: *Sahih*).

This conviction is reinforced in Chapter Two Literature Review, as explained by Koenig and Al-Shohab (2014). They claim Islām discourages 'downward' comparisons concerning possessions and promotes 'upward' comparisons concerning values. Muslims believe this tendency replaces the sense of inferiority felt by poorer members of society with

feelings of equality and justice that eliminate a person's low self-esteem, ultimately inspiring a more egalitarian and fair society. According to Islāmic attitudes and the Prophet's commandment, the relationship between the giver and beneficiary should be based on mutual respect, without verbal or physical abuse. If the connection is created on such a principle, then the giver will not develop a view in which he or she controls the money being donated, and the beneficiary will not feel he or she is at the mercy of the giver's decision. The relationship between the giver and beneficiary should be built on the ethics and morals of a Muslim when distributing *zakāt*. These include anonymity, open-giving, avoidance of taunting and hurting, practising humility, giving of one's best and to one's dearest, and seeking the worthy and deserving (Al-Ghazali n.d.).<sup>145</sup> These interactions should be established upon dignity, humility, and genuine goodwill, rather than on race, creed, religious or national affiliations, according to Abu Nadrah's citation of the Prophet in the *Hadīth*.

The interview findings revealed that, in the case of practising religion, Muslims in Qatar behave differently from the hierarchal system. S14<sup>146</sup> said, 'The subject of religion plays a large role, so I focused on it to be able to simplify the system of values governing religion in which mercy and humanity [are the principal factors]'. Religion becomes the main reference point, even if it conflicts with personal desires. This is demonstrated in the fact that the majority of Muslims in Qatar practice *zakāt*, motivated by religious convictions, as discussed above. S14 added:

Religious prejudice precedes many values, such as mercy and humanity, so I focused on these values, and the last values of religion continue - religion is encouraged and rewards the actor.

S11<sup>147</sup> also said, 'Humanity comes from the religious aspect of mercy and morality (sense of the needy)'. Religion is not the only factor which influences the behaviour of Qataris: it also instils concern and consideration for others without discrimination, especially those less fortunate. This was observed by the researcher in her own lived experience among Muslims in Qatar. S4<sup>148</sup>, who identified herself as *Shī'ah*, also confirmed this:

I was born in Qatar, and since my birth, I have not so far found any difference in dealings [with other people]. I went to Qatari schools and studied with girls from Qatari *Sunnah* families, and I did not find any discrimination.

S4 continued:

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<sup>145</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt's* Methodology: Givers and Beneficiaries According to Sociology of Islām Approach.

<sup>146</sup> Interview with S14, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 17/07/2018.

<sup>147</sup> Interview with S11, a female citizen and (18-25) years, on 08/05/2018.

<sup>148</sup> Interview with S4, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 20/06/2018.



In Qatar, there was a strong cohesion and harmony. If you ask people, they do not know what the difference is between the *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah*.

The sense of cohesion and harmony are also shown through the sympathetic and prompt responses to most humanitarian appeals such as 'Relieve Aleppo'. This opinion was confirmed by the majority of interviewees, including S14<sup>149</sup> and C6<sup>150</sup>. S14 said 'the campaign for which all the manifestations of celebrations of the National Day of Qatar was cancelled in 2016 because of the massacre in Aleppo, and in solidarity with the Syrian people'. This shows that the Muslims in Qatar practice '*Ummah* (solidarity) and feelings of mercy or compassion in times of international crises; however, these feelings of 'mercy' do not seem to extend to the poor and needy in Qatar, especially to the people (unskilled workers) on the streets of Doha (capital of Qatar). Khan and Harroff-Tavel (2011) and HRW (2016) highlighted this dilemma.<sup>151</sup> It is difficult to explain how the needy workers must feel when business-owners deal with them from an Islāmic perspective; yet, at the same time, the business-owners do not have sympathy for the less fortunate workers by supporting them through *zakāt*. It is difficult to understand how the workers must feel when the business-owners send their money abroad to support the poor, when those Qatari workers are actually in the same situation. It is difficult to explain how workers must feel when they witness business-owners' quick response to humanitarian appeals abroad, yet seem to ignore the workers' conditions at home. This suggests Islāmic sympathy is limited to those living or suffering abroad.

To conclude, the results of this research revealed the good relationship between members of the Qatari society. The religious reference is the basic feature on which the behaviour of the Qatari society was based, in addition to the inherited social morals. This relationship does not reflect their sympathy for those who are less fortunate than they are, in Qatari society itself. The necessity to recognise and address the needs of this working class of workers in Qatar is the responsibility of both Muslim scholars and charitable organisations in Qatar.

The analysis and discussion on *zakāt*-givers' lived experiences concerning the practice of *zakāt* has shown many factors which support or hinder practising *zakāt*. The relationship Qatari *zakāt*-givers have with *Allah*, for instance, has an impact on their motivations, decision-making, self-evaluation, and society. These relationships exposed cases of the practice of *zakāt*,

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<sup>149</sup> Interview with S14, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 17/07/2018.

<sup>150</sup> Interview with C6, a charity staff member, on 27/03/2018.

<sup>151</sup> See Chapter Eight: 'The Poor' Category: Muslims in Qatar Awareness of its Application.

denial, avoidance, or ignoring *zakāt*. The religious and social influences as well as personal convictions also had a role in the relationship between the giver and the beneficiary in Qatari society.

## 6.6. Summary

The results of the survey, supported by the interviews, showed that, despite religion being the main factor driving the Qatari decision-making, there were other factors as well which influenced their decisions. Tribal customs and traditions, family bonding of citizens and residents, personal convictions, and social influences such as creating an Islāmic environment, all participated alongside Islāmic teachings in influencing Qatari decision-making. The majority of Muslims in Qatar: men, women, citizens, and residents practice *zakāt* as a religious duty. The tribal and different cultural backgrounds also had an impact on the practice of *zakāt*. This evidence emerged from investigating the behaviour of citizens, and the powerful influences of nuclear and extended families on the collection and distribution of *zakāt*. The desire of some Qatari males and females to practise *zakāt* individually, however, contradicts the tribal system. The ties residents have with their family members in their countries of origin is also one of the social aspects to which Muslims in Qatar have contributed to the impact *zakāt* practice has in Qatar.

The three influences – religious, cultural, and personal – also exposed cases of practice, denial, avoidance, and ignorance (ignoring). The results of Islāmic identity and tribal domination (at the expense of other cultural elements) is evidence that some Muslims in Qatar are prevented from speaking openly about their personal views on practising *zakāt*. This has driven some Muslims in Qatar to by-pass the religious intentions by using traditional interpretations to avoid paying *zakāt*. This may arguably be acceptable from a religious point of view, but it is morally undesirable. The main significance of *zakāt* is cohesion and empowerment of society members through co-existence, providing assistance, and contributing to alleviating suffering, regardless of whether it is internationally or nationally. The lack of religious awareness of *zakāt* also created a situation in which some Muslims in Qatar disregarded or ignored the practice of *zakāt*. Ignoring *zakāt* is another obstacle facing the practice of *zakāt* other than avoiding it. *Zakāt* is therefore subject to religious and social considerations in contemporary Qatar, and thus the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar faces both opportunities and challenges. Following Islāmic teachings and family bonding, on one hand,

means *zakāt* will continue to be practised in the immediate future; on the other, personal convictions in avoidance lack of awareness, or ignore it, create a challenge for *zakāt* in implementing its practice. Cases of *zakāt*'s avoidance, ignorance, and denial (if it exists), are discoveries of this research, and will contribute to the future studies in developing the religious and social fields through the theoretical and practical aspects of *zakāt* practice.<sup>152</sup>

The influence of religious and social factors, and personal conceptions on Qatari behaviour, not only affect their decision-making in practising *zakāt*, but also the patterns of *zakāt* mechanism in Qatar. The mutual effect of *zakāt*-givers and Qatari charitable organisations have on beneficiaries regarding the collection and distribution of *zakāt* is one of the challenges *zakāt* faces. This factor is the focus of the next chapter, Chapter Seven, starting with the mutual effect of *zakāt*-givers and Qatari charitable organisations' behaviour, and the mechanism of *zakāt* - its collection and distribution.

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<sup>152</sup> See Chapter Nine: Research Contributions.

## CHAPTER SEVEN

### **Qatari Charitable Organisations and Lived Experiences of *Zakāt*: Between Spiritual Practice and Big Business**

#### **7.0. Introduction**

Chapter Six presented a discussion on the influence of religious and social aspects, and personal convictions on *zakāt*-givers' behaviour when practising *zakāt*. This includes the different behaviour adopted such as denial, avoidance, and ignoring *zakāt*. This chapter focuses on the organisational and institutional pathways through which people in Qatar give *zakāt*. This chapter examines the mutual effect of *zakāt*-givers and charitable organisations such as *Zakat* Fund and NGOs, and their collection mechanism. The effect these organisations may have on everyday lived experiences of Muslims in Qatar - givers and beneficiaries - may shed light on how organisations persuade *zakāt*-givers to donate. Members of Qatari society have four choices on how to pay their *zakāt*: individual practice; through *Zakat* Fund; and through NGOs. This research uncovered a fourth way: payment of *zakāt* through charity representatives or intermediaries.

This chapter complements the previous chapter by providing a discussion on the influences of theological and sociological aspects on the practice of *zakāt* in contemporary Qatar 2017-2020. The three research questions are equally considered, and understanding achieved concerning theological and social motivation, and their effect on individual decision-making, the main characteristics of *zakāt* practice in Qatar, and finally, the opportunities and challenges. Based on the theoretical framework of sociology of religion, this chapter presents the analysis and discussion on the research findings collected from the surveys and interviews in conjunction with the literature review. The analysis and discussion are further supported by the results of the previous chapter: *Zakāt*-Givers' Lived Experiences with the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar 2017-2020.

This chapter addresses *zakāt* in terms of charitable organisations' lived experiences with the practice of *zakāt*. The researcher critically engages with structures and charitable organisations in Qatar, viewing their experiences with *zakāt* regarding collection and distribution. The researcher also investigates the differences between governmental and non-

governmental charitable organisational structures, and their conduct of *zakāt*, specifically, their behaviour in marketing *zakāt*. The role of well-respected scholars of *zakāt* practice in Qatar is also addressed.

The focus of this chapter is on the key themes which emerged from the research, particularly the sociological influences on the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. The restriction of projects (*zakāt*-givers' conditional donations) and *zakāt* distribution between desire and needs were a challenge for *zakāt*. The sociological influences on the practice of *zakāt* were evident in terms of the attention paid to the collection and distribution of *zakāt* in Qatar. Charitable organisations (government and NGOs) had various methods of persuading *zakāt*-givers to pay their *zakāt*.

### **7.1. Charitable Organisations in Qatar and Lived Experiences of *Zakāt***

This section is a review of the types of charitable organisations in Qatar, and presents a discussion on the extent of Qatari interaction with these organisations. The researcher also analyses how the existence of charitable organisations in Qatar has been both an opportunity and a challenge to the practice of *zakāt*, thus addressing the research question. A fourth way has been revealed in this research: payment of *zakāt* through charity representatives or intermediaries. This will be discussed later in this chapter.

The interview findings of this research are consistent with contemporary literature in terms of the behaviour of charitable organisations present in Qatar 2017-2020 (*Al-Raya* 2007; *International Centre for Research and Studies* 2016; *Al-Jazeera* 2017d; Shaheen 2018). Qatari charitable organisations are distributed across the country and divided between the *Zakat* Fund, which is regulated by the Qatari government, and other non-governmental charities such as Qatar Red Crescent, Qatar Charity, *Eid* Charity, and Reach Out To Asia, among others (*International Centre for Research and Studies* 2016; *RACA* 2020b). One of the differences between *Zakat* Fund and other organisations is that *Zakat* Fund focuses on distributing *zakāt* inside Qatar, while other organisations focus on *zakāt*-financed projects outside Qatar. The diversity and large number of charitable organisation offices throughout Qatari society provide an incentive for givers to pay *zakāt*. This creates more opportunities for the practice of *zakāt*. The prominent presence of these charitable organisations, on the other hand, make the *zakāt*-givers become used to the Islāmic concept, thus creating a sense of indifference, and presenting a challenge to practising *zakāt*.

The researcher made several field visits to the charitable organisations in Qatar. It was noted on each visit that the buildings of charitable organisations were beehives of industry, bustling with employees, administrators, executors, visitors, donors, and people requesting aid. The fuller picture appears in the researcher's fieldwork. There is a considerable number of cases of those in need - the beneficiaries of *zakāt* in Qatari society - in both *Zakat* Fund and the NGOs. This was surprising in a wealthy country such as Qatar, whose GDP per capita is the highest in the world. It was assumed this would have enabled both citizens and residents to achieve a high standard of living (Tok, Alkhater, and Pal 2016), but the reality was different. The existence of poverty in Qatar may have irritated or even confused the Muslims in Qatar when they saw *zakāt* claimants and recipients in Qatar. They may have many questions such as how there is a presence of poor or needy beneficiaries in a wealthy Islāmic country. They question the possibility of misadministration in the distribution of *zakāt*, or whether *zakāt* is governed by bodies other than religious ones responsible for its distribution, or whether citizens or residents receive preference.

The *zakāt*-beneficiaries in Qatar are not the only ones who influence the activities of the collection and distribution mechanism of *zakāt*. According to *zakāt*-givers, the high activity of charitable organisations is the result of the trust and confidence that Qatari citizens and residents place in such organisations. They perceive the collection and distribution mechanisms of *zakāt* as trustworthy (see figure 7.1. below). The source of Muslims in Qatar trust is the practice of these organisations which has further helped to attract both *zakāt*-givers and beneficiaries. The behaviour of charitable organisations in marketing *zakāt* such as advertisements promoting projects in areas affected by poverty or disasters, for instance, will be the focus of this chapter, including the differences between governmental and non-governmental charities.

The findings from the survey indicate that citizens and residents support both *Zakat* Fund and NGO charities alike – 120 out of a total of 150 respondents compared to 117 out of a total of 155 respondents, respectively.<sup>153</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> See Appendix (I): I.2.1. Government Collection Body, and section I.2.3. Charity Organisations.




Figure 7.1: Trustworthiness of Qatar charitable organisations

The well-perceived services of the charitable organisations, a mutual sense of trust is present between the majority of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) and the organisations. This is evident from numerous interview responses. S12<sup>154</sup> and S1<sup>155</sup> for instance, stated that the *Zakat* Fund would be their first choice when locating an outlet to practise *zakāt*. S15<sup>156</sup> agreed and added: ‘*Zakat* Fund is a well-controlled and disciplined tool to collect *zakāt* and deliver to beneficiaries’. The perceived reliability and performance of the services provided by charitable organisations seems to have fostered a sense of confidence in these respondents; however, this sense of confidence does not extend to other Qatari *zakāt*-givers. The effort these charitable organisations put into collecting and distributing *zakāt* may be appreciated and trusted by some respondents, there are some who are dissatisfied with their behaviour or activities. S6<sup>157</sup>, for instance, had what she called ‘a bad experience’, when the charity to which S6 gave the donation, did not follow the project that she wished to support: ‘There is no credibility [in these organisations]’. She also said, ‘They forced me to sponsor an orphan girl [whom] I did not choose’. The choices some *zakāt*-givers make are not always possible or appropriate. There are logistical, environmental, or even political reasons why some charities do not observe the *zakāt*-givers’ wishes. Providing *zakāt* donations to some of the chosen beneficiaries take

<sup>154</sup> Interview with S12, a female citizen and (46-65) years, on 09/05/ 2018.

<sup>155</sup> Interview with S1, a female citizen and (26-35) years, on 0/05/2018.

<sup>156</sup> Interview with S15, a male citizen and (26-35) years, on 09/05/2018.

<sup>157</sup> Interview with S6, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 26/09/2018.

organisation and planning beyond the allotted time for the project (a year, for instance) or allocating *zakāt* funds to inappropriate projects is challenging for *zakāt* organisations. Supporting a project subject to environmental conditions such as floods or snow may not be possible in the time allowed, and supplying Qur'āns to beneficiaries who need agricultural tools, for example, may be declined. Charitable organisations in Qatar such as *Zakat Fund* do not only have a responsibility to observe the principles of their organisations (and indeed, government legislation), but also to satisfy the wishes of their donors as much as possible. This 'conditional' type of *zakāt* becomes a challenge for these organisations.

According to current observations, charitable organisations provide easy and accessible routes to beneficiaries living in remote areas of the world to receive *zakāt*. The activity of these organisations in Qatar is considerable. Based upon the lived experiences of these organisations, they are believed to be 'public squares' for the majority of Muslims, where givers and beneficiaries gather together.<sup>158</sup> Organisations act in a similar way to the environments of mosques: committing a prayer in a united manner in a mosque can be seen as a regular manifestation of Islāmic values in Muslim societies. Saleh and Baqutayan (2012) argue the act of uniting which follows the same religious conduct, is a behavioural pattern found in Islāmic societies, demonstrated by prayers in a mosque. One's behaviour in a mosque is familiar to everyone present, since each one is following the same religious principles. Charitable organisations are similar - the act of practising *zakāt* is visible to the public, whether one is a giver or beneficiary. This means secrecy is forfeited by these organisations which drives some of the *zakāt*-givers away from dealing with them. This reluctance could be attributed to a religious interpretation that the giving of *zakāt* should be discreet. The Qur'ān states:

'If you dispense your charity publicly, it is well; but if you conceal it and pay it to the needy in secret, it will be even better for you' (*Al-Baqara*, 2: 271).

Charitable organisations can be a source of arrogance and pride. This means the giver's presence in the place of charitable organisations, especially if he or she is a well-known personality, lead to boasting about the amount donated. This is highly prominent in Qatari society since it is characterised by competitive tribal culture which dominates other cultures.<sup>159</sup> Tribes compete between each other for titles, fame, prestige, popularity, and so on. This behaviour exists in Qatar society, confirmed by S14<sup>160</sup> who said:

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<sup>158</sup> Habermas (1991: 176) says, in its ideal form, the public sphere is 'made up of private people gathered together as a public and articulating the needs of society with the state'.

<sup>159</sup> See Chapter Four: Tribal and Other Cultures - Demographic Diversity.

<sup>160</sup> Interview with S14, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 17/07/2018.



There is a so-called charitable family fund, where they collect their donations for a period of time in the *majlis*, and then hand over the funds to an institution for the purpose of establishing a family project.

This is forbidden in the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*. The Qur'ān says:

‘... , So do not boastfully claim yourselves to be purified. He fully knows those that are truly God-fearing’ (*An-Najm*, 53: 32).

According to the *Ḥadīth*: ‘Iyad bin Himar reported: The Messenger of *Allah* said, ‘*Allah* has revealed to me that you should humble yourselves to one another. One should neither hold himself above another nor transgress against another’ (*Sahih Muslim* Book 32: *Hadith* 6264).

A lived religious framework shows that, in everyday practice, religion often varies from what is set out in its foundational texts. A culture of pride and competition has evolved around the giving and collection of *zakāt*, as S14 said. This demonstrates how religious practices can be distorted by individual and collective actions of a society, and the relationships between the two. It has been observed in this research that practices and individual behaviour vary significantly between governmental and non-governmental organisations.

## **7.2. Differences between Governmental and Non-governmental Charitable Organisations**

This section is an explanation and discussion on the daily processes of charitable organisations regarding the practice of *zakāt*. The section deals with governmental and non-governmental charitable organisations alike, in an effort to investigate the daily lives of the giver and beneficiary in their practice of *zakāt* with these organisations. The researcher also explores the interactions between organisations and the giver and beneficiary, and outlines the methods charitable organisations use in collecting and distributing *zakāt*. To achieve this, the researcher conducted eight interviews with non-governmental organisations. *Zakat* Fund, a governmental organisation, responded via e-mail. It did not allow any interviews with employees, and gave no reasons (see Appendix M). This was in addition to the researcher’s monitoring and observation through frequent visits to these organisations, with an interest in identifying and exploring the behavioural differences between governmental and non-governmental organisations regarding *zakāt*. Governmental organisations, represented by the *Zakat* Fund in this case, focused its projects inside Qatar, for instance, while charitable organisations such as Qatar Charity focus more on projects outside Qatar.

*Zakat* Fund (government charity) - researcher's observations. The headquarters of *Zakat* Fund is one of the largest buildings amongst charitable organisations in Qatar. Its structure

gives the impression of awe and prestige compared to other associations. This huge structure is the only one that represents the Qatari government in the direct mechanism of *zakāt* (see Figure 7.2 below).

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Figure 7.2: *Zakat* Fund Office building, Doha, Qatar

Source: <http://welcomeqatar.com/news/qatar-news/zakat-fund-allocates-qr-17-8-million-aid/attachment/zakat-fund-allocates-qr-17-8-million-aid-in-may/> [accessed 09/03/2020]

The building is divided into departments with separate entrances for men and women. The researcher is a female; consequently, she was only allowed to enter the women's department. This procedure was understandable and expected, since *Zakat* Fund's behaviour represents the Qatari identity that follows the *Hanbalī* school of thought (*Hukoomi* 2018b), which prefers men and women to be distinctly separated where possible (*Al-Missiri and Habdan* 2009). Tribalism in relation to this, as part of *Hanbalī* tribal identity in Qatari society, also prevents the presence of both genders in the same location (*Blanchard* 2014). This means, for instance, a husband or wife must delegate the responsibility for paying *zakāt* to the other, or they must perform *zakāt* separately, and follow the guidelines given such as which entrance to use. Gender separation for Qatari citizens in this case is an appropriate and normal concept; yet, for residents who make up the majority of Qatar's population, and come from other Islāmic denominations and cultures, gender division may create an unusual and uncomfortable atmosphere for them. Qatari residents represent the majority of Qatari society (*De Bel-Air* 2014). Their income is lower than Qatari citizens (*Al-Watan* 2016); neither the results of the survey nor the interviews for this research revealed that the residents objected to this separation.

It could be argued that objecting in this case would expose them to the danger of losing their job – ‘a dream come true’ for some.

The researcher noticed that religiously-based advertisements such as those which included Qur’ānic verses, and others which encouraged *zakāt* for international projects, were not as widespread in the reception area. compared to those of non-governmental organisations. The scarcity of advertisements at a governmental institution could be partly attributed to the fact that they are well-supported by the Qatari government. The researcher also observed that the charity’s administrative departments were distinctly separated between donating and receiving. A lack of direct communication between the administrative employees and the *zakāt*-givers or beneficiaries provided a sense of privacy for the work being completed within the organisation. This separation is intended to offer discretion and respect for both givers (who wish to pay privately) and beneficiaries (who wish to preserve their dignity and avoid embarrassment). This privacy concept, however, may also deprive the other givers of being able to display their power or to ‘show off’. This privacy is also extended to the institution’s employees regarding requests. They will arguably not be influenced by tribal customs or norms, connections, the network, or acquaintances, which could affect their work in terms of preferring one request over another.

There is a strong sense of social connection and community as the Qatari society is tribal. A Qatari citizen’s social circle can be small and close, due to this fact, meaning it is easy for people to recognise and identify each other. Identification is also disclosed by looking at the names of tribal families written on files located in the reception area. The *zakāt*-giver will not therefore be able to maintain secrecy when paying *zakāt*. The employee may also know him or her, and the amount paid for *zakāt*; in a competitive situation between tribes, this issue may cause embarrassment for a beneficiary, as his or her identity will also be exposed, and the information will probably be circulated among the tribes, in both examples.<sup>161</sup> This, in turn, could cause humiliation or further competition. If one works in the *zakāt* institution, and meets someone he or she knows, it can lead to bias, and may even influence the decision on whether or not a request is valid for *zakāt* funding. This acts as a significant challenge to the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar since many may be discouraged to donate in an attempt to avoid social embarrassment. It could transform *zakāt* into a competitive act which diminishes the true Islāmic intent of the practice.

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<sup>161</sup> See Chapter Four: Tribal and Other Cultures - Demographic Diversity.

It was also noted that the receptionist sits in an office, separated from the rest of the staff by a thick wall. It was the receptionist's duty to accommodate *zakāt* requests from citizens or residents. The researcher observed cases in which an elderly woman asked for financial assistance for domestic issues, and another woman requested monthly financial assistance, thus proving the above-mentioned points regarding lack of privacy. The cases submitted to the receptionist would be discussed internally to determine whether financial aid from the *Zakat* Fund should be considered or not. The researcher observed that the applicants seemed reluctant and embarrassed to ask for financial assistance, despite having a right to it, as stated in the Qur'ān (*At-Tauba*, 9: 103). The faint voice of the applicant, for example, could hardly be heard by the charity's employee. The applicant also continuously looked around, presumably fearing someone in the reception area would recognise her. There are many people in positions in which they are forced to claim financial aid, but there is still an attempt to preserve dignity and respect.<sup>162</sup> To preserve dignity and respect, *Zakat* Fund has launched a campaign named 'The Project of "You may think them to be wealthy ...." (the chaste families)'. This campaign is founded upon the Qur'ānic reference in the case of the poor:

'Those needy ones who are wholly wrapped up in the cause of *Allah*, and who are hindered from moving about the earth in search of their livelihood, especially deserve help. He who is unaware of their circumstances supposes them to be wealthy because of their dignified bearing, but you will know them by their countenance, although they do not go about begging from people with importunity. Whatever wealth you spend on helping them, *Allah* will know of it' (*Al-Baqara*, 2: 273).

The campaign has the responsibility of looking for and identifying such needy families to provide them with necessary assistance: their sense of independence prevents them from asking for help, despite their severe needs (*Zakat Fund* 2020). This will not prevent some cases of beneficiaries being presented in the offices of charitable organisations however; direct communication prevails between the beneficiaries and staff. It is remarkable that there is still no online application for *zakāt*-beneficiaries, despite Qatar being considered technologically advanced (Muhammad 2019). This issue did not appear in the data collection of this research; however, by using this method of application, it suggests that the beneficiary could avoid direct contact with the charity's staff members, and also the potential of embarrassment and loss of dignity. The use of technology to submit requests for assistance online, on the other hand, deprives the social benefits of direct communication between the giver and the beneficiary. The benefits of 'return gift', 'redistribution of wealth', and 'a good reputation among people'

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<sup>162</sup> See Chapter Six: Lived Experiences of *Zakāt*: Relationship between *Zakāt*-givers and Beneficiaries.

will be achieved according to the religious, social, and economic levels.<sup>163</sup> Social contact is required for the co-existence of people, feelings towards each other, and mutual understanding. The option to submit a request for assistance online, however, has its advantages. It avoids face-to-face contact for beneficiaries who feel embarrassed having to request financial assistance through direct communication with the staff of organisations or the giver.

It is quite difficult to distinguish between a citizen and resident in the reception area of charitable organisations. The languages the applicants use provide a clue: citizens speak uniform Qatari, and residents tend to speak in a dialect. The right to submit an application to the government-supported *Zakat* Fund is available to everyone, unlike other government departments such as hospital accident and emergency in which citizens receive priority. Citizens do not pay any taxes for education or health, for instance, in addition to the fact that they receive higher salaries than the residents. The *Zakat* Fund's example touches on the religious aspect in which the Prophet urges equality by not favouring an Arab over a foreigner or vice versa (*Musnad Ahmad* 22978, Grade: *Sahih*).

According to the lived experiences of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) with givers and beneficiaries of *zakāt*, the researcher visited the headquarters of some non-governmental charitable organisations such as Qatar Charity, Qatar Red Crescent, and Jassim and Hamad Bin Jassim Charity (see Figure 7.3 below). The difference between these charities and *Zakat* Fund was mainly the impression they gave on entering the buildings, and their structural organisation. The headquarters of these organisations are more minimalist compared to *Zakat* Fund. This means that, as a result of the multitude of diverse organisations, their sub-offices have been distributed more widely in the Qatari society than in the case of *Zakat* Fund.

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<sup>163</sup> See Chapter Two: *Zakāt's* Methodology: Givers and Beneficiaries According to Sociology of Islām, and Chapter Six: Qatari Lived Experience: A Religious Environment Impact on the Practice of *Zakāt*.

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Figure 7.3: Qatar Red Crescent, Doha, Qatar

Source: <https://www.qatarliving.com/forum/news/posts/qatar-red-crescent-turns-40-marks-occasion-colorful-celebrations> [accessed 09/03/2020]

The researcher noticed that there were many advertisements for projects abroad in the reception of the NGO offices. The NGOs used the same entrances for both men and women, in contrast to the gender-segregated entrances of *Zakat* Fund. Non-governmental charities are not expected to represent the Qatari identity, as *Zakat* Fund is in accordance with the *Ḥanbalī* school of thought. The NGOs' policy of gender integration was expected and understandable because they were not subject to the cultural demands of Qatar's *Ḥanbalī* interpretations.

Another difference lies in the focal point of the organisation. NGOs commonly pay attention to projects outside of Qatar. This may encourage residents to offer their *zakāt* to such countries in which the residents have connections through their backgrounds.<sup>164</sup> Their interest comes from the desires of the Qatari society, and the behaviour of organisations in marketing foreign projects. Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) consequently sympathised with the beneficiaries' situations in the relevant countries. According to the interview results, human sympathy and rapid response in humanitarian campaigns are among the characteristics of Muslims in Qatar.<sup>165</sup> The Qatari society is dominated by residents who have a continuous relationship with their families in their countries of origin. The Palestinian residents for example, sympathise more with the people of their war-stricken country; their support will be more focused on projects which are in Palestine than elsewhere. The residents' ties with their homelands were echoed in the survey results: 27 out of a total of 150 respondents -preferred to

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<sup>164</sup> See Chapter Four: Tribal and Other Cultures - Demographic Diversity.

<sup>165</sup> See Chapter Eight: The Desired *Zakāt*-Beneficiaries Category: *Zakāt*-Givers' Preferred Choice.

pay their *zakāt* abroad; this is significantly higher than the four citizen respondents who felt the same<sup>166</sup> (see Figure 7.4. below).




Figure 7.4: Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) *zakāt* payment preferences

The reason for the high percentage amongst Qatari residents is due to their lived experience which describes how family bonds are maintained through the connection to family members in their countries of origin. It was particularly noted that the NGOs did not reach the same level of activity by those asking for assistance as did *Zakat* Fund. This is due to *Zakat* Fund mainly focusing on projects within Qatar, and thus attracting more Qatari citizens and (some) residents.

Figure 7.4 also shows the high percentage of citizens compared to residents who prefer to pay *zakāt* for Qatari projects or beneficiaries. The affiliation of citizens to Qatar, and their trust in the *Zakat* Fund, is stronger because it represents the Qatari government. This was evident in the survey, in which 23 citizens out of a total of 150 respondents preferred to pay their *zakāt* in Qatar, compared to six resident respondents. The payment of *zakāt* is subject to the desires of *zakāt*-givers, according to their personal reasons: where their *zakāt* should go and whom it should benefit. The decision-making of *zakāt*-givers regarding where their money goes also affects the work of the organisations. It motivates the organisations to study how to attract *zakāt*-givers, and to provide them with the best options to ensure their *zakāt* is paid to their desired projects or beneficiaries.

There are some other issues concerning the behaviour of these non-governmental charities. The lived experience of NGOs shows the disproportionality of *zakāt* distribution

<sup>166</sup> See Appendix (I): I.2.6. Prefer Pay the *Zakāt* To...

between residents and citizens, and the projects based outside Qatar. C1<sup>167</sup> stated that the main donors state 60 per cent of their donations should go to citizens, and the remaining 40 per cent should go to residents. This was even though citizens do not need as much of the *zakāt* money as the residents. C1 also added:

The citizens have the priority, but, in terms of number, the residents are greater, and therefore actually receive a larger portion of the funds.

It might also be an indication of mismanagement of charitable organisations. The link between *zakāt* and poverty is founded on the religious belief such as *Ḥadīth* (*Al-Bukhari* and *Muslim* Book 8: *Hadith* 218) - *zakāt* eliminates poverty in a country.<sup>168</sup> It is probable that an imbalance or irregularity exists in the process of distributing *zakāt* in Qatar, contrary to Islāmic principles. There were many interviewees such as S7<sup>169</sup> and S19<sup>170</sup> who agreed with the above statement by the Prophet who stated that if *zakāt* money were correctly and justly distributed, it would include all Muslims in poverty.<sup>171</sup> The behaviour of this organisation regarding the inequality in the distribution of donations between the citizens and the residents is understood to be an attempt to preserve the presence of the Qatari citizens, especially as they are the minority. Pursuing this behaviour is also an extension of the government's behaviour in discriminating between citizens and residents such as emergency treatment in hospitals (as previously mentioned). Inequality and discrimination among the members of any society fuels negative feelings towards the 'other', especially (as in this case) if the issue concerns a religious aspect.

The charitable organisations' attention to *zakāt* is not limited to their presence in Qatari society (previously discussed). There are also international charitable organisations conducting *zakāt* from outside Qatar without offices in the nation. A fourth means by which Muslims in Qatar choose to pay *zakāt* is through charity representatives or intermediaries.

### 7.3. Charity Representatives or Intermediaries

The interview findings in this research indicated that Muslims in Qatar also pay their *zakāt* through 'charity representatives or intermediaries' apart from individual practice or through *Zakat* Fund and NGOs. The interview findings clarified that not all international charitable organisations have offices in Qatar at present - 2018; many formed links instead with

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<sup>167</sup> Interview with C1, a charity staff member, on 27/03/2018.

<sup>168</sup> See Chapter Eight: 'The Poor' Category: Muslims in Qatar Awareness of its Application.

<sup>169</sup> Interview with S7, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 01/06/2018.

<sup>170</sup> Interview with S19, a male citizen and (above 66 years), on 29/05/2018.

<sup>171</sup> See Chapter Eight: 'The Poor' Category: Muslims in Qatar Awareness of its Application.



internal Qatari charities and donors. According to the behaviour of international NGOs, direct communication between the *zakāt*-givers and international organisations such as UNHCR, UNOCHA, NRC and Islāmic Relief which operate outside Qatar, is carried out by people who represent these organisations within Qatari society. The donor, who is usually in direct contact with a charitable organisation, is a Qatari businessman (businesswoman) or citizen, and funds the organisation's projects in other parts of the world. Participant QA1<sup>172</sup> claimed that:

International charitable organisations send their representatives to work in the Qatari community. They often communicate with well-known Qatari businessmen [and women] to encourage them to pay *zakāt* to their organisations.

QA1 further added that such organisations are capitalising on the opportunity to access substantial funds accumulated by a wealthy Qatari society. This signifies the considerable amount of *zakāt* that is extracted from Muslims in Qatar, and is proven by sizeable international organisations seeking specific names in Qatari society. The names of entrepreneurs are clear in Qatari society through their commercial activities as owners of malls, for instance, and promoters of 'mega-investment' projects in the country. This supports the current literature review, which shows the potential advantages *zakāt* offers for international organisations in Qatar. The vast funding capacity of local organisations such as Qatar Charity indicates this prospect. This view provides great *zakāt* opportunities in which a fertile environment is strong for *zakāt* funding and activity. A feeling of mutual trust has developed, on the other hand, making the businessperson become a customer - a *zakāt*-giver of the organisation. Being the customer of the organisation is an advantage, as *zakāt* - in this case money - will be a guaranteed income for the organisation's operations. According to the researcher's observations, there are no contracts or agreements which bind the givers' loyalty to the organisation. The givers can withdraw from giving to the organisation at any time, but this is not ethically acceptable in Qatar society. It is a moral commitment between the two parties - a result of the Qatari social bond between its members according to tribal influence.

The other link of charity representatives or intermediaries is direct co-operation between international organisations (outside Qatar) and local organisations (inside Qatar), through representatives of the international organisations. A direct relationship is formed with the offices of these organisations over time. The researcher writes in other publications that, 'There is a partnership between Islāmic Relief and Qatar Charity that supports its projects in [the Gaza Strip]' (Alkahlout 2020: 85). She adds: 'Islāmic Relief Worldwide (IRW), The Qatar

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<sup>172</sup> Interview with QA1, an activist in Islamic donations, on 15/ 05/2018.

Red Crescent, Qatar Charity, and the Qatari Committee for Reconstruction have been heavily involved in supporting civil society organisation (CSO) projects and initiatives. Building the capacity of CSOs, for instance, is possible through income generation and livelihood projects (Alkahlout 2020: 85). This behaviour from a wealthy Islāmic state is expected by international organisations. QA1 added: ‘Organisations in Palestine, U.K., Pakistan, and so on, are sending delegates regularly to market their projects or to raise awareness of their work’ (see section below ‘The Marketing of *Zakāt*: Beyond Big Business’). These initiatives show that co-operation with local Qatari organisations can fund international organisations.

The co-operation between charitable organisations from inside and outside Qatar also satisfy the Qatari government, since these collaborations contribute to the use of Qatari soft power in the region and across the world.<sup>173</sup> Qatari Ministry of Development Planning and Statistics (MDPS) mentions that Qatar uses ‘soft power diplomacy initiatives in regional and international affairs’ (MDPS 2015: 9). Qatar could thus strengthen its position in the international community. *Zakāt*-supported initiatives could contribute to consolidate the image of Qatar as a good donor. This measure indicates that Qatar's use of soft (subtle) power has become a priority in its behaviour at both regional and global levels, to preserve its sovereignty, and to seek international public support. The practice of *zakāt* is now therefore observed to be both under the far-reaching terms of politicisation and religious application. This uncertainty between the religious and political concepts presents both opportunities and challenges for *zakāt*. Such co-operation between some charitable organisations and the Qatari government is both an opportunity and a challenge. It is an opportunity because it may attract *zakāt* donations due to promoting national pride. On the other hand, *zakāt* may be paid to support political agendas rather than being motivated solely by religious incentives. The government will intervene here in the path of *zakāt*, and distribute it according to its own interests rather than serving the religious goal of *zakāt*. The tireless and relentless work of Qatari charitable organisations concerning *zakāt* is, nevertheless, evident. These organisations have employed efficient methods of marketing *zakāt* through their collection and distribution strategies.

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<sup>173</sup> Soft power is ‘the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes one wants through attraction rather than coercion or payment. A country’s soft power rests on its resources of culture, values, and policies’ (NYE JR 2008: 94).

#### 7.4. The Marketing of *Zakāt*: Beyond Big Business

The findings agreed with the current literature in terms of charitable organisations using various methods to attract *zakāt*-givers, including the spreading of sub-offices, collection points and boxes, campaigns, and television reports. Advertisements on television adopted the use of humanitarian appeals by religious scholars to emphasise the (religious) importance of *zakāt* (Latibu 2016; *Hukoomi* 2018d; *Hukoomi* 2018e; and *Qatar Charity* 2018). The researcher debates these methods and others in this section which were discovered in the research, and used by charitable organisations in marketing *zakāt* in Qatar. These methods not only contributed to attracting *zakāt*-payers, but also showed to what extent Muslims in Qatar interact with them.

The behaviour of charitable organisations and *zakāt*-payers has a reciprocal effect, and offers opportunities and challenges to the practice of *zakāt*. An example is given here of a Qatari shopping mall. The location is frequented by many citizens and residents, where charitable organisations begin to persuade givers to practise *zakāt*, either in the car park or the entrance hall. The different charitable organisations worked to convince *zakāt*-givers to donate (see Figure 7.5 below). Stalls had been set up with a member of staff from a particular charity collecting *zakāt*, as well as fielding questions and enquiries from givers to explain the projects presented.




Figure 7.5: Collection points and pin boxes, Doha, Qatar

The behaviour of charitable organisations has shown - through the lens of lived experiences - that they have succeeded in creating an Islāmic environment illustrated by numerous features. A male staff member, for instance, characterised by traditional Islāmic dress and a beard, sat at the office representing his charitable institution to receive donations and questions. The conscious choice of a male representative is significant, yet understood, since a characteristic

of the Qatari tribal society is the patriarchal control over women.<sup>174</sup> Qatari traditional dress for men, the *thoub*, an ankle-length (usually) white garment, is similar to traditional Islāmic dress (Elshenawy 2017).<sup>175</sup> The choice of clothing alongside the traditional (Islāmic) beard aids in producing an Islāmic atmosphere, and thus positions the member of staff as a trusted authority in providing information about *zakāt*. This deliberate attempt to manifest an Islāmic environment was confirmed in the response of C2<sup>176</sup>:

Playing on religion in the collection of donations, especially during *Ramadān*, is excessive [as is] the use of advertisements, television, and media, and Muslim scholars as a means of collecting money.

It is understandable that the behaviour of charitable organisations is to create an Islāmic environment to attract donors in a country whose foundations are built on the Islāmic religion. This is one of the strongest motivations which encourage *zakāt*-givers to make their decisions, and thus fulfils a goal. Another example is the use of verses of encouragement and threats from the Qur'ān such as *Ar-Ra'd*, 13: 22-23, and *Al-i'Imran*, 3: 180. This method provides two options for the givers: Heaven or Hell.<sup>177</sup> The goal of charitable organisations, in this case, facilitates their expansion rather than spiritual practice. The advertisements that promote an Islāmic atmosphere undermines its value and confidence for some Muslims in Qatar. The result creates a *zakāt* opportunity to practice; however, the possible loss of conviction amongst Muslims in Qatar could reduce the practice of *zakāt*. The persistent attempt to produce an Islāmic atmosphere through methods such as collection boxes and advertisements has been normalised in society, and has become a passive thought to the *zakāt*-giver rather than an active one (charity fatigue). Muslims in Qatar will become accustomed to seeing collection boxes, and appeals to practice *zakāt*. This behaviour may push Muslims in Qatar to ignore these stimuli which would thus create a challenge to the practice of *zakāt*.

These methods do not collect large amounts of money for *zakāt* as they target shoppers' surplus money, as S6<sup>178</sup> stated. They will certainly continue to be a part of their collection strategy, however, as they not only achieve their objective in marketing the name of the organisation, but also educate potential donors about projects and initiatives. This policy

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<sup>174</sup> See Chapter Six: The Impact of the Qatari Society's Tribal Nature and the Cultural Background on the Lived Experience of Muslims in Qatar in Practice of *Zakāt*.

<sup>175</sup> 'Thoub is a cultural custom of Qatar. Men are wearing the thoub to indicate their cultural beliefs. It is worn by Qatari men to honour their culture. [...] cut along the lines of a shirt which reaches to the ground. [...] choosing fabrics in different shades of white, of fibres or weaves. The wearer is allowed to choose the shape of the collar, the buttons & the cuffs' (*Qatar Culture Club* 2011).

<sup>176</sup> Interview with C2, a charity staff member, on 25/09/2018.

<sup>177</sup> See Chapter Two: Interrogating Religious Motivations.

<sup>178</sup> Interview with S6, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 26/09/2018.

nevertheless shows that charitable organisations create an Islāmic environment which branches out into two parts: the religious aspect, and the social aspect (as previously discussed). It therefore means that *zakāt*-givers pay their *zakāt* owing to the strong influence and persuasion of the charitable organisations.

Another factor that contributed to persuading givers to donate is the Internet. Once the search for the word ‘*zakāt*’ has been triggered on the Internet, all advertisements, humanitarian campaigns, and projects will ‘pop up’. It seems that the donor is being targeted from every direction by the behaviour of charitable organisations. Those ‘pop-ups’ continually appear in the giver's daily life which may cause charity fatigue, or worse, the giver avoids or denies *zakāt*. Figure 7.6 below is an example of how charitable organisations use advertising to persuade *zakāt*-givers to donate through the Internet.




Figure 7.6: Qatar Charity website

Source: <https://www.qcharity.org/en/qa> [accessed 09/03/2020]

Figure 7.6 displays a photograph of a child on the Qatar Charity website, a large *zakāt* institution. The depiction is used to encourage compassion and thus prompt donations. This image was found in Winter 2019/20. The photograph shows that children require shelter and warm accommodation, and calls for donations to achieve this goal (and bring a smile to the child's face). A child is seen lying on a mattress in an abandoned and dark environment which appears to be unsuitable and dirty. The child is sleeping in a place like a store. The environment around reflects the lack of the basics of life such as a washing area, clean water, electricity, and some sort of security - in the twenty-first century! The mattress in the middle of the room with lighting from a greenhouse is a symbol of poverty and abandonment which can be resolved

through *zakāt* donations. The image is designed to present a sense of social responsibility to help those in need, and to better the life of a child who is experiencing hardship. The website's icons appear at the front of the image such as the 'Donate' icon, found in capital letters at the top right-hand-side, whilst a 'Quick Donate' icon is located at the left of the image. The consistent use of the donate option gives the impression that giving *zakāt* is an easy process, emphasised by the ability to 'Quick Donate' - something that could not be done in previous Islāmic societies due to technological limitations. This explanation, together with the urgency created, leaves little excuse for the viewer to avoid paying *zakāt*. The photograph is not only designed to promote religious motivations to the giver, but also has an effect on human emotions, especially images relating to children. The 'Urgent Help' hyperlink is, furthermore, distinct and large, whilst the 'Live Chat' option is found discreetly at the bottom right of the screen. The user is given multiple ways to pay his or her *zakāt*. This produces a sense of urgency, calling the viewer to act promptly, and to commit to his or her religious duties. Questions can be answered through the 'Live Chat' feature to seek advice, similar to the way they would be asked in a real office. Payment methods for *zakāt* are available in many ways, which leave no excuses not to pay *zakāt*. The employment of various devices to create an environment that persuades *zakāt*-giving in Qatar has become a behavioural pattern of Qatari charitable organisations.

A Qatari may approve of this method, as it not only highlights an international cause and unified struggle, but also assists in the search for *zakāt*-beneficiaries, and thus linking them to other societies. This suggests that excessive pressure is being used to urge Qatari *zakāt*-givers to donate. These methods, however, are met with some criticism. S6<sup>179</sup> shared his negative experience with Qatari charities:

They used a lot of undesirable requests for donation. They used leaflets and SMS, which is causing discomfort and annoyance, and also pushed to pay individual *zakāt* [contributions].

This advertisement 'attack' creates a contradiction between *zakāt* as a spiritual practice and as big business. The behaviour of charitable organisation has become similar to merchants in which they market their goods which are projects. Pictures of the needy, including the child above, are representations which promote these projects. Competition will be high between one organisation and another in promoting their projects to a wealthy Islāmic society. The offer of the goods exists and is waiting for a response from a giver.

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<sup>179</sup> Interview with S6, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 26/09/2018.

This analysis of charitable organisations may not be to the liking of many Muslims: underestimating the feelings regarding the value of charitable work will be hard to accept by a Muslim society and identity such as Qatar. The cruelty of marketing strategies (photographs of homeless children), and the compelling way charitable organisations present their projects have left negative emotions in the hearts of some Muslims in Qatar such as S6 and S15. S15<sup>180</sup> said:

In making a decision, I do not trust radio, television, social media, or advertisements and newspapers, because they come according to the feelings and emotions of the publisher, director and others, so their campaigns are not sincere.

The advertisements used Qur'ānic verses and *Ḥadīth* to urge individuals to practise *zakāt* and to donate in any Islāmic form. The advertisements also capitalise on the humanitarian aspect to convey the intentions of the projects - many of the images used are of disaster-struck areas where there have been wars, famine, environmental or natural disasters. This finding matches the current literature (Burnett 2002: 113; Erlandsson, Nilsson, and Västfjäll (2018); Willis (n.d)).<sup>181</sup> The behaviour of charitable organisations in persuading and attracting givers via the Internet has also created a negative atmosphere, in addition to advertisements in public places. The use of 'shocking' or disturbing imagery in advertisements, ultimately shows the balance between reward and punishment for *zakāt* in Qatari society. Psychological stress, from one perspective, is felt through the realism of the images, prompting *zakāt*-givers to feel guilty if they ignore the appeal. Projects appealing to potential *zakāt*-givers utilise two approaches to marketing - the religious aspect and the human aspect. These methods encourage guilty feelings, and work on the consciences of the givers. This also becomes a challenge to the practice of *zakāt*. Using Qur'ānic verses, on the other hand, provides a reminder to *zakāt*-givers of its religious significance. The advertisements also educate givers about beneficiaries who need support around the world, and thus do not isolate the cause to Qatar. A positive viewpoint of advertisements provides a kind of reward by reminding the givers about *zakāt*'s application to worldwide beneficiaries of *zakāt*. This ultimately makes the process of searching and verifying the issue easier for the giver, encouraging distribution of *zakāt* to the highest possible number of beneficiaries around the globe.

*Zakāt*-givers are aware of the marketing efforts of organisations, although they remain sceptical of such efforts. Charitable organisations may use promotional methods or 'tricks' to attract *zakāt*-givers to donate, they also require funds for employees' salaries, for instance, and therefore, these organisations also consist of departments that specialise in raising funds for

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<sup>180</sup> Interview with S15, a male citizen and (26-35) years, on 09/05/2018.

<sup>181</sup> See Chapter Four: Qatar Charities: *Zakāt* Collection Methods and Qatari Response.

this purpose. Modern technology provides easy access to information which enables the Qatari to check and verify the information. This access allows the Muslims in Qatar to have a greater awareness of what is occurring around them. An instance of this is the awareness Muslims in Qatar have, and whether they trust televised media or not. One survey respondent commented, ‘Television is a tool [for] those who pay more money unless it is owned by an official body that desires good’. S7<sup>182</sup> added ‘Television is now driven by specific powers’, while S13<sup>183</sup> explained why she trusts the Qatari channel: ‘There are eyewitnesses on these matters, and I phone them to make sure’. These examples show that some Muslims in Qatar do not always believe everything presented to them, and their analysis of events reflects their awareness of the possible deception they present; besides, the efforts of charitable organisations do not always persuade the majority of Muslims in Qatar, as reflected in the survey results<sup>184</sup> (see figure 7.7 below).




Figure 7.7: Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) respondents’ trust in campaigns and advertisements to pay *zakāt*

The survey showed 48 out of a total of 140 respondents decided to make payments based on the campaigns and advertisements. Media reports influenced 70 out of a total of 141 respondents, and humanitarian appeals persuaded 76 out of a total of 147 respondents. The

<sup>182</sup> Interviews with S7, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 01/06/2018.

<sup>183</sup> Interview with S13, a female resident and (36-45) years, on 15/05/2018.

<sup>184</sup> See Appendix (I): I.3.5. Advertisements, I.3.3. Media Reports, and I.3.7. Humanitarian Appeals



latter may be more attractive to *zakāt*-givers because they relate to the current events in the giver's mind. Empathy is more readily triggered, in this case, especially when the appeals are presented by Muslim scholars (discussed below). It is unsurprising that these organisations behave in this way to attract *zakāt*-givers. Survey interviewees felt this practice should not be conducted in the name of religion because it places excessive demands on the donors.

Charitable organisations themselves are subjected to negative experiences from *zakāt*-givers, since they have little freedom concerning their own projects and initiatives. *Zakāt* distribution has become a balancing act between the donors' desires and the international community's needs; since *zakāt*-givers specify where they wish their money should go, the charitable organisations must abide by their wishes (as much as possible), and put aside their own or preferred projects. A problem arises when initiatives for those in need may be restricted to make way for the donors' desires, even if they are considered less important. C8<sup>185</sup> gave an example:

In Sudan, they are in need of agricultural projects such as opening up land for planting, but the money sent is used to build mosques. The other side of the coin is that countries in crisis or in need are 'shocked' by donors' desires.

C8 added that most of the conditional or more desirable projects are digging wells, printing copies of the Qur'ān, building mosques, and sponsorship of orphans – thus agreeing with C3<sup>186</sup> and C5<sup>187</sup>. Choosing the orphans project, for instance, is related to a religious motivation as mentioned in Qur'ān.

Those who, for the love of Him, feed the needy, and the orphan, and the captive (*Ad-Dahr*, 76: 8).

This indicates that the majority of Muslims in Qatar follow Islāmic teachings, including practising *zakāt*, although it also means that focusing on specific projects will not cover the needs of the rest of society. McLaren and Qonita (2019) explain that in Indonesia the religious incentive for orphan projects, which is of more interest for the *zakāt*-givers, has forced many poor parents to send their children to orphanages, which become forms of modern-day slavery. Redirecting *zakāt* funds towards supporting parents in poverty to care for their children, therefore becomes as important as the issue of orphans.

S16<sup>188</sup> added: 'Each country has its own case; for example, in Palestine, we find a lot of orphans. Thus, the categories must be distributed according to the particular needs of

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<sup>185</sup> Interview with C8, a charity staff member, on 18/07/2018.

<sup>186</sup> Interview with C3, a charity staff member, on 03/05/2018.

<sup>187</sup> Interview with C5, a charity staff member, on 17/07/2018.

<sup>188</sup> Interview with S16, a male resident and (18-25) years, on 15/05/2018.

countries'. S16's approach would suit the *zakāt*-beneficiaries far more than following *zakāt*-givers' desires. According to Muslim scholars such as Al-Qaradawi (1999: 11), the interpretation of the two verses: 'and in their wealth there was a rightful share for him who would ask and for the destitute' (*Az-Zariyat*, 51: 19); and 'those in whose wealth there is a known right, for those that ask and those that are dispossessed' (*Al-Ma'arij*, 70: 24-25) gives the poor the right to the money of the wealthy, or the *zakāt* of the rich rightfully belongs to the poor. This means that the priority for *zakāt* funds should be in the interests of the poor, and not according to the desires of the donors.

The relationship in rights between the giver and the beneficiary is attributed to the religious influence on Muslims in Qatar, as they may perceive their desires regarding *zakāt* as projects which are endearing, and would yield good sanctions from *Allah* and His Prophet. A Qatari individual's choice in selecting projects based on Islāmic teachings can be a direct result of religious propaganda used in the marketing of charitable organisations. Their behaviour is of a reciprocal nature, showing that charitable organisations play on the religious chords of donors, which consequently 'backfire' or negatively affect the organisations. The behaviour of charitable organisations directly and indirectly affects which projects and initiatives are implemented, causing less significant causes to be undertaken, and thus straying from the Qurānic intention of *zakāt*. This tendency represents a considerable challenge to *zakāt* application and practice. The first tendency is to try to honour the giver's desire at the expense of the needs of beneficiaries. The second tendency is to market the preferred projects of charitable organisations, despite the more urgent needs of beneficiaries. This behaviour of charitable organisations can facilitate an opportunity, as it makes the practice of *zakāt* easy and accessible, while consistently reminding Muslims in Qatar of their religious duty. The reciprocal relationship between Qatari *zakāt*-givers and charitable organisations can be illustrated by their dependence on one another. *Zakāt*-givers need charitable organisations to distribute their donations to beneficiaries through various projects; on the other hand, *zakāt* institutions cannot operate or move forward with initiatives except through donations from the *zakāt*-payers.

A mutual relationship is also found between Qatari Muslims and the Muslim scholars in whom they place great trust, whilst the scholars feel a professional duty and social responsibility to spread the awareness of Islāmic concepts, including *zakāt*, amongst Muslims in Qatar. Islāmic scholars have often used a biased approach towards *zakāt*, based on their partisan and religious affiliations and schools of thought. This has ultimately caused *zakāt*-

givers to support a specific beneficiary category, according to what they have been taught by their particular scholar. This partisan or religious affiliation constrains the knowledge about the freedom of choice a Qatari has. The behaviour of *zakāt* institutions, and the bias of Islāmic scholars has proved to be an obstacle to *zakāt* application. The mutual relationship in both cases may have nurtured the religious environment around *zakāt* in Qatar, but, it has also provided an opportunity to encourage the practice and application of *zakāt*, even though the motives or goals may be different.

### 7.5. The Role of Eminent Scholars in Qatari *Zakāt* Practice

The diversity of the Qatari demographics - citizens and residents, gender and age groups - well as the *Sunnah* and *Shī'ah* sects, has brought a rise in faith leaders or sheikhs of various schools of thought who encourage different belief systems. The role of religious scholars, from an Islāmic society perspective, is to issue *fatawā* (plural of *fatwā*) – rulings - on matters concerning permitted or rejected acts (Al-Qaradaghi interview with *Al-Raya* 2012). The findings revealed that Qatar society has several religious authoritative and advisory bodies regarding *zakāt*. These bodies are in relation to individual judgment, business religious advisors, and the religious advisors of Qatar charitable organisations. This knowledge was confirmed by many of the respondents such as QA2<sup>189</sup>, and QA1<sup>190</sup> who said:

Some businessmen have confidence in these charitable organisations' religious advisors, although they [may also] have their own religious advisor for consultation on *zakāt*.

Findings in the research highlighted that Muslim faith-leaders play an additional role relevant to *zakāt*. The function of *Muftī* or jurisprudence scholars are not limited to issuing *fatawā* or religious rulings about *zakāt*: their role also extends to encouraging Muslims to pay *zakāt*. Muslim scholars are urged to remind the Muslims in Qatar of the significance of *zakāt* practice. The methodology of reminding and raising awareness of Muslim scholars regarding the diversity in the practice of *zakāt* in Qatari society is thus considered an opportunity for *zakāt*. and the continuity of its practice; on the other hand, religious leaders have different Islāmic scholarly backgrounds and different affiliations. Every religious leader wants to prove his (or her) point of view by persuading the *zakāt*-givers to pay their *zakāt* to a specific type of

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<sup>189</sup> Interview with QA2, an activist in Islamic donations, on 20/07/2018.

<sup>190</sup> Interview with QA1, an activist in Islamic donations, on 15/05/2018.

beneficiary according to personal desires. The religious leaders use their own interpretations of the concept to support their argument. C8<sup>191</sup> explained:

Donations are divided according to [political] affiliations: [The] Muslim Brotherhood donates to Qatar Charity, [The] *Salafi* movement donates to the *Eid* Charity, and the in-between donate to RAF Foundation.

This quote shows that it is not always possible for a Muslim scholar's position to remain fully neutral, emphasising how Muslim scholars may challenge the practice of *zakāt* in Qatari society. Speeches on *zakāt*, typically given by male Muslim scholars who work for Qatari charitable organisations, usually conclude by praising the organisation for which he works. The findings showed that it is quite common practice in Qatari society for such speeches to be promoted on television programmes, the radio, and other news media. QA1 and QA2 confirmed this. QA1 said: 'Charities use religious celebrities to urge the Qatari to pay the *zakāt*'. It is understood that one of the tasks of the scholars or preachers is to encourage Muslims to perform their Islāmic duties – in this case, *zakāt*.

This form of promotion is, however, for the benefit of a particular organisation. The *Muftī* is an employee who uses his religious status or rank based on his reputation. It seems in effect, they are *zakāt* lobbyists, in which the *Muftī* practices his own method of pressuring *zakāt*-givers to donate to the organisation for which the *Muftī* works. The religious leaders similarly use their interpretation to bolster their personal argument. This means that manipulation of religion is used in the practice of *zakāt*; furthermore, *zakāt* here also falls under the heading of 'trade'. The distribution and collection of *zakāt* consequently faces a challenge because of the bias of scholars. Transparency and religious impartiality in such contexts are compromised – an attitude forbidden in Islāmic teachings - and will have a direct effect on Muslims in Qatar decision-making regarding paying their *zakāt*. The probable consequences are echoed in the interviews, with S11<sup>192</sup> agreeing with S2<sup>193</sup>. S11 said 'There is a prior experience that caused the loss of confidence in Muslim scholars. They have two sides [like] a hypocrite'. She explained that she does not trust some of the Muslim scholars because their speeches are politicised or affiliated with a certain party at the expense of others. S19<sup>194</sup>, on the other hand, expressed his full confidence in Muslim scholars. This state of distrust and trust amongst the interviewees also resonated in the survey<sup>195</sup> (see figure 7.8. below).

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<sup>191</sup> Interview with C8, a charity staff member, on 18/07/2018.

<sup>192</sup> Interview with S11, a female citizen and (18-25) years, on 08/05/2018.

<sup>193</sup> Interview with S2, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 29/05/2018

<sup>194</sup> Interview with S19, a male citizen and (above 66 years), on 29/05/2018.

<sup>195</sup> See Appendix (I): I.3.6. Calls from Muslim Scholars.




Figure 7.8: Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) trust and mistrust of calls from Muslim scholars

According to the survey, 97 Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) out of a total of 143 respondents placed their trust in calls from Muslim scholars. The research confirmed the importance of Muslim scholars in influencing a Qatari individual's decision-making. This shows that, on one hand, Muslim scholars in Qatar have an important religious responsibility to remind and educate the Muslims in Qatar about the need to pay *zakāt*; they are also a means of convincing and attracting *zakāt* payers, on the other. This means that the influence of Muslim scholars on the practice of *zakāt* is an opportunity for *zakāt*. The political or functional (career) bias of the organisation to which Muslim scholars are affiliated, or the scholars' own personal prejudice as an outcome of sectarian or ethnic affiliation, however, contribute to a challenge in the practice of *zakāt*. The position of Muslim scholars in the Muslim community occupies an important position: their influences resonate in the behaviour of the society. Society relies on the management of its religious affairs through the interpretations of Muslim scholars. Muslim scholars are considered to be the connecting line between Muslims and their understanding and awareness of their religion. Muslim scholars also have to appreciate this esteemed position in which they are held among the ordinary people. These scholars are considered by society to be bearers of a religious responsibility on behalf of *Allah*, which must be preserved.

The reciprocal effect of Muslim scholars and Muslims in Qatar awareness of *zakāt*-beneficiaries is also apparent through the interpretations between traditional and classical ideology, and those who extend the meaning of *zakāt* to (modern) applications in contemporary society. This will be the focus of the next chapter (Chapter Eight).

## 7.6. Summary

This chapter has focused on the lived experiences of charitable organisations regarding the practice of *zakāt*. These charitable organisations in Qatar were identified and studied, particularly the extent of trust and interaction between them and Qataris. The differences between governmental and non-governmental charitable organisations in the daily life of a giver or beneficiary were explored and analysed. The researcher investigated the methods charitable organisations use in the collection and distribution of *zakāt*. The chapter presented a fourth direction of *zakāt* payment through international charity representatives or intermediaries. The level of interest these organisations showed in *zakāt* in Qatar was illustrated from both sides: either through direct communication between international organisations and well-known Qatari businessmen (and businesswomen), or between international and local organisations in Qatar to support projects outside of Qatar.

Observations have been made on the various techniques used by charitable organisations to attract *zakāt*-givers such as spreading sub-offices, and collection points and boxes. How religion was manipulated through the creation of an Islāmic environment has been explored. Examples of the employees' dress code in the malls, and the Qur'ānic verses attached to advertisements and campaigns were presented to underpin the Islāmic message. Muslim scholars were among the causative factors of *zakāt* opportunities; yet they were also the cause of distorting the practice of *zakāt* through the bias of their religious or political affiliations or personal convictions.

Chapter Eight which follows, is the third part of the analysis and discussion of this research, and looks at the results of previous analyses and discussions in chapters Six and Seven: how the lived experiences of Qatari individuals and charitable organisations in the practice of *zakāt* have affected *zakāt*-beneficiaries. Chapter Eight addresses *zakāt*-beneficiaries and lived experiences of *zakāt* through two sections: desired and 'controversial' *zakāt*-beneficiaries.

## CHAPTER EIGHT

### The Interpretations of *Zakāt*-Beneficiaries: Opportunities and Challenges

#### 8.0 Introduction

This chapter is the third part of the analysis and discussion chapters. It is complemented by the previous chapters which provided an analysis and discussion on the influences of theological and sociological aspects on the practice of *zakāt* in contemporary Qatar 2017-2020, taking into consideration each of the research questions. This chapter is divided into two sections: the first one addresses the concept of *zakāt*-givers' desired or preferred *zakāt*-beneficiaries, and the second one focuses on what this researcher calls 'controversial *zakāt*-beneficiaries' whom Muslims in Qatar prefer or choose not to support, and the related challenges.

Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who wish to pay *zakāt* to their preferred (or desired) categories facilitates an opportunity for *zakāt*. The problems which arise in applying *zakāt* according to their awareness and interpretations, however, raise complications for *zakāt* in terms of each giver's interpretation of the desired category of *zakāt*-beneficiaries. This section is an analysis and discussion on each of these desired *zakāt*-beneficiary categories<sup>196</sup> and complexities:

- i. 'The poor' category, and Muslims in Qatar awareness of its application;
- ii. 'People burdened with debt' category, and the double standards between Qatari citizens and residents; and
- iii. Application to 'the needy' and 'the wayfarer or stranded traveller' categories: social solidarity ('*Ummah*) and humanitarian aid.

The second section focuses on 'controversial' *zakāt*-beneficiaries whom Muslims in Qatar prefer not to support, and the related challenges. This chapter also explores each of the categories and the challenges which have arisen such as:

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<sup>196</sup> *Zakāt*-beneficiaries are: 'the poor,' 'the needy,' 'the alms collectors and administrators,' 'the reconciliation of hearts,' 'people in bondage or slavery,' 'people burdened with debt,' 'for the cause of *Allah*', and 'the wayfarer or stranded traveller'. See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* Mechanism: Distribution According to Eight Categories of *Zakāt*-beneficiaries.

- i. 'The alms for collectors and administrators' category between the behaviour of Qatari charitable organisations and *zakāt*-givers conditional projects;
- ii. 'The people in bondage or slavery' category and misunderstandings and mistranslations;
- iii. 'The reconciliation of hearts' category and tolerance and religious intolerance; and
- iv. 'For the cause of *Allah*' category and the politicisation of *zakāt*.

This chapter complements the previous chapter by paying attention to all the key themes which emerged from the research, but focused more on the theological influences in practising *zakāt* in Qatar. These included:

- i. Qatari's lack of awareness of the concept of the beneficiaries of *zakāt*;
- ii. The confusion that exists between the traditional and modern interpretations of *zakāt*; and
- iii. The different interpretations and mistranslations of the beneficiaries' category of *zakāt*.

The sociological influences on practising *zakāt* in Qatar also played a part in the decision-making of *zakāt*-givers. The Qatari society's wealth, generosity, and religious commitment were strong social and religious motivations. The politicisation of *zakāt* practice in contemporary Qatar, however, had an effect on the collection and distribution of *zakāt*. The Qatari government placed collection and distribution restrictions on *zakāt* institutions for political reasons. *Zakāt*-givers were also divided in their understanding of the various interpretations of beneficiary categories such as 'for the cause of *Allah*' and its military use.

### **8.1. The Desired *Zakāt*-Beneficiaries Category: *Zakāt*-Givers' Preferred Choice**

Qatari society's characteristics and behaviour in its religious commitments and its wealth (discussed in the literature review and the previous chapters) has created an environment in which *zakāt* is highly encouraged and actively practised by a high percentage of Muslims in Qatar. This is often (but not always) motivated by religion such as trade and reward with *Allah*, preparing for the Afterlife, and Qatari culture.<sup>197</sup> A lived religion viewpoint shows that *zakāt* is now embedded as a cultural practice, even for those Qataris who are not 'religious'. The researcher has also uncovered inequalities and double standards in relation to the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. The focus of the analysis and discussions in this chapter will be on each

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<sup>197</sup> See Chapter Six: Qatari Lived Experience: A Religious Environment Impact on the Practice of *Zakāt*.



beneficiary category. One of the themes which emerged from this study is the Qatari society's generosity and quick response to humanitarian appeals.

The analysis of the interview findings revealed that Qataris are quick to respond generously, and to observe their *zakāt* duty. S11<sup>198</sup> said: 'Qatari culture is known for its kindness and generosity'. C6<sup>199</sup> agreed with S11: 'The Qatari are very generous indeed [...] which means that [Qatar] is the refuge for anyone in need'. QA1<sup>200</sup>, an activist in Islāmic donations, believed Qatari response or sympathy for humanitarian calls for action were high in such appeals as 'Relieve Aleppo' and 'For Brothers and Sisters in Humanity'.<sup>201</sup> QA1 said '[The] Qatari is generous and compassionate - an example of this is Aleppo [18th of December 2016] - from 8 p.m. to 12 a.m., US\$200 million has been raised for charities'. Religious commitment, wealth, and generosity are enough to realise a fertile environment for *zakāt* to be practised for years to come. This characteristic of generosity and quick response to humanitarian appeals has strengthened and enhanced the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. The Islāmic identity and environment, and the religious commitment of givers, encourage many Muslims in Qatar to pay their *zakāt*. This makes Qatar society attractive to local and international charitable organisations to establish a relationship with the Qataris (see previous chapter Seven). The characteristic of generosity and responsiveness can be exploited, however, in a way that does not serve the purposes of the religious aspect of *zakāt* practice. The behaviour of Qatari charitable organisations, for instance, has created a contradiction between *zakāt* as a spiritual practice, and *zakāt* as 'big business'. The selection of Qatar thus became an ideal model to study the effect of religious and social factors in the practice of *zakāt*.

The four 'desired' or preferred *zakāt*-beneficiary categories are 'the poor'; 'the needy'; 'people burdened with debt', and 'the wayfarer or stranded traveller'. The desired *zakāt*-beneficiaries are the ones which Qatari *zakāt*-payers willingly support, and which are promoted without hesitation. The encouragement Muslims in Qatar are given to pay *zakāt* to these four beneficiary categories is an opportunity to practice *zakāt*; however, the preference for one beneficiary over another has created a challenge. Non-practising or ignoring the beneficiary

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<sup>198</sup> Interview with S11, a female citizen and (18-25) years, on 08/05/2018.

<sup>199</sup> Interview with C6, a charity staff member, on 27/03/2018.

<sup>200</sup> Interview with QA1, an activist in Islamic donations, on 15/05/2018.

<sup>201</sup> The target was to raise funds 'for brothers and sisters in humanity' for both Muslims and non-Muslims. This campaign intended to provide relief for 300,000 refugees in six countries: Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, and Bangladesh, in addition to Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar. The first two hours of this campaign received 24,750 million Qatari riyals (US\$6.8 million) (*Al-Sharq* 2019). See Chapter Four: Qatar Charities: *Zakāt* Collection Methods and Qatari Response.

category wastes an opportunity that can be gained in the application options for *zakāt*. The research interviews, moreover, revealed that these four beneficiaries also had an element of challenge in the practice of *zakāt*. The opportunities and challenges for these four desirable beneficiary categories feature both positive and negative outcomes. There are three reasons behind the discrimination of the desire to support these four beneficiaries of *zakāt*: (i) to satisfy the religious commitment of givers; (ii) to provide a possible resolution to some problems which arise from lack of funding, or to end the suffering caused by events such as conflicts and poverty; and (iii) to represent the humanitarian feelings Qataris have towards other people in crisis. The first beneficiaries who were affected by the givers' desires, and their level of awareness of the meaning of *zakāt* are 'the poor'.

### 8.1.1. 'The Poor' Category: Muslims in Qatar Awareness of its Application

The significance of a Qatari's beliefs in Islāmic teachings on *zakāt* application was evident in the interviewees' responses. They presented strong support for 'the poor' category in solving the poverty problem - a notion synonymous with the teachings of the Qur'ān. The Qur'ān says:

So, eat of it and feed the distressed and the poor (*Al-Hajj*, 22: 28).

'The poor' beneficiary is the 'one whose wealth and income are far from satisfying his or her essential needs' (Al-Qaradawi 1999: 345). S7<sup>202</sup> particularly agreed with this belief in that *zakāt* can help to solve the poverty problem: '*Zakāt* should go to the poor in order to end the poverty cycle'. The link between *zakāt* and poverty is a religious belief. Ibn Abbas reported:

The Messenger of *Allah* said: [...] if they obey you, tell them that *Allah* has made the payment of *Zakat* obligatory upon them. It should be collected from their rich and distributed among their poor' (*Al-Bukhari* and *Muslim* Book 8: *Hadith* 218).

The interviewees also affirmed that if *zakāt* money were correctly and justly distributed, it would cover all the needs of poor Muslims; some of the respondents went even further, and said it should also include all the poor people in the whole world, regardless of their faith – a concept promoted by the 'Brothers and Sisters in Humanity' group. They also derived that notion from the Prophet's cousin, Ali Ibn Abi Talib, who declared that *Allah* instructs the rich Muslims to give from their wealth as much as the poor may need (Al-Bayhaqi 1997). This

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<sup>202</sup> Interview with S7, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 01/06/2018.

shows that *zakāt*, as a religious obligation, would go a long way towards bridging the inequality gap between rich and poor.

This means that Muslims in Qatar believe that the rich in society have the ability to cover all the needs of the poor in the same society. When a Qatari sees a poor person for instance, he or she may believe that the rich class is ‘miserly’ regarding the payment of *zakāt*. The ‘poor’ beneficiary may feel resentment towards the rich, on the other hand, especially if the poor beneficiary believes in the verse of *Al-Ma'arij*, 70: 24-25: ‘the poor have a right to the wealth of the rich’. This may explain why *Zakat* Fund is interested in projects which specialise in helping the poor, the needy, and those burdened with debt (see Appendix M: *Zakat* Fund Responses). S19<sup>203</sup> also said: ‘It’s better to give *zakāt* to the poor because poverty is the cause of all problems and sickness - if poverty [were] a man, I [would] kill him’. Here, S19 derived his statement from Ali Ibn Abi Talib’s quotes (Yousef 2011: 30). This strong sentiment by S19 reflects the increased poverty in the Middle East since the Arab Uprisings.<sup>204</sup> The large number of people who were (are being) displaced or deprived of their basic needs such as their homes, incomes, and security, escalated as a result of the continuing conflicts and wars in the region. The rising poverty in the surrounding countries becomes both an opportunity for *zakāt* and a justification for the behaviour of Qatari residents. The relatives of residents, especially from Egypt, Yemen, and Syria, constantly request financial support from their relatives in Qatar.

Muslims in Qatar who follow the teachings of Islām by paying attention to the poor, have had a clear impact in creating an environment to facilitate the support of ‘the poor’ category; however, many individual Muslims in Qatar are not aware of who is listed under ‘the poor’ category. Sixty-five per cent of survey interviewees, including S13<sup>205</sup> and S20<sup>206</sup> believed that Muslims in Qatar do not need *zakāt* assistance, as Qatar is populated by rich people. They believe if poverty does exist in Qatar, it will not be as bad as in other countries. S13 said: ‘I pay my *zakāt* outside Qatar because I think that rich people in Qatar will help the poor ones’.

S20 contradicts himself. He appears to be aware of the eight categories of *zakāt*, yet he is not prepared to accept poverty also exists in Qatar. He says charity begins at home, yet pays his *zakāt* outside Qatar:

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<sup>203</sup> Interview with S19, a male citizen and (above 66 years), on 29/05/2018.

<sup>204</sup> Arab Uprisings: several uprisings started in December 2010 in Tunisia, with the Tunisian Revolution. Mass demonstrations, protests, riots, military coups, foreign military interventions, and acute civil wars occupied the Middle East and North Africa's scene in the last seven years (Abdelsalam 2015).

<sup>205</sup> Interview with S13, a female resident and (36-45) years, on 15/05/2018.

<sup>206</sup> Interview with S20, a male resident and (above 66 years), on 30/05/2018.

[There are] eight categories of *zakāt* [which] exist for Muslims. Muslims need *zakāt*, and charity begins at home. If I have to choose to pay my *zakāt* here or in Jordan, I will pay it in Jordan - not because I do not like Qatar - on the contrary, I love it more than Jordan; however, in Jordan, there are more poor people than in Qatar. The Muslim has the priority for me [over] others [non-Muslims].

S20 may believe that the poor of Jordan suffer more than the poor of Qatar, but does S20 have life experiences with the poor of Qatar, and are they similar to the poor of Jordan? The poor of Jordan cannot be compared to the poor of Qatar. Based on the lived experiences of the researcher, the two societies are different in terms of the economic conditions social structure. The comments of S13 and S20 raise a question on whether Muslims in Qatar are actually aware of the meaning of this category. The lack of (full) awareness of this category and its application, create a challenge to practising it, despite personal convictions having their influence on decision-making. The interviewees' opinions raise another question on the measurement of poverty. Ravallion (1992), in his book *Poverty Comparisons*, states, 'the poverty limit is the minimum level of income deemed adequate in a particular country'. This is contrary to the situation in Qatar: Qatar has one of the highest GDP in the world (Tok, Alkhater, and Pal 2016). It is difficult to measure the cause and effect of the behaviour of one society. A Qatari is a human being who has personal convictions and different feelings from others. Societies generally consist of wealthy, middle-class, and poor. S13 and S20 have backgrounds from different countries: Egypt and Jordan, respectively. They may both believe that they have enough experience to compare between their lived experience of poverty in Egypt and Jordan. Their perception of poverty is different from poverty in Qatar. The concept of who is 'poor' was shared by both the citizens and residents. The luxurious and lavish life-style in Qatar may also have had an influence on their perception that the poor are few or non-existent in Qatar; consequently, for many of the participants, it would be unusual to focus their *zakāt* on 'poor' Qataris. It is possible that many participants, including S13 and S20, were not aware of how *zakāt* funds were distributed according to 'the poor' category, and therefore formed their opinions on who is eligible for *zakāt* through their own lived experiences.

The measurement of poverty in each country is different. Al-Qaradawi (1999) argues that *zakāt* fund distribution should be based on the case of the poor in each country, not a comparison of poor Muslims in other countries. This statement contradicts the opinions of the majority of interviewees, because, according to them, the wealth in Qatar must mean the level of poverty is low. It may also be difficult to identify the poor due to the lack of contact with 'chaste' families, as mentioned in the Qur'ān. The Qur'ān says:

Those needy ones who are wholly wrapped up in the cause of Allah, and who are hindered from moving about the earth in search of their livelihood, especially deserve help. He who is unaware of their circumstances supposes them to be wealthy because of their dignified bearing [...] (*Al-Baqara*, 2: 273).

This means the experiences of Qatari citizens and residents, especially unskilled labourers working in particularly difficult conditions, present a different picture.

Khan and Harroff-Tavel (2011) and *HRW* (2016) explain that (resident) workers receive low wages, experience longer working hours than the citizens, have no protection from harsh climatic conditions, and are subjected to late payment of wages. These harsh and unfair conditions are signs that although Qatar needs their labour, Qataris are either not prepared to treat them fairly, or choose to ignore their welfare, including financial difficulties. The likelihood that their wages will be low means that there are many cases of poverty among these workers, not a few. It should consequently be easy to identify the poor within Qatari society; however, there is a reason why some Qatari residents prefer to distribute their *zakāt* to the poor outside Qatar, even though the poor cases could be their neighbours. The answer may be due to their bond with their families in their countries of origin, or charitable organisations promoting the ‘poor’ projects externally rather than internally. This means that poor cases abroad seem to draw more attention than local ones. This also means the socio-cultural impact on the residents’ behaviour is stronger than awareness of *zakāt* distribution in ‘the poor’ category, according to *Sharī‘ah*. The majority of participants in this research, moreover, showed little understanding of the meaning of poverty - and the need to use *zakāt* to alleviate it. Qatari residents understood poverty by often reflecting on the levels of poverty within their own countries. This debate was further complicated with almost no recognition from Muslims in Qatar about the possibility of using *zakāt* to improve the living conditions of unskilled migrant workers. One of the limitations of this research was the results showed the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar was only from the givers’ perspective; therefore, observing the influence of the relationship between givers and beneficiaries through such concepts as ‘return gift’, ‘redistribution of wealth’, and ‘a good reputation among people’ in Qatar society was not comprehensive.<sup>207</sup> This debate requires further research.<sup>208</sup>

This category is considered a *zakāt* opportunity which encourages *zakāt*-payers, although it can also be a challenge due to the lack of awareness of the meaning of *zakāt* by both citizens and residents. The ‘people burdened with debt’ category, on the same lines, has

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<sup>207</sup> See Chapter Three: The Reciprocal Effect of The Practice of *Zakāt* and Society, and Chapter Six: Qatari Lived Experience: A Religious Environment Impact on the Practice of *Zakāt*.

<sup>208</sup> See Chapter Nine: Thesis limitations and Recommendations for Further Research.

desirable aspects for the practice of *zakāt*, but this category is also caught between opportunities and challenges in implementing it.

### 8.1.2. 'People Burdened with Debt' Category and Double Standards between Qatari Citizens and Residents

The 'burdened with debt category' relates to those whose debts make it impossible for them to meet their basic needs. Beneficiaries of this category are entitled to receive *zakāt* provided that: (i) these debts have occurred due to insufficient income to meet their daily expenses, and (ii) have not been caused by committing a sin such as drinking alcohol or gambling; and (iii) the offenders have repented (Ibn Qudamah 1968: 480; Al-Zuhayli 1989: 956-7). Muslims in Qatar have demonstrated a willingness and enthusiasm to select this beneficiary category. This has been shown in many interviews and the comments by survey respondents. QA2<sup>209</sup> said: 'I always prefer [...] debt-holders, those in debt, [...], and follow-up even after it is delivered to the needy'. The Muslims in Qatar desire to support beneficiaries who are in debt may be explained by the existence of more debtors in contemporary times, caused for instance by the Arab Uprisings.<sup>210</sup> The recent wars and conflicts in the region also resulted in a difficult economic situation for members of societies in Libya, Sudan, Syria, and Qatar. Based on the researcher's observations, debtors' stories are often transmitted through the media and by members of society. According to the Qatari society's characteristic in its quick response to deserving cases, confirmed by S11, C6, and QA2, offers more chances to sympathise with the debtor beneficiary (see section 8.1. above). This category also reflects the country's adherence to the teachings of Islām. The source of their incentives to encourage this category, for example, came from the attention Islām has paid to debtors - the longest verse in the Qur'ān is related to debt. The Qur'ān says:

Believers! Whenever you contract a debt from one another for a known term, commit it to writing [...].  
(*Al-Baqara*, 2: 282).

This theme is also present in the *Ḥadīth*. Abu Sa'id Al Khudri narrates: 'In the time of the Messenger of *Allah* a man suffered loss affecting fruits he had bought and owed a large debt, so the Messenger of *Allah* said: "Give him alms"' (*Sunan Abi Dawud* Book 23: *Hadith* 3462). A strong relationship exists between the concepts of poverty and debt.<sup>211</sup> Considering the inter-

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<sup>209</sup> Interview with QA2, an activist in Islamic donations, on 20/07/2018.

<sup>210</sup> Arab Uprisings: several uprisings started in December 2010 in Tunisia, with the Tunisian Revolution. Mass demonstrations, protests, riots, military coups, foreign military interventions, and acute civil wars occupied the Middle East and North Africa's scene in the last seven years (Abdelsalam 2015).

<sup>211</sup> See Chapter Three: The Reciprocal Effect of the Practice of *Zakāt* and Society.

relationship between poverty and debtors as a cause of poverty, many Muslims in Qatar direct their *zakāt* funds towards the ‘debtor’ category. Those experiencing great financial problems also face considerable costs in re-establishing their lives, which compels them to incur (more) debts, contributing to the continuous poverty cycle. The encouragement to support the categories of both poverty and debtors is deeply interlinked, providing a higher incentive for paying *zakāt*.

The study reveals that Qatari debtors and their families who live in the same society have different levels of need, according to either their poverty status, or the desire for a privileged lifestyle which they cannot afford. The Qatari residents who need to re-establish their lives, for example, are different from Qatari citizens. The interviews in the current study revealed that not all the cases of ‘burdened with debt’ are equal. C1<sup>212</sup> stated that: *zakāt* money which is spent on people in debt in Qatar includes citizens and residents, but is not only based on poverty. The residents are commonly in debt, not because of an extravagant lifestyle, but because of the lack of sufficient funds for their daily living needs. C1 clarified this by saying:

I am not going to compare a resident woman who is desperate for her basic needs, and a widowed citizen woman [*sic*] with servants in her house who asks for help with her kids’ needs – their needs are not equal.

C1 added, the citizens are usually in debt due to a luxurious lifestyle. Citizens can purchase expensive goods such as luxury cars and the latest technological equipment, especially through easy access to bank loans and low interest rates. Fenton (2012: n.p.) says ‘most Qataris are living beyond their means in a prevailing culture of extravagance and conspicuous consumption’. This phenomenon may be explained by the rapid Qatari economic growth made possible by gas and oil revenue, and Qatar’s highest per capita GDP in the world (Tok, Alkhatir and Pal 2016). The rapid development of Qatar’s economy and infrastructure development, based on income from its sale of gas and material imports for the World Cup 2022 venture, has made it easy for citizens to fall into debt - a ‘social curse’ according to *Reuter* (Finn 2016). A reason for the existence of double standards between Qatari citizens and residents in debt in Qatari society is the result of the priorities which the Qatari government gives to citizens at the expense of residents. The income of Qatari citizens differs from that of Qatari residents - citizens’ salaries are higher than those of residents - although they may be at the same job level (Al-Watan 2016). The differences in the level of debts between citizens and residents is explained by the viewpoints of participants such as S13 and S20 in the previous section. According to these participants, a life of luxury that causes debt does not call for sympathy

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<sup>212</sup> Interview with C1, a charity staff member, on 27/03/2018.

from the givers in the same way as the debts incurred for the basic needs of life. This also explains the tendency of residents to have strong ties with their families in their countries of origin; through their lived experiences of poverty in those countries compared to Qatar, they feel more obliged to send their *zakāt* to their relatives, rather than support local debtors. This is also a form of establishing a ‘good reputation within a community’. The residents who send money home are regarded as ‘good’ people because they support their families.

This inequality calls for separate cases of ‘people burdened with debt’ to be individually investigated and processed to ensure justice and fairness. The encouragement to Qatari givers, both residents and citizens, through the ‘people burdened with debt’ category is considered an opportunity for *zakāt*, although the structural restrictions of the Qatari society create obstacles in the distribution of *zakāt* under this category. The first obstacle occurs when charitable organisations and their members face an issue in distributing *zakāt* to debtors (see C1’s response above). The second obstacle occurs under the individual distribution, the givers face a conflict in their decision to determine the debtor beneficiary - whether he or she is a citizen or resident. If the giver is a citizen, he or she might be influenced by his or her national, sectarian, or tribal affiliation. If the giver is a resident, on the other hand, he or she may face a personal conviction that indebted citizens will not have the same needs as residents in debt – shown in the comparison between poor Qataris and poor individuals abroad. ‘The needy’ and ‘the wayfarer or stranded traveller’ categories also met double standards between opportunities and challenges in their application.

### **8.1.3. ‘The Needy’ and ‘The Wayfarer or Stranded Traveller’ Categories Application between Social Solidarity (‘*Ummah*’) and Humanitarian Aid**

According to the religious definition, ‘the needy’ are those who are able to pay for some of their essential needs such as food, but are unable to meet other needs such as shelter, from their income (Al-Zuhayli 1989; Al-Qaradawi 1999). Wayfarers or stranded travellers are people who possess little or no funds to return to their native countries, and, through *zakāt*, are given the sum of what they need. Those who travel to a country shall be reimbursed, according to what they require, as long as the journey was not for sinful purposes (Ibn Qudamah 1968; Al-Zuhayli 1989; Al-Qaradawi 1999). The main reasons interviewees had for supporting these categories were the possible resolutions to problems arising from lack of funding, and to end the suffering caused by events which have surfaced in the twenty-first century such as conflicts.



Interviewees were also motivated by humanitarian feelings they had towards other people in crisis.

#### **8.1.3.1. Impact of Different Interpretation of 'Ummah Practice on Humanitarian Aid Projects**

The results of a crisis or disaster will increase the number of orphans and foundlings, widows and divorcees, prisoners and their families, unemployed and homeless people, refugees, and internally displaced persons. These victims come under the umbrella of *zakāt*'s modern application for 'the needy' and 'the wayfarer or stranded traveller' categories.<sup>213</sup> These categories support initial humanitarian aid and financial assistance through the host countries such as the *Zaatari* refugee camp in Jordan. It is possible that all the victims of the consequences of any crisis or disaster will be assisted, regardless of their ethnicity or religious beliefs. Muslims and non-Muslims have integrated with one another in societies which were once uniform and religious in culture. It was discovered in the research, however, that the distribution of *zakāt* for projects in the affected areas contradicts the concept of social solidarity ('*Ummah*). The concept of '*Ummah* dictates that a Muslim must feel an Islāmic and social responsibility to take care of his or her brothers and sisters worldwide, yet does not mention non-Muslims.

The current interview findings coincided with the literature reviewed in this study in terms of Islāmic social solidarity, evident in the Qur'ān (*Al-i'Imran*, 3: 103), (*At-Tauba*, 9: 71), and *Ḥadīth* (*Jami` at-Tirmidhi* Vol. 4, Book 7: *Hadith* 2166). This proves to be a significant incentive for the practice of *zakāt*, and an opportunity for its application. The sense of social solidarity was evident in the participants' positive opinions on *zakāt* projects central to Muslim societies. S16<sup>214</sup> and S13<sup>215</sup> agreed. S16 stated: 'First, sufficiency for Muslims, and then give to non-Muslims - even if under crisis - religion first'. This shows the convictions and behaviour of the interviewees in social solidarity of Muslims coincides with the behaviour of religious societies in general. Individuals of the same religion prefer to support each other rather than other (religious) groups (Tongerren et al. 2015). The concept of '*Ummah* could also prove to be problematic and coloured by socio-cultural contexts in a particular place. The social solidarity of '*Ummah* may have an adverse effect on non-Muslims' feelings towards Muslims

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<sup>213</sup> See Chapter Three: Table 3.1: *Zakāt* application according to traditional and modern Islāmic schools.

<sup>214</sup> Interview with S16, a male resident and (18-25) years, on 15/05/2018.

<sup>215</sup> Interview with S13, a female resident and (36-45) years, on 15/05/2018.

in this matter, particularly in the modern era in which societies are considerably diverse. The sociologist Al-Rwaili<sup>216</sup> agreed. He showed no preference: he gave his *zakāt* to Jewish women in France who needed financial support. Kahf<sup>217</sup>, Director of Islāmic Finance in Hamad Bin Khalifa University (HBKU), did not agree with supporting development projects which included Muslims and non-Muslims in a Muslim-minority society. His example was from Mauritius, where the Muslim population is less than 30 per cent. Kahf is right in a way: why should *zakāt* be paid to non-Muslims who have not contributed to the fund? Kahf's view stems from the religious concept related to *zakāt*: it should be taken from wealthy Muslims and given to poor Muslims (*Al-Bukhari and Muslim* Book 8: *Hadith* 218). The answer lies in the concept of '*Ummah* – social solidarity between Muslims. Social solidarity, however, has a broader meaning today. The world generally consist of mixed communities. Muslims and non-Muslims have the same aspirations and needs, especially since societies have become an amalgamation in contemporary times as a result of easier mobility opportunities such as travel. *Zakāt* would go a long way to developing the Islāmic desire for peace among all communities rather than a selected few.

If the situation is a matter of life or death, however, another Muslim scholar has a different opinion. In his interview for this research, Al-Qaradaghi<sup>218</sup>, the Secretary-General of the International Union of Muslim Scholars stated: 'There are Muslims and non-Muslims who have been affected, and the issue here [becomes] a matter of life or death - in that case, religion is disregarded'. Kahf agreed with Al-Qaradaghi here, and added: 'This does not only apply to humans, but also to saving animals through *zakāt* funds'. The continued lack of basic needs such as medicine, food, and so on, however, will also lead to the loss of life. This indicates the need to re-interpret the beneficiaries of *zakāt*, and to consider the appropriate measures to be taken for societies at the present time.<sup>219</sup>

The statements of Muslim scholars such as Al-Qaradaghi and Kahf regarding giving *zakāt* to a non-Muslim in a life-or-death situation are considered important in this research. Firstly, these scholars are regarded as influential figures in the Islāmic community. Secondly, talking about humanitarian aid for the needy in the afflicted areas, especially those displaced from their countries, and living in refugee camps, is sensitive. Everyone, Muslims and non-Muslims suffer in the same way from the consequences of wars and natural disasters. Everyone is faced

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<sup>216</sup> Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al-Rwaili on 16/10/2018.

<sup>217</sup> Two interviews with Professor Monzer Kahf on 15 - 16/04/2018.

<sup>218</sup> Two interviews with Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi on 14/04/2018 and 12/05/2018.

<sup>219</sup> See Chapter Nine: Thesis limitations and Recommendations for Further Research.

with life or death in these situations, and desperately needs humanitarian aid. The need for support through humanitarian aid projects from *zakāt* funds was echoed in the survey – 105 Qatari respondents (citizens and residents) agreed, including those who provided support to mixed communities.<sup>220</sup> S20<sup>221</sup> said: ‘If it is humanitarian aid, then there is nothing to prevent you from giving your *zakāt* to projects that include both Muslims and non-Muslims’. The majority of the *zakāt* beneficiary categories take advantage of the concept of humanitarian aid in terms of saving lives, alleviating poverty, providing temporary shelter for internally displaced persons and refugees, and victims of wars, natural disasters, and so on. Muslims in Qatar are generally conscious of the concept of humanitarian aid, but seem to be ignorant of some of the *zakāt* beneficiary categories. *Zakāt* not only provides humanitarian aid – but goes further: it also provides for the poor, people in need, people burdened with debt, wayfarers, and so on. This is additional evidence of the lack of awareness of the modern application of *zakāt*. The duty of scholars is therefore to spread awareness of the modern application of *zakāt*, particularly in its application to mixed societies.

The survey and interview respondents were all Muslims, including the relevant authorities such as Muslim scholars. The adherence to the concept of *’Ummah* possibly came from the perspective of strengthening Muslim solidarity everywhere, and protecting them from any interference threatening their existence or their religion. The idea of threatening Muslims is present, which means the interpretations of some Muslim scholars have left space for *zakāt* to support projects which defend Muslims (Al-Qaradawi 1999). Petersen (2011) states that *’Ummah* can also entail the protection of fellow Muslims from external threats. This can be characterised by conflicts between the East and West where Muslims perceive the Western culture of Christian origin to be a threat to Islām (Huntington 1996; Carlton-Ford and Ender 2010). It can also be relevant to Muslims’ perceived threats from other Muslims, as shown by the recent Arab Uprisings. The application of *zakāt* would support one party at the expense of another in this case, only further fuelling the conflict. The concept of *’Ummah* has also been exploited for political and ideological reasons. The idea that *zakāt* should be for Muslims first, and only under the Islāmic umbrella of *’Ummah*, is another way of playing on religion from a political angle.<sup>222</sup> This therefore distorts the universal message of the Islāmic religion. The Qur’ān states:

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<sup>220</sup> See Appendix (I), section, ‘I.5.6. Another Sector’.

<sup>221</sup> Interview with S20, a male resident and (above 66 years), on 30/05/2018.

<sup>222</sup> See Chapter Seven: The Marketing of *Zakāt*: Beyond Big Business.

‘We have sent you forth as nothing but mercy to people of the whole world’ (*Al-Anbiyaa*, 21: 107).

Muslim scholars such as Al-Tabari (839 – 923 CE) (2001), Ibn Kathir (1300 – 1373 CE) (2001), and Ibn Baz (2019), would agree that mercy (compassion) should be given to all humans around the world, regardless of their religious connections. Here, mercy is translated through *zakāt* as specifically for Muslims, but may include all people if they face life-or-death situations, as mentioned above. Mercy through *zakāt* is therefore conditional, and does not address the modern reality of mixed communities. This debate, and the results of this research, will contribute to the discussion of *zakāt* issues with Muslim scholars.

Social solidarity (*‘Ummah*) is considered a religious incentive to encourage Muslims in Qatar to practise *zakāt*; this reflects an opportunity for the practice of *zakāt*. The conflicting interpretations of *‘Ummah*, however, have resulted in two cases of support given by *zakāt* to non-Muslims, or projects that involve mixed societies. The first case - non-specific humanitarian support for projects which are not life-threatening. Here, the interpretations regarding giving priority to Muslims under *‘Ummah* were consistent, both from a jurisprudence aspect (Kahf), and by individual Qataris (respondents). The second case - support for humanitarian aid projects in affected areas which are a risk to human life – there was no distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Incompatibility exists in the interpretations between jurisprudence and individual Qataris; by focusing on the second case, disasters have many unforeseen and devastating consequences for everyone affected: Muslims and non-Muslims alike can be wounded, bereaved, in refugee camps, or internally displaced. These disaster victims require immediate humanitarian aid as human beings, regardless of whether they are Muslims or non-Muslims. A Qatari's application of the Islāmic teaching of *‘Ummah* in practising *zakāt* is an encouraging opportunity; however, it is flawed due to its exclusive nature which is arguably out-dated in the current, globalised world. This interpretation of giving and helping everyone, regardless of his or her socio-religious-ethnic background emerges from the heart of Islamic beliefs: it seeks to reinforce respect for humanity, as mentioned in the *Ḥadīth* (*Musnad Ahmad* 22978, Grade: *Sahih*). The researcher found that the motivation to explore a new field of research concerned the compatibility of *zakāt* applications with peacebuilding activities<sup>223</sup> in contemporary times, was an opportunity.

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<sup>223</sup> Peacebuilding activities: Socio-economic development and culture of justice, truth, and reconciliation; equitable and balanced poverty reduction, sound and equitable economic management, repatriation and reintegration of the displaced, dialogue among conflicting groups, capacity building and training in conflict resolution, peace education (*The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development* (OECD) 2007: 8).

This interpretation of helping and supporting everyone in need, regardless of his or her socio-religious-ethnic background is partly compatible with the traditional concepts of '*Ummah* and *zakāt*'. '*Ummah* exists according to its original intention – (worldwide) social solidarity among all Muslims. Practising *zakāt* by all Muslims is still obligatory, but its collection and distribution strategies need to change; although 'the needy' and 'stranded wayfarer' categories are some of the preferred *zakāt*-beneficiary categories, *zakāt*-givers need to be aware of other important issues such as peacebuilding initiatives. The generosity of Qatari Muslims, for instance, has shown '*Ummah* exists: the funds are available to alleviate suffering by Muslims, but it needs to go further by supporting peacebuilding activities such as spreading tolerance between religions, or resolving conflicts between Muslims and Muslims (Syria, Yemen) and between Muslims and non-Muslims (Hindus and Sikhs in India versus Indian Muslims). This concept would subsequently serve projects based in mixed communities in affected areas such as the refugee and displaced persons issues, humanitarian aid, and reconciliation of religions.

The remaining *zakāt*-beneficiary categories: 'alms collectors and administrators'; 'the reconciliation of hearts'; 'people in bondage or slavery'; and 'for the cause of *Allah*' were also revealed in the survey results, interviews, and the literature review. These beneficiary categories were 'controversial', and subject to approval and disapproval by the participants.

## 8.2. The 'Controversial' *Zakāt*-Beneficiaries: *Zakāt*-Givers' Choices

The controversial categories of *zakāt*-beneficiaries received agreement and disagreement for various reasons such as uncertainties about the results; for instance, the fear of mixing other (social or political) aspects with religion. It is worth discussing the *zakāt* challenges which contributed to creating controversial *zakāt*-beneficiaries, before discussing each category in this section. The Qatari awareness of interpretations in *zakāt* applications - classical and contemporary - were an obstacle to *zakāt* in the twenty-first century.

The findings in the interviews revealed that many Muslims in Qatar were apprehensive about the difference in *zakāt* interpretations between classical and modern schools.<sup>224</sup> Kahf<sup>225</sup>, the Director of Islāmic Finance in HBKU, had a separate reformative view on the application of *zakāt* according to classical schools. He disagreed with the *zakāt* curricula in Qatar:

<sup>224</sup> See Chapter Three: Table 3.1: *Zakāt* application according to traditional and modern Islāmic schools.

<sup>225</sup> Two interviews with Professor Monzer Kahf on 15 - 16/04/2018.

The *zakāt* curricula that are taught in Qatari schools and universities have been the same for the past 1,400 years, and do not correspond with the way of life in the twenty-first century. I am in total disagreement with this teaching.

The Islāmic curriculum on *zakāt* which is taught in schools and universities in Qatar such as the notion of adopting the *Hanbalī* approach is confirmed by the College of *Sharia* in Qatar University.<sup>226</sup> Al-Rwaili<sup>227</sup>, S17<sup>228</sup> and S14<sup>229</sup> agreed with Kahf and stated, scholars are limited to the old scholastic books which neither reflect current times, nor make much sense to the public. S14 added: ‘Al-Qaradawi and the Department of Advocacy and Guidance stated: ‘We sometimes find that some of the responses are rigid and traditional, and non-simulation of reality, unfortunately’’. It is worth noting that, Al-Qaradawi is classified as a follower of modern schools in the application of *zakāt*. This scholar’s interpretations of *zakāt* differs from those of the main branches of Islām - *Sunnah* and *Shī‘ah* - in terms of the changes throughout history and various schools of religious thought (Saeed 2006). The different interpretation between Abu Hanifah and Ibn Rushd, for example, regarding *zakāt* and the land issue remain confusing.<sup>230</sup> Muslims are not generally able to understand the instructions of *zakāt*. According to *Sharī‘ah* and the diversity of Qatari society, one must fulfil certain conditions in order to attain a jurist’s position in society. Having knowledge of *Ijmā‘* (Consensus) and *Qiyās al-Ulamā‘* (Analogical Deduction) as objectives of Islām is one condition, especially the consensus of the Companions (*Al-Raya* 2012).<sup>231</sup> Scholars who have graduated from the Qatari education system adopt rules that may not generally correspond with contemporary times (2017-2021).

The results of the interviews of citizens and residents mainly illustrated that *zakāt* interpretations in Qatar oscillate between traditional and modern (contemporary) applications of *zakāt*.<sup>232</sup> A multitude interpretations of *zakāt* were a common cause of disputes about it and its application. It has consequently become essential for Muslim scholars to revise and develop their interpretations of *zakāt* in Qatar to conform to modern times. This would enhance the discussion on the extent to which *zakāt* mechanism and philosophy have generally been

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<sup>226</sup> See Chapter Four: *Zakāt* Education and Awareness in Qatar Society.

<sup>227</sup> Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al-Rwaili on 16/10/2018.

<sup>228</sup> Interview with S17, a male resident and (26-35) years, on 15/05/2018.

<sup>229</sup> Interview with S14, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 17/07/2018.

<sup>230</sup> See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* in its Religious Form: Definition and Various Interpretations.

<sup>231</sup> Consensus means agreement within a group - usually by Muslim scholars who are trustworthy in connection with special rulings in the matter of jurisprudence. Analogy, on the other hand, is to find a common cause of a problem that did not exist in the era of the Prophet and his Companions (Al-Amidi 1981). See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* in its Religious Form: Definition and Various Interpretations.

<sup>232</sup> See Chapter Three: Table 3.1: *Zakāt* application according to traditional and modern Islāmic schools.

developed to suit the challenges of the 21st century, particularly in Qatar.<sup>233</sup> Qatari society is considered to have been in continuous development and evolution between periods. There are contemporary issues and developments which have not been raised in traditional textbooks or in Qatari schools and universities, such as online trading, commercial stock trading, and the value of homes and land, which have evolved over time. This may encourage a Qatari to either avoid or ignore practising *zakāt*, and therefore becomes a challenge. Qatari Muslim scholars who are responsible for (modern) interpretations of *zakāt*, should take into consideration these issues in the lived experience of a Qatari.

The ‘controversial’ or less popular beneficiary categories are based on their order in the Qurānic verse (*At-Tauba*, 9: 60), beginning with the ‘alms for collectors and administrators’ category.

#### **8.2.1. ‘Alms for Collectors and Administrators’ Category: Qatari Charitable Organisations Behaviour and *Zakāt*-Givers Conditional Projects**

*Zakāt* is an institutionalised system.<sup>234</sup> *Zakāt* workers such as those who collect *zakāt* from givers, follow a separate ruling from the rest of Islāmic donations, including a separate approach to conditional and unconditional *zakāt*-beneficiaries. This category also includes employees who administer and distribute *zakāt* to the beneficiaries (Ibn Qudamah 1968; Al Qaradawi 2006). The participants in this research did not object to the ‘alms collectors and administrators’ category from a career point of view; their objection was the way their position was used by Qatari charitable organisations. The participants did not wish to give their *zakāt* to this category of beneficiaries because of the high salaries paid to *zakāt* employees, for instance, and the financial costs of fees incurred by projects implemented by *zakāt* institutions. S2<sup>235</sup> said: ‘In Yemeni society, the most corrupt organisations belong to the charities, because, under this category, they collect *zakāt* and keep it as a salary for themselves’. S6<sup>236</sup> explained on the same lines: ‘In Qatar, charity organisations take huge salaries from the humanitarian institutes for which they work, thus ignoring the religious intentions of *zakāt*’. The unnecessary amounts claimed for projects such as first-class flight tickets, and five-star hotel

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<sup>233</sup> See Chapter Nine: Thesis limitations and Recommendations for Further Research.

<sup>234</sup> This section uses the ‘*zakāt* institution’ rather than ‘charitable organisations’. This category of ‘the alms for collectors and administrators’ is only concerned with those who work with *zakāt*, and not with other Islamic donation types such as *ṣadaqah* and *waqf*.

<sup>235</sup> Interview with S2, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 07/06/2018.

<sup>236</sup> Interview with S6, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 26/09/2018.

accommodation, were common talking points in the interviews. S1<sup>237</sup> added that one of the projects funded by *zakāt* cost 400,000 Qatari riyals (US\$109,890)<sup>238</sup>, and the administration fees were 600,000 Qatari riyals (US\$164,835)<sup>239</sup>. United Nations organisations are similarly criticised for over-budgeting administration expenditure (*The Guardian* 2015). The participants' criticism of the administrative management of *zakāt* institutions regarding their unnecessary fees for *zakāt* projects, is not unique to Qatar: it can be found in other Muslim-majority societies. The researcher observed, through her own lived experience, the same behaviour applied to societies both outside of the Gulf region, including Egypt, Palestine, and Jordan, and even in Muslim-minority societies such as in Britain. These data show that the category is perceived to be exploited, and therefore does not serve the beautiful goal for which *zakāt* was established. This reinforces the theme between spiritual practice and 'big business' through the behaviour of charitable organisations concerning *zakāt*. *Zakāt* institutions, moreover, use excessive methods to attract donors such as repetitive appeals through various media platforms, and setting up many offices and collection points and boxes in gathering areas all around Qatar.<sup>240</sup> These institutions have also provided various means to pay *zakāt*, including by phone, online, cash and bank cheques, to name a few. This suggests that Muslims in Qatar have no excuses not to contribute. The institutes send out frequent reminders as well, as part of their persuasive efforts. These appeals soon lose their novel effect for Muslims in Qatar, and the feelings of fulfilment when donating *zakāt*. The willingness they had to observe their religious duty is weakened. Muslims in Qatar may therefore have some negative feelings towards these institutions due to their constant bombardment with appeals. This could possibly lead to some Muslims in Qatar avoiding paying *zakāt*. The spiritual and religious feeling behind *zakāt* is also lost according to Islāmic teachings. This arguably negative behaviour of *zakāt* institutions has sparked a challenge in the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar, as it has contributed to making it a tedious and unsatisfying commitment.

*Zakāt* is an international and practical institution that does not constitute a burden on the state as it exists in itself. It does not need state capital in order to function (Al-Qaradawi 1999). *Zakāt* institutions create job opportunities and reduce unemployment by building their organisations through their workers, funded by *zakāt* - one of its strengths. The employees'

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<sup>237</sup> Interview with S1, a female citizen and (26-35) years, on 09/05/2018.

<sup>238</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=400%2C000&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 12/01/2020]

<sup>239</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=600%2C000&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 12/01/2020]

<sup>240</sup> See Chapter Seven: The Marketing of *Zakāt*: Beyond Big Business.



monthly salaries should be equivalent to other institutions, given the religious aspect. Working in *zakāt* institutions is a noble occupation which deserves respect and appreciation; moreover, it is a part-solution to unemployment, and also a social institution in itself. It can therefore be considered an opportunity for the practice of *zakāt*. Kahf<sup>241</sup> and Al-Qaradaghi<sup>242</sup> had different opinions from the interviewees regarding the administration of *zakāt* institutions in Qatar; both emphasised that most of those working in the area of Islāmic donations such as collecting *zakāt* in public places, were volunteers working to please *Allah*. This perspective is supported by the researcher's visit to *Zakat* Fund. The employees stated that their salaries were paid by the Qatari government and not through the *zakāt* donations of Muslims in Qatar. This beneficiary category, however, remains highly controversial, and makes some Muslims in Qatar reluctant to pay *zakāt*; the high costs claimed for administration pushes potential donors away from these institutions. They might feel their donations could be put to the wrong use such as supporting the wrong recipient or cause. What is known and common in the behaviour of charitable organisations towards *zakāt* regarding salaries and project fees in Qatari society is a challenge to the practice of *zakāt*. The challenges facing the practice of *zakāt* do not only appear in the 'alms for collectors and administrators' category, but 'the reconciliation of hearts' category also faced controversy in Qatari society.

### 8.2.2. 'The Reconciliation of Hearts' Category between Tolerance and Religious Intolerance

The confusion that exists between the traditional and modern interpretations of *zakāt* theme also appeared in the 'reconciliation of hearts' category. The duality of traditional and contemporary religious thinking continues in this beneficiary category. The majority of jurists have agreed that this category is to spread Islām. It was used in Prophet Muhammad's time to encourage non-Muslims to convert to Islām (Al-Zuhayli 1989; Al-Qaradawi 1999). The majority of participants agreed with this. S14<sup>243</sup> for instance, preferred to pay her *zakāt* to non-Muslims in order to encourage them to convert to Islām. In their written comments, one of the survey respondents said, 'I give my *zakāt* to the non-Muslim hoping that he or she becomes a Muslim and embraces Islām'. This means that this beneficiary category has lost much of its modern intention – raising Islāmic awareness to address the compassion felt by Muslims for Muslims, or Muslims for non-Muslims, by creating a coherent, fraternal society that cares for

<sup>241</sup> Two interviews with Professor Monzer Kahf on 15 - 16/04/2018.

<sup>242</sup> Two interviews with Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi on 14/04/2018 and 12/05/2018.

<sup>243</sup> Interview with S14, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 17/07/2018.

its people, regardless of their religious beliefs (see Table 3.1: *Zakāt* application according to traditional and modern Islāmic schools).

There are more interpretations of this category. The evidence shows this category is still bound by interpretations which have been written and understood according to societies which have existed for hundreds of years. Al-Qaradawi (1999) states, in contrast, it includes giving to the non-believers from this category to stop threats towards Muslims; this is in accord with Petersen's (2015) point on the external threats to and by Muslims.<sup>244</sup> Al-Qaradawi (1999) adds that it can also fund the institutions to care for new Muslims (converts) by giving *zakāt* to the leaders of poor countries, and to the tribes of non-believers to encourage them to convert to Islām (Al-Ghufaili 2008: 405-413). This category has the possibility of raising awareness about Islām. Islām has attracted negative connotations in recent times. The category has the potential to lessen this negativity, and be used to further inter-religious dialogue rather than to seek conversion of non-Muslims. The creation of projects that raise awareness about Islām and its meaning – peace; for example, the greeting in Islām is *As-salāmu 'Alaykum*, which means 'peace be upon you'.<sup>245</sup> Islām's call for peace is closer to its true message through applications such as *zakāt*. This insight allows the current volume of work to be an introduction to further academic research on this topic concerning peacebuilding activities (see section 8.1.3 above).

This category is an important one. Its intention is to promote tolerance, closeness, and inter-connectedness; on the other hand, this harmonious intention is often misinterpreted or misrepresented. This category is concerned with the 'heart' (sentiments), and addresses relations between Muslims and those who have converted to Islām. The aim of the 'reconciliation of hearts' category is to create a coherent, fraternal society between Muslims and non-Muslims, regardless of their religious beliefs. It is part of the concept of humanity as a whole, and the sense of human fraternity which individuals have towards the 'other'. Muslims in Qatar here need to raise awareness about the modern applications of this beneficiary category. This is the role of the authorities responsible for *zakāt*, such as Muslim scholars, in spreading awareness. The confusion that exists between the traditional and modern interpretations of *zakāt* theme not only appeared in the reconciliation of hearts' category, but also with 'people in bondage or slavery' category.

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<sup>244</sup> See Chapter Three: Interrogating Religious Motivations.

<sup>245</sup> See Chapter Three: *Zakāt* and National Politics.

### 8.2.3. 'People in Bondage or Slavery' Category and Misunderstanding and Mistranslations

The Muslims in Qatar lack of awareness and understanding of the meaning of this category has its origins in the mistranslations of Arabic-to-Arabic texts, and consequently, mistranslations from Arabic to other languages such as English, *Hindi*, Malaysian, and so on. The everyday practice of *zakāt* is often diverted from its theological meaning. Al-Ghufaili (2008: 417-418) for example, translated this category as 'manumitting': the freeing of Muslim slaves, or releasing slaves who have an agreement with their masters to be freed in exchange for money payable to the master (Ibn Kathir 2001). Al-Zuhayli (1989: 956) added: it is also for the Muslim who has an agreement with another, and cannot afford to make a payment. Al-Zuhayli stated that this category does not exist anymore. Al-Qaradaghi, the Secretary-General of the International Union of Muslim Scholars, disagreed, and stated: 'Not only *zakāt* interpretations are obstacles to *zakāt* awareness, but also the translations from Arabic to other languages, such as the translation '*Fi Al-Riqāb*' – people in bondage or slavery'. He added that: '*Allah* didn't say "freeing slaves" but He said freeing "necks" [freeing the yoke around people's necks], and in the Arabic language the '*Riqāb*' expression can be used for those whose "necks" [or persons] were humiliated or subdued, whether it was a man in slavery or a people under occupation'. According to Al-Qaradawi (1999) and other scholars (Shaltūt 2004; Za'tari 2010; and Ismail and Hussain 2017) '*Fi Al-Riqāb*' category means freeing those who have been shamed by being trapped in a situation from which there is no escape (debt), the threat of oppression, prisoners-of-war, and people in bondage or slavery, a phenomenon which existed during the Prophet's time. Human trafficking and modern slavery in current terms arguably comes under this category.

The lived experiences of Qatari *zakāt*-givers, however, showed that they still lacked awareness of the meaning of this category and its modern application. The interviews with Muslims in Qatar determined that the category comes under the interpretation of 'slaves' being freed 1,400 years ago, and they believed this category does not exist now. S16<sup>246</sup> and S7<sup>247</sup> confirmed this category was applicable to the people in bondage or slavery in early Islām when the issue of slavery and freedom were part of the social structure. These different interpretations have therefore contributed to the Qatari *zakāt*-givers' confusion when making their decisions regarding *zakāt*, and consequently, will provide a further challenge to *zakāt* application.

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<sup>246</sup> Interview with S16, a male resident and (18-25) years, on 15/05/2018.

<sup>247</sup> Interview with S7, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 01/06/2018.

The dismissal of a beneficiary category because of the mistranslation decreases the opportunities of *zakāt* practice. *Zakāt*'s application will be incomplete, as the translation isolates the practice to the slave, whereas 'the slave' is only part of this category. This means fewer of those who need it, including oppressed populations, will benefit. Due to the lack of awareness of *zakāt* in the actual translation of this category, participants did not tend to contribute their *zakāt* to include its modern application such as those who are enslaved, oppressed, or wrongly imprisoned, or to victims of trafficking (Stirk 2015: 10). It is also for 'blood money' - payable for the wrongful killing of people (or their livestock), and addresses the problem of modern slavery such as victims of human trafficking (Koenig and Al Shohaib 2014: 36). Al-Qaradawi (1999: 395) adds: it can also be employed to release the Muslim prisoners and captive people in former colonial countries.

The modern application of *zakāt* regarding '*Fi Al-Riqāb*' – 'people in bondage or slavery' category faced challenges from the giver's lack of awareness of modern applications in terms of categories such as 'the reconciliation of hearts'. This lack of awareness of the various categories of *zakāt* is a clear indication that they need to be updated to reflect modern situations. Clarifying the misunderstanding caused by mistranslations from Arabic-to-Arabic, and Arabic to other languages, for example, would go a long way to preventing avoidance of these *zakāt* categories.<sup>248</sup> The role of Muslim scholars in *Ijmā'* (Consensus) and *Qiyās al-Ulamā'* (Analogical Deduction) are important as part of the objectives of Islām.

This research is concerned with the analysis and discussion of the impact religious and social behaviour have on the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. The findings revealed that the politicisation of *zakāt* also helped the avoidance or resistance to its practice and application in Qatar.

#### **8.2.4. 'For the Cause of Allah' Category and Politicisation of Zakāt**

Politicisation of *zakāt* is controversially similar to the previous categories which emerged as key themes in this research. The sub-themes were subject to various interpretations of 'for the cause of Allah' category such as military use, Qatari government's restrictions regarding *zakāt* institutions, and *zakāt* collection and distribution in terms of project financing.

The analysis of data (collected through a survey of 153 people, interviews with 20 citizens and residents, and 19 stakeholders (academics and scholars) shows that there is

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<sup>248</sup> See Chapter Nine: Thesis limitations and Recommendations for Further Research.

evidence of the politicisation of *zakāt*. Al-Rwaili<sup>249</sup>, a sociologist, said that Saudi Arabia is an example of a religious authority which issued *fatawā* (religious rulings), urging people to donate to Afghanistan and the *Mujāhidīn* against the Soviet Union.<sup>250</sup> Fraihat<sup>251</sup>, a scholar of conflict resolution and peacebuilding studies, agreed with Al-Rwaili, and added another example: ‘the conflict between Saudi Arabia and Iran’. This shows that religious sectarianism therefore features as a part of the conflicts which may be funded by *zakāt*. This analysis implies the Qatar government, for one, demands Muslim scholars use their influence through their interpretations of the meaning of *zakāt*, to attract *zakāt*-givers to provide funding for political projects. *Zakāt*-givers form a kind of trust in their chosen scholars, and respond by paying their *zakāt* to the government, or to entities approved by the government. This debate originates from one of the category’s interpretations of ‘for the cause of *Allah*’ category (those who fight to defend Islām), endorsed by scholars from all four main *Sunnah* schools - *Ḥanafīyyah*, *Mālikīyyah*, *Shāfi‘īyyah*, and *Ḥanbalī* (Al-Qaradawi 1999: 406). Al-Qaradaghi and Kahf both agreed with Al-Qaradawi. The interview findings indicated that Muslims in Qatar - both citizens and residents - were not pleased with the application of *zakāt* under this category. QA4<sup>252</sup> explained: ‘Fighting is one element of “for the cause of *Allah*”’, but in the current era, it is abhorrent, as it is a mess – you can’t know with whom or against whom [you are fighting]’. S2<sup>253</sup> added: ‘The category has a pretentious name and attracts a lot of Muslims, including myself; hence, the need to re-interpret [is necessary], according to the present circumstances’. Participants experienced confusion regarding using *zakāt* to support arming of wars. They cited the fighting in Syria as an example, in which the two conflicting parties are Muslim, and each party is supported by different Muslim scholars. According to this category, they considered it as justified if, for instance, it meant defending one’s country or property from attack by another country. If it were a war between Muslims, say Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatari *zakāt*-givers would support Qatar, and Emirati *zakāt*-givers would support the UAE. The participants argued that *zakāt* would therefore start a war between Muslims which some interviewees could not support.

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<sup>249</sup> Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al-Rwaili on 16/10/2018.

<sup>250</sup> *Oxford Reference* (2021) defines the word ‘*Mujāhidīn*’ as ‘Plural of *mujahid*, “one who engages in *jihad*.” The term does not have a necessary connection with war. In literal terms, it means “one who struggles on behalf of Islam.”’

<sup>251</sup> Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Fraihat on 24/05/2018.

<sup>252</sup> Interview with QA4, an activist in Islamic donations, on 27/06/2018.

<sup>253</sup> Interview with S2, a female resident and (26-35) years, on 07/06/2018.

Politicisation of *zakāt* is historically valid. *Zakāt* has been connected to political interference since the early days of Islām. *Zakāt* was used to support military campaigns such as the ‘*Riddah Wars*’ (Hossain 2012: 3) which were ignited to protect the concept of *zakāt*. A considerable number of the interviewees expressed a willingness to focus on other, less political interpretations of the category. An instance of this is the act of *jihād* by stopping harm through words and deeds. It was narrated that, Anas said: ‘The Messenger of *Allah* said: “Strive in *Jihad* with your hands, your tongues and your wealth”’ (*Sunan an-Nasa’ I* Vol. 1, Book 25: *Hadith* 3194). This is the aim of the peaceful message of Islām and should be promoted, as mentioned in the Qur’ān (*An-Nisaa*, 4: 86) and *Ḥadīth* (*Sunan Ibn Majah* Vol. 4, Book 29: *Hadith* 3251), and not for the incitement to violence and the use of weapons. Contemporary opinions such as those of Ibn Abdu’l-Hakam and Shaltut, consider this category could also be used to finance mosques, religious foundations, schools, charitable trusts, hospitals, social projects, or emergency relief programmes around the globe (Al-Qaradawi 1999; Kochuyt 2009). The different interpretations and the dissatisfaction by the participants with using *zakāt* for political purposes in the interests of governments, makes this category particularly controversial. *Zakāt*’s use for political interference was strongly rejected in the survey. The survey question that has multiple choices it recorded as 127 respondents of Muslims in Qatar were not happy about their *zakāt* supporting political dialogue, and 110 respondents were unwilling for their donations to be directed towards conflict resolutions<sup>254</sup> (see Figure (8.1.) below.




Figure 8.1: Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) unwilling to make *zakāt* payments for grass-root conflict resolution and political dialogue

<sup>254</sup> See Appendix (I): ‘I.5.2. Grass-root Conflict Resolution’ and ‘I.5.4. Political Dialogue’.

It is therefore evident that, in order to avoid the exploitation of this category by politicians, the interpretation of Muslim thinkers responsible for the Consensus and Analogical Deduction of Islām's objectives, there should also be an awareness of other interpretations of this category. The ambiguity surrounding this category has caused it to become a challenge or obstacle to the application of *zakāt*.

Another current example of the politicisation of *zakāt* is Qatar's political instability caused by its neighbours. Qatar was accused of funding 'terrorism' and fermenting regional instability in June 2017; a blockade was consequently imposed on the country by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt.<sup>255</sup> If military confrontation had occurred, *zakāt* funds would probably have been used. Interviewees such as Qatari citizens S18<sup>256</sup> and Al-Rwaili<sup>257</sup> (a sociologist) expressed their willingness to give their *zakāt* to the Qatari government in support of the Qatari army. Al-Rwaili said, 'I can help my country in fighting for its own interests'.

The majority of the staff members of Qatari charities such as C8<sup>258</sup> and C6<sup>259</sup> confirmed that the unstable political situation in the region is a factor which restricts *zakāt* distribution. This is centred around the Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities (RACA), and how RACA's behaviour changed after the siege on Qatar.<sup>260</sup> C4<sup>261</sup> pointed out: 'There is a restriction on any training [sessions] related to *zakāt* issues'. C7<sup>262</sup> disagreed and said: 'The political instability in the region does not affect the charities – their status in Qatar is better'. C7's statement contradicts evidence from other interviewees; for example, C5<sup>263</sup> confirmed that the *Eid* Charity and RAF Foundation were shut down as the result of political intervention during the siege on Qatar. These data suggest that accusations of Qatar supporting 'terrorism' and several extremist groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood (considered a 'terrorist' organisation by the countries laying siege to Qatar) as well as the *Houthi* of Yemen, through *Al-Qā'idah* and the Organisation of the Islāmic State (*Dā'ish*) (*Saudi Press Agency* 2017a, b, c, d) may

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<sup>255</sup> See Chapter Four: Politicisation of *Zakāt* in Qatar.

<sup>256</sup> Interview with S18, a male citizen and (26-35) years, on 12/06/2018.

<sup>257</sup> Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al-Rwaili on 16/10/2018.

<sup>258</sup> Interview with C8, a charity staff member, on 18/07/2018.

<sup>259</sup> Interview with C6, a charity staff member, on 27/03/2018.

<sup>260</sup> According to RACA (2020), its task is to 'under[take] the process of overseeing the accurate collection, coordination, and control of donations, and obligating all associations to submit to the supervision of the commission' Yousf (2017). He adds, the charity should be 'providing them with the necessary information and documents required to carry out their work and perform their supervisory duty according to the protocol upon which the body was established'.

<sup>261</sup> Interview with C4, a charity staff member, on 18/09/2018.

<sup>262</sup> Interview with C7, a charity staff member, on 04/07/2018.

<sup>263</sup> Interview with C5, a charity staff member, on 17/07/2018.

have instigated these closures. According to Matleq (2016), RACA decided to tighten the monitoring of charities.<sup>264</sup> It was evident from the findings that the intermediaries or representatives of charity organisations from outside countries were not excluded from the unstable political situation in the region: Qatar did not allow any group from outside to connect with organisations in Qatar. The Qatari government's priority was to protect its security from unknown funding sources and distribution mechanisms. The increased control on charity organisations' *zakāt* issues is an indicator of the significance of *zakāt*, and the important role it plays in Qatari society.

The government's behaviour further complicated matters regarding *zakāt* and thus acted as a challenge to *zakāt* and its application. The work of Qatari charitable organisations in collecting and distributing *zakāt*, and its application to individual *zakāt*-givers would be affected. The practice of *zakāt* will consequently be bound by the political conditions of the State of Qatar. Qatar's charitable activities in the Comoros ceased, it was argued, as a retaliatory measure because of its alignment with the Saudi-led embargo on Qatar.<sup>265</sup> C6<sup>266</sup> confirmed this:

The Comoros has a hospital which cost almost 100 million Qatar riyals [US\$27 million]<sup>267</sup>. It was in its last [building] stages - the hospital [has been] suspended for two years [...] because of the boycott.

This shows that *zakāt* has become a political device utilised by both the government and Qatari individuals. The relationship stems from governments' use of Muslim jurists to influence *zakāt*-givers to donate to a specific project or category such as 'for the cause of *Allah*', although the findings from the interviews and survey did not prove this regarding the government of Qatar. The use of Muslim clerics by governments to sway and influence *zakāt*-givers encourages them to donate to a specific category. *Zakāt*-givers then accept this relationship, and thus comply with the politicisation of *zakāt*, by supporting projects recommended by the interpretations of favoured Islāmic scholars. The determination and statements of scholars have a long-term impact on *zakāt*-givers, even in the absence of government interference - this was evident in Qatar and its neighbours. Due to the politicisation of *zakāt*, it is worth starting future research into the intermediaries and the mediating influences on *zakāt*'s mechanism - collection and distribution - focusing on Qatar as a case study.<sup>268</sup>

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<sup>264</sup> See Chapter Four: Politicisation of *Zakāt* in Qatar.

<sup>265</sup> See Chapter Four: Politicisation of *Zakāt* in Qatar.

<sup>266</sup> Interview with C6, a charity staff member, on 27/03/2018.

<sup>267</sup> <https://www.xe.com/ar/currencyconverter/convert/?Amount=100%2C000%2C000&From=QAR&To=USD> [accessed 12/01/2020]

<sup>268</sup> See Chapter Nine: Thesis limitations and Recommendations for Further Research.



To conclude, although there are some *zakāt*-beneficiary categories supported by Muslims in Qatar without hesitation, all beneficiaries of *zakāt* have been exposed to two dimensions: opportunities and challenges. The interaction of Qataris with the afflicted countries, and the provision of humanitarian aid, was evident through the theme of ‘Qatari society’s wealth, generosity, and religious commitment’. This contributed to creating opportunities for better and long-term practice of *zakāt*. The lack of awareness, however, of the actual meaning of *zakāt* and its eight beneficiary categories such as poverty and social solidarity - ‘*Ummah*’ - was one of the most important factors that contributed to creating challenges for the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar. This challenge is mainly due to the Qatari confusion or lack of awareness between traditional and modern interpretations of *zakāt*. There are many Muslims in Qatar who are still attached to the interpretation of *zakāt* that goes back hundreds of years. The reasons were clear from the books and curricula on *zakāt* in terms of traditionalist Muslim scholars; this was evident through the confusion regarding the categories of the beneficiaries of *zakāt* such as the reconciliation of hearts’ and ‘people in bondage or slavery’. The behaviour of Qatari charitable organisations concerning the contradiction between *zakāt* as a spiritual practice, and *zakāt* as ‘big business’ (exorbitant project fees and high salaries) has exhausted the motivation of many Muslims in Qatar. Qatari government intervention also had a prominent role in the practice of *zakāt* by restricting the interpretation of ‘for the cause of *Allah*’ category to the financing of wars. This had little support from most of the respondents.

These challenges have possibly led to a decline in the practice of *zakāt*. *Zakāt* lost many ‘in need’ applications such as families affected by the recurrent wars, and missed opportunities for reconciliation in those conflicts. These approaches to *zakāt* have arguably encouraged *zakāt*-payers to avoid practising *zakāt* (or even ignoring it) which goes against the intention of *zakāt*. Here, the role of those responsible for *zakāt*, especially Muslim scholars, is to spread awareness of *zakāt*. Educating Muslims in Qatar about modern *zakāt* applications, and updating the *zakāt* curricula in schools and universities could be the first steps. The researcher hopes that the contributions of this research will support opportunities and reduce challenges for the practice of *zakāt* (see Chapter Nine).

### 8.3. Summary

This chapter has addressed two main types of *zakāt*-beneficiaries: acceptable and less acceptable by *zakāt*-givers; both types have their supporters and opponents according to the findings. It is clear that the lived experience of Muslims in Qatar was influenced by the theological and sociological aspects of practising *zakāt* in Qatar. The theological influence was prominent in most cases, although the social behaviour and personal convictions of Muslims in Qatar also played an important part in the decision-making of *zakāt*-givers. This research has shown that some *zakāt*-givers have preferences for certain categories which may be impractical, logistically difficult (or even impossible), or politically motivated. The lack awareness of modern interpretations of the *zakāt*-beneficiary categories by Muslim scholars, for example, has not only caused confusion for *zakāt*-givers, but also controversy over some of the beneficiary categories. The lack of awareness of the meaning and modern application of ‘people in bondage and slavery’ category was evident in the findings. The Muslims in Qatar chose to exclude the application of *zakāt* to this beneficiary category. Social influences such as tribal culture, also contributed to the motivation of *zakāt*-payers. Qatari citizens do not mind supporting the Qatari government with *zakāt* in the case of war. The lived experience of the Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) revealed that there is an absence of religious awareness of modern *zakāt* applications regarding the eight beneficiary categories. The social bond between the residents and their families in their countries of origin, for example, deprives the ‘poor’ cases which exist within the unskilled worker community in Qatar. The residents claim the ‘poor’ and ‘needy’ are greater in their countries of origin than in Qatar; in addition, they claim Qatar is a wealthy country and can afford to support threats of war and conflict without their *zakāt* contributions. The tribal influence also affects the decision-making of citizens. They are willing to support the Qatari government through their *zakāt* in the event or threat of war. The Qatari government has politicised *zakāt* by limiting the engagement of charitable organisations in external projects, especially in countries participating in the blockade against Qatar. The Muslims in Qatar are reluctant to use *zakāt* for political purposes, although the Qatari government has played a political role in the practice of *zakāt*; on one hand, it limited the involvement of charitable organisations in external projects to protect itself from being accused of supporting undesirable organisations by the international community; and on the other, to take control of the distribution of *zakāt* funds, perceived to be in danger of attracting undesirable or politically-motivated interference from external sources. The situation is further complicated by some Muslim scholars (with political motives) instructing Muslims in Qatar to pay *zakāt* to ‘for the cause of *Allah*’ category.

The Muslims in Qatar characteristics of religious commitment, wealth, and generosity encourage support for both acceptable and controversial or less popular projects. The exploration of the beneficiary categories such as ‘the poor’; ‘the needy’; ‘the people burdened with debt’ and ‘the wayfarer or stranded traveller’ reveal the choice of *zakāt*-givers fulfils their preference or desire to support these specific categories. The *zakāt*-givers desired categories create opportunities, but reasons exist to believe these same categories are also challenging. These challenges are represented in the lack of awareness of citizens and residents about the application of *zakāt* to ‘the poor’ category, either inside or outside Qatar; the double standards applied to citizens and residents relating to debt; and the application tensions regarding ‘the needy’ and ‘the wayfarer or stranded traveller’ categories - between fulfilling the objective of social solidarity (*‘Ummah*) and providing humanitarian aid to all people, regardless of their religion.

Disagreements can similarly be seen in categories such as ‘alms collectors and administrators’, ‘people in bondage or slavery’, ‘the reconciliation of hearts’ and ‘for the cause of *Allah*’. Related projects receive support or are avoided or ignored for reasons such as the diversity of *zakāt* interpretations. Muslims in Qatar question whether to follow traditional interpretations (as taught by the Qatari education system) or contemporary views which are rendered more applicable to current society. Observing the obstacles encountered by different *zakāt*-beneficiary categories - although accepted by Muslim scholars - reveals such information is unfamiliar to the Muslim population. The Muslims in Qatar were not satisfied with the administrative behaviour of Qatari charitable organisations, despite their efforts in humanitarian work through *zakāt* projects.

The researcher believes that the results of this research will contribute to enhancing the opportunities for practicing *zakāt*, and reducing the challenges that *zakāt* faces. The task of developing *zakāt*, and reducing the challenges it faces, lies with those concerned with *zakāt*. Muslims, Islāmic jurists, the authorities responsible for the collection and distribution of *zakāt* such as governments and NGOs, sociologists, and the general public: all have a duty to perform according to the theological, sociological, and lived experience of Muslims.

The next chapter, Chapter Nine, explains in detail the contributions of this research. The researcher attempts to answer the research questions through the presentation on how the theological and sociological aspects affect the practice of *zakāt* in present day Qatar, and addresses the research recommendations for further studies.

## CHAPTER NINE

### Conclusion and Recommendations

#### 9.0 The Significance of this Research

This research aimed to identify how theological and sociological considerations affect the practice of *zakāt* in contemporary Qatar (2017-2020). One original contribution of this research is that it explores the practice of *zakāt* from a lived experience perspective rather than solely from religious texts. The main focus of previous studies of *zakāt* practice has been from a religious angle. The approach this research has taken goes further: it is arguably unique in that it is one of the first studies to examine *zakāt* from both a sociological and religious perspective. This important study introduces new knowledge by focusing on the lived experience of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) - what people in Qatar do every day regarding *zakāt*. The findings from the analysis of the interviews, supported by the survey revealed that individual practice of *zakāt* in Qatar is shaped by both social factors and theological requirements. The two disciplines of sociology of religion and theology are therefore both necessary to answer the research question.

The selection of Qatar as a case study for this research revealed nuanced research findings. Qatar's demographic landscape consists of a mixed population of citizens and residents, different Islāmic denominations (*Sunnah* and *Shī'ah*), and different cultures (tribal and 'imported' cultures). These sectarian and cultural differences contributed to the diversity of practice, and provided a varied context for the research. The contribution of this research provides an original perspective on the motivations and behaviour of individual *zakāt*-givers, and their dealings with the wider society. The activity of charitable organisations in Qatar and their interaction with *zakāt* also created a fertile environment for this research in studying the practice of *zakāt*: the attention paid by charitable organisations (government and NGOs) to *zakāt*, and their methods for persuading *zakāt*-givers to pay their *zakāt*. The unstable political situation in Qatar due to the blockade also had an active role in investigating the practice of *zakāt* under the cover of politics and government interventions. The fact that *zakāt*-givers' motivation was influenced by the social aspect of *zakāt* practice, even though it is a religious requirement, is an important factor in this study. The influences on the practice of *zakāt* have contributed towards *zakāt*-givers' decision-making. These include not only cultural traditions

and customs, both local and imported, but also the behaviour of Qatari charitable organisations, and the politicisation of *zakāt*; despite these societal influences, this research revealed that religious motivation was the strongest influence in decision-making among Muslims in Qatar regarding *zakāt*. This research has contributed to uncovering the effect of multiple religious interpretations of *zakāt* and its practice. The theological and sociological influences on *zakāt* have created both opportunities and challenges in the practice of *zakāt*. The theological and sociological influences on *zakāt* have created both opportunities and challenges in the practice of *zakāt*. There is no ideal way to practise *zakāt* as it depends on human sentiments or individual beliefs or motives; however, this research has shown the factors which enhance the opportunities for practising *zakāt*, whilst highlighting the issues which could help to avoid or alleviate the challenges facing the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar.

### **9.1 Theological and Sociological Influence on the Practice of *Zakāt* in Contemporary Qatar**

The lived experiences of religion as a theoretical framework for this research allowed a study of everyday practices of *zakāt* in Qatar. The results revealed that the religious texts relating to *zakāt* are not necessarily the ones which translate in the behaviour of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) in their daily lives in terms of practising *zakāt*. The demographics and characteristics of Qatari society as Islāmic, and the disciplinary approach of the sociology of Islām, helped the researcher to understand how the socio-religious influences work together regarding the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar.

According to the theological influence on the practice of *zakāt*, the Islāmic environment, which includes religious and social aspects, was strong enough to influence the Muslims in Qatar in their decision-making. The literature review explains the religious aspect of *zakāt*, which is understood by most Qatari Muslims as a relationship between the *zakāt*-giver and *zakāt*-beneficiary. The intention is to provide financial help to those beneficiaries in need (according to the eight *zakāt* categories). This relationship was often supported by religious motivations such as self-purification, *taqwā* (piety), preparing for the afterlife, trade and reward with *Allah* for the *zakāt*-giver, and socio-religious motivation *’Ummah* (social solidarity). Sheikh Al-Qaradagh<sup>269</sup> proposed a new socio-religious motivation: ‘A good reputation among people’, as a result of the dual benefit between the giver and the beneficiary. According to Al-

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<sup>269</sup> Two interviews with Sheikh Ali Al-Qaradaghi on 14/04/2018 and 12/05/2018.

Qaradaghi, the *zakāt*-givers feel the people's appreciation and gratitude, which leads to their self-esteem and contentment: they will be remembered and rewarded by *Allah* for their good deeds on The Day of Judgment. The socio-religious motivation of 'a good reputation among people' is similar to the 'redistribution of wealth' and 'return gift' concepts of giving. The beneficiary and giver switch roles: the beneficiary becomes the 'giver' and the initial giver becomes the receiver of the money spent in the community. This financial cycle boosts the economy and ultimately benefits the wealthy.

The religious influences on the decision-making of Muslims in Qatar concerning the practice of *zakāt* are represented in two parts. First, the individual relationship with *Allah* through following Islāmic teachings provided by the Qur'ān and *Ḥadīth*. Second, the Islāmic environment which is present throughout Qatar follows Islāmic law (*Sharī'ah*). Muslims in Qatar showed keen interest in *Sharī'ah* through Islāmic studies and jurisprudence in schools, universities, and Islāmic centres. Attempts to raise the awareness of *zakāt* were made by both scholars and charitable organisations. The attention paid by Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) regarding the practice of *zakāt* was one of the opportunities for *zakāt*-givers. The lived experiences of *zakāt*-givers in Qatar have also revealed that there are religious factors which challenge their practising of *zakāt*, such as confusion due to the lack of awareness of the modern applications of *zakāt*. One of the main reasons for the lack of awareness is due to the books and curricula that adhere to the traditional interpretations of *zakāt*, which do not reflect the development of societies, and the issues to which Muslims in Qatar are exposed in their daily lives. Over 70 per cent of interviewees in Qatar (citizens and residents), for example, revealed that they were not encouraged by *zakāt*'s application to 'the reconciliation of hearts' category. They believed this category was only to encourage non-Muslims to convert to Islām. But this category has a broader meaning about 'the heart' or feelings. It addresses the desire for peace across different faiths, in the hope of creating a coherent, fraternal society whose members care for each other.

Another religious factor which affected the practice of *zakāt* was the misunderstanding between Arabic-to-Arabic interpretations in the textbooks, and the consequent mistranslations from Arabic to English and other languages of the 'people in bondage or slavery' category, according to the interview with Sheikh Al-Qaradaghi. This research shows that the relevance of this category was reduced to a limited concept of supporting projects which dealt with the emancipation of slaves, dating back 1,400 years. Despite some Muslim scholars pointing out this dilemma, the daily lives of Muslims in Qatar proves that the misunderstanding and

mistranslations of this category still exist in the twenty-first century. The absence of clarity in the meaning of this category is not limited to Qatar or to contemporary times, it has also affected Muslims in general.

The Muslims in Qatar's confusion over the differences between traditional and modern (contemporary) interpretations of *zakāt* created uncertainties, and consequently, a lack of clear religious awareness of the applications of *zakāt*, and motivated ignoring the practice of *zakāt*. ('ignoring' here means that, although Muslims in Qatar believe in the concept of charity, they tend to be confused by how or why *zakāt* is practised, and therefore ignore it). The lack of clear religious awareness of the applications of *zakāt* created an imbalance for Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents). Its misleading implications, on the other hand, have created opportunities for future research. A wider focus and in-depth investigation is required in terms of updating the *zakāt* curriculum in schools, universities, and religious centres, and spreading the awareness of modern applications of *zakāt* in Qatar society.

Religious intolerance also had an impact on the practice of *zakāt*. *Zakāt* is perceived by Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) to fall under the umbrella of the nation's social solidarity 'Ummah – a collection of funds by Muslims only for the benefit of other Muslims. The preference of Muslims in Qatar for Muslim beneficiaries in the distribution of humanitarian aid under the concept of 'Ummah, becomes a challenge for the implementation of *zakāt*: crises occur where both Muslims and non-Muslims need help. The globalised world includes mixed societies living together, and experiencing or suffering the same things. Al-Qaradaghi and Kahf<sup>270</sup> stated that where the issue of life and death is concerned, religion takes second place, regardless of whether that person is a Muslim or not; however, losing basic support (in the form of *zakāt*) for food and medicine can also lead to the loss of life. The majority of interviewees disagreed with Al-Qaradaghi and Kahf. They claimed Islām provides support for non-Muslims through *ṣadaqah* (voluntary charity) and *waqf* (endowment), although these religious forms are not compulsory compared to *zakāt*. Updating the concept of *zakāt* which complies with the twenty-first century situation would go a long way in preventing ill-feelings between Muslims and Muslims, and indeed, between Muslims and non-Muslims.

This research has demonstrated that religious motivations were the main engines in encouraging the practice of *zakāt* by givers; however, the social aspect in Qatar has also played an effective role in influencing the practice of *zakāt*. This examination of lived experience

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<sup>270</sup> Two interviews with Professor Monzer Kahf on 15 - 16/04/2018.

revealed the significance of Qataris' social influence on the practice of *zakāt*. Tribalism and different cultural backgrounds, the behaviour of charitable organisations, and political intervention revealed a strong social impact on the decision-making process of Muslims in Qatar.

The tribal culture of Qatar, represented by the dominant minority, was far more likely to concern the Qatari citizens than the residents. Qatari Muslims are a combination of *Sunnah* majority and *Shī'ah* minority (Fromherz 2012). Its conservative tribal and religious *Sunnah Hanbalī* status has had an impact on the concept of charity by *zakāt*-givers, and played an active role in the social status of Qatar society. The lived experiences with Qatari citizens clarified the Qatari family roles, which often dictated the process at home or in the *majlis* (councils). This had a direct influence on citizens' decision-making in the practice of *zakāt*.<sup>271</sup> The opportunity lies in the fact that *zakāt* is reinforced as a custom and tradition, and thus becomes a habit within the tribes of Qatari society, and ensures continuity of the practice. This habitual behaviour, however, also becomes a conceptual challenge for *zakāt*-givers. The practice of *zakāt* as a social habit arguably prevents Muslims in Qatar from understanding (or lack of awareness of) the religious concepts of *zakāt* which often lead to ignoring *zakāt*.

The decision-making of Muslims in Qatar to pay their *zakāt* was guided by four main influences: the Islāmic environment, tribal traditions, different cultural backgrounds, and personal convictions. These together, suggested cases of practice, denial, avoidance, and ignorance; however, there was evidence of avoidance (purchasing land or buildings according to traditional interpretations), but no evidence of denial. The characteristics of tribal society in Qatar contribute to preventing someone who does not believe in *zakāt* from declaring his or her position, as it would be considered a form of apostasy or *ridda*.<sup>272</sup> The cultural habits adopted by the resident-majority population, furthermore, also had an impact on the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar - for instance, by sending their *zakāt* abroad.

The lived experiences of Qatari residents have also revealed how their connections with family members in their countries of origin have an impact on the practice of *zakāt*. The residents are predominantly migrant workers from India and Egypt, and have preserved many of their own cultural traditions and norms (De Bel-Air 2014; Zahlan 2016). These family ties are maintained, and continuously encouraged by the beneficiaries, despite the geographical

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<sup>271</sup> See Chapter Two: Tribal Culture and its Impact on The Practice of *Zakāt*.

<sup>272</sup> The first Caliph Abu Bakr declared a war on those Muslims who refused to pay *zakāt* called the 'Ridda Wars' (Hossain 2012: 3).



distance between them; furthermore, the givers will have a special status with their families (Al-Qaradaghi's concept of 'a good reputation'), especially if they are less financially secure than the givers. The research findings, however, demonstrated that the family obligation felt by residents is a challenge in terms of 'the poor' beneficiary category. The residents send *zakāt* to the poor in their own country whilst they overlook the disadvantaged people living in Qatar such as unskilled labourers.<sup>273</sup> The resident givers, they argued, consider the workers are fortunate to have a chance to live in Qatar, and experience a so-called 'luxurious life-style', regardless of their poor working conditions. According to Khan and Harroff-Tavel (2011) and HRW (2016) an unskilled labourer accepts the dire employment situation as far better than the worse unemployment conditions or the poverty which exists in the worker's country of origin; the poor families need whatever financial assistance they can receive. The resident givers and beneficiaries, according to the respondents, both shared equal suffering such as separation from their families. The purpose of coming to Qatar was to earn money to support their families back home, they said. *Sharī'ah* was the umpire between the distribution of *zakāt* outside or inside Qatar. Al-Qaradawi (1999) argues that *zakāt* fund distribution should be based on the case of the poor in each country, not a comparison with poor Muslims in other countries. The residents' personal convictions in the distribution of *zakāt*, however, dominated their decision-making. Their behaviour pushed *zakāt* stakeholders to face more challenges to this practice in Qatari society. This is where the role of Muslim scholars and charitable organisations, especially NGOs, could help to raise awareness of *zakāt* by shedding light on the *zakāt* beneficiaries in Qatar - the unskilled workers - rather than promoting projects abroad. The behaviour of *zakāt*-givers encourages charitable organisations to appeal for more funds for external projects. Citizens and residents are affected by some charitable organisations' advertisements to support foreign projects, instead of first addressing the seemingly 'invisible' poverty in Qatar; both Qatari citizens and residents overlooked the inequality in Qatar, and focused instead on the outside world.

Qatari charitable organisations such as *Zakat* Fund (Qatari government organisation), non-governmental charity organisations (NGOs), and charity representatives or intermediaries have taken advantage of the Islāmic environment and characteristics of Qatari society, to promote their projects and persuade Qatari *zakāt*-givers to donate. The *Zakat* Fund focuses its attention

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<sup>273</sup> Qatari residents are divided into two types: 'white collar' workers – managers to clerks - and artisans and unskilled workers. The latter type is the majority and work under harsh conditions. See Chapter Four: Citizen and Resident Demographic Diversity.

on projects inside Qatar - especially those concerned with the poor and needy Qatari citizens and residents. NGOs, on the other hand, were more concerned with projects outside Qatar. The interview findings revealed Qataris' generous behaviour, and quick response to appeals and campaigns for collecting donations, also created opportunities for charitable organisations in the practice of *zakāt*. They use religion such as Qur'ānic verses, and successive advertisements everywhere (public places and the Internet), for examples, urging the practice of *zakāt* to persuade and motivate Qatari givers to pay *zakāt*. The behaviour of charitable organisations could be considered as a reminder of the religious obligation, however, did not find favour with some Muslims in Qatar. Qatari respondents declared that this strategy produced an uncomfortable atmosphere (charity fatigue), and even made them feel reluctant to pay *zakāt* to organisations, preferring instead to pay *zakāt* to individuals of their choice.<sup>274</sup>

The behaviour of the charitable organisations in promoting projects relating to religion, also created problems for the interests of the beneficiaries of *zakāt*. Research interviewees such as C8<sup>275</sup> suggested that projects supporting orphans, drilling wells for water, and printed editions of the Qur'ān, were a form of controlling, to some extent, the beneficiaries of *zakāt* according to the wishes of *zakāt*-givers. C8 claimed the Sudanese society's need for agricultural tools, for instance, was more important than distributing copies of the Qur'ān. The beneficiary, in this case, would be subject to the wishes of the giver, rather than his or her needs being addressed. The type of need and help differs for each beneficiary and in each country. One of the aims of *zakāt* in society is to alleviate suffering such as poverty rather than satisfy the desires of one group at the expense of the needs of another. The impression given by behaviour of the charitable organisations was that *zakāt* had become 'big business', rather than a spiritual or religious commitment that would serve the beneficiaries and society in general.

The dissatisfaction shown by a number of research participants in the administration of *zakāt* funds by Qatari charitable organisations was another challenge for *zakāt*-givers. Paying their employees high salaries as well as claiming expensive project fees did not receive much approval. The participants agreed that projects need financing, but did not believe their *zakāt* should go towards financing these high, so called 'administration fees', rather than one of the more acceptable *zakāt*-beneficiary categories. There were other research participants, by contrast, who praised the work of the organisations, and trusted them to distribute their donations, either according to the donor's wishes, or to those of the organisation. The 'alms for

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<sup>274</sup> See Chapter Seven: The Marketing of *Zakāt*: Beyond Big Business.

<sup>275</sup> Interview with C8, a charity staff member, on 18/07/2018.

collectors and administrators' category consequently became problematic, and its practice was affected.

The Qatari social impact on the practice of *zakāt* extended to the politicisation of *zakāt*, starting with approving the arming of wars, according to the interpretations of *zakāt*, or subjecting it to supervision and sometimes distribution by the Qatari government.

The first – using *zakāt* to provide weapons for wars. Islām has used *zakāt* to defend itself or to spread its message since its birth. The Islāmic equivalent of *zakāt* is Islāmic tax. The state (with Islāmic sovereignty) disposes of *zakāt* according to what it deems appropriate for its own interest or in the interest of the Islāmic religion. The collection and distribution of *zakāt* has occurred for over 1,400 years. It began with Islām's '*Ridda Wars*' and has continued until the present day. The main reason for politicisation of *zakāt* has been through the interpretations of both traditional and modern Muslim scholars of the 'for the cause of *Allah*' category.<sup>276</sup> There is a possibility therefore, that within theological understandings, *zakāt* may be used to purchase weapons and engage in war and armed conflicts. The interview findings revealed that the majority of Qatari citizens, whose decision-making was influenced by tribal affiliations, had no objection to *zakāt* being used to finance wars and weapons.<sup>277</sup> They believed it was a matter of national solidarity with the State of Qatar, especially in light of the blockade that had been imposed on the country since 2017. Religion here had become both politicised and a belligerent practice, instead of the promotion of tolerance and reconciliation, for example, between groups of Muslims. The majority of the interviewees - citizens and residents - in this research were dissatisfied with the use of *zakāt* in politics, even if it was for conflict resolution and political dialogue. They specified that it should only be used for spiritual and religious reasons, not for warfare. To understand the participants' objection to the use of *zakāt* for political purposes is to understand why they do not approve. Using *zakāt* to finance the supply of weapons in regional wars such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and internal conflicts between Muslims and Muslims (brothers against brothers) such as in Syria, is a contradiction of '*Ummah* and the intention of *zakāt*. Participants such as S20<sup>278</sup> pointed out that the beneficiaries such as the poor, the needy, debtors, refugees, and displaced persons are more deserving of *zakāt* than are wars instigated by political agenda, which can often create the need for *zakāt*. This disagreement between *zakāt*-givers and scholars is significant because it shows that the lived

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<sup>276</sup> See Chapter Three: Table (3.1) *Zakāt* application according to traditional and modern Islāmic schools.

<sup>277</sup> See Chapter Eight: 'For the Cause of *Allah*' Category and Politicisation of *Zakāt*.

<sup>278</sup> Interview with S20, a male resident and (above 66 years), on 30/05/2018.

experience of *zakāt*-givers may vary from theological interpretation which is partly informed by lived experience, and socio-political contexts. *Zakāt*-givers stated that, in contemporary contexts, it was difficult, if not impossible, to determine whether any contemporary war may be understood as ‘fighting in defence of Islām or Muslims’. This category ‘for the cause of *Allah*’ could apply to building mosques and religious foundations, schools, charitable trusts, and hospitals. This suggests initiating social projects or emergency relief programmes around the globe by raising awareness about the goals of a peaceful religion: a religion which stipulates and encourages spreading peace and tolerance among members of all societies, whilst also defending itself from internal or external aggression for political ends.

The second – Qatari government intervention in the collection and distribution of *zakāt*. The research showed that this intervention not only restricted and monitored individual practice of *zakāt*, but also the work of charitable organisations regarding their collection and distribution. The Qatari government restricted charitable organisations and projects that operated outside of Qatar, especially countries which supported or participated in the blockade. This was especially after they were accused of supporting ‘terrorism’ by the blockade countries. This factor made the Qatari government become more involved in monitoring all or most of *zakāt* transactions by re-activating the Regulatory Authority for Charitable Activities (RACA). RACA prevents *zakāt* collection by individuals without governmental authorisation; in addition, any charitable activities such as humanitarian projects that were funded by *zakāt*, whether from inside or outside of Qatar, must have RACA approval. The findings revealed that this monitoring and control were not welcomed by all charity organisations: some of them such as the RAF Foundation (The Foundation Sheikh Thani Ibn Abdullah for Humanitarian Services) consequently closed down its offices in Qatar. The reasons for the government's restrictions on the practice of *zakāt* are various; to protect its security from unknown funding sources and distribution is one; others are pursuing the government's interests in directing *zakāt* funds, and controlling internal affairs of the state.<sup>279</sup> Interviews with respondents such as Al-Rwaili<sup>280</sup> a sociologist, revealed that the intention of government intervention was not only to ensure the path of the religious aspect of *zakāt* was followed by both *zakāt*-givers and *zakāt*-beneficiaries, but also to control the direction *zakāt* funds were taking. *Zakāt*, in any political case, serves the interests of the Qatari government more than serving its religious purpose. The

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<sup>279</sup> See Chapter Eight: ‘For the Cause of *Allah*’ Category and Politicisation of *Zakāt*.

<sup>280</sup> Interview with Dr. Mohammed Al-Rwaili on 16/10/2018.

politicisation of *zakāt* disrupts the practice of *zakāt*, thus becoming one of its challenges in Qatar. It also leads to the confusion of Muslims in Qatar, and their reluctance to pay *zakāt*.

The daily life of a Qatari (citizen and resident) in the practice of *zakāt* also clarified personal convictions in terms of human behaviour rather than in terms of theological or sociological influences, such as avoiding or ignoring the practice of *zakāt*. Personal convictions (as a result of a lack of awareness of the beneficiaries of *zakāt*) emerged through the decision-making of Muslims in Qatar regarding the division of *zakāt*-beneficiaries. The lived religion of *zakāt*-givers revealed that they divided the *zakāt*-beneficiary categories into two sections: the approved *zakāt*-beneficiaries or desirable projects such as ‘the poor’ and ‘the needy’, ‘people burdened with debt’, and ‘the wayfarer or stranded traveller’, and the other on so-called ‘controversial’ or less desirable *zakāt*-beneficiary categories such as ‘alms collectors and administrators’, ‘the reconciliation of hearts’, ‘people in bondage or slavery’ and ‘for the cause of *Allah*’. *Zakāt* becomes a challenge for *zakāt*-givers, regardless of the opportunities, when its application is not available to all beneficiaries.

To conclude this section, the findings (interviews supported by the survey) of this research have shown the lived experiences of *zakāt*-givers revealed how beneficiaries of *zakāt* were exposed to both opportunities and challenges in the practice of *zakāt* in Qatari society. The opportunities for practising *zakāt* were represented by various attitudes and behaviour: (i) reflection on Qatar’s Islāmic identity and environment, and the impact this had on the behaviour of the Qatari individual; (ii) the role of Muslim scholars in educating and reminding Muslims in Qatar of their religious commitment towards *zakāt*; and (iii) the behaviour of charitable organisations also contributed to reminding givers of their religious obligation towards *zakāt*. These opportunities for practising *zakāt*, however, may also have contributed to creating challenges for the beneficiaries of *zakāt* (beyond the scope of this study). These challenges were created due to: (i) the lack of awareness among the givers of the concept of *zakāt*-beneficiaries, and the modern applications of *zakāt*; (ii) the behaviour of charitable organisations making *zakāt* ‘big business’, and the extensive and continual advertising methods caused charity-fatigue, rather than aiming to achieve its intention as a spiritual practice; (iii) the behaviour of *zakāt*-givers in restricting their *zakāt* according to their desires rather than the requirements of beneficiaries; and (iv) government intervention in controlling and directing *zakāt* projects.

This research has bridged the theological and sociological approaches by exploring how *zakāt* is lived in Qatar; in doing so, it has uncovered the messy realities and everyday negotiations that Muslims undertake in deciding how and to whom they give their *zakāt*. Building on this, the following research contributions help to develop this bridging process, as well as providing other original contributions of this research through theoretical frameworks to strengthen the opportunities for *zakāt*-givers and stakeholders, and help to alleviate the challenges facing those engaged with *zakāt*.

## 9.2. Research Contributions

This research focused on the practice of *zakāt* according to the social perspective within a religious framework. This study detailed opportunities for enacting *zakāt* by Qatari Muslims (citizen and resident) from both a religious and a social aspect in order to develop and strengthen its concept, implementation, and impact. This means it has offered additional successful opportunities for practising *zakāt* in the future. The challenges are also highlighted in an attempt to avoid their recurrences which hinder the practice of *zakāt*. The three key contributions of this research are:

- Development of theological thinking regarding how *zakāt* may be understood within a lived religion approach;

- Development of jurisprudence approaches to *zakāt* and its concepts in terms of social perspectives; and

- Highlighting the behaviour of charitable organisations and the government in terms of the collection and distribution mechanism of *zakāt*.

This research has contributed to better understanding of *zakāt*, so that it is no longer simply a theological or religious concept: it is also lived, business-orientated, and political. This research has also contributed to clarifying the religious concept of *zakāt*: givers and beneficiaries do not always understand, or are unaware of, the meaning of the eight categories of *zakāt*. The research has shown that there is a gap between religious texts and their applications through lived experience. This research, in addition, has contributed to creating new horizons for the development of further writings in socio-scientific research related to religious studies. Consideration has been directed to the social factors, daily lives, and everyday negotiations of the *zakāt*-givers and beneficiaries in dealing with *zakāt*. These factors have laid the foundation for further research.

This research has also contributed to a gendered exploration of the lived experience of *zakāt*. The researcher's own lived experience through this research has revealed that most Islāmic studies are conducted by males: there is an absence of females in the theoretical production of Islāmic studies. This research has created an incentive for women to produce theoretical and intellectual contributions to the philosophy and jurisprudence of *zakāt*. The lived religion focus of this research has also contributed to highlighting the way in which the role of the *zakāt* giver is gendered. The researcher, by virtue of being a female, was able to access and include the voices and experiences of (Muslim) women in Qatar in relation to *zakāt*. Due to her positionality and approach to the research, this researcher was able to gain the confidence of Qatari female Muslims, which allowed these women to share their understanding of *zakāt* and its mechanism, and their experiences of practising *zakāt* in a patriarchal society. Female participants included educated academics, workers, and housewives. Their voices were strong, and women are often influential within their family contexts. Qatari female citizens and residents contribute to discourses around jurisprudential, philosophical, and everyday aspects of religion. This research emphasises the need for more research by and with female contributors in the sociology of Islām.

The exploration of the theology of *zakāt* in this thesis suggests the need for upgrading the scope of interpretations of *zakāt* in Islāmic studies within schools and universities. A contribution has been made to the development of theological understandings of *zakāt*. The results obtained from this research such as the lack of awareness of the concept of beneficiaries by *zakāt*-givers', and the confusion caused by traditional and modern (contemporary) interpretations of *zakāt* reflect the importance of the need for new research.

Based on the nation's social solidarity - '*Ummah*' - and the desire issue of *zakāt*-givers over the needs of *zakāt*-beneficiaries, this research assists in raising awareness regarding the concepts of the eight beneficiary categories of *zakāt*. This research offers the foundations for contributions from Muslim scholars (both male and female) to focus on issues that raise Muslims' awareness in terms of the modern applications of *zakāt*, particularly concerning 'the reconciliation of hearts' and 'for the cause of *Allah*' categories.

Highlighting *zakāt*'s mechanism in terms of its contributions and administration through organisations presents an opportunity for further research. The examination of these organisations' lived experience reveals that one of the reasons for problems is using religion as a means to an end. Publishing projects such as printing the Qur'ān and posters illustrating

orphans have an Islāmic reference, for example, and help to attract and persuade *zakāt*-givers to donate. The constant request for donations through whatever means, on the other hand, causes charity fatigue.

The findings of this research also disclosed that existing *zakāt* frameworks tend to comply with projects and causes which are approved or preferred by *zakāt*-givers, rather than what is appropriate for the beneficiaries. No claim is made as to what the appropriate strategies should be for beneficiaries - greater attention should therefore be given to this topic in future research; all charitable organisations in Qatar have marketing campaigns, for instance. Attention focuses on attracting donors by providing them with projects which follow Islāmic teachings which satisfy them, such as the distribution of the Qur'ān and sponsoring orphans. This was evident in McLaren and Qonita (2019) in their study on the problems of orphan projects in Indonesia, due to the promotion of charitable organisations at the expense of other projects such as parents in poverty to care for their children.<sup>281</sup> The interests of givers are thus privileged over the interests of beneficiaries. This needs further reflection by scholars and organisations working with *zakāt*. These findings suggest that this might also be the case with the management of other types of Islāmic donations such as *ṣadaqah* (voluntary charity) or *waqf* (endowment). This research has, therefore, presented a platform for charitable organisations to consider the establishment of projects which are marketed in proportion to the requirements of beneficiaries, and which do not privilege the (sometimes unreasonable) interests of the *zakāt*-givers or the charitable organisations.

This research has also brought to attention the Qatari charitable organisations' administrative issues, such as employees' high salaries, the recognised need for monitoring the level of fees for some projects, and significant expenditure on marketing and prioritising of givers over beneficiaries. These issues uncovered within Qatari charitable organisations may also exist within the international charity sector. This research suggests the need for greater introspection and evaluation of these and other related issues across the sector. This research provides an opportunity for those interested in this regard to benefit from the results of this research which can be found in the analysis, discussion, and appendices chapters.

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<sup>281</sup> See Chapter Eight: 'Alms for Collectors and Administrators' Category between Qatari Charitable Organisations' Behaviour and *Zakāt*-Givers Conditional Projects.



### 9.3. Thesis limitations and Recommendations for Further Research

This research has made important contributions to certain focal points in completing the plan for this study. The potential future initiatives from this study which are beyond the scope of this thesis include suggestions for further investigation according to omissions and challenges which faced this research. The four key recommendations from this research are:

- i. Emphasise the lived experience of beneficiaries of *zakāt*;
- ii. Develop ‘lived religion’ approaches to study various Islāmic tenets;
- iii. Revise, develop, and update *zakāt* interpretations; and
- iv. Recognise the impact of intermediaries and the mediating influences including societal context on *zakāt* mechanisms.

One of the limitations of this research was the results showed *zakāt* practice in Qatar only from the givers’ perspective. The researcher did not interview beneficiaries of *zakāt*, since no participants identified themselves as beneficiaries. Maintaining dignity and self-protection, for instance, was due to tribal and cultural influence among Qatari tribes, and a reason for declining to disclose a beneficiary identity. *Zakāt*-beneficiaries are considered parallel to *zakāt*-givers in studying the practice of *zakāt*; therefore, observing the influence of the relationship between givers and beneficiaries through such concepts as ‘return gift’, ‘redistribution of wealth’, and ‘a good reputation among people’ of Qatar society was not comprehensive.

The other recommendations for this research are to develop ‘lived religion’ approaches to various Islāmic principles. The majority of *zakāt* studies were from a religious and juristic perspective, and conducted according to the jurisprudential issues of *zakāt* under *Sharī‘ah*, and their interpretations. The other types of *zakāt* studies focus on the mechanism of *zakāt* in terms of collection and distribution. The mechanism of *zakāt* was clear in the examples of the case studies such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia. The ‘lived religion’ issue, on the other hand, should not be limited to the practice of *zakāt*, but can be used to explore various Islāmic tenets such as prayer and fasting. It is therefore important to know the Muslims’ interactions between religious commitment and their behaviour. ‘Lived religion’ as a concept insists that people read and negotiate their way around religious theory, and then implement religious doctrine in ways that do not always fully conform to the text. It goes without saying, a Muslim is a human being who has personal convictions between belief and practice, compared to the social influences of culture on his or her decision-making. The environment in which people live will have an influence alongside religion on their decision-making.

The experience of the daily life of the *zakāt*-giver proved that there is a lack of awareness about the general concept of *zakāt*, especially the eight *zakāt*-beneficiary categories. Lack of awareness was also restricted by the traditional interpretations of *zakāt*, and lack of awareness of modern applications. Qatari society is affected by the curricula in schools and universities that focus on traditional scholarship. Traditional applications do not usually reflect the challenges of the times and the developments of society from time to time. This is reflected in many *zakāt* applications, such as ‘the reconciliation of hearts’ and ‘people in bondage or slavery’ categories.<sup>282</sup> There is therefore an urgent need for revision, development, and updating of *zakāt* interpretations in schools, universities, and religious centres.

Another limitation for this research was that the researcher was unable to conduct interviews with the governmental organisation - *Zakat* Fund - which represents *zakāt* in Qatar. The interviews were declined without giving reasons. The researcher based the analysis of the behaviour of this organisation on the written answers received via email. The limitations to the research also occurred when the researcher distributed the hard copies of the survey to the staff of three ministries in Qatar. This resulted in 61 responses out of 153 - more than a third of the total number of replies, which arguably had an effect on the findings, especially concerning the political aspect. This research has identified the important role of intermediaries and the mediating influences over the *zakāt* mechanism - collection and distribution. *Zakāt* challenges disclosed in the findings such as politicisation of *zakāt* and mismanagement in charitable organisations, were also among important, under-explored conditions which need further study. Politics changed the path of *zakāt* from the giver to the beneficiary such as the Comoros project according to C6<sup>283</sup>.<sup>284</sup> Charitable organisations were another factor in which the intermediaries influenced the mechanism of *zakāt*. These organisations prompted the givers’ decision-making with their persuasive behaviour (which often caused charity fatigue), and promoting the projects which did not serve the beneficiaries (such as those in Sudan). The importance of this research will help to uncover the challenges that the practice of *zakāt* faces due to unwanted intervention from charitable organisations and politics.

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<sup>282</sup> See Chapter Eight: The Interpretations of *Zakāt*-beneficiary Categories: Opportunities and Challenges.

<sup>283</sup> Interview with C6, a charity staff member, on 27/03/2018.

<sup>284</sup> See Chapter Eight: ‘For the cause of *Allah*’ Category and Politicisation of *Zakāt*.

#### 9.4. Concluding Reflections

The researcher has travelled a long journey in attempting to complete a deeper understanding of the influences of theological and sociological aspects on the practice of *zakāt* in contemporary Qatar 2017-2020. She has met many different people from different backgrounds, with different opinions and different life experiences. She observed people in the end are human beings, regardless of their religious beliefs, backgrounds, or social status, and suffer the same pain and happiness at various stages in their lives. This research has opened her eyes to the fact that *zakāt* is not a purely religious practice. *Zakāt* also has a social aspect with which Muslims co-exist in their daily lives.

She is a Muslim herself, and comes from Gaza - one of the conflict zones. She is consequently aware of how important and valuable *zakāt* is in helping to reduce people's suffering. Her decision to focus on lived experience has taught her many things, and provided much information and discoveries. A distribution of the Qur'ān, for instance, may satisfy some donors who wish to promote Islām, but it will not feed the hungry, or provide shelter for displaced persons. She hopes this research will motivate others to expand on the platform she has laid for further studies. She believes these will provide a deeper understanding of the meaning of *zakāt* in a modern context. She hopes her *zakāt* journey will help to instigate a more compassionate approach that looks at how *zakāt* is lived by ordinary people in their everyday lives.

The researcher is optimistic that this research supports Muslim scholars and intermediaries (both charitable organisations and government authorities) to embrace the proposed updated or expanded form of *zakāt* from a socio-religious aspect. This may provide more successful opportunities for practising *zakāt*, and ways to mitigate the effect of the challenges that hinder its practice. This research on *zakāt* and its findings are located within the social, political, and geographical context of Qatar. The findings of this research demonstrate how everyday Islāmic practices reflect religious understandings which are globally shared by Muslim communities. The findings also crucially bring to light how these same practices are also locally determined. Demographics, local culture, and politics determine how these practices are lived. This research emphasises the need to situate the local in addition to the global in studies of various aspects of Muslim life.

This research thus complicates and nuances understandings of *zakāt*. While this thesis starts with theological understandings of *zakāt*, it develops new knowledge by focusing on

what people do in their everyday lives. People think about *zakāt*, give *zakāt*, and accept *zakāt* in contexts that are shaped by theology, but significantly, also by their own personal beliefs, and by socio-political and cultural stimuli emerging from the communities and societies they inhabit. This thesis is about how Islām, particularly *zakāt*, is practised in Qatar. Yet, in developing a model that privileges everyday experiences of a theologically-determined religious practice, it develops a model that can be used to study other aspects of Islām in other geographical contexts.

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## APPENDICES

### Appendix A: Questionnaire English

**Dear Sir / Madam,**

Thank you for accepting to participate in this questionnaire.

The questionnaire is part of my Ph.D. research. The research seeks to explore the philosophy and conceptual framework behind Islamic charity, focusing on modern *zakāt* as a core pillar of Islām. It aims to investigate *zakāt*-givers' behaviour and *zakāt* philosophy in the political Islamic economy. How can *zakāt*, furthermore, be utilised as a source of funding for peacebuilding?

The questionnaire focuses on the following areas: awareness of the meaning and concept of *zakāt*; how Qatari *zakāt*-givers choose one recipient body over another; what motivates of Qatari *zakāt*-givers, and how the decision is being made. The researcher will carefully analyse your answers in order to gain a better understanding of the *zakāt*-givers' behaviour in the Qatari context. Your participation is valuable and important, and it will be much appreciated if you could answer the required questions in detail, according to your experience. The interview is totally voluntary, however, and you can choose to answer all, some, or none of the questions.

Please be assured that the information you provide will be held anonymously. The results will be shown only in an aggregate form, which means that it is impossible to trace responses back to you individually. The data collected through this study will only be used only for academic research purposes. If you would like any additional information and feedback about the purpose and results of this study, please contact me directly. You may withdraw your questionnaire from the research, within eight weeks after your initial agreement to participate.

Please note that, this survey is being undertaken as part of my Ph.D. research at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR), Coventry University and it complies with the University's ethics procedures.

Many thanks for your time and participation.

**Ola Alkahlout (Ph.D. candidate)**

Content redacted on data protection grounds.

( ) Please tick this box to show that you understand and agree with the information given above and that you are providing your consent to participate in this study.

**Personal Information:**

**Gender:** ( ) Male ( ) Female

**Nationality:** ( ) Qatari ( ) Foreign Resident

**Age:** ( ) 18-25 years ( ) 26-35 years ( ) 36-45 years  
( ) 46-65 years ( ) Above 66 years

**Survey Questionnaire**

Please tick the appropriate box to indicate your response to the following statements:

	<b>Section 1: Awareness of <i>Zakāt</i> ‘The compulsory alms-giving’</b>	Yes	No	I do not know
1.1	I am aware of the conceptual meaning of <i>Zakāt</i> .			
1.2	I am aware of to whom <i>Zakāt</i> is due.			
1.3	I am aware of <i>Zakāt</i> ’s wealth types and its conditions.			
1.4	I am aware of the use of <i>Niṣāb</i> ‘The minimum for <i>Zakāt</i> ’.			
1.5	I am aware of the eight categories of <i>Zakāt</i> -beneficiaries.			
1.6	I am aware of <i>Zakāt</i> ’s process or flow (from giver to beneficiary)			
1.7	I need to learn about <i>Zakāt</i> .			

Would you like to add any other comments regarding your level of awareness of *Zakāt*? If so, please use the space below.

	<b>Section 2: I give my <i>Zakāt</i> to... (Please choose an answer in each question)</b>	Agree	Disagree	I do not know
2.1	<b>Government collection body.</b> ( <i>Zakat</i> Fund which is a department under the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs under Qatari government control)			
2.2	<b>Mosques.</b> (Local or known mosques in the area)			

2. 3	<b>Charity Organisations.</b> (Eid Charity, Qatar Charity, Qatar Red Crescent, Reach Out To Asia, and so on)			
2. 4	<b>Individuals</b> (Paid directly to chosen beneficiaries without involving a third party)			
2. 5	<b>I give my <i>Zakāt</i> through ...</b> a) Cash payments.			
	b) Amounts in kind			
	c) Banking transactions			
2. 6	<b>I prefer to pay my <i>Zakāt</i> ...</b> a) In Qatar.			
	b) Abroad			
	c) Both			

Would you like to add any other comments concerning your *Zakāt*-giving behaviour? If so, please use the space below.

	<b>Section 3: Decision-making</b> <b>When I make my <i>Zakāt</i> decision, I trust and act according ...</b>	<b>I trust</b>	<b>I do not trust</b>	<b>I do not know</b>
3. 1	My family; I pay my <i>Zakāt</i> with them			
3. 2	My own judgment			
3. 3	Media Reports (TV, radio, newspapers)			
3. 4	Social Media Reports (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram ...)			

3. 5	Advertisements (billboard, TV commercials ...)			
3. 6	Calls from Muslims Scholars			
3. 7	Humanitarian Appeals (government, United Nation, NGOs)			

Would you like to add any other comments regarding your decision-making when it comes to *Zakāt*-giving? If so, please use the space below.

<b>Section 4: Motivation: For Religion or For Humanity</b>				
4. 1	I give my <i>Zakāt</i> as			
	a) A religious obligation.			
	b) Humanitarian grounds.			
	c) Both			
		Agree	Disagree	I do not know
4. 2	There is no difference between religious and humanitarian imperatives.			
4. 3	<i>Zakāt</i> is no different from other voluntary actions (e.g., <i>Ṣadaqah</i> , <i>Waqf</i> ). It is not an obligation.			
4. 4	<i>Zakāt</i> should be given to both Muslims and non-Muslims.			
4. 5	<i>Zakāt</i> 's rules and application need to be developed and updated to reflect modern challenges.			

Would you like to add any other comments regarding your *Zakāt*-giving behaviour? If so, please use the space below.

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	<b>Section 5: <i>Zakāt</i> and Peacebuilding. In peacebuilding, if it were permissible to give your <i>Zakāt</i> to the following, which sector would you choose ...</b>	Tick
5.1	Creating job opportunities	
5.2	Grass-root conflict resolution (tribal, civil and intra-state conflicts)	
5.3	Infrastructure projects (e.g., Drinking-water supply systems and sewerage networks, electricity networks, road construction.)	
5.4	Political dialogue (Includes a wide range of activities: from high-level negotiations to mediation to community reconciliation attempts)	
5.5	Raising Awareness (e.g.: Investment in raising awareness about the peaceful nature of Islām in order to counter the violent images portrayed by the terrorist groups)	
5.6	Another sector. (Humanitarian aid, development aid ...)	

Would you like to add any other comments concerning your *Zakāt*-giving preferences? If so, please use the space below.

--

THANK YOU VERY MUCH  
FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION IN THIS STUDY

## Appendix B: *Fiqh* Questions

### Al-Qaradawi Semi-Structured Interview

Research Subject:

***Zakāt's* Modern Philosophy and its Application in Peacebuilding. Case study: Qatar.**

I am Ola Alkahlout, Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) of Coventry University in the U.K.

My PhD research seeks to explore the philosophy and conceptual frameworks behind Islamic charity, focussing on modern *zakāt* as a core pillar of Islām. *Zakāt* has a paramount importance in Islamic alms-giving as a religious duty. The aim of the research to investigate *zakāt*-givers' behaviour and *zakāt* philosophy in the Islamic political economy in the Qatari context. It investigates furthermore, how *zakāt* can be utilised as a source of funding for peacebuilding, taking into consideration the dire need for peacebuilding efforts as a result of an increased in the number of wars and armed conflicts.

Interview Schedule

Interviewee: Sheikh Prof. Dr. Yusuf al-Qaradawi Date: Place: Al-Qaradawi Office	Intended Duration: 30 – 60 minutes Interview began _____ Interview finished: _____. Actual duration: _____ min.
Topic: <i>Fiqh</i> (juristic) and philosophical questions on <i>zakāt</i> and peacebuilding.	
<p>Questions:</p> <p>The time shifts from Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) until our days. <i>Zakāt</i> has passed through multiple stages of religious commitment to giving by Muslims.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>To what extent has classical <i>zakāt</i> been developed to suit modern <i>zakāt</i>? Do you think <i>zakāt</i> needs revision today, to update its rules and application to reflect modern challenges?</li> </ul> <p><i>Zakāt</i> collection and disruption has been exposed to external factors that have changed its real path. Political purposes and personal interest in <i>zakāt</i> administration, for example.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Do you think <i>Zakāt</i> needs increased monitoring regarding its collection and disbursement? If so, how? If not, why?</li> </ul> <p>As a result of tribal and civil conflicts that kill, harm, or wound people and require 'blood' money for unintentional or semi-intentional homicide, or indemnity for injury, according to Islamic law.</p> <p>One of the eight categories of <i>zakāt's</i> beneficiaries is people in bondage or slavery.</p> <p>If blood money is unaffordable:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Do you think, from the juristic (legal) point of view, that this category can cover grass-root conflict resolutions as a peacebuilding approach?</li> <li>Can this be used for the benefit of modern victims of human trafficking?</li> </ul>	



Another one of the eight categories of *zakāt*-beneficiaries is the reconciliation of hearts. Most jurists have agreed that, this category is designed to spread Islām. It was suitable for Prophet Mohammed's time to encourage non-Muslims to convert to Islām.

Islām is witnessing a vicious attack nowadays, due to the terrorist groups and organisations operating under the name of Islām, and the lack of public awareness about Islām as a religion. Examples include the fighting in Myanmar between Muslims and Buddhists, and the fighting in The Central African Republic between Muslims and Christians.

- As a jurist, do you think this category, reconciliation of hearts, can be used to raise awareness about Islām? Can it provide positive information about Islām, especially in conflict zones, where disputes erupt between Muslims and non-Muslims, as a method of conflict resolution for a peacebuilding approach?

There are many projects that exist in peacebuilding. It creates job opportunities, infrastructure projects, schools and hospitals buildings, and so on. We are currently living in an open world where Muslims and non-Muslims are living together and closer than before.

- Can *zakāt* be used for peacebuilding? In what contexts?
- What is the religious jurisprudence opinion for using *zakāt* funds to adopt a peacebuilding approach in mixed communities, where Muslims and non-Muslims live together?

Qatar is witnessing an unstable situation at present, as a result of the embargo imposed by the neighbouring countries.

- Do you think this Ph.D. research is pertinent to the current socio-political developments for the diverse Muslim communities in Qatar?
- Do you think *zakāt* is affected?
- Do you think this research project will make a difference to the current understanding of *zakāt*? If so, how?
- How do you think this research project will make a difference to peacebuilding?
- Do you think there will be lines of rapprochement between Muslims and non-Muslims through the door of *zakāt*?

Content redacted on data protection grounds.

## Appendix C: Islamic Study Academic Questions

### Kahf Semi-Structured Interview

Research Subject:

***Zakāt's Modern Philosophy and its Application in Peacebuilding, Case study: Qatar.***

I am Ola Alkahlout, Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) of Coventry University in the U.K.

My PhD research seeks to explore the philosophy and conceptual frameworks behind Islamic charity, focussing on modern *zakāt* as a core pillar of Islām. *Zakāt* has a paramount importance in Islamic alms-giving as a religious duty. The aim of the research to investigate *zakāt*-givers' behaviour and *zakāt* philosophy in the Islamic political economy in the Qatari context. It investigates furthermore, how *zakāt* can be utilised as a source of funding for peacebuilding, taking into consideration the dire need for peacebuilding efforts as a result of an increased in the number of wars and armed conflicts.

#### Interview Schedule

Interviewee: Sheikh Prof. Dr. Monther Kahf Date: Place: Kahf Office	Intended Duration: 30 – 60 minutes Interview began _____ Interview finished: _____. Actual duration: _____ min.
Topic: Fiqh (juristic) and philosophical questions on <i>Zakāt</i> and peacebuilding.	
<p>Questions:</p> <p>The time shifts from Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h.) until our days. <i>Zakāt</i> has passed through multiple stages of religious commitment to giving by Muslims.</p> <p>To what extent has classical <i>zakāt</i> been developed to suit modern <i>zakāt</i>? Do you think <i>zakāt</i> needs revision today, to update its rules and application to reflect modern challenges?</p> <p><i>Zakāt</i> collection and disruption has been exposed to external factors that have changed its real path. Political purposes and personal interest in <i>zakāt</i> administration, for example.</p> <p>Do you think <i>zakāt</i> needs increased monitoring regarding its collection and disbursement? If so, how? If not, why?</p> <p>As a result of tribal and civil conflicts that kill, harm, or wound people and require 'blood' money for unintentional or semi-intentional homicide, or indemnity for injury, according to Islamic law.</p> <p>One of the eight categories of <i>Zakāt's</i> beneficiaries is people in bondage or slavery.</p> <p>If blood money is unaffordable:</p>	

Do you think, from the juristic (legal) point of view, that this category can cover grass-root conflict resolutions as a peacebuilding approach?

Can this be used for the benefit of modern victims of human trafficking?

Another one of the eight categories of *zakāt*-beneficiaries is the reconciliation of hearts. Most jurists have agreed that, this category is designed to spread Islām. It was suitable for Prophet Mohammed's time to encourage non-Muslims to convert to Islām.

Islām is witnessing a vicious attack nowadays, due to the terrorist groups and organisations operating under the name of Islām, and the lack of public awareness about Islām as a religion. Examples include the fighting in Burma or Myanmar between Muslims and Buddhists, and the fighting in The Central African Republic between Muslims and Christians.

As a jurist, do you think this category, reconciliation of hearts, can be used to raise awareness about Islām? Can it provide positive information about Islām, especially in conflict zones, where disputes erupt between Muslims and non-Muslims, as a method of conflict resolution for a peacebuilding approach?

There are many projects that exist in peacebuilding. It creates job opportunities, infrastructure projects, schools and hospitals buildings, and so on. We are currently living in an open world where Muslims and non-Muslims are living together and closer than before. Can *zakāt* be used for peacebuilding? In what contexts?

What is the religious jurisprudence opinion for using *zakāt* funds to adopt a peacebuilding approach in mixed communities, where Muslims and non-Muslims live together?

Qatar is witnessing an unstable situation at present, as a result of the embargo imposed by the neighbouring countries.

Do you think this Ph.D. research is pertinent to the current socio-political developments for the diverse Muslim communities in Qatar?

Do you think *zakāt* is affected?

Do you think this research project will make a difference to the current understanding of *zakāt*? If so, how?

How do you think this research project will make a difference to peacebuilding?

Do you think there will be lines of rapprochement between Muslims and non-Muslims through the door of *zakāt*?

Content redacted on data protection grounds.

## Appendix D: Zakat Fund Questions

### Zakat Fund (Government) Semi-Structured Interview

Research Subject:

***Zakāt's Modern Philosophy and its Application in Peacebuilding. Case study: Qatar.***

I am Ola Alkahlout, Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) of Coventry University in the U.K.

My PhD research seeks to explore the philosophy and conceptual frameworks behind Islamic charity, focussing on modern *zakāt* as a core pillar of Islām. *Zakāt* has paramount importance in Islamic alms-giving as a religious duty. The aim of research is to investigate *zakāt*-givers' behaviour and *zakāt* philosophy in the political Islamic economy in the Qatari context. It investigates how *zakāt* can be utilised as a source of funding for peacebuilding initiatives, taking into consideration the dire need for peacebuilding efforts as result of an increased in the number of wars and armed conflicts.

#### Interview Schedule

Interviewee: <i>Zakat</i> Fund Date: Place: <i>Zakat</i> Fund (Government office)	Intended Duration: 30 – 60 minutes Interview began _____ Interview finished: _____. Actual duration: _____ min.
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Topic: *Zakāt's* Mechanism and Peacebuilding Projects.

#### Questions:

The time shifts from Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h) until the present. *Zakāt* has passed through multiple stages of religious commitment from *Zakāt* givers. Most of *zakāt* is done through individuals.

Regarding the *Zakat* Fund as a representative of the Qatari government, Is *zakāt* taken by force, such as direct bank transfers?

- What is the current process for *zakāt* collection?
- When collecting *zakāt*, is there a separation between *zakāt* funds and government donations?
- Is there a religious figure you can refer to when it comes to specific questions you receive (or that you have) about *zakāt*? If yes, whom?

*Zakāt* collection and disbursement is exposed to external factors that change its real path, like political purposes and personal interest in *zakāt* administration.

- Are there sufficient administrative controls and oversight to protect *zakāt* distribution from the influence of personal interests?
- Do you think *Zakāt* distribution needs increased monitoring of the collection and disbursement? If so, how? If not, why?
- Does the *Zakat* Fund have sufficient neutrality and transparency in processing *zakāt*? How so? Please explain.

Qatar is currently witnessing instability as a result of the embargo imposed by the neighbouring countries.

- What is the ratio of those receiving *zakāt* in recent years compared to the last six months?
- Do you think *zakāt* is affected?
- How does a Qatari citizen deal with *zakāt*? And how well do they respond to government humanitarian appeals?
- Who are more active in *zakāt*, Qatari citizens or foreign residents?
- Do foreign residents use different avenues for payment of *zakāt* – for example, do they give *zakāt* to their countries of origin?
- Is the *zakāt*-giver familiar with all the details of his or her *zakāt* journey until it reaches the beneficiary?

Peacebuilding creates many projects: job opportunities, infrastructure projects, school and hospital building, and so on. We are currently living in an open world, where Muslim and non-Muslims are living together and closer than before.

- Do you use *zakāt* for peacebuilding? In what contexts?
- Are there projects that bring together Muslims and non-Muslims?
- Which projects are most operated by *zakāt*?
- Are there specific beneficiaries to whom you pay *zakāt* money? Please identify them.
- Are there external bodies that receive *Zakāt* money from your department? Who are those bodies?
- Is there any political intervention in *zakāt* distribution?

Content redacted on data protection grounds.

## Appendix E: NGO Questions

### Qatar Charity (NGO) Semi-Structured Interview

Research Subject:

***Zakāt's Modern Philosophy and its Application in Peacebuilding, Case study: Qatar.***

I am Ola Alkahlout, Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) of Coventry University in the U.K.

My PhD research seeks to explore the philosophy and conceptual frameworks behind Islamic charity, focussing on modern *zakāt* as a core pillar of Islām. *Zakāt* has a paramount importance in Islamic alms-giving as a religious duty. The aim of the research to investigate *zakāt*-givers' behaviour and *zakāt* philosophy in the Islamic political economy in the Qatari context. It investigates furthermore, how *zakāt* can be utilised as a source of funding for peacebuilding, taking into consideration the dire need for peacebuilding efforts as a result of an increased in the number of wars and armed conflicts.

Interview Schedule

Interviewee: Qatar Charity	Intended Duration: 30 – 60 minutes
Date:	Interview began _____ Interview finished: _____.
Place: Qatar Charity Office	Actual duration: _____ min.
Topic: <i>Zakāt</i> Mechanism and Charitable Projects.	
<p>Questions:</p> <p>The time shifts from Prophet Muhammad (p.b.u.h) until our days. <i>zakāt</i> passes through multiple stages of religious commitment from <i>zakāt</i> givers.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Today, how does the process of <i>zakāt</i> collection work?</li> <li>• When collecting <i>zakāt</i>, is there a separation between <i>zakāt</i> funds and other Islamic donations?</li> <li>• Is there excessive use of incitement in advertising campaigns to collect <i>zakāt</i>?</li> <li>• Is there a religious figure you consult when it comes to questions about <i>zakāt</i>? If yes, whom?</li> <li>• Which forms of <i>zakāt</i> payment do you receive? Cash payments, amounts in kind, banking transactions or something else? Which method of payment is the most common among Muslims in Qatar?</li> </ul> <p><i>Zakāt</i> collection and disbursement is exposed to external factors that change its real path, like political purposes and a personal interest in <i>zakāt</i> administrations.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Is there sufficient administrative control to protect <i>zakāt</i> distribution from being influenced by personal interests?</li> <li>• Do you think that <i>zakāt</i> collection and disbursement need increased monitoring? If yes, how?</li> <li>• Do NGOs and your organisation in particular, have sufficient neutrality and transparency in processing <i>zakāt</i>? And how do you prove convey that to <i>zakāt</i> givers?</li> <li>• What are the criteria/standards that you follow in processing <i>zakāt</i>?</li> </ul>	

Today, Qatar is witnessing instability as a result of the embargo imposed by the neighbouring countries.

- What is the ratio of receiving *zakāt* in the recent years compared to the last six months?
- Do you think *zakāt* giving has been affected by the recent instability?
- How does a Qatari citizen deal with *zakāt*? How well do they respond to the humanitarian appeals?
- Who donates more through in *zakāt*, Qatari citizens or foreign residents?
- Do foreign residents use different avenues for payment of *zakāt* – for example do they give *zakāt* in countries of origin instead?
- Does the Qatari community tend to give *zakāt* as groups or as individuals?
- Is the *zakāt*-giver familiar with all the details of his/her *zakāt* journey until it reaches the beneficiary?

In peacebuilding, where many projects exist, creating job opportunities, infrastructure projects, building schools and hospitals, and so on, nowadays, we are living in an open world where Muslim and non-Muslims are living together and closer than before.

- Do you use *zakāt* for peacebuilding? In what contexts?
- Are there projects that bring together Muslims and non-Muslims?
- Which projects are most operated by *zakāt*?
- Are there specific beneficiaries who receive *Zakāt* donations? Please identify them.
- Are there external bodies that take *zakāt* money from you? Who are those bodies?
- Do you think there will be lines of rapprochement between Muslims and non-Muslims from the door of *zakāt*?
- On which categories of *zakāt*-beneficiaries do you spend *zakāt* on?

Content redacted on data protection grounds.

## Appendix F: Political Economy Academic Questions

Research Subject:

***Zakāt's Modern Philosophy and its Application in Peacebuilding, Case study: Qatar.***

I am Ola Alkahlout, Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) of Coventry University in the U.K.

My Ph.D. research seeks to explore the philosophy and conceptual framework of Islamic charity, focusing on modern *zakāt* as a core pillar of Islām. *Zakāt* has a paramount importance in Islamic alms-giving as a religious duty. The aim of the research is to investigate *zakāt*-givers' behaviour and *zakāt* philosophy in Islamic political economy in the Qatari context. It investigates, furthermore, how *zakāt* can be utilised as a source of funding for peacebuilding, taking into consideration the dire need for peacebuilding efforts as a result of the increased number of wars and armed conflicts.

Interview Schedule

Interviewee: _____ Date: _____ Place: _____	Intended Duration: _____ Interview began _____ Interview finished: _____ Actual duration: _____min
Topic: <i>Zakāt</i> Mechanism and Charitable Projects.	
<p>Dear Professor,</p> <p>I am writing to you, as an expert working outside the field of Islamic studies, to enquire about issues relating to the political, social, economic, and cultural implications of the collection and distribution of <i>zakāt</i> in Qatar.</p> <p>Could you please answer the following questions?</p> <p>Political and Economic Department Questions:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do you think there is a relationship between politics, economy and <i>zakāt</i>? If so, how has this relationship been developed over time, and within the Qatari context? If not, why?</li> <li>• Do you think that the practice of <i>zakāt</i> for Muslims is important from the point of view of politicians and economists?</li> <li>• Do you think that, <i>zakāt</i> is an individual responsibility for a Muslim, should there be competent bodies under the management of Muslim religious leaders, independent of the state, or should the state take responsibility for the collection and distribution of <i>Zakāt</i> (e.g., Qatar)? Please explain the reasons for your answers.</li> <li>• Do you think that <i>zakāt</i> applications have been developed to cope with the rapid changes in our world today, specifically in Qatar?</li> <li>• How can <i>zakāt</i> contribute, morally and materially, to the development of countries (such as Qatar)?</li> <li>• Is <i>zakāt</i> being used to support war economy? Please clarify.</li> </ul>	



- In the case of sectarian differences, how do you see governments dealing with the hardliners in the application of the laws of Islām?

Content redacted on data protection grounds.

## Appendix G: Social and Cultural Academic Questions

Research Subject:

***Zakāt's Modern Philosophy and its Application in Peacebuilding, Case study: Qatar.***

I am Ola Alkahlout, Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) of Coventry University in the U.K.

My Ph.D. research seeks to explore the philosophy and conceptual framework of Islamic charity, focusing on modern *zakāt* as a core pillar of Islām. *zakāt* has a paramount importance in Islamic alms-giving as a religious duty. The aim of the research is to investigate *zakāt*-givers' behaviour and *zakāt* philosophy in Islamic political economy in the Qatari context. It investigates, furthermore, how *zakāt* can be utilised as a source of funding for peacebuilding, taking into consideration the dire need for peacebuilding efforts as a result of the increased number of wars and armed conflicts.

Interview Schedule

Interviewee: _____ Date: _____ Place: _____	Intended Duration: _____ Interview began _____ Interview finished: _____ Actual duration: _____min
Topic: <i>Zakāt</i> Mechanism and Charitable Projects.	
<p>Dear Professor,</p> <p>I am writing to you, as an expert working outside the field of Islamic studies, to enquire about issues relating to the political, social, economic, and cultural implications of the collection and distribution of <i>zakāt</i> in Qatar.</p> <p>Could you please answer the following questions?</p> <p><b>Social and Cultural Department Questions:</b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Do you think there is a relationship between social norms, culture and <i>zakāt</i>? If so, how has this relationship been developed over time, and within the Qatari context? If not, why?</li> <li>• Do you think <i>zakāt</i> contributes towards achieving social justice? If so, how is social justice achieved in a diverse community with either a Muslim majority or minority? If not, why?</li> <li>• Can <i>zakāt's</i> moral and material values contribute to the development of the state (e.g., Qatar)? If so, how? If not, why?</li> <li>• Do you think practicing <i>zakāt</i> is important for Muslims? If so, why? If not, why?</li> <li>• Do you find the status of <i>zakāt</i> has an impact on the fast-changing modern world, specifically in Qatar? If so, how? If not, why?</li> <li>• Do you think that, <i>zakāt</i> is an individual responsibility for a Muslim, should there be competent bodies under the management of Muslim religious leaders, independent of the state, or should the state take responsibility for the collection</li> </ul>	

and distribution of *zakāt* (e.g., Qatar)? Please explain the reasons for your answers.

Content redacted on data protection grounds.

## Appendix H: Peacebuilding Academic Questions

### Dr Ibrahim Fraihat: Semi-Structured Interview

Research Subject:

***Zakāt's Modern Philosophy and its Application in Peacebuilding, Case study: Qatar.***

I am Ola Alkahlout, Ph.D. candidate at the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations (CTPSR) of Coventry University in the U.K.

My Ph.D. research seeks to explore the philosophy and conceptual framework of Islamic charity, focusing on modern *zakāt* as a core pillar of Islām. *Zakāt* has a paramount importance in Islamic alms-giving as a religious duty. The aim of the research is to investigate *zakāt*-givers' behaviour and *zakāt* philosophy in Islamic political economy in the Qatari context. It investigates, furthermore, how *zakāt* can be utilised as a source of funding for peacebuilding, taking into consideration the dire need for peacebuilding efforts as a result of the increased number of wars and armed conflicts.

Interview Schedule

Interviewee: Dr Ibrahim Fraihat Date: 24/05/2018 Place: Doha Institute for Graduate Studies	Intended Duration: 60 minutes Interview began _____ Interview finished: _____ Actual duration: ____min
Topic: <i>Zakāt</i> Mechanism and Charitable Projects.	
Questions: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Do <i>zakāt</i> stakeholders, (<i>zakāt</i>'s stakeholders who have authority to issue religious decisions which have an impact on Muslim societies: <i>Dār Al- 'Iftā'</i>, Muftī, Sheikhs and Imāms of the mosque) could help in track 1, 2, and 3 of peacebuilding? If yes, how? If no, why?</li> <li>'Does <i>zakāt</i> support conducting any peacebuilding activities? If yes, please could you give an example? If not, why?</li> <li>Does religious sectarianism feature as a part of conflict in conflict zones? If yes, please could you give an example?</li> <li>Do you think lack of religious awareness is increasing the conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims? If yes, how?</li> <li>Do you think there could be opportunities for rapprochement between Muslims and non-Muslims through the door of <i>zakāt</i>?</li> <li>To what extent does Qatar have an active role in peacebuilding over the world? If any, what motivates Qatar to play this role?</li> </ul>	

- How do you find the role of religious scholars in spreading the values of peace?
- How do you find the role of religious scholars in spreading the hatred and incitement to violence?
- Do you think religion can be a driver to bring about peace in inter-faith and intra-faith conflicts?
- Do you think *zakāt* can play a role in consolidating peace, and how this can be achieved?
- Can you advise on any case studies of which you are aware, where *zakāt*, or any other Islamic financial sources, have been used towards peacebuilding activities?
- How do you think this research project could make a difference to peacebuilding?

Content redacted on data protection grounds.

# Appendix I: Survey

## Findings Results

### Survey

The data of this research recording with SPSS. The variables have been defined in value categories:

- vii. Agreement by participants to read and accept terms and conditions of information sheets;
- viii. *Zakāt*-givers (or not).
- ix. Demographic variables: nationality, gender, and age groups.
- x. Five sections:
  - f. Section one: awareness of *zakāt*.
  - g. Section two: to whom *zakāt* is given.
  - h. Section three: Decision-making.
  - i. Section four: Motivation.
  - j. Section five: *Zakāt* and Peacebuilding. (Subsequently converted to suggested projects under the opportunities of *zakāt* practice).
- xi. Contact details of participants.
- xii. Appendix table.

The variables of (i), (ii), and (iii) were shown through output results to describe the characteristics of the sample; tables which describe variables show count, percentages, and cumulative percentages. The variable (iv) has five sections: every item and answer in each section was processed by using custom tables<sup>285</sup> which can summarise statistical data. The variables and summary measures were chosen to be used in the tables. Layers were also used to add a measurement of depth to the tables thus creating three dimensions if only one-layer category is visible at a time (*IBM* 2013: 5). The question in each section is individually reflected in the table as follows: Vertical includes Demographic variables: Gender: Male and Female, Nationality; citizens and residents, and Age groups: (18-25), (26-35), (36-45), (46-65), and those over 66 years. Horizontal consists of Questions and Answers - for example 'Yes', 'No', 'I don't know'; below each answer there are: 'Count', 'Row total N%', 'Column Total N%',

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<sup>285</sup> Custom tables allow researchers to preview their table output as they choose for variables and options. They also offer a level of flexibility not found in a typical table (*IBM* 2013.: 1)

and ‘Missing’. The ‘Row total N%’ is separately indicated for the percentage of total participants for each set of demographic variables: gender, nationality, or age groups. ‘Column Total N%’ is separately indicated for the percentage of total participants for each type in the demographic variables: males or females, citizens and residents, and age groups.

Regarding writing up the findings analysis from the Tables in this chapter, the gender and nationality will follow ‘Row total N%’, while age groups will follow ‘Column Total N %’. Row 1 compares each variable, such as the male count and percentage in comparison to the female count and percentage; the same applies to citizens and residents. Column 1 lists each group’s count and percentage, and is compared with the same age group participants in the other answers such as ‘Yes’, ‘No’, ‘I don’t know’, and ‘Missing’.

Comments’ Table: at the end of each section, there is a table for the participants’ count of those who left a comment and those who did not. The same process of horizontal and vertical sections applies in this table, except for the answers section.

Variable (v) Contact details of participants shows results for ‘Contact Details’ count. The same process of horizontal and vertical sections applies in this table, except for the answers section. Finally, The variable (vi) Appendix Table: shows contact details for the variables based on three layers together (Gender, Nationality and Age group), and is shown as ‘Row Total N%’, which indicates the percentage of participants in the sample for three demographic variables respectively.

**Note:** The results of the programmes such as (BOS, SPSS, and NVivo), have shown three fields; religion and society, Islamic political economy, and peacebuilding. After through elaboration, the researcher was compelled to focus on sociology of religion. The data collected for the other two fields beneficial enriching the analysis under the category of the challenges and opportunities in the practice of *zakāt* in Qatar (see Chapter One: Introduction, Setting the Scene).

### **I.1. Section One: Awareness of *Zakāt*’s ‘Compulsory alms-giving’ Concept**

Section 1 discusses Muslims’ basic awareness of the conceptual meaning of *zakāt*, *Shari’ah* (Islamic law), and *zakāt*’s flow, through seven questions. The answer to these questions were

optional; ‘Yes’, ‘No’, or ‘I do not know’. The number of unanswered questions is recorded as ‘Missing’. Section One has seven tables, in addition to the participants’ comments table.

### I.1.1. Awareness of the Conceptual Meaning of *Zakāt*.

The question discusses the general concept of Muslims’ awareness of *zakāt*; for example, whether it is physical worship, finance, and so on (Table I.1.1). The highest activity is in the ‘Yes’ section, followed by ‘I do not know’ section. ‘No’ sections have the least answers, and the ‘Missing’ section has no respondents. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) that have awareness of the conceptual meaning of *zakāt* is 96 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
I am aware of the conceptual meaning of Zakat.	Yes	Count	56	91	82	65	22	56	45	16	8
		Row Total N %	38.1%	61.9%	55.8%	44.2%	15.0%	38.1%	30.6%	10.9%	5.4%
		Column Total N %	93.3%	97.8%	96.5%	95.6%	91.7%	96.6%	97.8%	94.1%	100.0%
	No	Count	2	0	2	0	0	1	1	0	0
		Row Total N %	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	3.3%	0.0%	2.4%	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%	2.2%	0.0%	0.0%
	I do not know	Count	2	2	1	3	2	1	0	1	0
		Row Total N %	50.0%	50.0%	25.0%	75.0%	50.0%	25.0%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	3.3%	2.2%	1.2%	4.4%	8.3%	1.7%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
		Row Total N %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Table (I.1.1) Awareness of the Conceptual Meaning of *Zakāt*

**‘Yes’:** More females responded ‘YES’ in the survey of 91 participants – 97.8 per cent, compared to 56 males – 93.3 per cent. There is a difference between Q citizens and residents: 82 Qatari nationals – 96.5 per cent, and 65 residents – 95.6 per cent. The age group percentages are between 91.7 per cent and 100 per cent.

**‘No’:** Two Qatari citizens males responded ‘No’: one from the (26-35) years, and one from the (36-45) years.

**‘I do not know’:** More males responded ‘I do not know’ in the survey of 2 participants – 3.3 per cent, compared to 2 females – 2.2 per cent.; one responded from the citizens, and three from residents. The age group (18-25) respondents were two, and one each from the (26-35) and (46-65) years.

**‘Missing’:** the table does not record any missing answers.

### I.1.2. Awareness of to Whom *Zakāt* Is Due

Table (I.1.2) below illustrates Muslims’ awareness of to whom *zakāt* is due; whether it is allocated to all Muslims, rich, poor, and so on, or whether it is allocated according to a



Muslim's specific standard of living. Table (I.1.2) provides the number of participants in this question. The highest activity is in the 'Yes' section, followed by the 'No' section. The 'I do not know' and 'Missing' sections have the least answers. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) that have awareness of whom should receive *zakāt* comes to 94.7 per cent.

		Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	above 66 years
I am aware of to whom Zakatis due.	Yes	Count	58	87	81	64	21	56	44	17
		Row Total N %	40.0%	60.0%	55.9%	44.1%	14.5%	38.6%	30.3%	11.7%
		Column Total N %	96.7%	93.5%	95.3%	94.1%	87.5%	96.6%	95.7%	100.0%
	No	Count	2	3	3	2	1	2	1	0
		Row Total N %	40.0%	60.0%	60.0%	40.0%	20.0%	40.0%	20.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	3.3%	3.2%	3.5%	2.9%	4.2%	3.4%	2.2%	0.0%
	I do not know	Count	0	2	0	2	1	0	1	0
		Row Total N %	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	50.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	0.0%	2.2%	0.0%	2.9%	4.2%	0.0%	2.2%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	0	1	1	0	1	0	0	0
		Row Total N %	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	0.0%	1.1%	1.2%	0.0%	4.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Table (I.1.2) Awareness of To Whom *Zakāt* Is Due

**‘Yes’:** 58 males responded ‘Yes’- 96.7 per cent of both male and female respondents. 87 females responded; Yes’ – 93.5 per cent, and 81 citizens, - 95.3 per cent. 64 females responded ‘Yes’, which represents 94.1 per cent. The participants’ responses from the age category were divided into 87.5 per cent for the (18-25) years, 96.6 per cent for (26-35) years, 95.7 per cent for the (36-45) years, 100 per cent for the (46-65) years, and 87.5 per cent for the (Above 66) years.

**‘No’:** A total of five Muslims responded; three citizens and two residents. Full awareness is in the (46-65) years, while, the (26-35) years had two respondents, and the rest of the groups had one respondent each.

**‘I do not know’:** Only two resident females responded: one in the (18-25) years, and the other in the (36-45) years.

**Missing:** One Qatari female in the (18-25) years did not respond; this is recorded as ‘missing’ in Table (I.1.2).

### I.1.3 Awareness of *Zakāt*'s Types of Wealth and Its Conditions

Table (I.1.3) displays the Muslims’ awareness of *zakāt*'s types of wealth regarding ‘compulsory alms-giving’: whether it concerns specific types of wealth such as gold, livestock, agriculture, and so on, or it belongs to any property owned by Muslims. The question also

discusses the conditions of accumulated wealth, such as savings, trading, and so on. The highest activity of responses is in the ‘Yes’ section, followed by ‘No’, followed by ‘I do not know’. The ‘Missing’ section has the least answers. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) that have awareness of *zakāt*’s different types of wealth and their conditions comes to 72.5 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
I am aware of Zakat's wealth types and its conditions.	Yes	Count	43	68	64	47	17	42	35	11	6
		Row Total N %	38.7%	61.3%	57.7%	42.3%	15.3%	37.8%	31.5%	9.9%	5.4%
		Column Total N %	71.7%	73.1%	75.3%	69.1%	70.8%	72.4%	76.1%	64.7%	75.0%
	No	Count	12	13	13	12	3	8	9	3	2
		Row Total N %	48.0%	52.0%	52.0%	48.0%	12.0%	32.0%	36.0%	12.0%	8.0%
		Column Total N %	20.0%	14.0%	15.3%	17.6%	12.5%	13.8%	19.6%	17.6%	25.0%
	I do not know	Count	5	11	8	8	4	7	2	3	0
		Row Total N %	31.3%	68.8%	50.0%	50.0%	25.0%	43.8%	12.5%	18.8%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	8.3%	11.8%	9.4%	11.8%	16.7%	12.1%	4.3%	17.6%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
		Row Total N %	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Table (I.1.3) Awareness of *Zakāt*’s Wealth Types and Its Conditions

**‘Yes’:** Female respondent numbers are higher than those of males: 68 females responded ‘Yes’ – 73.1 per cent - compared to 43 males – 71.7 per cent. The citizens category shows that, Qatari participant percentages are close to those of residents – 75.3 per cent for males, and 69.1 per cent for residents. The age group percentages are also close: between 64.7 per cent and 76.1 per cent.

**‘No’:** The percentages are also close: males 20 per cent, and females 14 per cent; citizens respondents 15.3 per cent, and residents 17.6 per cent. The (36-45) age group recording shows the highest participation - nine participants, followed by the (26-35) years - eight participants. The lowest number of participants in the (Above 66) years reflects the lowest number - two participants. The age groups (18-25) and (46-65) years have the same results with three participants from each group.

**‘I do not know’:** The category reflects a figure of five males’ respondents, compared to 11 female respondents. The nationality category reflects the same number of participants - eight for each. The age group category shows that, four participated in the survey from the (18-25) years; seven from the (26-35) years; two from the (36-45) years, and three from the (46-65) years; no respondents from the (Above 66) years participated in the survey.

**‘Missing’:** There was only one respondent from a resident female in the age group (26-35) years recorded.

#### I.1.4. Awareness of the Use of *Niṣāb* ‘The Minimum amount for *Zakāt*’

The *Niṣāb* question discusses awareness of the amount of money that should be paid. Table (I.1.4) shows that the highest activity response is in the ‘Yes’ section, followed by ‘No’, followed by ‘I do not know’. The ‘Missing’ section has the least answers. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) that have awareness of the use of *niṣāb* ‘the minimum amount for *zakāt*’ stands at 66 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
I am aware of the use of Nisab ‘The minimum for Zakat’.	Yes	Count	41	60	49	52	12	40	34	9	6
		Row Total N %	40.6%	59.4%	48.5%	51.5%	11.9%	39.6%	33.7%	8.9%	5.9%
		Column Total N %	68.3%	64.5%	57.6%	76.5%	50.0%	69.0%	73.9%	52.9%	75.0%
	No	Count	14	17	22	9	8	12	8	1	2
		Row Total N %	45.2%	54.8%	71.0%	29.0%	25.8%	38.7%	25.8%	3.2%	6.5%
		Column Total N %	23.3%	18.3%	25.9%	13.2%	33.3%	20.7%	17.4%	5.9%	25.0%
	I do not know	Count	5	15	13	7	4	6	4	6	0
		Row Total N %	25.0%	75.0%	65.0%	35.0%	20.0%	30.0%	20.0%	30.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	8.3%	16.1%	15.3%	10.3%	16.7%	10.3%	8.7%	35.3%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	1	0
		Row Total N %	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	0.0%	1.1%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%

Table (I.1.4) Awareness of the Use of *Niṣāb* ‘The Minimum amount for *Zakāt*’

**‘Yes’:** 41 males – 68.3 per cent - responded ‘Yes’ to this question, compared to 60 females – 64.5 per cent. citizens respondents 57.6 per cent, and residents 76.5 per cent; the percentage of participants from the age groups ranges from 50 per cent to 75 per cent.

**‘No’:** the respondents were both male and female: 23.3 per cent for males, and 18.3 per cent for females. citizens respondents are 25.9 per cent, compared to residents – 13.2 per cent. The age group category shows that, twelve participated in the survey from the (26-35) years, and the same applies to the (18-25) and (36-45) years with eight participants for each group. The (46-65) years, also the (Above 66) years had two participants for each group.

**‘I do not know’:** the responses were highest in the female section - 15 participants - representing 16.1 per cent, compared to five male respondents – 8.3 per cent. The Nationality category shows 13 citizens respondents – 15.3 per cent - compared to seven residents – 10.3 per cent. There were no responses from the (Above 66) years. The remaining age groups, (18-25) and (36-45) years, and (26-35) and (46-65) years have the same results: four and six respondents, respectively.

**‘Missing’:** The category reflects one Qatari female from the (46-65) years of the age group.

### I.1.5. Awareness of the Eight Categories of *Zakāt*-beneficiaries

The eight categories of *zakāt*-beneficiaries are mentioned in the Qur'an (*At-Tauba* 9:60). Table (I.1.5) below provides the results of this question. The highest response activity is in the 'Yes' section, followed by 'No', followed by 'I do not know'. The 'Missing' section has the least answers. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) that have awareness of the eight categories of *Zakāt*-beneficiaries is 57.51 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
I am aware of the eight categories of Zakat beneficiaries.	Yes	Count	39	49	45	43	12	31	29	11	5
		Row Total N %	44.3%	55.7%	51.1%	48.9%	13.6%	35.2%	33.0%	12.5%	5.7%
		Column Total N %	65.0%	52.7%	52.9%	63.2%	50.0%	53.4%	63.0%	64.7%	62.5%
	No	Count	15	28	25	18	9	19	10	3	2
		Row Total N %	34.9%	65.1%	58.1%	41.9%	20.9%	44.2%	23.3%	7.0%	4.7%
		Column Total N %	25.0%	30.1%	29.4%	26.5%	37.5%	32.8%	21.7%	17.6%	25.0%
	I do not know	Count	3	15	12	6	3	7	5	3	0
		Row Total N %	16.7%	83.3%	66.7%	33.3%	16.7%	38.9%	27.8%	16.7%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	5.0%	16.1%	14.1%	8.8%	12.5%	12.1%	10.9%	17.6%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	3	1	3	1	0	1	2	0	1
		Row Total N %	75.0%	25.0%	75.0%	25.0%	0.0%	25.0%	50.0%	0.0%	25.0%
		Column Total N %	5.0%	1.1%	3.5%	1.5%	0.0%	1.7%	4.3%	0.0%	12.5%

Table (I.1.5) Awareness of the Eight Categories of *Zakāt*-beneficiaries

**'Yes':** 39 males - 65 per cent - responded 'Yes' to this question. 49 female participants - 52.7 per cent - also responded 'Yes'; citizens and residents' responses were similarly close: 52.9 per cent and 63.2 per cent, respectively. The age group section reflects different percentages: between 50 per cent and 64.7 per cent.

**'No':** The responses came from 15 males - 25 per cent - compared to 28 from females – 30.1 per cent. 25 citizens responded – 29.4 per cent - compared to 18 residents – 26.5 per cent. The age groups' responses were divided: (18-25) years - 37.5 per cent; (26-35) years - 32.8 per cent; (36-45) years - 21.7 per cent; (46-65) years - 17.6 per cent; and (Above 66) years - 25 per cent of the total of each group.

**'I do not know':** The category had the highest responses from 15 females compared to three males. 12 citizens responded compared to six residents. The lowest count was in the age group (Above 66) years which had no participants. The rest of the age groups have close percentages between 10.9 per cent and 17.6 per cent.

**'Missing':** The section reflects three male participants and one female. The citizens section also had three responses 'missing', and one resident. These 'missing' responses have been divided into the following: one participant from the (26-35) years; two participants from the (36-45) years, and one participant from (Above 66) years.

### I.1.6. Awareness of *Zakāt*'s Process or Flow Mechanism (From Giver to Beneficiary)

Table (I.1.6) below provides the responses from respondents regarding their awareness concerning *zakāt*'s journey from giver to beneficiary. The highest response activity is in the 'Yes' section, followed by 'No', followed by 'I do not know'. The 'Missing' section has the least answers. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) that have awareness of *zakāt* process or flow mechanism (from giver to beneficiary) comes to 43.1 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
I am aware of Zakat's process or flow (from giver to beneficiary)	Yes	Count	27	39	38	28	10	26	22	6	2
		Row Total N %	40.9%	59.1%	57.6%	42.4%	15.2%	39.4%	33.3%	9.1%	3.0%
		Column Total N %	45.0%	41.9%	44.7%	41.2%	41.7%	44.8%	47.8%	35.3%	25.0%
	No	Count	22	33	31	24	12	20	15	5	3
		Row Total N %	40.0%	60.0%	56.4%	43.6%	21.8%	36.4%	27.3%	9.1%	5.5%
		Column Total N %	36.7%	35.5%	36.5%	35.3%	50.0%	34.5%	32.6%	29.4%	37.5%
	I do not know	Count	11	20	16	15	2	11	9	6	3
		Row Total N %	35.5%	64.5%	51.6%	48.4%	6.5%	35.5%	29.0%	19.4%	9.7%
		Column Total N %	18.3%	21.5%	18.8%	22.1%	8.3%	19.0%	19.6%	35.3%	37.5%
	Missing	Count	0	1	0	1	0	1	0	0	0
		Row Total N %	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	0.0%	1.1%	0.0%	1.5%	0.0%	1.7%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Table (I.1.6) Awareness of *Zakāt*'s Process or Flow Mechanism (From Giver to Beneficiary)

**'Yes':** This category had 27 male respondents - 45per cent; 39 females – 41.9 per cent; 38 citizens 44.7 per cent; and 28 residents – 41.2 per cent. The age groups have varied responses; for example, 10 responded from the (18-25) years - 41.7 per cent, and 26 responded from the (26-35) years - 44.8 per cent. The rest of the groups show 47.8 per cent for the (36-45) years; 35.3 per cent for the (46-65) years, and 25 per cent for (Above 66) years.

**'No':** This category reflects that females had the highest number of participants. 33 female participants responded – 35.5 per cent - compared to 22 male respondents – 36.7 - per cent. citizens had the highest number with 31 participants – 36.5 per cent - compared to 24 residents – 35.3 per cent. The age groups have varied responses; 12 responded from the (18-25) years - 50 per cent; 20 responded from the (26-35) years - 34.5 per cent; 15 responded from the (36-45) years - 32.6 per cent; five responded from the (46-65) years - 29.4 per cent; and three responded from the (Above 66) years - 37.5 per cent.

**'I do not know':** This category shows 11 male and 20 female respondents; 16 and 15 responses from citizens and residents, respectively. The age group section has mixed responses; for example, two were recorded for the (18-25) years; three for the (Above 66) years; 11 for the (26-35) years; and nine and six for the (36-45) and (46-65) years, respectively.

**'Missing':** This category has one female, resident from the (26-35) years age group.

### I.1.7. Need to Learn About *Zakāt*

Table (I.1.7) shows whether respondents are interested to learn more about *zakāt* or not. The highest activity is in the ‘Yes’ section, followed by the ‘No’ section. The ‘I do not know’ and ‘Missing’ sections have the least answers. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) that lack knowledge about *zakāt* is 82.3 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
I need to learn about Zakat.	Yes	Count	44	82	73	53	21	52	34	15	4
		Row Total N %	34.9%	65.1%	57.9%	42.1%	16.7%	41.3%	27.0%	11.9%	3.2%
		Column Total N %	73.3%	88.2%	85.9%	77.9%	87.5%	89.7%	73.9%	88.2%	50.0%
	No	Count	14	8	9	13	2	6	9	2	3
		Row Total N %	63.6%	36.4%	40.9%	59.1%	9.1%	27.3%	40.9%	9.1%	13.6%
		Column Total N %	23.3%	8.6%	10.6%	19.1%	8.3%	10.3%	19.6%	11.8%	37.5%
	I do not know	Count	2	2	2	2	1	0	2	0	1
		Row Total N %	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	50.0%	25.0%	0.0%	50.0%	0.0%	25.0%
		Column Total N %	3.3%	2.2%	2.4%	2.9%	4.2%	0.0%	4.3%	0.0%	12.5%
	Missing	Count	0	1	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
		Row Total N %	0.0%	100.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	0.0%	1.1%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	0.0%	0.0%

Table (I.1.7) Need to Learn About *Zakāt*

**‘Yes’:** The responses were 44 from males – 73.3 per cent - and 82 from females – 88.2 per cent. 73 citizens responded - 85.9 per cent - compared to 53 residents – 77.9 per cent. The age group (Above 66) years had the least participants; four responded - 50 per cent. The rest of the age groups had close percentages between 73.9 per cent and 89.7 per cent.

**‘No’:** This category shows 14 males responded – 23.3 per cent, compared to eight female respondents – 8.6 per cent. Nine citizens responded and 13 residents – 19.1 per cent and 10.6 per cent, respectively. The age groups have varied responses; two responded from the (18-25) years - 8.3 per cent; six responded from the (26-35) years - 10.3 per cent; nine responded from the (36-45) years - 19.6 per cent; two responded from the (46-65) years - 11.8 per cent; and three responded from the (Above 66) years - 37.5 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** The category reflects have close results between males and females – two participants each; similarly, citizens and residents. The age groups (26-35) years and (46-65) years did not respond. The other age groups responded as follows: (18-25) years - 4.2 per cent; (36-46) years - 4.3 per cent; and (above 66) years - 12.5 per cent.

**‘Missing’:** the only missing response came from a citizen’s female in the age group (36-45) years.

### I.1.8. Participations’ Comments

Table (I.1.8) shows the number of comments left by participants. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) participants who commented comes to 19.6 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Would you like to add any other comments regarding your level of awareness of Zakat?	Commented	Count	11	19	14	16	5	13	7	4	1
		Row Total N %	36.7%	63.3%	46.7%	53.3%	16.7%	43.3%	23.3%	13.3%	3.3%
		Column Total N %	18.3%	20.4%	16.5%	23.5%	20.8%	22.4%	15.2%	23.5%	12.5%
	Not Commented	Count	49	74	71	52	19	45	39	13	7
		Row Total N %	39.8%	60.2%	57.7%	42.3%	15.4%	36.6%	31.7%	10.6%	5.7%
		Column Total N %	81.7%	79.6%	83.5%	76.5%	79.2%	77.6%	84.8%	76.5%	87.5%

Table (I.1.8) Participations' Comments

**Respondents who commented:** 11 males and 19 females. 14 citizens and 16 residents. The age groups show the following number of respondents who left comments: The age groups have varied responses; five responded from the (18-25) years – 20.8 per cent; 13 responded from the (26-35) years – 22.4 per cent; seven responded from the (36-45) years – 15.2 per cent; four responded from the (46-65) years – 23.5 per cent; and one responded from the (Above 66) years – 12.5 per cent.

### Section One: Respondents' Comments:

1. My knowledge about *zakāt* is acquired from just readings in books of *Fiqh* and listening to the lectures of religious scholars and I did not make an academic study in *Shari'ah* sciences or *Fiqh Al-Zakat*.
2. I think that *zakāt* is a reason for solving all the problems of starvations in the whole world if it is applied by all people.
3. As for No. (10), it is not easy to answer it if it is related to the institutions and associations.
4. The Muslim youth are in need to a simple and detailed concept about *zakāt*, May Allah blesses you in our behalf the best blessing.
5. There should be an awareness about the Islamic communities' updates and what may be added to the 8 categories and if some categories thereof are no longer exist.
6. *Zakāt* should be calculated obligatorily.
7. I think that more research should be done in the connection of *zakāt* to prayer in most of the verses mentioned in the Qur'an.
8. It is preferred to provide approved authorities for *zakāt* to connect *zakāt*-givers in order to explain the different products and projects for the same purpose with providing interactive websites for such purpose.

9. The money is usually delivered to the associations and institutions that undertake the delivery of it to the needy people and the procedures shall be as declared by each organisation.
10. I think that the above-mentioned questions are sufficient to answer all of the aforementioned.
11. I am aware of *zakāt* due on me personally as per my possessions and the things for which I should give *zakāt*, but I do not know otherwise.
12. I hope that there is an application of *Zakat* Fund to remind us.
13. We want to know more information about *zakāt* and the beneficiaries.
14. What are its benefits and strengths compared to the taxes applied in the foreign countries?
15. Yes, i would love to learn more details om *zakāt*, for example, what income or wealth or property is *zakāt* ford on. Also, to learn about above boxes number 1.4 and 1.6
16. I know the general concept of *zakāt*, but its terms and provisions may not be memorized.
17. I wasn't aware of the eight *Sharih'a* beneficiaries.
18. My idea about *zakāt* is that it purifies the spirit and the money, noting that I do not know completely about *zakāt*.
19. My knowledge about *zakāt* is limited since the master of the house undertakes the payment, so our interest in this matter is limited. However, the general picture perceived by me is that *zakāt* purifies money and the targeted party is the poor and needy and key perceptions aimed at achieving balance in society. *Zakāt*-beneficiaries are mentioned expressly, and the category of Administer of Funds is one of them. By searching, I find that it is considered a problem in the present time and I think we need more search regarding this beneficiaries.
20. *Zakāt* money is spent on the poor and needy. Through my experience in the humanitarian action, the denotations were distributed to the poor and the needy in particular.
21. *Zakāt* is a significant item in Islām and it is a basic pillar of the five pillars of Islām. The Muslims are competent in it and *zakāt* is taken from the rich and given to the poor.
22. Personally, I have not paid *zakāt* in all my life since my father is responsible for that matter as he pays for me and my sister till she get married as per our customs. Therefore, my *Sharī'ah* knowledge about *zakāt* provisions is very weak.
23. *Zakāt* is paid in *Ramaḍān* to increase the reward in this holy month. The associations are fully aware of the time of *zakāt* and informing the client of it.



24. Because I live in male-dominated society where the woman does not participate in knowing *zakāt*-beneficiaries.
25. *Zakāt* is given to the Muslim and non-Muslim for endearing in Islām and *zakāt* is for the rich and poor.
26. Yes, I think I need more information about *zakāt*. For example, why the paper money are not accepted, i.e., *zakāt* should be calculated on the basis of silver and gold. The matter in this age is different from before, knowing that I belong to the Shī‘ah Ithna-Asheri Community.
27. The accurate identification of Wayfarer beneficiaries.
28. I need more knowledge and *Sharī‘ah* science about this subject.
29. The knowledge is general, but we always go through the knowledge of obligations or knowing the minimum issues related to them and we consider what is more than that as general information or education and in sometimes for the specialists.
30. The person pays his/her money to buy a building so as not to pay *zakāt* since the one who has property of buildings does not pay *zakāt*. I disagree with that.

## **I.2. Section Two: I Give my *Zakāt* to...**

Section two discusses the Muslims’ orientation towards their payment of *zakāt*: whether they prefer to give it to a government collection body, the mosque, charity organisations, or individuals. The answers are determined by ‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’, and ‘I do not know’. The ‘Missing’ question is added for the same reasons as in Section One. This section also discusses the way in which *zakāt* is paid: cash payments, in kind, or banking transactions, in addition to the place they prefer to pay their *zakāt*: Qatar, abroad, or both. Section Two therefore has six tables to reflect these data, in addition to the participants’ comments count table.

### **I.2.1. Government Collection Body**

Table (I.2.1) provides the participants’ multiple-choice answers to this question - whether they agree, disagree, or do not know whether to give their *zakāt* to a government collection body, such as *Zakat* Fund, which is a department of the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs, and is under Qatari government control. Table (I.2.1) shows the number of participants in this section. The highest activity is in the ‘Agree’ section, followed by ‘Disagree’, followed by ‘I do not know’. The ‘Missing’ section has the least answers. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) that use the government collection body is 78.4 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Government collection body (Zakat Fund which is a department under the Ministry of Endowments and Islamic Affairs under Qatari government control)	Agree	Count	47	73	75	45	19	51	32	12	6
		Row Total N %	39.2%	60.8%	62.5%	37.5%	15.8%	42.5%	26.7%	10.0%	5.0%
		Column Total N %	78.3%	78.5%	88.2%	66.2%	79.2%	87.9%	69.6%	70.6%	75.0%
	Disagree	Count	8	12	6	14	1	5	10	3	1
		Row Total N %	40.0%	60.0%	30.0%	70.0%	5.0%	25.0%	50.0%	15.0%	5.0%
		Column Total N %	13.3%	12.9%	7.1%	20.6%	4.2%	8.6%	21.7%	17.6%	12.5%
	I do not know	Count	4	6	3	7	3	1	3	2	1
		Row Total N %	40.0%	60.0%	30.0%	70.0%	30.0%	10.0%	30.0%	20.0%	10.0%
		Column Total N %	6.7%	6.5%	3.5%	10.3%	12.5%	1.7%	6.5%	11.8%	12.5%
	Missing	Count	1	2	1	2	1	1	1	0	0
		Row Total N %	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	33.3%	33.3%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	1.7%	2.2%	1.2%	2.9%	4.2%	1.7%	2.2%	0.0%	0.0%

Table (I.2.1) Government Collection Body

**‘Agree’:** The males and females have close results: 78.3 per cent and 78.5 per cent, respectively. citizens’ results are higher than residents: 75 participants – 88.2 per cent, compared to 45 residents – 66.2 per cent. The age group percentages vary between 69.6 per cent and 86.9 per cent.

**‘Disagree’:** This category shows eight males responded – 13.3 per cent, compared to 12 female participants – 12.9 per cent. 20 participants from the Nationality section show six citizens respondents – 7.1 per cent - and 14 residents – 20.6 per cent. The age groups have one participant from each of the (18-25) years – 4.2 per cent and (Above 66) years - 12.5 per cent, compared to 10 participants from the (36-45) years - 21.7 per cent; five participants from the (26-35) years - 8.6 per cent; and three participants from the (46-65) years - 17 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows four males responded – 6.7 per cent, compared to six female participants – 6.5 per cent. 10 participants from the Nationality section show three citizens respondents – 3.5 per cent; and seven residents – 10.3 per cent. The age groups have one participant from each of the (26-35) years – 1.7 per cent; and (Above 66) years - 12.5 per cent; compared to three participants from each of the (18-25) – 12.5 per cent and (36-45) years - 6.5 per cent; and two participants from the age group- (46-65) years - 11.8 per cent.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows gender and nationality have the same distribution: one male citizen compared to two female residents. The age groups show one participant for each - (18-25), (26-35), and (36-45) years.

## I.2.2. Mosques

The participants were asked whether they chose to give their *zakāt* to the mosques or not. Table (I.2.2) provides the number of responses to this question. The highest activity is in the ‘Agree’ section, followed by ‘Disagree’, followed by ‘I do not know’. The ‘Missing’ section has the

least answers. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who give to mosques is 49 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Mosques. (Local or known mosques in the area)	Agree	Count	30	45	47	28	14	29	21	6	5
		Row Total N %	40.0%	60.0%	62.7%	37.3%	18.7%	38.7%	28.0%	8.0%	6.7%
		Column Total N %	50.0%	48.4%	55.3%	41.2%	58.3%	50.0%	45.7%	35.3%	62.5%
	Disagree	Count	15	21	16	20	5	12	12	7	0
		Row Total N %	41.7%	58.3%	44.4%	55.6%	13.9%	33.3%	33.3%	19.4%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	25.0%	22.6%	18.8%	29.4%	20.8%	20.7%	26.1%	41.2%	0.0%
	I do not know	Count	9	13	11	11	4	7	6	2	3
		Row Total N %	40.9%	59.1%	50.0%	50.0%	18.2%	31.8%	27.3%	9.1%	13.6%
		Column Total N %	15.0%	14.0%	12.9%	16.2%	16.7%	12.1%	13.0%	11.8%	37.5%
	Missing	Count	6	14	11	9	1	10	7	2	0
		Row Total N %	30.0%	70.0%	55.0%	45.0%	5.0%	50.0%	35.0%	10.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	10.0%	15.1%	12.9%	13.2%	4.2%	17.2%	15.2%	11.8%	0.0%

Table (I.2.2) Mosques

**‘Agree’:** This category shows 30 males responded - 50 per cent, compared to 45 females – 48.4 per cent. citizens had the highest responses with 47 participants – 55.3 per cent, compared to 28 residents – 41.2 per cent. The age groups had different percentage levels in each group: 58.3 per cent for (18-25) years, 50 per cent for (26-35) years, 45.7 per cent for (36-45) years, 35.3 per cent for (46-65) years, and 62.5 per cent for (Above 66) years.

**‘Disagree’:** This category shows 15 male respondents compared to 21 females: 25 per cent and 22.6 per cent, respectively. The Nationality section has 16 citizens respondents and 20 residents – 18.8 per cent and 29.4 per cent, respectively. The (above 66 years) section has no responses, and the (18-25) years and (26-35) years have the same percentage of participation - 20.7 per cent and 20.8 per cent, respectively. The highest participation is in the age group (46-65) years - 41.2 per cent; and in the (36-45) years - 26.1 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows nine males responded - 15 per cent, compared to 13 female respondents - 14 per cent. The Nationality section has 11 citizens respondents and 11 residents – 12.9 per cent and 16.2 per cent, respectively. The (Above 66) years has the highest percentage of participation - 37.5 per cent. The other groups share the percentage between 11.8 per cent and 16.7 per cent.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows females have the highest number of respondents, 14 – 15.1 per cent, compared to six males - 10 per cent. citizens have the highest number with 11 respondents – 12.9 per cent, compared to nine residents – 13.2 per cent. The (Above 66) years age group has no missing answers, while the rest of the age groups have one response from the (18-25) years – 4.2per cent per cent, 10 responded from the (26-35) years – 17.2 per cent, seven

responded from the (36-45) years – 11.8 per cent, and two responded from the (46-65) years – 11.8 per cent.

### I.2.3. Charity Organisations

The participants' answers regarding their desire as to whether to give their *zakāt* to charitable organisations or not is reflected in Table (I.2.3). This table provides the number of participants responding to this question. The highest activity is in the 'Agree' section, followed by the 'Disagree' section. The 'I do not know' and 'Missing' sections have the least answers. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who give to charity organisations comes to 76.4 per cent

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Charity Organisations. (Eid Charity, Qatar Charity, Qatar Red Crescent, Reach Out To Asia, and so on)	Agree	Count	44	73	72	45	19	45	33	13	7
		Row Total N %	37.6%	62.4%	61.5%	38.5%	16.2%	38.5%	28.2%	11.1%	6.0%
		Column Total N %	73.3%	78.5%	84.7%	66.2%	79.2%	77.6%	71.7%	76.5%	87.5%
	Disagree	Count	8	11	5	14	2	6	8	2	1
		Row Total N %	42.1%	57.9%	26.3%	73.7%	10.5%	31.6%	42.1%	10.5%	5.3%
		Column Total N %	13.3%	11.8%	5.9%	20.6%	8.3%	10.3%	17.4%	11.8%	12.5%
	I do not know	Count	3	6	4	5	2	5	0	2	0
		Row Total N %	33.3%	66.7%	44.4%	55.6%	22.2%	55.6%	0.0%	22.2%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	5.0%	6.5%	4.7%	7.4%	8.3%	8.6%	0.0%	11.8%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	5	3	4	4	1	2	5	0	0
		Row Total N %	62.5%	37.5%	50.0%	50.0%	12.5%	25.0%	62.5%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	8.3%	3.2%	4.7%	5.9%	4.2%	3.4%	10.9%	0.0%	0.0%

Table (I.2.3) Charity Organisations

**'Agree'** The category shows the number of female respondents is higher than that of males: 73 participants – 78.5 per cent, compared to 44 males – 73.3 per cent. The citizens count is also higher than residents – 84.7 per cent, compared to 45 residents – 66.2 per cent. The age groups reflect the percentages of participants as close to each other. The average percentage of participants is between 71.7 per cent and 87.5 per cent.

**'Disagree'** This category shows 18 Muslims disagreed: eight males – 13.3 per cent, and 11 females – 11.8 per cent. The results reflect five responses from citizens respondents – 5.8 per cent, and 14 residents – 20.6 per cent. The respondents in the (18-25) and (46-65) years have the same number: two participants from each; six responded from the (26-35) years – 10.3 per cent; eight responded from the (36-45) years – 17.4 per cent; one responded from (Above 66) years – 12.5 per cent.

**'I do not know'** This category shows 3 male respondents - 5 per cent, and six females – 6.5 per cent. four citizens responded – 4.7 per cent, compared to five residents – 7.4 per cent. The (36-45) years and (Above 66) years have no respondents, while five responded in the (26-35) years group. The (18-25) and (46-65) years have an equal number of participants: two from each group.

**‘Missing’** This category shows eight Muslims left this question unanswered: five males and three females. The citizens and residents have close results: 4.7 per cent and 5.9 per cent, respectively. The age groups (46-65) and (Above 66) years have no responses, while the (18-25), (26-35), and (36-45) years show one, two, and five participants, respectively.

#### I.2.4. Individuals

The participants were asked whether they preferred to give their *zakāt* to individuals, without involving a third party in this section. Table (I.2.4) provides the number of participants in this question. The highest activity is in the ‘Agree’ section, followed by ‘Disagree’ section; both ‘I do not know’ and ‘Missing’ sections have the least answers. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who prefer to give their *zakāt* to individuals stands at 77.7 per cent

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Individuals (Paid directly to chosen beneficiaries without involving a third party)	Agree	Count	48	71	61	58	20	43	37	11	8
		Row Total N %	40.3%	59.7%	51.3%	48.7%	16.8%	36.1%	31.1%	9.2%	6.7%
		Column Total N %	80.0%	76.3%	71.8%	85.3%	83.3%	74.1%	80.4%	64.7%	100.0%
	Disagree	Count	6	12	9	9	1	8	4	5	0
		Row Total N %	33.3%	66.7%	50.0%	50.0%	5.6%	44.4%	22.2%	27.8%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	10.0%	12.9%	10.6%	13.2%	4.2%	13.8%	8.7%	29.4%	0.0%
	I do not know	Count	4	4	8	0	2	4	1	1	0
		Row Total N %	50.0%	50.0%	100.0%	0.0%	25.0%	50.0%	12.5%	12.5%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	6.7%	4.3%	9.4%	0.0%	8.3%	6.9%	2.2%	5.9%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	2	6	7	1	1	3	4	0	0
		Row Total N %	25.0%	75.0%	87.5%	12.5%	12.5%	37.5%	50.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	3.3%	6.5%	8.2%	1.5%	4.2%	5.2%	8.7%	0.0%	0.0%

Table (I.2.4) Individuals

**‘Agree’** This category shows 48 males responded - 80 per cent, compared to 71 females – 76.3 per cent. Residents had the highest responses with 85.3 per cent, compared to citizens 71.8 per cent. The participants from the (Above 66) years all responded, while the rest of the respondents’ average percentage in the age groups is between 64.7 per cent and 83.3 per cent.

**‘Disagree’** This category shows six male respondents - 10 per cent, compared to 12 females – 12.9 per cent. The citizens and residents have equal responses: nine participants in each group. The (26-35) years reflects the most respondents who disagree: eight. The follow up figure in the (46-65) years has five participants. The rest of the age groups (18-25) and (36-45) years have one and four responses, respectively.

**‘I do not know’** This category shows males have equal respondents with females: four participants from each group. The citizens only responded (no resident) with eight participants - 100 per cent. Qatari participants are distributed among the age groups: two participants from the (18-25) years - 8.3 per cent; four participants from the (26-35) years - 6.9 per cent; one

participant from the (36-45) years - 2.2 per cent; and one participant from the (46-65) years- 5.9 per cent.

**‘Missing’** This category shows eight Muslims left this question unanswered: two males, six females; seven citizens; and one resident. The eight Muslims are distributed among one participant for (18-25) years - 1.5 per cent; three participants from the (26-35) years - 5.2 per cent; and four participants from the (36-45 years - 8.7 per cent.

### I.2.5. Give *Zakāt* Through ...

This question asked whether participants preferred to give their *zakāt* through cash payments, in kind, or banking transactions. Table (I.2.5) provides the number of participants in this section. The highest activity is in the ‘Cash payments’ section, followed by ‘Banking transactions’, followed by ‘Amount in kind’. The ‘Missing’ section has the least answers. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) give *zakāt* through cash payments is 86.2 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
I give my Zakat through ...	Cash payments.	Count	50	82	77	55	24	46	41	13	8
		Row Total N %	37.9%	62.1%	58.3%	41.7%	18.2%	34.8%	31.1%	9.8%	6.1%
		Column Total N %	83.3%	88.2%	90.6%	80.9%	100.0%	79.3%	89.1%	76.5%	100.0%
	Amounts in kind	Count	3	3	0	6	0	5	0	1	0
		Row Total N %	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	83.3%	0.0%	16.7%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	5.0%	3.2%	0.0%	8.8%	0.0%	8.6%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%
	Banking transactions	Count	7	6	7	6	0	5	5	3	0
		Row Total N %	53.8%	46.2%	53.8%	46.2%	0.0%	38.5%	38.5%	23.1%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	11.7%	6.5%	8.2%	8.8%	0.0%	8.6%	10.9%	17.6%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	0	2	1	1	0	2	0	0	0
		Row Total N %	0.0%	100.0%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	0.0%	2.2%	1.2%	1.5%	0.0%	3.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%

Table (I.2.5) Give *Zakāt* Through ...

**‘Cash payments’:** The category shows 50 males responded – 83.3 per cent, compared to 82 females – 88.2 per cent. 77 citizens responded – 90.6 per cent, compared to 55 residents – 80.9 per cent. The participants in the (18-25) and (Above 66) years age groups all responded, while the (26-35), (36-45), and (46-65) years responded with 79.3 per cent; 89.1 per cent; and 76.5 per cent, respectively.

**‘Amounts in kind’:** This category shows the male and female count of respondents is the same: three participants from each group. Six participants from the residents’ section responded. The residents are five participants from the (26-35) years, and one participant from the (46-65) years.

**‘Banking transactions’:** This category shows seven male respondents, compared to six females. Citizens have seven respondents, compared to six residents. There are five participants

in the age groups: one from the (26-35) years, and one from (36-45) years; the (46-65) years has one response. The rest of the age groups have no responses.

**‘Missing’** This category shows that, only females responded in the Gender section, with two participants: one citizen and one resident in the (26-35) years group.

### I.2.6. Prefer Pay the *Zakāt* To...

This question asked participants where they would like to pay their *zakāt*: in Qatar, abroad, or both. Table (I.2.6) provides the number of participant responses. The most activity appears in the ‘Both’ section, followed by ‘Abroad’, followed by ‘Qatar’. ‘Missing’ had the lowest answer activity. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) prefer paying *zakāt* abroad is 18.9 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
I prefer to pay my Zakat ...	In Qatar.	Count	9	20	23	6	4	6	15	3	1
		Row Total N %	31.0%	69.0%	79.3%	20.7%	13.8%	20.7%	51.7%	10.3%	3.4%
		Column Total N %	15.0%	21.5%	27.1%	8.8%	16.7%	10.3%	32.6%	17.6%	12.5%
	Abroad	Count	15	16	4	27	4	14	10	3	0
		Row Total N %	48.4%	51.6%	12.9%	87.1%	12.9%	45.2%	32.3%	9.7%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	25.0%	17.2%	4.7%	39.7%	16.7%	24.1%	21.7%	17.6%	0.0%
	Both	Count	34	56	55	35	16	37	19	11	7
		Row Total N %	37.8%	62.2%	61.1%	38.9%	17.8%	41.1%	21.1%	12.2%	7.8%
		Column Total N %	56.7%	60.2%	64.7%	51.5%	66.7%	63.8%	41.3%	64.7%	87.5%
	Missing	Count	2	1	3	0	0	1	2	0	0
		Row Total N %	66.7%	33.3%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	3.3%	1.1%	3.5%	0.0%	0.0%	1.7%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%

Table (I.2.6) Prefer Pay the *Zakāt* To...

**‘In Qatar’:** The category shows more females prefer to pay their *zakāt* in Qatar than males – 21.5 per cent, compared to 15 per cent for males. Qatar national responses are 27.1 per cent, compared to 8.8 per cent for residents. The various ratios are distributed between the following age groups: 16.7 per cent for the (18-25) years; 10.3 per cent for the (26-35) age group; 32.6 per cent for the (36-45) years; 17.6 for the (46-65) years; and 12.5 per cent for the (Above 66) years, respectively.

**‘Abroad’:** This category shows more males preferred to pay their *zakāt* in Qatar than females – 25 per cent, compared to 17.2 per cent for females. Citizens and residents have a wide gap: four citizens responded – 4.7 per cent, compared to 27 residents’ responses - 39.7 per cent. The (Above 66) years has no responses, while the other age have close percentages: 16.7 per cent for the (18-25) years; 24.1 per cent for the (26-35) years; 21.7 per cent for the (36-45) years; and 17.6 per cent for the (46-65) years, respectively.



**‘Both’:** This category shows 34 males responded – 56.7 per cent, compared to 56 females – 60.2 per cent. 55 citizens responded – 64.7 per cent of the total National section, compared to 35 residents – 51. per cent. The age group (Above 66) has the highest percentage of participants - 87.5 per cent; the (36-45) years has the lowest response - 41.3 per cent. The percentage of respondents from the rest of the age groups is close: 66.7 per cent for the (18-25) years; 63.8 per cent for the (26-35) years; and 64.7 per cent for (46-65) years.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows only citizens responded: two males and one female. One citizen is from the (26-35) years group, and two citizens from the (36-45) years.

### I.2.7. Participations’ Comments

Table (I.2.7) shows the comments left by participants. 19 participants were interested in leaving comments. The total of Qatari (citizens and residents) participants who commented is 12.4 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Would you like to add any other comments concerning your Zakat-giving behaviour?	Comment	Count	5	14	8	11	3	8	3	4	1
		Row Total N %	26.3%	73.7%	42.1%	57.9%	15.8%	42.1%	15.8%	21.1%	5.3%
		Column Total N %	8.3%	15.1%	9.4%	16.2%	12.5%	13.8%	6.5%	23.5%	12.5%
	Not Comment	Count	55	79	77	57	21	50	43	13	7
		Row Total N %	41.0%	59.0%	57.5%	42.5%	15.7%	37.3%	32.1%	9.7%	5.2%
		Column Total N %	91.7%	84.9%	90.6%	83.8%	87.5%	86.2%	93.5%	76.5%	87.5%

Table (I.2.7) Participations’ Comments

**Respondents who commented:** Five males left comments – 8.3 per cent, compared to 14 females – 15.1 per cent. The Gender section reflects 8 citizens and 11 residents responded. The Age groups that participated are three from the (18-25) years; 8 from the (26-35) years; 3 from the (36-45) years; 4 from the, (46-65) age group; and one from the (Above 66) years.

### Section Two: Respondents’ Comments

1. Honestly, the instrument varies according to the availability whether by direct cash or by a faster manner through the transfer by bank messages.
2. We want an awareness about what the mosques do with the money of *zakāt*.
3. I prefer to give my *zakāt* to the charitable organisations for beneficiaries outside Qatar (Poor Muslims).
4. Ideally, it is preferred to provide a phone app or website that provides subscription and offers many services, including a calculation of the due *zakāt*. Other ways include offering of *zakāt*-beneficiaries’ products appropriate to the value amount owed by me



so that I can click on it, read some of the information, and see some of the images. If I like it and it is appropriate to me, I will press the OK button and then the required amount is deducted from my balance, and even sending a monthly or annually report and images to me on how *zakāt* amount has developed such project or *Zakāt* due by my decision.

5. I give my *zakāt* to the deserved people in need whether inside Qatar or abroad.
6. *Zakāt* payment in some countries should be made carefully. Here I mean that in some countries the money should not be delivered to the governmental bodies, and I mean here *Zakat* Fund unless it is ascertained that it is delivered to those who deserve it and Allah knows (a personal opinion). The condition is that it should be delivered to its beneficiaries.
7. I did not pay *zakāt* before. However, *zakāt* is paid for the traded and hoarded up money. I think that this matter should also be reconsidered since relating and attaching *zakāt* to the subject of trading will reduce, in my personal opinion, the effectiveness of this resource.
8. The poor outside Qatar are poorer than Qatar.
9. I trust Qatari *Zakat* Fund as the Qatari government has the leading role in *Zakāt*.
10. As I mentioned previously, *zakāt* is paid by my father – May Allah protect him – and I do not know the full provisions of it.
11. There is no governmental body responsible for *zakāt* and the collection of its money.
12. In Yemen, *zakāt* is taken directly from my salary.
13. I give my *zakāt* in the form of in-kind and cash amounts and bank transactions. Priority in preference is given to the charitable organisations.
14. I think that *zakāt* and its payment differs according to the circumstances. Sometimes I find a family in need to which I prefer to give *zakāt* by myself. I live in the State of Qatar where the citizen and resident are prosperous, so I often prefer to pay *zakāt* on my money in my country Iran because I know many of the poor families that are in need and suffer in silence.
15. According to the need of the people in need, it may be in country or through the Qatari institutions.
16. I often prefer the payment of *zakāt* in person based on my follow-up of the cases of *zakāt*-beneficiaries whether inside Qatar or abroad. Sometimes I do not mind sending it to a charitable body approved by the state.

17. The charitable organisations come to us to give them *zakāt* and some of the mosques send the poor to our houses and we give them it. I like to give my *zakāt* at the last ten days of *Ramaḍān*.

### I.3. Section three: Decision-making

Section three has discussed Muslims' decision-making; whether they trust making *zakāt* payments based on decisions made by family, their own judgment, media reports, social media reports, advertisements, calls from Muslim scholars, or humanitarian appeals from charities. The answers were; 'I trust', 'I do not trust' and 'I do not know'. The 'Missing' question is added for the same reasons as in Section One. This section has seven tables, besides the participants' comments table.

#### I.3.1. Family

This question discusses whether the participants trust paying their *zakāt* with their families or not. Table (I.3.1) provides the number of participants in this section. The highest activity of responses is in the 'I trust' section, followed by 'I do not trust' and 'I do not know'. The 'Missing' section has the least responses. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who paid in agreement with their families is 86.9 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
My family, I pay my Zakat with them.	I trust	Count	53	80	71	62	23	48	40	16	6
		Row Total N %	39.8%	60.2%	53.4%	46.6%	17.3%	36.1%	30.1%	12.0%	4.5%
		Column Total N %	88.3%	86.0%	83.5%	91.2%	95.8%	82.8%	87.0%	94.1%	75.0%
	I do not trust	Count	3	5	7	1	1	3	3	0	1
		Row Total N %	37.5%	62.5%	87.5%	12.5%	12.5%	37.5%	37.5%	0.0%	12.5%
		Column Total N %	5.0%	5.4%	8.2%	1.5%	4.2%	5.2%	6.5%	0.0%	12.5%
	I do not know	Count	2	6	6	2	0	4	3	0	1
		Row Total N %	25.0%	75.0%	75.0%	25.0%	0.0%	50.0%	37.5%	0.0%	12.5%
		Column Total N %	3.3%	6.5%	7.1%	2.9%	0.0%	6.9%	6.5%	0.0%	12.5%
	Missing	Count	2	2	1	3	0	3	0	1	0
		Row Total N %	50.0%	50.0%	25.0%	75.0%	0.0%	75.0%	0.0%	25.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	3.3%	2.2%	1.2%	4.4%	0.0%	5.2%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%

Table (I.3.1) Family

**'I trust':** This category reflects females had the highest number of participants. 80 female participants responded – 86 per cent - compared to 53 male respondents – 88.3 - per cent. citizens had the highest number with 71 participants – 83.5 per cent, compared to 62 residents – 91.2 per cent. The age group percentages vary between 75 per cent and 95.8 per cent.

**‘I do not trust’:** This category shows three males responded – 5 per cent, compared to five female participants – 5.4 per cent. eight participants from the Nationality section show seven citizens respondents – 8.2 per cent, and one resident – 1.5 per cent. The age groups have one participant from each of the (18-25) years – 12.5 per cent and (Above 66) years - 12.5 per cent, compared to three participants from the (36-45) years - 37.5 per cent; three participants from the (26-35) years - 37.5 per cent; and no respondents from the (46-65) years.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows two males responded – 3.3 per cent, compared to six female participants – 6.5 per cent. six citizens responded – 7.1 per cent - and two residents – 2.9 per cent. The age groups have four participants– 50 per cent (26-35) years and three participants for (36-45) years age group - 37.5 per cent, compared to one participant for (Above 66) years – 12.5 per cent. No responses from age groups (18-26) years, and (46-65) years.

**‘Missing’:** This category reflects close results between males and females – two participants each. One citizen responded – 1.2 per cent compared to three residents – 4.4 per cent. The age groups are distributed as follows: one participant for (46-65) years and three participants for (26-35) years.

### I.3.2. Own Judgment

This question asked whether the participants trusted their own judgment or not regarding paying *zakāt*. Based on Table (I.3.2) the highest activity of responses is in the ‘I trust’ section, followed by ‘I do not trust’, followed by ‘Missing’. The ‘I do not know’ section has the least responses. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who trusted their own judgments is 75.8 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
My own judgment.	I trust	Count	45	71	66	50	18	43	37	11	7
		Row Total N %	38.8%	61.2%	56.9%	43.1%	15.5%	37.1%	31.9%	9.5%	6.0%
		Column Total N %	75.0%	76.3%	77.6%	73.5%	75.0%	74.1%	80.4%	64.7%	87.5%
	I do not trust	Count	7	10	8	9	3	6	5	2	1
		Row Total N %	41.2%	58.8%	47.1%	52.9%	17.6%	35.3%	29.4%	11.8%	5.9%
		Column Total N %	11.7%	10.8%	9.4%	13.2%	12.5%	10.3%	10.9%	11.8%	12.5%
	I do not know	Count	3	4	5	2	2	4	0	1	0
		Row Total N %	42.9%	57.1%	71.4%	28.6%	28.6%	57.1%	0.0%	14.3%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	5.0%	4.3%	5.9%	2.9%	8.3%	6.9%	0.0%	5.9%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	5	8	6	7	1	5	4	3	0
		Row Total N %	38.5%	61.5%	46.2%	53.8%	7.7%	38.5%	30.8%	23.1%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	8.3%	8.6%	7.1%	10.3%	4.2%	8.6%	8.7%	17.6%	0.0%

Table (I.3.2) Own Judgment

**‘I trust’:** This category shows 45 male participants responded - 75 per cent, compared to 71 female participants – 76.3 per cent. Citizens had the highest responses with 66 participants – 77.6 per cent, compared to 50 residents – 77.5 per cent. The age groups have varied responses:

18 responded from the (18-25) years - 75 per cent; 43 responded from the (26-35) years – 74.1 per cent; 37 responded from the (36-45) years – 80.4 per cent; 11 responded from the (46-65) years – 64.7 per cent; and seven responded from the (Above 66) years – 87.5 per cent.

**‘I do not trust’:** This category shows seven male participants – 11.7 per cent - compared to 10 females who responded – 10.8 per cent. The Nationality section has eight citizens respondents – 9.4 per cent, compared to nine residents – 13.2 per cent. The percentage of the age groups are distributed between 10.3 per cent and 12.5 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows three males responded – five per cent, compared to four female respondents – 4.3 per cent. The Nationality section five citizens’ respondents – 5.9 per cent, compared to two from residents – 2.9 per cent. The age groups; (36-45) years and (Above 66) years have no responses, while the (18-25) years has two responses - 8.3 per cent; (26-35) years has four responses - 6.9 per cent; and (46-65) had one response - 5.9 per cent.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows five males responded – 8.3 per cent, compared to eight female participants – 8.6 per cent. six citizens responded – 7.1 per cent, compared to seven resident respondents – 10.3 per cent. The age groups (Above 66) years had no responses, while the percentage of the rest of the age groups distribution is between 4.2 per cent and 17.6 per cent.

### I.3.3. Media Reports

This question asked whether participants trusted media reports such as TV, radio, newspapers, and so on, and whether they paid their *zakāt* based on these reports or not. Based on Table (I.3.3) the highest responses come from ‘I trust’, followed by ‘I do not trust’, followed by ‘I do not know’. The ‘Missing’ responses had the lowest answer activity. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who trusted media reports stands at 45.7 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Media reports (TV, radio, newspapers).	I trust	Count	32	38	41	29	10	25	23	7	5
		Row Total N %	45.7%	54.3%	58.6%	41.4%	14.3%	35.7%	32.9%	10.0%	7.1%
		Column Total N %	53.3%	40.9%	48.2%	42.6%	41.7%	43.1%	50.0%	41.2%	62.5%
	I do not trust	Count	13	28	25	16	8	17	10	4	2
		Row Total N %	31.7%	68.3%	61.0%	39.0%	19.5%	41.5%	24.4%	9.8%	4.9%
		Column Total N %	21.7%	30.1%	29.4%	23.5%	33.3%	29.3%	21.7%	23.5%	25.0%
	I do not know	Count	11	19	14	16	6	11	10	3	0
		Row Total N %	36.7%	63.3%	46.7%	53.3%	20.0%	36.7%	33.3%	10.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	18.3%	20.4%	16.5%	23.5%	25.0%	19.0%	21.7%	17.6%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	4	8	5	7	0	5	3	3	1
		Row Total N %	33.3%	66.7%	41.7%	58.3%	0.0%	41.7%	25.0%	25.0%	8.3%
		Column Total N %	6.7%	8.6%	5.9%	10.3%	0.0%	8.6%	6.5%	17.6%	12.5%

Table (I.3.3) Media Reports

**‘I trust’:** This category shows 32 male participants responded – 53.3 per cent, compared to 38 female participants – 40.9 per cent. Citizens had the highest responses with 41 participants – 48.2 per cent, compared to 29 residents – 42.6 per cent. The age groups reflect the participants’ percentages as close to each other. The average percentage of participants is between 41.2 per cent and 62.5 per cent.

**‘I do not trust’:** This category shows 13 males responded – 21.7 per cent, compared to 28 females – 30.1 per cent. The results reflect 25 responses from citizens respondents – 29.4 per cent, compared to 16 residents – 23.5 per cent. The age groups reflect the percentages of participants as close to each other. The average percentage of participants is between 21.7 per cent and 33.3 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows 11 males responded – 18.3 per cent, and 19 female participants – 20.4 per cent. 14 citizens responded – 16.5 per cent, compared to 16 from residents – 23.5 per cent. The age groups: (Above 66) years had no respondents, while the rest of the age groups had an average percentage of participants between 17.6 per cent and 25 per cent.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows four males responded – 6.7 per cent, and 8 female participants – 8.6 per cent. The nationality section had five respondents from citizens – 5.9 per cent, and seven residents – 10.3 per cent. The age groups: the (18-25) years had no response; the (26-35) years had five responses – 8.6 per cent; the (36-45) years and (45-65) years had equal responses - three participants for each - 6.5 per cent and 17.6 per cent respectively; and one participant from (Above 66) years - 12.5 per cent.

#### **I.3.4. Social Media Reports**

This question asked whether the participants trust social media reports, such as *Facebook*, *Twitter*, *Instagram*, and so on, and if they paid their *zakāt* based on these reports or not. Based on Table (I.3.4) the highest activity responses come from ‘I do not trust’, followed by ‘I do not know’, followed by ‘I trust’. The ‘Missing’ had the lowest response activity. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who trusted social media reports is 13.7 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Social Media reports (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram ...).	I trust	Count	5	16	15	6	5	7	5	2	2
		Row Total N %	23.8%	76.2%	71.4%	28.6%	23.8%	33.3%	23.8%	9.5%	9.5%
		Column Total N %	8.3%	17.2%	17.6%	8.8%	20.8%	12.1%	10.9%	11.8%	25.0%
	I do not trust	Count	37	57	55	39	14	35	29	11	5
		Row Total N %	39.4%	60.6%	58.5%	41.5%	14.9%	37.2%	30.9%	11.7%	5.3%
		Column Total N %	61.7%	61.3%	64.7%	57.4%	58.3%	60.3%	63.0%	64.7%	62.5%
	I do not know	Count	13	13	11	15	5	10	10	1	0
		Row Total N %	50.0%	50.0%	42.3%	57.7%	19.2%	38.5%	38.5%	3.8%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	21.7%	14.0%	12.9%	22.1%	20.8%	17.2%	21.7%	5.9%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	5	7	4	8	0	6	2	3	1
		Row Total N %	41.7%	58.3%	33.3%	66.7%	0.0%	50.0%	16.7%	25.0%	8.3%
		Column Total N %	8.3%	7.5%	4.7%	11.8%	0.0%	10.3%	4.3%	17.6%	12.5%

Table (I.3.4) Social Media Reports

**‘I trust’:** This category shows five males responded – 8.3 per cent, compared to 16 female participants – 17.2 per cent. Citizens had 15 participants – 17.6 per cent, compared to six residents – 8.8 per cent. The percentages for the age groups are distributed between 10.9 per cent and 20.8 per cent.

**‘I do not trust’:** This category shows 37 males responded – 61.7 per cent, compared to 57 females’ participants– 61.3 per cent. The citizens show 55 respondents – 64.7 per cent, and residents shows 39 respondents – 57.4 per cent. The percentage of the age groups are distributed between 58.3 per cent and 64.7 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows male respondents as equal with females: 13 participants from each group. The citizens had 11 respondents – 12.9 per cent compared to 15 residents – 22.1 per cent. 10 participants responded in two age groups: (26-35) years – 17.2 per cent, and (36-45) years - 21.7 per cent. five participants responded from (18-25) years - 20.8 per cent; one participant from the (46-65) years - 5.9 per cent; and (Above 66) years had no responses.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows five males responded – 8.3 per cent, compared to seven females – 7.5 per cent. Citizens have four responses – 4.7 per cent, compared to eight residents – 11.8 per cent. The age groups show (18-25) years had no responses, while the percentage of the rest of age groups is distributed between 4.3 per cent and 17.6 per cent.

### I.3.5. Advertisements

This question asked whether the participants trust advertisements, such as billboards, TV commercials, and so on, and whether they paid their *zakāt* based on these advertisements or not. Based on Table (I.3.5) the ‘I trust’ and ‘I do not trust’ sections had the highest responses, followed by ‘I do not know’. The ‘Missing’ section had the lowest answer activity. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who trusted advertisements is 31.3 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Advertisements (billboard, TV commercials ...).	I trust	Count	18	30	29	19	10	17	14	4	3
		Row Total N %	37.5%	62.5%	60.4%	39.6%	20.8%	35.4%	29.2%	8.3%	6.3%
		Column Total N %	30.0%	32.3%	34.1%	27.9%	41.7%	29.3%	30.4%	23.5%	37.5%
	I do not trust	Count	25	33	32	26	11	19	19	7	2
		Row Total N %	43.1%	56.9%	55.2%	44.8%	19.0%	32.8%	32.8%	12.1%	3.4%
		Column Total N %	41.7%	35.5%	37.6%	38.2%	45.8%	32.8%	41.3%	41.2%	25.0%
	I do not know	Count	12	22	18	16	3	15	10	4	2
		Row Total N %	35.3%	64.7%	52.9%	47.1%	8.8%	44.1%	29.4%	11.8%	5.9%
		Column Total N %	20.0%	23.7%	21.2%	23.5%	12.5%	25.9%	21.7%	23.5%	25.0%
	Missing	Count	5	8	6	7	0	7	3	2	1
		Row Total N %	38.5%	61.5%	46.2%	53.8%	0.0%	53.8%	23.1%	15.4%	7.7%
		Column Total N %	8.3%	8.6%	7.1%	10.3%	0.0%	12.1%	6.5%	11.8%	12.5%

Table (I.3.5) Advertisements

**‘I trust’:** This category shows 18 males responded - 30 per cent, compared to 30 female participants – 32.3 per cent. 29 citizens responded – 34.1 per cent, compared to 19 residents – 27.9 per cent. The age groups show: the (18-25) years had 10 participants – 41.7 per cent; 17 participants from (26-35) years – 29.3 per cent; 14 participants from (36-45) years – 30.4 per cent; four participants from (46-65) years – 23.5 per cent; and three participants from (Above 66) years – 37.5 per cent.

**‘I do not trust’:** This category shows 25 males responded – 41.7 per cent, compared to 33 females– 35.5 per cent. The citizens had 32 respondents –37.6 per cent, compared to 26 residents – 38.2 per cent. The age groups show: 19 participants for each (26-35) years – 32.8 per cent - and (36-45) years age group - 41.3 per cent, respectively; 11 participants from the (18-25) years - 45.8 per cent; seven participants from the (46-65) years - 41.2 per cent; and two participants from the (Above 66) years– 25 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows 12 males responded – 20 per cent, compared to 22 female respondents – 23.7 per cent. The Nationality section had 18 male respondents – 21.1 per cent, compared to 16 female respondents – 23.5 per cent. The age groups show: (26-35) years had the highest percentage of participation – 25.9 per cent. The percentage of the rest of the age groups varies between 12.5 per cent and 25 per cent.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows females have the highest number of respondents. Eight females responded – 8.6 per cent, compared to five male participants – 8.3 per cent. Residents also had the highest number: seven respondents – 10.3 per cent, compared to six citizens – 7.1 per cent. The age groups show: (18-25) years had no responses, while the rest of the age groups had seven responses from the (26-35) age group – 12.1 per cent; three responses from the (36-45)

age group – 6.5 per cent; two responses from the (46-65) age group – 11.8 per cent; and one response from the (Above 66) years age group – 12.5 per cent.

### I.3.6. Calls from Muslim Scholars

This question asked whether the participants trusted the Muslim scholars, and whether they paid their *zakāt* based on the scholars' call or not. Based on Table (I.3.6) the highest responses were from 'I trust' section, followed by 'I do not trust' section, followed by 'I do not know' section. The 'Missing' section had the lowest response activity. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who replied to calls from Muslim scholars comes to 63.3 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Calls from Muslims scholars.	I trust	Count	40	57	51	46	18	35	28	9	7
		Row Total N %	41.2%	58.8%	52.6%	47.4%	18.6%	36.1%	28.9%	9.3%	7.2%
		Column Total N %	66.7%	61.3%	60.0%	67.6%	75.0%	60.3%	60.9%	52.9%	87.5%
	I do not trust	Count	9	18	18	9	3	13	7	4	0
		Row Total N %	33.3%	66.7%	66.7%	33.3%	11.1%	48.1%	25.9%	14.8%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	15.0%	19.4%	21.2%	13.2%	12.5%	22.4%	15.2%	23.5%	0.0%
	I do not know	Count	6	13	10	9	3	6	7	3	0
		Row Total N %	31.6%	68.4%	52.6%	47.4%	15.8%	31.6%	36.8%	15.8%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	10.0%	14.0%	11.8%	13.2%	12.5%	10.3%	15.2%	17.6%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	5	5	6	4	0	4	4	1	1
		Row Total N %	50.0%	50.0%	60.0%	40.0%	0.0%	40.0%	40.0%	10.0%	10.0%
		Column Total N %	8.3%	5.4%	7.1%	5.9%	0.0%	6.9%	8.7%	5.9%	12.5%

Table (I.3.6) Calls from Muslim Scholars

**'I trust':** This category shows 40 males responded – 66.7 per cent, compared to 57 female participants – 61.3 per cent. The Nationality section had citizens and residents as close: 60 per cent - 67.6 per cent, respectively. The age groups show: the (Above 66) years had the highest respondents with seven participants – 87.5 per cent, followed by the (18-25) years with 18 respondents – 75 per cent. The (26-35) years and (36-45) years had close percentages: 35 participants from (26-35) years – 60.3 per cent, and 28 responses from (36-45) years – 60.9 per cent. The lowest responses are from (46-65) years: nine responded – 52.9 per cent.

**'I do not trust':** This category shows nine males responded – 15 per cent, compared to 18 female participants – 19.4 per cent. The national section shows 18 citizens respondents – 21.2 per cent, and nine residents – 13.2 per cent. The age groups show: the (Above 66) years had no responses, and the percentage of the rest of the age groups varied between 12.5 per cent and 23.5 per cent.

**'I do not know':** This category shows six males responded – 10 per cent, compared to 13 female respondents – 14 per cent. The Nationality section has a close participation percentage: 10 from citizens – 11.8 per cent, and nine from residents – 13.2 per cent. The age groups:



(Above 66) years had no responses, and the rest of the age groups' percentages varied between 10.3 per cent and 17.6 per cent.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows males and females had equal responses: five participants for each. The Nationality section had six participants from citizens – 7.1 per cent, compared to four participants from residents – 5.9 per cent. the age groups had no respondents form (18-25) years, while four participants responded from each group: (26-35) years and (36-45) years - 6.9 per cent, and 8.7 per cent respectively; and one participant from each of the following groups: (46-65) years and (Above 66) years - 5.9 per cent and 12.5 per cent, respectively.

### I.3.7. Humanitarian Appeals

This question asked whether the participants trusted humanitarian organisations, such as government, United Nations, and NGOs, and whether they paid their *zakāt* according on these appeals or not. Based on Table (I.3.7) the highest responses came from ‘I trust’ section, followed by ‘I do not trust’ section, followed by ‘I do not know’ section. The ‘Missing’ section had the lowest response activity. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who supported human appeals is 49.6 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Humanitarian appeals (government, United Nation, NGOs).	I trust	Count	29	47	40	36	15	28	19	9	5
		Row Total N %	38.2%	61.8%	52.6%	47.4%	19.7%	36.8%	25.0%	11.8%	6.6%
		Column Total N %	48.3%	50.5%	47.1%	52.9%	62.5%	48.3%	41.3%	52.9%	62.5%
	I do not trust	Count	20	25	28	17	6	14	18	5	2
		Row Total N %	44.4%	55.6%	62.2%	37.8%	13.3%	31.1%	40.0%	11.1%	4.4%
		Column Total N %	33.3%	26.9%	32.9%	25.0%	25.0%	24.1%	39.1%	29.4%	25.0%
	I do not know	Count	7	18	14	11	3	12	8	2	0
		Row Total N %	28.0%	72.0%	56.0%	44.0%	12.0%	48.0%	32.0%	8.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	11.7%	19.4%	16.5%	16.2%	12.5%	20.7%	17.4%	11.8%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	4	3	3	4	0	4	1	1	1
		Row Total N %	57.1%	42.9%	42.9%	57.1%	0.0%	57.1%	14.3%	14.3%	14.3%
		Column Total N %	6.7%	3.2%	3.5%	5.9%	0.0%	6.9%	2.2%	5.9%	12.5%

Table (I.3.7) Humanitarian Appeals

**‘I trust’:** This category shows 29 males responded, 48.3 per cent, compared to 47 female participants – 50.5 per cent. Citizens had 40 respondents – 47.1 per cent. The residents had 36 respondents – 52.9 per cent. The percentage of the age groups varies between 41.3 per cent and 62.5 per cent.

**‘I do not trust’:** This category shows 20 males responded – 33.3 per cent, compared to 25 female participants – 26.9 per cent. Citizens had 28 respondents – 32.9 per cent, compared to 17 residents - 25 per cent. The percentage of the groups varies between 24.1 per cent and 39.1 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows seven males responded – 11.7 per cent, compared to 18 female participants – 19.4 per cent. Citizens had 14 respondents – 16.5 per cent, compared to 11 residents – 16.2 per cent. The age groups show: the (Above 66) years had no responses, while the percentage for the rest of the age groups varies between 11.8 per cent and 20.7 per cent.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows four males responded – 6.7 per cent, compared to three female participants – 3.2 per cent. Citizens had 3 responses – 3.5 per cent, compared to four residents – 5.9 per cent. The age groups show: the (18-25) years had no responses, while there were four respondents from (26-35) years - 6.9 per cent - and the rest of the age groups had equal responses: one participant from each (36-45), (46-65), and (Above 66) years - 2.2 per cent, 5.9 per cent, and 12.5 per cent, respectively.

### I.3.8. Participations’ Comments

Table (I.3.8) shows the number of participants who responded with comments - 14 responded in the ‘Comments’ section, compared to 139 ‘No Comments’. The total of Qatari (citizens and residents) participants who commented is 9.1 per cent

		Gender		Nationality		Age				
		Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Would you like to add any other comments regarding your decision making when it comes to Zakat-giving?	Comment	Count	6	8	9	5	3	5	2	3
		Row Total N %	42.9%	57.1%	64.3%	35.7%	21.4%	35.7%	14.3%	21.4%
		Column Total N %	10.0%	8.6%	10.6%	7.4%	12.5%	8.6%	4.3%	17.6%
	No Comment	Count	54	85	76	63	21	53	44	14
		Row Total N %	38.8%	61.2%	54.7%	45.3%	15.1%	38.1%	31.7%	10.1%
		Column Total N %	90.0%	91.4%	89.4%	92.6%	87.5%	91.4%	95.7%	82.4%

Table (I.3.8) Participations’ Comments

**Respondents who commented:** This category reflects six male participants responded with comments – 10 per cent - compared to eight female respondents – 8.6 per cent. Citizens had nine respondents – 10.6 per cent, compared to five residents – 7.7 per cent. The percentage of the age groups varies between 4.3 per cent and 17.6 per cent.

### Section Three: Respondents’ Comments

1. In Qatar, we have currently a common method which is sending by phone.
2. The alms can be given to public bodies, while *zakāt*-beneficiaries should be verified.
3. Television is a tool of those who pay more money unless it is owned by an official body that desires good.
4. I prefer to know *zakāt*-beneficiaries in person.

5. *Zakāt* is due to the Muslim, while the alms and donations may be given to all.
6. I do not understand the purpose of developing the rules and application of *zakāt*.
7. If the idea of *zakāt* provided by an authority is based on *Hadīth* and *Sharī‘ah* provisions, the concerned body will be trusted.
8. Taking the decision should be done by consulting the scholars and it is the best way.
9. Some of Muslim scholars are changed and I cannot trust the fickle persons, while I can trust the religious icons trusted by the Qatari government.
10. Achieving sufficiency for the Muslims and then the non-Muslims are given if under calamity, the religion comes first.
11. My knowledge of *zakāt* and its beneficiaries is based on that my father is the one responsible for paying *zakāt* al-Fitr and *zakāt* of livestock, lands and trade in a certain period, but I have always a question about how the state manages the received amounts.
12. State of Qatar has many generous people and high credibility.
13. In the family, we share the opinions in all the matters and due to the death of my father and being the eldest daughter who has the responsibility of the family, I do not act without referring to my mother and brothers to consult with them.
14. The campaigns of social media still need more verification, particularly if they are not attached with true certificates.
15. I depend in taking my decision on the personal estimation of the case and also on my trust in an official or governmental body approved by the State.
16. I give my *zakāt* based on connecting with my friends through social media. I only trust the Muslims in Qatar from the charitable organisations.

#### **I.4. Section Four: Motivation: on Religious Grounds or Humanitarian Grounds**

Section four examined Muslims’ motivation for paying their *zakāt*, whether their motivation is based on religion, humanitarian reasons, both, or there is no difference between religion and humanitarian grounds. The question also enquired whether participants preferred to give their *zakāt* to Muslims only, or to Muslims and non-Muslims. The question also asked whether the participants preferred to update *zakāt* rules, and whether its application needs to suit current times or not. The answer choices were ‘Agree’, ‘Disagree’, and ‘I do not know’. The ‘Missing’ question has been added for the same reason as in section One. Section Four has five tables in addition to participants’ comments table.

### I.4.1. The *Zakāt* Given As ...

This question asked Muslims' what their motivation was for paying their *zakāt*, whether their motivation was based on religion or humanitarian grounds, or both. Based the Table (I.4.1) the highest activity of responses is in both 'Religion' and 'humanitarian'. The 'Humanity' and 'Missing' had the lowest answer activity. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who gave *zakāt* based on religious or humanitarian ground or both stands at 39.8 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
For religion, humanity or both	Religion	Count	26	35	34	27	3	17	23	14	4
		Row Total N %	42.6%	57.4%	55.7%	44.3%	4.9%	27.9%	37.7%	23.0%	6.6%
		Column Total N %	43.3%	37.6%	40.0%	39.7%	12.5%	29.3%	50.0%	82.4%	50.0%
	Humanity	Count	1	0	1	0	0	0	1	0	0
		Row Total N %	100.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	100.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	1.7%	0.0%	1.2%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	2.2%	0.0%	0.0%
	Both	Count	32	56	49	39	21	39	22	3	3
		Row Total N %	36.4%	63.6%	55.7%	44.3%	23.9%	44.3%	25.0%	3.4%	3.4%
		Column Total N %	53.3%	60.2%	57.6%	57.4%	87.5%	67.2%	47.8%	17.6%	37.5%
	Missing	Count	1	2	1	2	0	2	0	0	1
		Row Total N %	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	66.7%	0.0%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
		Column Total N %	1.7%	2.2%	1.2%	2.9%	0.0%	3.4%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%

Table (I.4.1) The *Zakāt* Given As ...

**'Religion':** This category reflects males had the highest number of participants. 26 male respondents – 43.3 per cent, compared to 35 female respondents – 37.6 per cent. The citizens and residents have close results: 40 per cent and 39.7 per cent, respectively. The age groups have varied responses: three responded from the (18-25) age group – 12.5 per cent; 17 responded from the (26-35) years – 29.3 per cent; 23 responded from the (36-45) years - 50 per cent; 14 responded from the (46-65) years – 82.4 per cent; and four responded from the (Above 66) years - 50 per cent.

**'Humanitarian':** This category shows only one citizen male in the (36-45) years group responded.

**'Both':** This category shows 32 males responded – 53.3 per cent, compared to 56 females – 60.2 per cent. Citizens had 49 participants – 57.6 per cent, compared to 39 residents' participants – 57.43 per cent. The (18-25) years had the highest participants' percentage in the age groups with 87.5 per cent, followed by (26-35) years - 67.2per cent. The (46-65) years had the lowest - 17.6 per cent. The age group (36-45) years had two respondents - 47.8 per cent - while (above 66) years had three respondents - 37.5 per cent.

**'Missing':** This category had one male respondent and two females: one citizen and two residents. These respondents were two from (26-35) years, and one from (above 66) years.

### I.4.2. No Difference Between Religious and Humanitarian Reasons

The question discusses the participants' opinion whether they agree, disagree, or do not know about the difference between religious and humanitarian imperatives. Based on Table (I.4.2) 'Agree' had the most respondent activity, followed by 'Disagree'. 'I do not know' and 'Missing' had the lowest responses. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who saw no difference between religious and humanitarian reasons comes to 57.5 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
There is no difference between religious and humanitarian imperatives.	Agree	Count	32	56	51	37	14	29	29	10	6
		Row Total N %	36.4%	63.6%	58.0%	42.0%	15.9%	33.0%	33.0%	11.4%	6.8%
		Column Total N %	53.3%	60.2%	60.0%	54.4%	58.3%	50.0%	63.0%	58.8%	75.0%
	Disagree	Count	20	19	21	18	4	14	13	6	2
		Row Total N %	51.3%	48.7%	53.8%	46.2%	10.3%	35.9%	33.3%	15.4%	5.1%
		Column Total N %	33.3%	20.4%	24.7%	26.5%	16.7%	24.1%	28.3%	35.3%	25.0%
	I do not know	Count	4	8	4	8	4	6	2	0	0
		Row Total N %	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	50.0%	16.7%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	6.7%	8.6%	4.7%	11.8%	16.7%	10.3%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	4	10	9	5	2	9	2	1	0
		Row Total N %	28.6%	71.4%	64.3%	35.7%	14.3%	64.3%	14.3%	7.1%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	6.7%	10.8%	10.6%	7.4%	8.3%	15.5%	4.3%	5.9%	0.0%

Table (I.4.2) No Difference Between Religious and Humanitarian Reasons

**‘Agree’:** This category reflects 32 males responded – 53.3 per cent, compared to 56 females – 60.2 per cent. Citizens had the highest responses, 51 participants - 60 per cent, compared to 37 residents – 54.4 per cent. The age groups have varied responses: 14 responded from the (18-25) years - 58.3 per cent; 29 responded from the (26-35) years – 50 per cent; 29 responded from the (36-46) years - 63 per cent; 10 responded from the (46-65) years - 58.8 per cent; and six responded from the (above 66) years – 75 per cent.

**‘Disagree’:** This category shows 20 male participants responded – 33.3 per cent, compared to 19 female participants – 20.4 per cent. There are 21 citizens responses – 24.7 per cent, compared to 18 residents 26.5 per cent. The percentage of participants in the age groups varies between 16.7 per cent and 28.3 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows four male participants responded – 6.7 per cent, compared to 8 female participants – 8.6 per cent. The Nationality section had four citizens respondents – 4.7 per cent, and eight residents – 11.8 per cent. The age groups (46-65) and (Above 66) years had no responses, while (18-25) years had four participants - 16.7 per cent; (26-35) years had six participants - 10.3 per cent; and (36-45) years had 2 participants - 4.3 per cent.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows four male participants responded – 6.7 per cent, compared to 10 female participants – 10.8 per cent. Nine citizens responded – 10.6 per cent, compared to five residents – 7.4 per cent. The age groups vary: (Above 66) years had no responses, while

(18-25) and (36-45) years had two responses each– 8.3 per cent and 4.3 per cent, respectively. The (26-35) years had nine responses – 15.5 per cent, and (46-65) years had one response - 5.9 per cent.

### I.4.3. *Zakāt* Is No Different From Other Voluntary Actions

The question discussed whether the participants agree that, *zakāt* is no different from other voluntary actions (e.g., *Ṣadaqah*, *Waqf*), and whether it is an obligation or not. Based on Table (I.4.3), ‘Disagree’ had the most response activity, followed by ‘Agree’, followed by ‘I do not know’. ‘Missing’ had the lowest response activity. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who perceived *zakāt* as no different from other voluntary actions is 17.6 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Zakat is no different from other voluntary actions (e.g. Sadaqah, Waqf). It is not an obligation.	Agree	Count	4	23	22	5	5	11	11	0	0
		Row Total N %	14.8%	85.2%	81.5%	18.5%	18.5%	40.7%	40.7%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	6.7%	24.7%	25.9%	7.4%	20.8%	19.0%	23.9%	0.0%	0.0%
	Disagree	Count	50	66	57	59	14	43	35	17	7
		Row Total N %	43.1%	56.9%	49.1%	50.9%	12.1%	37.1%	30.2%	14.7%	6.0%
		Column Total N %	83.3%	71.0%	67.1%	86.8%	58.3%	74.1%	76.1%	100.0%	87.5%
	I do not know	Count	4	3	4	3	5	2	0	0	0
		Row Total N %	57.1%	42.9%	57.1%	42.9%	71.4%	28.6%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	6.7%	3.2%	4.7%	4.4%	20.8%	3.4%	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	2	1	2	1	0	2	0	0	1
		Row Total N %	66.7%	33.3%	66.7%	33.3%	0.0%	66.7%	0.0%	0.0%	33.3%
		Column Total N %	3.3%	1.1%	2.4%	1.5%	0.0%	3.4%	0.0%	0.0%	12.5%

Table (I.4.3) *Zakāt* Is No Different From Other Voluntary Actions

**‘Agree’:** This category shows females had a higher response than males. 23 female participants responded – 24.7 per cent, compared to four male participants – 6.7 per cent. Citizens also had a higher response than residents. 22 citizens – 25.9 per cent, compared to five residents – 7.4 per cent. The Age groups show: (26-35) and (36-45) years had equal responses, 11 participants from each – 19 per cent and 23.9 per cent respectively, while (18-25) had five responses – 20.8 per cent. There were no responses from the rest of the age groups.

**‘Disagree’:** This category shows 50 male participants responded – 83.3 per cent, compared to 66 female participants - 71 per cent. The Nationality section shows 57 citizens respondents – 67.1 per cent, compared to 59 residents – 86.8 per cent. The age groups have varied responses: 14 from the (18-25) years - 58.3 per cent; 43 from the (26-35) years – 74.1 per cent; 35 from the (36-46) years - 76.1 per cent; 17 from the (46-65) years - 100 per cent; and seven from the (Above 66) years – 87.5 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows four male participants responded – 6.7 per cent, compared to three female participants – 3.2 per cent. four citizens responded – 4.7 per cent,

compared to three residents – 4.4 per cent in the Nationality section. The age groups show: (18-25) years had five participants - 20.8 per cent; and (26-35) years had two participants – 3.4 per cent. The rest of the age groups had no responses.

**‘Missing’:** This category reflects two male participants responded, compared to one female. two citizens nationals responded, compared to one resident. The age groups show: (26-35) years had two respondents, and (Above 66) years had one respondent.

#### I.4.4. *Zakāt* Should Be Given to Both Muslims and Non-Muslims

This question asked whether the participants preferred *zakāt* to be given to both Muslims and non-Muslims or not. Based on Table (I.4.4), ‘Disagree’ had the most response activity, followed by ‘Agree’, followed by ‘I do not know’. The ‘Missing’ section had the lowest response activity. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who thought *zakāt* should be given to both Muslims and non-Muslims is 35.2 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Zakat should be given to both Muslims and non-Muslims.	Agree	Count	21	33	23	31	10	19	17	5	3
		Row Total N %	38.9%	61.1%	42.6%	57.4%	18.5%	35.2%	31.5%	9.3%	5.6%
		Column Total N %	35.0%	35.5%	27.1%	45.6%	41.7%	32.8%	37.0%	29.4%	37.5%
	Disagree	Count	26	47	47	26	10	25	24	10	4
		Row Total N %	35.6%	64.4%	64.4%	35.6%	13.7%	34.2%	32.9%	13.7%	5.5%
		Column Total N %	43.3%	50.5%	55.3%	38.2%	41.7%	43.1%	52.2%	58.8%	50.0%
	I do not know	Count	9	8	8	9	3	12	2	0	0
		Row Total N %	52.9%	47.1%	47.1%	52.9%	17.6%	70.6%	11.8%	0.0%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	15.0%	8.6%	9.4%	13.2%	12.5%	20.7%	4.3%	0.0%	0.0%
	Missing	Count	4	5	7	2	1	2	3	2	1
		Row Total N %	44.4%	55.6%	77.8%	22.2%	11.1%	22.2%	33.3%	22.2%	11.1%
		Column Total N %	6.7%	5.4%	8.2%	2.9%	4.2%	3.4%	6.5%	11.8%	12.5%

Table (I.4.4) *Zakāt* Should Be Given to Both Muslims And Non-Muslims

**‘Agree’:** This category shows 21 males responded - 35 per cent, compared to 33 females – 35.5 per cent. Citizens had 23 participants – 27.1 per cent for the total Nationality section, compared to 31 residents – 45.6 per cent. The percentage of the age groups varies between 29.4 per cent and 41.7 per cent.

**‘Disagree’:** This category shows 26 male respondents – 43.3 per cent, compared to 47 females – 50.5 per cent. The citizens section had 47 respondents – 55.3 per cent, compared to 26 residents – 38.2 per cent. The age groups had equal responses; 10 participants from each (18-25) - 41.7 per cent, and (46-65) years - 58.8 per cent. The percentage for the rest of the groups varies between 43.1 per cent and 52.2 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows nine males – 15 per cent, compared to eight females – 8.6 per cent. The citizens had eight respondents – 9.4 per cent, compared to nine residents –



13.2 per cent. The age groups had three respondents from (18-25) years - 12.5 per cent; 12 respondents from (26-35) years - 20.7 per cent; and two participants from (36-45) years - 4.3 per cent. The age groups (46-65) and (Above 66) years had no respondents.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows four male participants responded – 6.7 per cent, compared to five females – 5.4 per cent. Citizens had seven respondents – 8.2 per cent, compared to two residents – 2.9 per cent. The age groups show: one participant for each (18-25) and (above 66) years - 4.2 per cent, and 12.5 per cent, respectively. The age groups (26-35) and (46-65) years also had an equal number of participants: two from each group - 3.4 per cent, and 11.8 per cent, respectively. The age group (36-45) years had three responses – 6.5 per cent.

#### I.4.5. Update *Zakāt*’s Rules and Application

This question asked whether Muslims agree (or not) that, *zakāt*’s rules and application need to be developed and updated to reflect modern challenges, or they do not know. Based on Table (I.4.5) ‘Disagree’ had the most response activity, followed by ‘Agree’, followed by ‘I do not know’. The ‘Missing’ section had the lowest response activity. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who thought *zakāt*’s rules and application should be updated is 55.5 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Zakat's rules and application need to be developed and updated to reflect modern challenges.	Agree	Count	28	57	51	34	13	31	30	8	3
		Row Total N %	32.9%	67.1%	60.0%	40.0%	15.3%	36.5%	35.3%	9.4%	3.5%
		Column Total N %	46.7%	61.3%	60.0%	50.0%	54.2%	53.4%	65.2%	47.1%	37.5%
	Disagree	Count	11	14	13	12	0	10	11	3	1
		Row Total N %	44.0%	56.0%	52.0%	48.0%	0.0%	40.0%	44.0%	12.0%	4.0%
		Column Total N %	18.3%	15.1%	15.3%	17.6%	0.0%	17.2%	23.9%	17.6%	12.5%
	I do not know	Count	17	17	16	18	10	13	4	5	2
		Row Total N %	50.0%	50.0%	47.1%	52.9%	29.4%	38.2%	11.8%	14.7%	5.9%
		Column Total N %	28.3%	18.3%	18.8%	26.5%	41.7%	22.4%	8.7%	29.4%	25.0%
	Missing	Count	4	5	5	4	1	4	1	1	2
		Row Total N %	44.4%	55.6%	55.6%	44.4%	11.1%	44.4%	11.1%	11.1%	22.2%
		Column Total N %	6.7%	5.4%	5.9%	5.9%	4.2%	6.9%	2.2%	5.9%	25.0%

Table (I.4.5) Update *Zakāt*’s Rules and Application

**‘Agree’:** This category shows 28 males responded – 46.7 per cent, compared to 57 females – 61.3 per cent. 51 citizens responded – 60 per cent of the total Nationality section, compared to 34 residents – 50 per cent. The percentage of participants in the age groups varies between 37.5 per cent and 65.2 per cent.

**‘Disagree’:** This category shows 11 males responded – 18.3 per cent, compared to 14 females – 15.1 per cent. The citizens had 13 respondents – 15.3 per cent, compared to 12 participants from residents – 17.6 per cent. The age groups show: (18-25) had no responses, while the



percentage for the rest of the participants in the of age groups vary between 12.5 per cent and 23.9 per cent.

**‘I do not know’:** This category shows 17 males responded – 28.3 per cent, compared to 17 females – 18.3 per cent. The Nationality section has 16 citizens participants – 18.8 per cent, compared to 18 residents – 26.5 per cent. The age group percentages vary: 10 participants from (18-25) years - 41.7 per cent; 13 participants from (26-35) years - 22.4 per cent; four participants from (36-45) years - 8.7 per cent; five participants from (46-65) years - 29.4 per cent; and two participants from (above 66) years - 25 per cent.

**‘Missing’:** This category shows four male participants responded – 6.7 per cent, compared to five female participants – 5.4 per cent. five citizens responded– 5.9 per cent, compared to four residents – 5.9 per cent. The percentage in the age groups varies: one participant for each (18-25) years - 4.2 per cent and (36-45) years - 2.2 per cent; one for (46-65) years - 5.9 per cent; four for (26-35) years - 6.9 per cent, and 2 for (above 66) years – 25 per cent.

#### I.4.6. Participations’ Comments

Table (I.4.6) shows the number of comments left by participants. Based on Table (I.4.6) 18 participants left comments compared to 135 participants who did not. The total of Qatari (citizens and residents) participants who commented is 11.7 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Would you like to add any other comments regarding your Zakat-giving behaviour?	Comment	Count	6	12	9	9	4	6	4	2	2
		Row Total N %	33.3%	66.7%	50.0%	50.0%	22.2%	33.3%	22.2%	11.1%	11.1%
		Column Total N %	10.0%	12.9%	10.6%	13.2%	16.7%	10.3%	8.7%	11.8%	25.0%
	Not Comment	Count	54	81	76	59	20	52	42	15	6
		Row Total N %	40.0%	60.0%	56.3%	43.7%	14.8%	38.5%	31.1%	11.1%	4.4%
		Column Total N %	90.0%	87.1%	89.4%	86.8%	83.3%	89.7%	91.3%	88.2%	75.0%

Table (I.4.6) Participations’ Comments

**Respondents who commented:** This category reflects six male participants responded - 10 per cent, compared to 12 female participants – 12.9 per cent. Citizens and residents had equal responses, nine from each, respectively. The percentage for the age groups varies between 8.7 per cent and 25 per cent.

#### Section Four: Respondents’ Comments

1. *Zakāt* is given firstly to the Muslims in need who are heirs at law. Then if these religious duties and their share of *zakāt* are secured, they are given to non-Muslims and everyone in need whether a Muslim or non-Muslim.
2. Of course, the scholars should develop and update the rules of *zakāt* applications. I am a student in, sorry, Doha Institute for Graduate Studies and in a discussion about the course of social politics I and my colleagues disagreed about the update that should be done to keep pace with the developments.
3. I want to know, is *zakāt* deserved to the Muslims only?
4. Campaigns should be made through the traditional and digital media to raise awareness about the religious duty of *zakāt*, on whom it is imposed, what are *zakāt*-beneficiaries and the common errors, and to perform these campaigns in cooperation with a wide range of the authorities concerned with this religious duty at the official or national or international level.
5. In my point of view, our Islamic religion is a religion of mercy to the entire world. Whereas *zakāt* is one of the pillars of Islām, I see that Allah The Almighty guides His servants for not humiliating the poor and the needy. Thus, keeping the individuals and the human being. By *zakāt*, the poor is given his need and at the same time the rich feels compassion and humanity towards the other poor and needy people, which maintains the whole society and create the spirit of humanity and compassion among individuals.
6. *Zakāt* is given to Muslims only.
7. *Zakāt* is one of the pillars of Islām and it is due on the Muslim who has money that reaches the *zakāt* limit, property, livestock or companies.
8. *Zakāt* is given to the Muslims and non-Muslims out of need and there is no discrimination.
9. I believe that the main religious motivation is wired to a solidarity humanitarian impulse, but I always have a question about the hungry person and what is his/her position in *zakāt*.
10. I do not know about the Muslim scholars since the recent events in Qatar made us not trust them and their opinions have been changed.
11. I think that the Ministries of *Awqaf* in our Arab countries do not perform the role assigned to them and they confuse the religious education with the affairs of mosques and endowments. So, I see that they should be separated and Al *Awqaf* to be responsible only for the endowments and their affairs. While the religious education should has a

separated ministry of its own. The endowment to be under the supervision of the nation scholars who are not subject to the state and are not state employees.

12. In my point of view, regardless of the fact that *zakāt* is a religious duty and one of the pillars of Islām, it is a humanitarian action which is intended to help the poor and needy. I see there is no difference in the two reasons. It is an obligatory duty imposed by Islām since there are many of the people who slack on emphasis and payment of it.
13. A lot of work rests with many of the rich people who do not pay and the religious institutions in order to urge the persons to pay *zakāt* to its beneficiaries.
14. Islamic religion is the religion of humanity and of all legislation. It is in favour of serving the human and keeping his dignity at all times and in all places. Therefore, we have two classifications for performing the charitable action; one of them is an obligation which is *zakāt* and the other is necessary which is alms that may be given to Muslim and non-Muslim.
15. I give my *zakāt* to the non-Muslim hoping that he/she becomes a Muslim and embraces Islām.
16. I give *zakāt* on my money to the non-Muslims only for Allah's sake although *zakāt* is due only to Muslims.

## **I.5. Section Five: *Zakāt* and Peacebuilding**

This section addressed participants' opinions regarding whether it was permissible to give *zakāt* to peacebuilding activities, and which sector would they preferred: creating job opportunities, grass-root conflict resolution, infrastructure projects, political dialogue, raising awareness, or another sector. The participants could choose one or more. This section has six tables, in addition to the participants' comments table.

### **I.5.1. Creating Job Opportunities**

Table (I.5.1) provides the number of participants who selected 'yes' or 'no' responses in creating job opportunities through peacebuilding activities. The table shows 'Selected' has more response activity 'No Selected': 102 respondents chose 'selected' compared to 51 respondents who chose 'No selected'. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who believed *zakāt* funds could create job opportunities comes to 66.6 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Creating job opportunities	Selected	Count	42	60	48	54	15	37	30	12	8
		Row Total N %	41.2%	58.8%	47.1%	52.9%	14.7%	36.3%	29.4%	11.8%	7.8%
		Column Total N %	70.0%	64.5%	56.5%	79.4%	62.5%	63.8%	65.2%	70.6%	100.0%
	No Selected	Count	18	33	37	14	9	21	16	5	0
		Row Total N %	35.3%	64.7%	72.5%	27.5%	17.6%	41.2%	31.4%	9.8%	0.0%
		Column Total N %	30.0%	35.5%	43.5%	20.6%	37.5%	36.2%	34.8%	29.4%	0.0%

Table (I.5.1) Creating Job Opportunities

**Selected:** This category reflects males had the highest per cent of participants– 70 per cent, compared to – 64.5 per cent. Citizens had 48 participants – 56.5 per cent - compared to 54 residents – 79.4 per cent. The age groups show: (18-25) to (46-65) years varied between 62.5 per cent and 70.6 per cent; (Above 66) years had full response – 100 per cent.

### I.5.2. Grass-root Conflict Resolution

Table (I.5.2) provides the ‘selected’ and ‘no selected’ answers with participants choosing Grass-root conflict resolution, such as tribal, civil and intra-state conflicts. The Table shows ‘No selected’ had the highest response activity compared to ‘Selected’: 110 responded ‘No selected’, compared to 43 ‘Selected’. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who considered *zakāt* should be used for grass-root conflict resolution is 28.1 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Grass-root conflict resolution (tribal, civil and intra-state conflicts)	Selected	Count	15	28	19	24	10	17	13	1	2
		Row Total N %	34.9%	65.1%	44.2%	55.8%	23.3%	39.5%	30.2%	2.3%	4.7%
		Column Total N %	25.0%	30.1%	22.4%	35.3%	41.7%	29.3%	28.3%	5.9%	25.0%
	No Selected	Count	45	65	66	44	14	41	33	16	6
		Row Total N %	40.9%	59.1%	60.0%	40.0%	12.7%	37.3%	30.0%	14.5%	5.5%
		Column Total N %	75.0%	69.9%	77.6%	64.7%	58.3%	70.7%	71.7%	94.1%	75.0%

Table (I.5.2) Grass-root Conflict Resolution

**Selected:** This category reflects females had the highest number of participants. 28 female participants responded – 30.1 per cent, compared to 15 male respondents – 25 per cent. Residents had the highest number with 24 participants – 35.3 per cent, compared to 19 citizens – 22.4 per cent. The age groups have varied responses: 10 responded from the (18-25) years – 41.7 per cent; 17 responded from the (26-35) years – 29.3 per cent; 13 responded from the (36-45) years – 30.2 per cent; one responded from the (46-65) years – 5.9 per cent; and two responded from the (Above 66) years – 25 per cent.

### I.5.3. Infrastructure Projects

Table (I.5.3) illustrates the number of respondents who selected the infrastructure projects, such as drinking-water supply systems and sewerage networks, electricity networks, and road construction. The Table shows ‘Selected’ had a higher response activity than ‘No Selected’, where 97 responded ‘Selected’ compared to 43 who responded, ‘No selected’. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who saw infrastructure projects as a legitimate use of *zakāt* funds is 63.3 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Infrastructure projects (e.g. Drinking-water supply systems and sewerage networks, electricity networks, road construction.)	Selected	Count	37	60	50	47	15	38	29	9	6
		Row Total N %	38.1%	61.9%	51.5%	48.5%	15.5%	39.2%	29.9%	9.3%	6.2%
		Column Total N %	61.7%	64.5%	58.8%	69.1%	62.5%	65.5%	63.0%	52.9%	75.0%
	No Selected	Count	23	33	35	21	9	20	17	8	2
		Row Total N %	41.1%	58.9%	62.5%	37.5%	16.1%	35.7%	30.4%	14.3%	3.6%
		Column Total N %	38.3%	35.5%	41.2%	30.9%	37.5%	34.5%	37.0%	47.1%	25.0%

Table (I.5.3) Infrastructure Projects

**Selected:** This category reflects females had the highest number of participants. 60 female participants responded – 64.5 per cent, compared to 37 male respondents – 61.7 per cent. Citizens had 50 respondents – 58.8 per cent, compared to 47 residents – 69.1 per cent. The age groups have varied responses: 15 responded from the (18-25) years – 15.5 per cent; 38 responded from the (26-35) years – 39.2 per cent; 29 responded from the (36-45) years – 29.9 per cent; nine responded from the (46-65) years – 9.3 per cent; and six responded from the (Above 66) years – 6.2 per cent.

### I.5.4. Political Dialogue

Table (I.5.4) shows 127 Muslims had not responded to the select political dialogue section, which includes a wide range of activities: from high-level negotiations to mediation to community reconciliation attempts, compared to 26 who did select. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who deemed political dialogue as a legitimate use of *zakāt* funds is 16.9 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Political dialogue (Includes a wide range of activities: from high-level negotiations to mediation to community reconciliation attempts)	Selected	Count	6	20	16	10	4	11	10	0	1
		Row Total N %	23.1%	76.9%	61.5%	38.5%	15.4%	42.3%	38.5%	0.0%	3.8%
		Column Total N %	10.0%	21.5%	18.8%	14.7%	16.7%	19.0%	21.7%	0.0%	12.5%
	No Selected	Count	54	73	69	58	20	47	36	17	7
		Row Total N %	42.5%	57.5%	54.3%	45.7%	15.7%	37.0%	28.3%	13.4%	5.5%
		Column Total N %	90.0%	78.5%	81.2%	85.3%	83.3%	81.0%	78.3%	100.0%	87.5%

Table (I.5.4) Political Dialogue

**Selected:** This category reflects females had the highest number of participants. 20 female participants responded – 21.5 per cent, compared to six male respondents – 10 per cent. Citizens had 16 respondents – 18.8 per cent, compared to 10 residents – 14.7 per cent. The age groups have varied responses: four responded from the (18-25) years – 16.7 per cent; 11 responded from the (26-35) years – 19 per cent; 10 responded from the (36-45) years – 21.7 per cent; and one responded from the (Above 66) years – 12.5 per cent. The (46-65) years did not respond.

### I.5.5. Raising Awareness

Table (I.5.5) provides the results of participants who responded ‘Selected and ‘No selected’ in raising awareness; for example, investment in raising awareness about the peaceful nature of Islām in order to counter the violent images portrayed by the so called ‘terrorist’ groups. 68 responded ‘Selected’, compared to 85 who chose ‘No selected’. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who thought *zakāt* funds could be used to raise awareness about Islām is 44.4 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Raising Awareness (e.g.: Investment in raising awareness about the peaceful nature of Islam in order to counter the violent images portrayed by the terrorist groups)	Selected	Count	29	39	42	26	12	18	22	11	5
		Row Total N %	42.6%	57.4%	61.8%	38.2%	17.6%	26.5%	32.4%	16.2%	7.4%
		Column Total N %	48.3%	41.9%	49.4%	38.2%	50.0%	31.0%	47.8%	64.7%	62.5%
	No Selected	Count	31	54	43	42	12	40	24	6	3
		Row Total N %	36.5%	63.5%	50.6%	49.4%	14.1%	47.1%	28.2%	7.1%	3.5%
		Column Total N %	51.7%	58.1%	50.6%	61.8%	50.0%	69.0%	52.2%	35.3%	37.5%

Table (I.5.5) Raising Awareness

**Selected:** This category reflects males had the highest percentage of participants, 48.3 per cent males compared to 41.9 females. Citizens had 42 respondents – 49.4 per cent, compared to 26 residents – 38.2 per cent. The age groups have varied responses: 12 responded from the (18-25) years – 50 per cent; 18 responded from the (26-35) years – 31 per cent; 22 responded from the (36-45) years – 47.8 per cent; 11 responded from the (46-65) years – 64.7 per cent; and five responded from the (Above 66) years – 62.5 per cent.

### I.5.6. Another Sector

Table (I.5.6) illustrates the number of respondents who selected the ‘Another’ sector, such as humanitarian aid, development aid, and so on. The Table shows ‘Selected’ had the highest response activity compared to ‘No Selected’: 105 responded ‘Selected’ compared to 48 who responded ‘No selected’. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who favoured another sector in the use of *zakāt* funds is 68.6 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Another sector (Humanitarian aid, development aid ...)	Selected	Count	41	64	60	45	14	41	30	14	6
		Row Total N %	39.0%	61.0%	57.1%	42.9%	13.3%	39.0%	28.6%	13.3%	5.7%
		Column Total N %	68.3%	68.8%	70.6%	66.2%	58.3%	70.7%	65.2%	82.4%	75.0%
	No Selected	Count	19	29	25	23	10	17	16	3	2
		Row Total N %	39.6%	60.4%	52.1%	47.9%	20.8%	35.4%	33.3%	6.3%	4.2%
		Column Total N %	31.7%	31.2%	29.4%	33.8%	41.7%	29.3%	34.8%	17.6%	25.0%

Table (I.5.6) Another Sector

**Selected:** This category reflects 41 male participants responded – 68.3 per cent, compared to 64 female respondents – 68.8 per cent. Citizens had 60 respondents – 70.6 per cent, compared to 45 residents – 66.2 per cent. The percentage for the age groups varies between 58.3 per cent and 82.4 per cent.

### I.5.7. Participants’ Comments

Table (I.5.7) shows the number of participants who responded with comments - 16 responded with a ‘Comment’ compared to 137 ‘No Comment’. The total of Qatari (citizens and residents) participants who responded with comments comes to 10.4 per cent.

			Gender		Nationality		Age				
			Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years
Would you like to add any other comments concerning your Zakat- giving preferences?	Comment	Count	7	9	7	9	5	5	3	2	1
		Row Total N %	43.8%	56.3%	43.8%	56.3%	31.3%	31.3%	18.8%	12.5%	6.3%
		Column Total N %	11.7%	9.7%	8.2%	13.2%	20.8%	8.6%	6.5%	11.8%	12.5%
	Not Comment	Count	53	84	78	59	19	53	43	15	7
		Row Total N %	38.7%	61.3%	56.9%	43.1%	13.9%	38.7%	31.4%	10.9%	5.1%
		Column Total N %	88.3%	90.3%	91.8%	86.8%	79.2%	91.4%	93.5%	88.2%	87.5%

Table (I.5.7) Participants’ Comments

**Respondents who commented:** This category reflects seven male participants responded – 11.7 per cent, compared to nine female respondents – 9.7 per cent. Citizens had seven respondents – 8.2 per cent, compared to nine residents – 13.2 per cent. The age group percentage varies between 6.5 per cent and 20.8 per cent.

### Section Five: Respondents' Comments

1. I prefer giving *zakāt* to all places which assist in establishing a stable life full of humanity and help the people in need to develop their abilities and live decent life.
2. I also see assisting any person in need due to the confidence we assigned to the institution that takes *zakāt*.
3. Health Sector.
4. Supporting the small projects for the poor people.
5. In my opinion, solving the disputes is the task of state and governments. *Zakāt* money should not be the basis in this field, but rather there should be governmental or international intervention.
6. I do not agree on any of the aforementioned points. *zakāt* is given to the needy people and is not for the development of cities, growth and so on.
7. There is no awareness in the society about *zakāt* and its benefits and society should be made aware of it.
8. The Holy Quran specified to whom *zakāt* should be given. So, I selected 1 and 5 since I find that this choice is the closest to give the category mentioned in Quran directly, knowing that some other mentioned choices may serve these categories mentioned in Quran but indirectly.
9. I became more inclined to distance myself from the institutionalization of *zakāt* and its payment should be limited to the individual action so as not to get the target away from that matter which is the community solidarity and re-balancing of society.
10. *Zakāt* in Somalia is usually paid in person. The people usually know the modest families in need, and they use mosque Imāms and preachers since it is paid to those in need. Somalia is a tribal community which assists in specifying the poor families in each tribe and to whom it should be paid. There is no trust in authorities.
11. The more the money is spent sustainably, the more successful the process will be.
12. I am working in a social institution whose objective is to help youth and create job opportunities. I see many of the tragic stories, especially in the current situation, and many refugees. So, I find that creating job opportunities and establishing projects is an important goal in which *zakāt* money to be spent since they are the best way to help people by making them active persons in the society and not to give them the money which will be spent without solving the main problem.



13. Arranging the entitlement in paying *zakāt* as per the region where the person lives, then based on the problems of the Islamic world in general in countries of poverty, wars, religious discrimination and racism.
14. I always prefer the developmental fields, orphan guardianship, students, debt holders, those in debt, modest families, treatment of patients inside and outside Qatar through precise follow-up even after it is delivered to the needy.
15. I prefer giving it to the poor.

## I.6. Contacts Details

This section is about the participants who wanted to leave their contact details for an interview with the researcher regarding the research. The optional question asked for the participant's name and email address. Table (I.6) shows 32 participants responded, compared to 121 who did not respond. The total of Muslims in Qatar (citizens and residents) who left their contacts details is 20.9 per cent.

		Gender		Nationality		Age					
		Male	Female	Qatari	Foreign Resident	18-25 years	26-35 years	36-45 years	46-65 years	above 66 years	
Would you like to leave your contact for interview?	Yes	Count	14	18	16	16	4	10	9	6	3
		Row Total N %	43.8%	56.3%	50.0%	50.0%	12.5%	31.3%	28.1%	18.8%	9.4%
		Column Total N %	23.3%	19.4%	18.8%	23.5%	16.7%	17.2%	19.6%	35.3%	37.5%
	No	Count	46	75	69	52	20	48	37	11	5
		Row Total N %	38.0%	62.0%	57.0%	43.0%	16.5%	39.7%	30.6%	9.1%	4.1%
		Column Total N %	76.7%	80.6%	81.2%	76.5%	83.3%	82.8%	80.4%	64.7%	62.5%

Table (I.6. Contacts Details

**Yes:** This category reflects males had the highest percentage of participants 23.3 males, compared to 19.4 females. Citizens and residents had equal respondents, 16 for each of them – 50 per cent, respectively. The age groups have varied responses: four responded from the (18-25) years – 16.7 per cent; 10 responded from the (26-35) years – 17.2 per cent; nine responded from the (36-45) years – 19.6 per cent; six responded from the (46-65) years – 35.3 per cent; and three responded from the (Above 66) years – 37.5 per cent.

## Appendix J: NVivo Nodes

### Results: Research Nodes from NVivo Program.

**Created Files:** The data has been collected from the source, which contains all the sections (data collection and interviews), and each section has been imported from the interview files that carry the same section name. Sections on Political Economy and Sociology have been merged into one file, because they contain the same type of questions; likewise with the sections on *Fiqh* and Islamic Studies.

The respondents' comments on the survey documents have also been placed in a separate file, due to the researcher's interest in every comment. These have been included with the responses to the questionnaire and were discussed with the rest of the interviewees. The NVivo file names are: (i) Conflict resolution and Peacebuilding Studies; (ii) *Fiqh* and Islamic Studies; (iii) Political Economy and Sociology; (iv) Qatari Activists in Charity; (v) Qatari Charities; (vi) Respondents' Comments from Survey; (vii) Survey Participants' Interviews; and (viii) *Zakat* Fund. Following, the content of each file is explained:

**Case one:** 'Survey Participants' Interviews': the survey respondents' comment files and survey's participants interview files have been merged, because they contain the same units of observation as the questionnaire, such as Muslims' behaviour, the practice of *zakāt*, and Muslims' awareness, among others and so on (i).

**Case two:** '*Fiqh* and Islamic Studies': the files on *Fiqh* and Islamic Studies have been merged, with minor modifications in each section, because they have the same questions on religion, Islamic curriculum, and the eight *zakāt*-beneficiaries categories, and so on (ii).

**Case three:** 'Political Economy and Sociology', the files on Political Economy and Sociology have been merged, with minor modifications in each section, because they have the same questions that relate to *zakāt*, politics, the economy, society and socio-cultural impact, social justice concerning *zakāt*, among other (iii).

**Case four:** 'Participants' Wishes' is the new case, which has been added. The researcher is considered to be a channel through which the participants' hopes may be realised due to this research (iv).

The rest of the cases have the same names as their files: (v) Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Studies; (vi) *Zakat* Fund; (vii) Qatari Activists in Charity; and (viii) Qatari Charities.

**Created Nodes:** each file has its own nodes or categories<sup>286</sup> (some nodes are repeated in other files). These nodes are used to help focus on the different aspects of the answers to the research questions in the discussion and analysis chapters. The function of nodes is to store references in NVivo in order to code the text. The coding process involves importing each interviews' transcription from the source, and has been read, word-for-word, and paragraph-by-paragraph to help understand the context. This is followed by highlighting the text and dragging and dropping it into a selected content code in a new or existing node.

The two types of common nodes - 'tree' and 'free' - contain all the known information about a particular concept or category (Hilal and Alabri 2013). The project's tree nodes are based on research questions and sub-questions, research objectives, literature review and interview questions. The free nodes have been created from the participants' responses to the interviews; for example, NVivo tree and free nodes, such as *Zakāt Fiqh* and Islamic Studies, external bodies, and Qatari society, among others.

- i. *Zakāt Fiqh* and Islamic Studies
  - a. External Bodies
  - b. Qatari Society
  - c. Religious Figures
  - d. *Zakāt* Administration
    - *Zakāt* Collection
    - *Zakāt* Journey
    - *Zakāt* Neutrality and Transparency
    - *Zakāt* Payment
  - e. *Zakāt* and Peacebuilding
    - Humanitarian Appeals
    - Specific Beneficiaries

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<sup>286</sup> Category: A category is a collection of similar data sorted into a list. This arrangement enables researchers to identify and describe the characteristics of the category. The category can then be defined, compared and contrasted with other categories, or divided into smaller categories, and its parts identified and described. Categories are important for determining what is IN the data (the 'WHAT'). Categories are used in ethnography and the initial phase of grounded theory (the collection and analysis of data), and later, in the development of a taxonomy (classification, arrangement) in which a researcher identifies relationships between categories, or sub-categories in some models (grounded theory) (Kohlbacher 2006).

**Codebook:** To obtain the results from NVivo nodes, the process involves the number of files and references to be exported from the codebook. The number of files in this node help in detecting how many respondents in the files or sections are interested in speaking, while the reference numbers assist the researcher in observing how many texts or paragraphs have been discussed in this node. Table 5.2 provides is an example of ‘Participants' Wishes’ and ‘Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Studies’ nodes and sub-nodes.

<i>Name</i>	<i>Files</i>	<i>References</i>
ii. Participants' Wishes	10	10
iii. Conflict Resolution and Peacebuilding Studies	1	1
a. Muslims and non-Muslims Channel	2	3
b. Qatar and Peacebuilding	2	4
c. Religious Influence and Conflict	1	1
• Politicisation of Religion	1	2
• Religious Sectarianism Impact	2	4
d. <i>Zakāt</i> and Peacebuilding Activities	2	4
• Development Projects	1	1
• <i>Zakāt</i> and Tracks 1, 2, and 3 of Peacebuilding	2	2
iv. Political Economy, Social, and Academic Fields	0	0
a. Politics, Economy and <i>Zakāt</i>	1	2
b. Social Norms, Culture and <i>Zakāt</i>	2	9
c. Tax system	2	3
d. <i>Zakāt</i> and Political Elements	2	8
e. <i>Zakāt</i> and Social Justice	2	5
f. <i>Zakāt</i> and Challenges of 21st Century	2	6
g. <i>Zakāt</i> Contribution	2	3
h. <i>Zakāt</i> Responsibility	2	2
v. Qatari Activists in Charity	0	0
a. Charities Role	2	3
b. External Bodies	1	1
c. Government Role	2	5
d. Ignoring <i>Zakāt</i>	2	2
e. Qatar Society and <i>Zakāt</i> Practice	2	3
• Struggle in God's Cause	1	2
• Women and Men	1	3
• <i>Zakāt</i> Awareness	1	3
f. Qatari Motivation	1	4
g. Religious Figures	3	6
h. Social Norms, Culture and <i>Zakāt</i>	3	4
• Family and <i>Majlis</i> Impact	3	4
• Social Media	1	1
i. <i>Zakāt</i> Administration	2	3
• Advertising Campaigns	1	1
• <i>Zakāt</i> Collection	1	3
• <i>Zakāt</i> Distribution	1	1
• <i>Zakāt</i> Journey	1	3

	• <i>Zakāt</i> Neutrality and Transparency	1	1
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Payment	0	0
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Separation	1	1
j.	<i>Zakāt</i> and Peacebuilding	1	1
	• Muslims and non-Muslims	1	5
	• Specific Beneficiaries	2	2
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Projects	1	3
k.	<i>Zakāt</i> and Challenges of 21st Century	0	0
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Updated	1	1
	○ Lack of <i>Zakāt</i> Knowledge	2	2
	○ Need to learn	1	2
l.	<i>Zakāt</i> and The Siege of Qatar	2	2
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Ratio and Whether Affected	1	1
vi.	Qatari Charities	2	5
a.	Advertising Campaigns	3	7
b.	Charities and Siege of Qatar	6	20
c.	Charities' Customers	2	3
d.	External Bodies	3	4
e.	Government Role	3	7
f.	Qatar Society and <i>Zakāt</i> Practice	1	1
	• Struggle in God's Cause	1	1
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Awareness	2	2
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Practice	3	3
	○ Individuals or Groups	2	2
	○ <i>Ramaḍān</i> Period	2	2
g.	Qatari Citizens and Foreign Residents	5	9
h.	Qatari Motivation	1	1
	a. Religious Figures	7	10
i.	Risks Facing Charities	1	1
j.	Social Justice	2	4
k.	<i>Zakāt</i> Administration	5	9
	• Administration Fees	1	2
	• Credibility and Transparency.	3	7
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Collection	1	1
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Distribution	3	9
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Journey	3	3
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Payment	2	3
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Separation	5	5
l.	<i>Zakāt</i> and Peacebuilding	4	8
	• Humanitarian Appeals	1	1
	• Muslim and non-Muslim Projects	5	9
	• Specific Beneficiaries	2	2
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Projects	3	9
vii.	Survey's Participants Interviews	0	0
a.	Decision-making, Giving, and Trust	0	0
	• Family and <i>Majlis</i> Impact	10	20
	• Humanitarian appeals	5	5
	• Media reports	6	10
	• Individual judgement_	9	9
	• Political Influence	1	1
	• Scholars' call	12	23

• Social Media	9	11
• Social Norms, Culture and <i>Zakāt</i>	11	17
b. Motivation	0	0
• Humanitarian grounds	6	10
○ Muslim and Non-Muslim	14	22
○ Religious and humanitarian	8	8
○ religious obligation	8	14
c. Qatar Society and <i>Zakāt</i> Practice	6	10
• Gender	1	1
○ Patriarchal Society	3	5
• Ignoring <i>Zakāt</i>	4	6
• Qatari Citizens and Foreign Residents	1	1
○ Foreign Residents	0	0
• Background Societies of Residents	4	17
• Relatives First	1	2
○ Qatari Citizen	1	1
• <i>Ramaḍān</i> Period	3	4
• <i>Shī'ah</i> Practice	3	16
• <i>Zakāt</i> and Undesirable Purposes	5	7
d. Siege of Qatar	1	1
e. The role of governmental, charitable, and religious agencies	0	0
• Charities Role	8	9
• Government Role	8	10
○ Government Irresponsibility	1	1
○ Government Responsibility	0	0
○ Politicisation of Religion	4	6
• Religion's Role	2	2
f. <i>Zakāt</i> and the Challenges of 21st Century	4	4
• <i>Zakāt</i> Updated	7	18
○ Lack of <i>Zakāt</i> 's Knowledge	5	14
○ Need to learn	6	21
g. <i>Zakāt</i> Awareness	10	17
• Conceptual Meaning of <i>Zakāt</i>	13	21
• <i>Niṣāb</i>	9	17
• To whom <i>Zakāt</i> is due	5	5
• <i>Zakāt</i> and Other Islamic Donations	8	8
• <i>Zakāt</i> and Other Pillars of Islām	2	3
• <i>Zakāt</i> -beneficiaries	6	7
• <i>Zakāt</i> Journey	12	15
• <i>Zakāt</i> 's wealth types and contribution conditions	1	1
h. <i>Zakāt</i> direction	2	4
• Abroad	7	9
• Qatar	1	1
• Qatar and Abroad	2	2
i. <i>Zakāt</i> giving to...	2	4
• Charities	10	17
• Individuals	5	8
• Mosques	10	16
• <i>Zakat</i> Fund and Ministry of Endowments	14	32
j. <i>Zakāt</i> through...	1	4
• Amounts in kind	0	0
• Banking transactions	3	3
• Cash payments	2	2

k.	<i>Zakāt's</i> Peacebuilding	3	9
	• Muslim and Non-Muslim	1	1
	• Peacebuilding Activities	9	19
	○ Conflict resolution	6	8
	○ Creating Job and Projects Opportunities	6	11
	○ Humanitarian aid	4	5
	○ Infrastructure projects	4	5
	○ Political dialogue	7	12
	○ Raising Awareness	5	6
	• Social Justice	1	1
	• <i>Zakāt</i> -beneficiaries	2	2
	○ The Poor	1	1
viii.	<i>Fiqh</i> and Islamic Studies	2	3
	a. Muslim and non-Muslim Channel	2	4
	b. <i>Zakāt</i> -beneficiaries Category	1	1
	• People Burdened with Debt	1	1
	• People in Bondage or Slavery	1	5
	• The Reconciliation of Hearts	1	2
	c. <i>Zakāt</i> Awareness and Update	2	8
	d. <i>Zakāt</i> History	1	1
	e. <i>Zakāt</i> Motivations and Peacebuilding	2	8
	f. <i>Zakāt</i> Politics	2	10
ix.	<i>Zakāt Fiqh</i> and Islamic Studies	0	0
	f. External Bodies	1	1
	g. Qatari Society	1	1
	h. Religious Figures	1	1
	i. <i>Zakāt</i> Administration	1	1
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Collection	1	1
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Journey	1	1
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Neutrality and Transparency	1	2
	• <i>Zakāt</i> Payment	1	1
	j. <i>Zakāt</i> and Peacebuilding	1	1
	• Humanitarian Appeals	1	1
	• Specific Beneficiaries	1	1

## Appendix K Consent Form

### **An Exploration of *Zakāt*'s Modern Philosophy and its Application in Peacebuilding Case study: Qatar. Consent Form**

I voluntarily agree to participate in this doctoral research project. I understand that this research is being conducted by Ola Alkahlout, a PhD candidate from the Centre for Trust, Peace and Social Relations at Coventry University in the UK to explore modern *zakāt* and its application for peacebuilding, focusing on the State of Qatar.

I understand and confirm the following by initialling each that applies:

1. I confirm that I have read and understand the Participant Information Sheet for the above-mentioned project and have had the opportunity to ask questions. \_\_\_\_\_
2. I understand that, my participation is voluntary, and that I am free to withdraw, within eight weeks after my interview, without giving a reason. \_\_\_\_\_
3. I agree to the interview being audio recorded and my name and all personal identifiers to be:
  - Disclosed \_\_\_\_\_ Anonymised \_\_\_\_\_
4. I would like to see a transcript of the interview before using in the research. I can amend if I feel necessary. \_\_\_\_\_
5. I agree to the use of anonymised quotes in publications. \_\_\_\_\_
6. I agree to my identity and all personal identifiers being revealed in any reporting:
  - Disclosed \_\_\_\_\_ Anonymised \_\_\_\_\_

Name of Participant: \_\_\_\_\_

Email: \_\_\_\_\_

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

Name of Researcher: Ola Alkahlout

Date: \_\_\_\_\_

Signature: \_\_\_\_\_

If you have any further questions about this research, please contact me,  
Content redacted on data protection grounds.



## Appendix L: Participant Information Sheet

### Participant Information Sheet

**Research Project Title:** An Exploration of *zakāt*'s Modern Philosophy and its Application in Peacebuilding. Case study: Qatar.

**Names of the researcher:** Ola Alkahlout

#### What is the research about?

The research seeks to explore the philosophical and conceptual frameworks behind Islamic charity, focusing on modern *zakāt*. The case study is Qatar. The aim of this project is to investigate *zakāt* as a source of funding for peacebuilding and humanitarian aid. The research will interrogate the following questions:

- What is the Islamic political economy of modern application of *zakāt* in Qatar?
- What are the systems and mechanisms utilised in Qatar to collect and spend *zakāt* funding?
- What are the motives and perceptions of givers on *Zakāt* collection and spending?
- To what extent do *zakāt*-givers know about the way their charity is used by the state aid structures?
- According to *zakāt*-givers, to what extent could the collection and use of *zakāt* be improved in Qatar?

#### Who is the research funded by?

Self-funded

#### Why have I been chosen to participate?

You have been chosen because I am interested in your views as a Muslim who lives in Qatar and observes *zakāt*. I am sure that, with your support, I shall be able to contribute to general knowledge, science, and encourage others to spread peace and understanding.

#### What do I have to do if I agree to participate?

Please answer as many questions as you can from your own experience; each section is very important for my research. I can develop more knowledge and understanding, by exploring and creating real opportunities that serve, not only Muslims, but the whole of humanity towards peacebuilding.

#### How will what I say be used? What will the information be used for?

Data collected may be shared with third parties, in an anonymous format, to allow access to the information by the research team. These anonymous data will not be available to individuals, but some may be available on the Internet.

**Will my anonymity be ensured?**

If you wish to remain anonymous, I will not use your personal data or identifiers. I will not use your name to protect your identity and I will also not reveal your professional position.

If I believe that you may be identified by any of the statements and this may cause you harm, I will contact you and ask you for permission to use the specific statement. Any personal data collected from you will be stored separately from the interview transcripts and survey responses.

**What are the risks associated with this project?**

Participating in this research project is not anticipated to cause you any harm, disadvantage or discomfort. If there is potential physical or psychological harm, it will probably be the same as those experienced in everyday life. If you think there is a risk to your identification, you can decide whether or not you agree to the data being used in any reports concerning this research.

**What are the benefits of participation?**

Findings of the research may inform policy and programmes towards the enhanced utility of the modern application of *zakāt*. The outcome will enhance the knowledge on different aspects of *zakāt* and its potential to contribute to peacebuilding.

**What happens if I don't want to take part?**

Participation is completely voluntary, and you will not suffer any consequences whatsoever if you decide not to take part. If you need further information, please e-mail me.

**What happens if I want to withdraw?**

It is your own choice and you have no responsibility or accountability. You are free to withdraw at any time during the eight weeks period, following your agreement to participate in this research, without giving a reason. If you need any further explanation, please e-mail me.

**How can I get in contact with the researchers?**

Content redacted on data protection grounds.

**Who can I talk to if I have concerns about this research?**

If you have concerns about this research, please contact

Professor Mike Hardy, Executive Director, Centre for Trust, Peace and Social  
Relations,  
Content redacted on data protection  
grounds.

## Appendix M: *Zakat* Fund Responses

### 1. How does *Zakāt* collection work?

The process of collecting *zakāt* according to what is planned and according to the decision to set up the *Zakat* Fund is a voluntary process from the people. There is no law to oblige them to pay *zakāt* and it is voluntary by ways in spending them too in accordance with the mechanisms set by the Fund.

### 2. What form of payment do you receive (cash payments, content payments, bank transactions or something else) and what is your most common method?

The Fund has many and varied means of collecting *zakāt*, including traditional and modern means of development and what is appropriate for them with legitimate methods.

The normal means are opening collection offices at the state level. All regions and offices have all the means of collection from handbooks, computers, and visa machines, as well as collection coupons. These offices are also equipped with Internet lines to be linked directly to the main office for collection receipts, which are directly connected to the program by computer. Quick collection also by assigning a telephone line where the delegate reaches the collector to collect it directly. And through the eGovernment website which also collects the amounts each month and transfers them to the Ministry of Finance, which transfers them to the Fund's accounts at Qatar International Islamic Bank, ATM machines for Islamic banks such as Qatar Islamic Bank and Masraf Al Rayan. And direct transfers from the bank account in the Islamic banks to the accounts of the Fund in these banks.

### 3. Is there sufficient administrative control to protect the distribution of *zakāt* from being affected by personal interests?

Yes, the fund has an administrative regulation governing its work.

### 4. Do you think *Zakāt* collection and spending need increased monitoring? If yes, how?

Yes, the collection of *zakāt* and its expenditure requires a regulatory system because the monetary deal is a must to ensure the money from the cashier to the accounts of the Fund with all accuracy and safety and then to obtain financial data for the Fund's money and what is spent on the cases of the Fund.

How does a Qatari citizen deal with *zakāt* and how much does he respond to humanitarian appeals?

*Zakāt* is an Islamic duty, which is the third pillar of Islām and the people of Qatar, as Muslims who cherish their Islām and wish to draw closer to God by performing their duties.

6. Does Qatari society tend to provide *zakāt* as groups or individuals?

*Zakāt* as a duty is imposed on each Muslim. This mandate to individuals and each Muslim is required to lead the *niṣāb* of *zakāt*. So we find that the provision of *zakāt* is individually, whether *zakāt* money or *companies* or the *Zakāt* of livestock because the origin of the duty is an individual assignment to each Muslim who has *niṣāb* of money to pay for *zakāt*.

7. Does the payer know the whole process money go through to the beneficiary?

It is known to the payer that *zakāt* are collected under 8 categories. So, the culture of the process we all have a role in spreading the knowledge. Financial and social investigation of the eligibility of the receivers of funds or through questioners when the payment of *zakāt* and on the mechanism when disbursed, so the payer is aware of the *zakāt* process to the beneficiary.

8. What is the most projects managed by *zakāt* fund?

According to the law of its establishment, it provides types of assistance within the State of Qatar. Types of assistance are:

1) Helping poor students: pays tuition fees for them.

2) Treatment Assistance: In cooperation with HMC, the Fund pays for the treatment of poor patients.

3) Permanent and Disbursed Assistance: The Fund provides this assistance to the poor and needy citizens and residents in Qatar after conducting a desk and field research to ensure that they are in need of *zakāt* funds.

4) Aid for those whose hearts are being reconciled (to Islām): The *Zakat* Fund pays the debts of those whose hearts are being reconciled (to Islām)

5) Seasonal aid: *Zakāt al-Fitr*: It is distributed to eligible beneficiaries registered with the Fund before *Eīd al-Fiṭr*.

- Charity basket: It is a catering aid to the cases at the beginning of the holy month of *Ramaḍān* in cooperation with Al-Meera Company.

*Eīd al-Fiṭr* and *Eīd al-Aḍḥā* holidays: Before the holidays, they are given the opportunity to buy their needs before Eid, and to be happy with their families during Eid.

Are there specific beneficiaries who receive *zakāt* donations? Please select them.

The *Zakat* Fund provides its assistance to those who apply to it and the regulations and laws that derive from the teachings of Sharia apply to it.

10. Is there a third party that receives *zakāt* money from the *Zakat* Fund?

*Zakat* Fund in accordance with the law of its establishment, its assistance is limited to the State of Qatar only.

11- Does the *Zakat* Fund enjoy impartiality and transparency in the *zakāt* mechanism?

The *Zakat* Fund has an approved mechanism for the disbursement of aid based on *Sharī'ah*, and takes into account the financial circumstances of the applicant.

12- Is there a religious figure to be consulted when it comes to questions about *zakāt*? If yes, who?

The *Zakat* Fund has a specialized section on matters of *Zakāt Fiqh* (*Sharī'ah* Research and Studies Department), which includes the number of legal specialists, and is referred to in all matters related to *zakāt*.

## Appendix N: Trans Chart

### I J M E S TRANSLITERATION SYSTEM FOR ARABIC, PERSIAN, AND TURKISH

#### C o n s o n a n t s

A = Arabic, P = Persian, OT = Ottoman Turkish, MT = Modern Turkish

	A	P	OT	MT		A	P	OT	MT		A	P	OT	MT
ا	—	—	—	—	ز	z	z	z	z	ك	k	k or g	k or ñ	k or n
ب	b	b	b	b or p	ژ	—	zh	j	j				or y	or y
پ	—	p	p	p	س	s	s	s	s				or ğ	or ğ
ت	t	t	t	t	ش	sh	sh	ş	ş	گ	—	g	g	g
ث	th	ṡ	ṡ	s	ص	ṡ	ṡ	ṡ	s	ل	l	l	l	l
ج	j	j	c	c	ض	ḍ	ḍ	ḍ	z	م	m	m	m	m
ح	—	ch	ç	ç	ط	ṭ	ṭ	ṭ	t	ن	n	n	n	n
خ	ḫ	ḫ	ḫ	h	ظ	ẓ	ẓ	ẓ	z	ه	h	h	h¹	h¹
د	kh	kh	h	h	ع	—	—	—	—	و	w	v or u	v	v
ذ	d	d	d	d	غ	gh	gh	g or ğ	g or ğ	ي	y	y	y	y
ر	dh	ẓ	ẓ	z	ف	f	f	f	f	ا²	a²			
	r	r	r	r	ق	q	q	k	k	لا³	—			

<sup>1</sup> When h is not final. <sup>2</sup> In construct state: at. <sup>3</sup> For the article, al- and -l-.

#### V o w e l s

##### ARABIC AND PERSIAN

Long / or ا ā

و ū  
ي ī

##### OTTOMAN AND MODERN TURKISH

ā { words of Arabic  
ū { and Persian  
ī { origin only

Doubled ى- iyy (final form ī)

iy (final form ī)

و- uww (final form ū)

uvv

Diphthongs َ au or aw

ev

َ ai or ay

ey

Short - a  
- u  
-

a or e  
u or ü / o or ö

ي i

ı or i

For Ottoman Turkish, authors may either transliterate or use the modern Turkish orthography.

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